



Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment

Participant Guide
January, 2009



Homeland
Security



National Domestic
Preparedness Coalition



DHS Branded Disclaimer Page

This program was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 2007-GT-T7-K017, administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Training & Exercise Integration Secretariat. Points of view or opinions in this program are those of the author(s) and do not represent the position or policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.



Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment

OpValTRVA Certification Course



Participant Guide

OpValTRVA © 2009
National Domestic Preparedness Coalition

1st Printing in January, 2009

Published and Distributed in the United States By:

National Domestic Preparedness Coalition
50 South County Commons Way, Suite E-6
South Kingstown, Rhode Island 02879
Office (407) 650-0707

Info@ndpci.us

www.ndpci.us



Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	v
OpValTRVA Training Syllabus	vi
Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (OpValTRVA) - Introduction	1
Module 1: Operational Value of Threat Risk, and Vulnerability Assessments (OpValTRVA) Overview	3
Duration	3
Instructor to Participant Ratio	3
Scope Statement.....	3
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO).....	4
Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)	4
Understanding the Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessments	5
Icon Map	5
Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability (OpValTRVA) Table Top Exercise Module 1	6
Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (OpValTRVA) - Background	8
Module 1 Summary	14
Module 2 – Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment Review	15
Duration	15
Instructor to Participant Ratio	15
Scope Statement.....	15
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO).....	15
Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)	16
Review of Assessments	17
Module 2 Summary	40
Module 3 – Analyze Information and Develop Plans	41
Duration	41
Instructor to Participant Ratio	41
Scope Statement.....	41
Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO).....	41
Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)	41
Analyzing Information and Developing Plans	44
Development of Plans and Operations	47
Practical Exercise 2	62
Developing Community Programs	63
Information and Intelligence	65
Resource Allocation	75
Response to Homeland Security Advisory System Color-Code Changes and Alerts	76
Incident Response and Recovery Management	78
Selection of Applicable Technology	81
Developing a Technology Plan.....	82
Evaluating a Technology Plan	83
Practical Exercise 3	84
Module 3 Summary	85



Module 4- Apply and Review86

 Duration86

 Instructor to Participant Ratio86

 Scope Statement.....86

 Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO).....87

 Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)87

Application to Operations88

Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (OpValTRVA) Table Top

Exercise Module 4.....94

Review95

Conclusion98

Appendix A Glossary of Terms103

Appendix B Acronyms.....110

Appendix C Threat Assessment Sample.....112

Appendix D Risk, Assessment Sample151

Appendix E Vulnerability Assessment Sample.....169



Acknowledgements

The following individuals conceived, developed and authored the National Domestic Preparedness Coalition's Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment Course:

National Domestic Preparedness Coalition:

Kenneth M. Glantz, CPP, Chief Executive Officer
John J. Lockett, Sr. Program Director
Denis J. Volkerson, Sr. Program Director

George Mason University:

Allan Turner, DPA, Research Professor
Catherine Hoover, Director, Office of Continuing Professional Education

Subject Matter Experts:

Chief Ranger Dorn, Battalion Chief, Ventura County, CA Fire Department
Lt. Paul Fulone, Lieutenant Homeland Security Director, Londonderry Police Department, NH
Sean Goodwin, Engineering Technician 5, New Hampshire Department of Safety, Division of
Emergency Services
Mrs. Lynn Topp, First Responder Program Manager, National Sheriffs' Association
Mr. David Williams, FBI Senior Special Agent Bomb Technician, Retired
Louis Ray Wood, Senior Director Loss Prevention, Marriott Vacation Club International
Theodore Freeman, III, Assistant Fire Chief, Ancora, NJ Fire Department



OpValTRVA Training Syllabus

Day	Time	Module #	Activity	
1	0800- 0850	Module 0	Instructor Introduction Pre-test	
1	0900- 0950	Module 0	Student Introductions Course Introduction	
1	1000-1200	Module 1	Practical Exercise 1/Course Overview	
1	1200-1300		Lunch	
1	1300-1450	Module 2	Review of assessments Threat Commonalities Risk Commonalities	
1	1500-1700	Module 2	Vulnerability Commonalities OpValTRVA Day Review	
2	0800-0950	Module 3	Analyze Information	
2	1000-1200	Module 3	Developing Plans Operational Plans Strategic Plans Emergency Plan Event Planning	COOP/GOG/BCP Plan CBRNE Planning Crime Scene Planning Practical Exercise 2
2	1200-1300		Lunch	
2	1300-1700	Module 3	Developing Community Programs Information and Intelligence OpValTRVA Daily Review	
3	0800-0850	Module 3	Resource Allocation Response to HSAS Color Code Change	
3	0900-0950	Module 3	Incident Response and Recovery Management Selection of Technology	
3	1000-1050	Module 3	Practical Exercise 3	
3	1100-1200	Module 4	Application to Operations	
3	1200-1300		Lunch	
3	1300-1430	Module 4	Practical Exercise 4	
3	1430-1520	Module 4	Review OpValTRVA Conclusion	
3	1530-1700		Questions & Comments Post-test Evaluations Certificates	



Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (OpValTRVA) - Introduction

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments have been and continue to be conducted by jurisdictions, agencies and organizations of all sizes throughout the United States. Assessments are often completed to satisfy mandates by local, tribal, state or the federal government, most often in concert with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) critical infrastructure protection initiatives. For the most part, these assessments are not used by the jurisdiction, agency or organization completing the assessment, but are merely completed and passed on to the requesting agency. There is a vast amount of information within the completed assessments that can be extremely beneficial to the jurisdiction, agency and organization.

The “Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment” (OpValTRVA) Training was developed by emergency responders to assist homeland security professionals, responders from all emergency response disciplines, and the private sector, responsible for managing risk, to understand and use operationally, information gathered in various threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment methodologies. Use of the available information will enhance a jurisdiction’s capability to manage homeland security risks, by applying information from the various assessments to their daily operations of prevention, protection, response, and recovery to all hazards.

This course will help homeland security professionals, including those in multiple response disciplines and the private sector, understand, analyze, and apply information gathered in the assessment process. The course will enhance operations including: patrol and tactical operations, intelligence gathering, creating and delivering community programs, emergency planning, resource allocation, response to Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) color-code changes, and DHS Alerts, operational response and recovery, as well as using the information for writing grant proposals and for the selection of applicable technology. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, this course will give assessors insight into what information should be included while completing assessments, by providing knowledge of what information is needed to produce plans and be useful to the operation.

Course development was based upon various Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (TRVA) methodologies supported and recognized for analyzing, reducing and countering risks by the Department of Homeland Security including, but not limited to: HLS-CAM, CARVER, C/ACAMs, BZZP, RAMCAP, OG&T MGT-310, OG&T MGT-315, and FEMA Assessments. In addition, Wild Land Fire, and National Standard assessments, such as Predictive Tools, RAVAR, BEHAVE, and FS-PRO, were considered.

The course will further address how various aspects of risk (i.e., threat, vulnerability and consequence or likelihood) can be translated to operational use, how information is combined and balanced to assess risk, and how the completed risk assessment can benefit the jurisdiction, agency or organization operationally.



The course will also focus on the importance of having various emergency response disciplines from both the public and private sectors participate in the assessment process, allowing for comparisons to be made across various missions, agencies, and topics for which risk is assessed.

Additionally, the training will examine various multi-use risk analysis products and show the participants how the various products can be aligned and made more adaptive in the fluid homeland security decision-making environment.

The course will incorporate FEMA's "all hazards" approach, as well as the Target Capability List, and elements of the National Preparedness Guidelines, and the National Response Framework. Specifically, the training will demonstrate how the information gathered in the assessment process can be used to enhance the applicable capability-based preparedness principals to optimize reductions in risk.

Regardless of the responders background, and even if the responder has never completed an assessment, learning about the operational value of the assessments as they relate to planning and operations, will help them when they complete threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments. Knowing how assessments can be used helps the assessor provide good upfront information in the assessment process.



Module 1: Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (OpValTRVA) Overview

Duration

2 hours

Instructor to Participant Ratio

1:25 maximum 50

Scope Statement

The “Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment” course will assist homeland security professionals, along with all stakeholders responsible for managing risk, to understand and use operationally information gathered in various assessment methodologies. This course will apply to participants nationally.

Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO)

Upon the completion of this module, the participant will understand the OpValTRVA purpose and the process used to develop it.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)

Upon the completion of this module, participants will be able to:

- 1-1. Identify how the value of threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments extends beyond the protection of critical infrastructures or events.
- 1-2. Identify the reason the OpValTRVA course was developed.
- 1-3. Identify the components of the RADAR Process.

Lesson Topics

- Development of the Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment Course
- Analysis of Need
- National Scope
- Resources Used to Develop OpValTRVA
- Stakeholders
- Purpose of Training
- RADAR Process
 - Five Steps of the RADAR Process
- OpValTRVA Validation



Instructional Strategy

The content will be presented through various techniques with adult learning concepts in mind. Participants will be required to conduct a very brief introduction about themselves to include their name, agency or company, assignment, and reason for attending. This will allow the instructors to address the specific needs and backgrounds of the participants during the course of instruction. A practical exercise will require individuals to operate within groups of approximately ten (10) to develop a multidisciplinary response to an armed barricaded subject at a high school auditorium. At the conclusion of the practical exercise, each group will present their response plans and considerations. The instructors will then direct a group discussion focusing on the additional tools or information the participants would have liked to have for the most effective response. The course will continue with an instructor presentation containing class discussion points for a continued interactive learning experience.

Assessment Strategy

Pre-Course Knowledge, Skills and Abilities Test, along with a practical exercise, will measure the course participants' pre-course understanding of OpValTRVA.

Practical Exercise (PE) Statement

A table top exercise utilizing video and PowerPoint® will enable students to meet this module's enabling objectives. Potential Threat Elements to include all hazards events could occur at anytime with little or no warning. This table top is designed to address a multidisciplined response to an emergency situation at a school. Although the setting for this exercise is a school, the reality is that the event could occur at any critical facility located within a jurisdiction. Participants, after being presented with a barricaded suspect at a school auditorium, will be required to develop a response plan for the incident. By focusing the table top around a school, many of which have had assessments completed, participants from various disciplines will be able to engage and learn from the scenario.



Understanding the Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessments

Icon Map



Knowledge Check: Used when it is time to assess the learners' understanding.



Example: Used when there is a descriptive illustration to show or explain.



Key Points: Used to convey essential learning concepts, discussions, and introduction of supplemental material.



Hint: Used to cover administrative items or instructional tips that aid in the flow of the instruction.



Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability (OpValTRVA) Table Top Exercise Module 1


Introduction: All hazards threats, including terrorism, both manmade and natural disasters, as well as technological hazards, can occur at any time and with little or no warning. The Module 1 table top exercise is designed to address a multidisciplinary response to an emergency situation at a school. A school was selected for the exercise because schools are common to most jurisdictions and most responders can relate to a response to a school. Although the setting for this exercise is a school, in reality, this event could occur at any critical facility located within a jurisdiction.

Action to be completed: Participants, after being presented with a barricaded suspect in a school auditorium, will be required to develop a response plan for the incident.

Rationale: The number of weapons related incidents in schools continues to increase. At the same time, high profile school incidents have required emergency responders to train for a response to an active shooter or potential hostage situation. In many cases, these incidents involve firearms or explosives. Critical infrastructure, facilities, and events may vary from one jurisdiction to the next; however, with very few exceptions a school will be a facility consistently found within a jurisdiction. Furthermore, a school may become the focal point of other community events or meetings that may further draw the attention of threat groups within a community. Using a school as the focal point for emergency response allows the participants to react and develop plans from a common knowledge base. This course focuses learning toward recognizing common elements of threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments and explains how these commonalities can be used daily, when developing plans or operations to include an immediate emergency response. By focusing the table top exercise around a school, many of which have had assessments completed, participants from various disciplines will be able to engage and learn from the scenario. This scenario applies to nationally recognized DHS concepts.

Time necessary to complete: The table top exercise is timed and will conclude within two (2) hours of its start. Forty-five (45) minutes will be dedicated for group planning with an additional forty-five (45) minutes for presentations. After the conclusion of the table top exercise, group presentations, and video conclusion, approximately thirty (30) minutes will be allocated for instructor review. Time may be adjusted to allow each group to present their response plan.

Resources: Resources include easel paper, markers, PowerPoint® driven video presentation and Aerial photograph of the school and surrounding area.





Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (OpValTRVA) - Background

Development of the Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment Course

The National Domestic Preparedness Coalition (NDPCI), a 501(c) 3 non-profit organization, in coordination with George Mason University, Administration of Justice Department and Office of Continuing Education, recognized that jurisdictions throughout the nation are completing threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments but are not using the information gathered to benefit their own operations.

The NDPCI was conceived and is directed by emergency responders. In coordination with George Mason University, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Preparedness Directorate Office of Grants and Training, NDPCI strives to provide the highest quality training programs, developed through partnerships and participation by those on the front lines: emergency responders and private industry.

Analysis of Need

In addition to direct observation that jurisdictions were not utilizing threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments to their own benefit, an extensive search of current Training and Education Development, federal, and state catalogs was conducted. It was determined that there were no current courses that focused on the operational value of information located in threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments. In addition, a search was conducted that reviewed several other training courses. This extensive search concluded that currently there are no existing courses that strictly focus on gleaning tactical, planning, response, or recovery information from TRVA, and applying this information to daily use.

In addition to the course research, two surveys were conducted to further validate the need for this course. During the first survey, emergency responders were polled. The first responder group was comprised of individuals with police, fire, Emergency Medical Service (EMS), private sector, and emergency management backgrounds. First responders indicated that there was a need to address the various applications of threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments for daily use.

A second survey was conducted by sending questionnaires to participants of a first responder TVRA training course held in 26 jurisdictions throughout the country. Emergency responders surveyed indicated that they would attend and recommend others attend a course dedicated to applying threat, risk, and vulnerability information for daily operations of prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts.



National Scope of OpValTRVA

The need to conduct threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments in every jurisdiction nationally is evidenced by the DHS Infrastructure Protection initiatives. The National Domestic Preparedness Coalition, under the direction of DHS, has taught and facilitated assessments for towns such as Pittsburg, New Hampshire, population 833, and Kemper County, Mississippi, the second most rural county in Mississippi. In the assessment process, the coalition has also trained large communities such as Miami Dade County, Florida, the fifth largest county in the country. Conducting assessments is important to every jurisdiction in the country. For example, if Miami Dade, FL conducts a vulnerability assessment at a middle school, it can use the information gathered in the assessment process to build operational plans to respond to an incident at the middle school. Likewise, Pittsburg, NH can conduct a vulnerability assessment on their middle school that can be used in the assessment process to build a response plan to an incident at the middle school. The course will translate to participants nationally.

The training will incorporate FEMA's "all hazards" approach, as well as elements of the Target Capability List, the National Preparedness Guidelines, and the National Response Framework. Specifically, the training will show the participant how the information gathered in the assessment process can be used to enhance the applicable capability-based preparedness principles to optimize reductions in risk.

Resources used to develop OpValTRVA

The Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessments course was derived from a collection of sources, including:

- National Response Framework 2008
- Universal Task List
- Target Capabilities List
- Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM)
- Buffer Zone Protection Plan
- C/ACAMS
- MSRAM
- HAZUS
- FEMA 452
- RAMCAP
- Homeland Security Presidential Directives
- National Preparedness Guidelines
- CRS Department of Homeland Security's Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues and Options for Congress
- Other open source documents
- ASIS International Resources



Stakeholders

It is critical that input from multiple stakeholders is included in the comprehensive assessment process. Stakeholders include homeland security professionals from all emergency response disciplines who are responsible for managing risks, including Law Enforcement, Emergency Medical Services, Emergency Management, Fire Service, Hazmat, Public Works, Governmental Administration, Nongovernmental Public Safety Communications, Health Care, Public Health, and the Private Sector.

Purpose of Training



The purpose of the “Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment” training is to assist homeland security professionals from all emergency response disciplines and the private sector, to understand and use operationally, information gathered in various assessment methodologies supported by the Department of Homeland Security.

A vast amount of information is contained in completed threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments. This course will enable federal, state, and local governments, non-governmental organizations, tribal, and private industry to utilize the enormous amount of information collected in assessments for daily operations.



Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment information can be useful in the following categories of planning and/or operations, which include but are not limited to:

- Operational Planning
- Strategic Planning
- Emergency Planning
- Event Planning
- Pre-incident and Post-incident Planning
- Developing Community Programs
- Information and Intelligence
- Intelligence Cycle
- Terrorist Planning Cycle
- Resource Allocation
- Response to Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) Color-Code Changes and Specific Alerts
- Incident Response and Recovery Management
- Selection of Applicable Technology
- Daily Operations



The Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (OpValTRVA) course will enhance the capability of public safety and private sector professionals from all disciplines to use various “all hazards” assessment methodologies to improve their daily missions of prevention, protection, response, and/or recovery.

RADAR Process

In conventional terms, radar is a system that is used to identify the range, altitude, direction, or speed of both moving and fixed objects such as aircraft, ships, motor vehicles, weather formations, and terrain. The term *RADAR* was coined in 1941 as an acronym for **R**adio **D**etection and **R**anging¹. Police use radar to catch speeders; military uses radar for a variety of applications including the detection of aircraft; Fire Service uses ground penetrating radar to detect subsurface changes in density; Emergency Managers use radar to track weather, etc.


Over the years, radar has become a term used to describe a means or sense of awareness or perception. A police officer’s “radar goes up” when entering a dark alley, a firefighter’s “radar is triggered” when a dangerous structure is observed. A citizen’s “radar is activated” when they see an unattended package at an airport.



For this course, RADAR is an acronym that refers to the structured process used to **R**evise assessments, **A**nalyze assessment information, **D**evelop plans and/or operations, **A**pply plans and/or operations in the field, and conduct periodic **R**eviews of the plans and assessments.

Similar to the Radio Detection and Ranging, and the sense of awareness and perception, the Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment’s RADAR process provides a framework to help responders be aware of and perceive and identify threats, risks, and vulnerabilities that should be incorporated into their plans and operations.

¹ RADAR <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3468301702.html>



The RADAR Process provides a structured method that enables emergency responders to extract pertinent information from various assessments and apply the information to the operation.



Five Steps of the RADAR Process

Review Assessment – During this phase of the process, individuals from various disciplines meet to review all applicable threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments. If more than one assessment exists for a community, data should be categorized and be placed into a usable format. It is important that all assessments for a community be collected and reviewed during this step.

Analysis of Information - During this phase of the process, information identified in the review stage is processed and reviewed for operational applicability.

Development of Plans and Operations – Information identified during the review process and analyzed for applicability for planning and operations is now used to develop plans, policies, and training applicable to the task being performed. This will provide an overview document for each discipline to determine applicability of each task to their daily responsibilities. The plans, policies, or trainings developed for the agency or department will now include comprehensive data and variables that may not have been considered without the assessment review.



Application to Plans and Operations – Information collected and populated into the plans, policies, and training is now implemented. Information is applied to policies, procedures, training and exercises and is now included in the agency’s missions of prevention, protection, response, mitigation, and recovery.

Review – Due to the constantly changing environment both with terrorist or hostile criminal groups and those naturally occurring in the environment, the documents used to collect information for this process needs to be reevaluated. Plans, policies, and training should be reviewed, at least annually, to ensure that variables have not changed.

OpValTRVA Validation

Step 1: The National Domestic Preparedness Coalition in coordination with George Mason University conducted research, which included National Infrastructure Guidelines, National Response Framework, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, law enforcement journals and periodicals, public and private assessment methodologies, journals and periodicals, internet research, federal studies, GAO reports, Universal Task List, Target Capabilities List, and best practices.

Step 2: Subject matter experts with law enforcement, private security, emergency management, fire, incident command, state homeland security management, and adult learning expertise were consulted and participated in the development of the OpValTRVA course.

Step 3: Based upon research, training and experience, and adult learning principles, the OpValTRVA course was developed with the goal of maximizing the learning experience and meeting all learning objectives.

Step 4: The OpValTRVA course was reviewed by over 30 subject matter experts and instructors to verify that the content and process was applicable and usable for all stakeholders, specifically state and local emergency responders. Additionally, the content was reviewed to ensure it was consistent with Department of Homeland Security guides relating to principles identified as crucial for the prevention, protection, response and/or recovery relating to critical infrastructure.

The OpValTRVA course provides end users across a multitude of disciplines, a structured process in which to apply information from assessments to a specific task completed on a daily basis.



Module 1 Summary

In this lesson participants learned:

The Purpose of the OpValTRVA course is to assist homeland security professionals from all emergency response disciplines and the private sector who are responsible for managing risk, to understand and use operationally, information gathered in various assessment methodologies supported by the Department of Homeland Security.

The RADAR Process provides a structured method that enables emergency responders to extract pertinent information from various assessments and apply the information to the operation.

The OpValTRVA course was validated by conducting research, which included National Infrastructure Guidelines, National Response Framework, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, law enforcement journals and periodicals, public and private assessment methodologies, journals and periodicals, internet research, federal studies, GAO reports, Universal Task List, Target Capabilities List, and best practices. Additionally, subject matter experts with law enforcement, private security, emergency management, fire, incident command, state homeland security management, and adult learning expertise were consulted and participated in the development of the OpValTRVA course.

Over 30 subject matter experts reviewed the final content, and the content was reviewed to ensure it was consistent with Department of Homeland Security guides relating to principles identified as crucial for the prevention, protection, response and/or recovery relating to critical infrastructure.



Module 2 – Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment Review

Duration

4 hours

Instructor to Participant Ratio

1:25

Scope Statement

There is a wealth of information that can be found in completed threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments. In order to begin extracting information pertinent to the operation, a review of completed assessments must be accomplished. This Module will define and explain threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments as well as providing participants with an understanding of specific categories addressed by most assessments.

Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO)

Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to identify common elements of a Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (TRVA) for information that is relevant to planning and operational activities.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)

At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to:

- 2-1. Define Threat and give an example
- 2-2. Define Risk, and identify elements of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk formula
- 2-3. Define Vulnerability and give an example
- 2-4. List the commonalities between multi-use threat, risk analysis, and vulnerability assessments

Lesson Topics

- Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment
 - Threat Assessment
 - Risk Assessment
 - Vulnerability Assessment
- Common Elements of Assessments
 - Common Elements of Threat Assessments
 - Common Elements of Risk Assessments
 - Common Elements of Vulnerability Assessments



Instructional Strategy

Course content for Module 2 will be primarily delivered by a series of PowerPoint® slides and instructor led discussions. Instructors will maintain interaction with participants by soliciting input and examples relating to individuals' experience and background. Instructors will relate content to the practical exercise scenario presented in Module 1.

Assessment Strategy


Participant progress will be evaluated by the instructor led discussions which will include specific questions presented to participants. Additionally, important concepts needed for Module 3 will be emphasized.

Practical Exercise (PE) Statement

There will not be a practical exercise during this module.



Review of Assessments



There is a wealth of information that can be found in completed threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments. In order to begin extracting information pertinent to the operation, a review of completed assessments must be accomplished.



It is important to include multiple disciplines' assessments in the review process because response often requires multiagency activity with overlapping responsibilities. During the review process, all assessments should be examined for information that can be used for planning and operations. Assessments can be obtained from a multitude of sources, including but not limited to:

- Emergency Management
- Law Enforcement
- Fire and Rescue
- Health and Medical
- Public Safety
- Public Works
- Public Health
- Water Management
- Environmental Management
- Department of Defense (DoD)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Private Sector Security
- 18 Critical Infrastructure Key Resource Sectors²
- State, Local, Tribal Government

Organizations complete assessments using a wide variety of terms to label the assessment process, such as threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment, threat analysis, needs assessments, fire risk assessments, fire assessments, public health assessments, security surveys, site surveys, building analysis, risk analysis, vulnerability analysis, etc. Regardless of what terminology is used to describe the assessment, there is a great likelihood that the assessment contains information that can be utilized in planning and operations.

² FEMA – Before and After: Prepare for Hanna, Recover from Gustav, 2008, HQ-08-183



Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessments

There are several threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments that are used by emergency responders and private industry. The assessments include but are not limited to the following: CARVER, C/ACAM, BZZP, RAMCAP, OG&T MGT-310, OG&T MGT-315, MSRAM, NFPA 730 & 731, FEMA Assessments and the HLS-CAM. In addition, there are several assessments that are used by the private sector. (See Appendix B)

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments are terms that are often interchanged; however, each refer to three different, yet interdependent processes.

Threat Assessment



The Department of Homeland Security views threat from an all-hazard perspective which is represented in the National Response Framework (NRF). According to the NRF, threat is defined as any indication of possible violence, harm, or danger. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is more specific to terrorism and infrastructure protection and defines threat as the intention and capability of an adversary to undertake actions detrimental to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR).

Various threat assessments can examine factors including a community's strengths, weaknesses, and emergency response capabilities, as well as identify critical facilities, infrastructures, and events. Threat assessments also consider Potential Threat Elements, (PTE's) and take into consideration all hazards. The threat assessment can help determine the likelihood that given the current intelligence or designated federal, state or local threat levels, a specific target will be subject to attack.

Federal, state, and local jurisdictions host potential targets or Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR), which may be susceptible to attack. Communities may be significantly and adversely impacted if their CI/KR is attacked. The threat assessment can look at how Potential Threat Elements or any hazard can function within the community and facilitate an attack on the identified CI/KR. The assessment can also consider the prevention and response capabilities of the community's emergency responders. It is important to remember that a comprehensive threat assessment should include terrorist or hostile criminal groups as well as accidental or naturally occurring events.



Risk Assessment



Risk is the probability of loss. Risk takes into consideration the variations between actual and expected results, and probability that a loss has or will occur. In other words, a risk could be speculative risk, the difference between loss and gain, or pure risk, in which loss is the only possible outcome and is related to events which are beyond the risk taker's control. When buying a lottery ticket one takes a "speculative risk;" one pays one dollar hoping to gain millions of dollars. Insurance companies look at pure risk where the only possible outcomes are no loss or loss. In the context of homeland security, risk is assessed as a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat, and measures the loss that can be expected if an asset, system or network is damaged, destroyed or disrupted by an all hazard event.

A risk assessment is a method of estimating the anticipated or expected loss from the occurrence of an adverse event by using the quantitative and/or qualitative values which relate to exposure and a recognized threat and impact. There are various uses for risk assessment. Businesses may use the risk assessment process to measure "risk" for various reasons such as measuring potential risk of investment, measuring the probability that an employee will suffer a catastrophic illness, and measuring the probability that infrastructure within their company will fail. For the most part, risk will be viewed from the perspective of potential harm that could be caused to Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources.

Within the Department of Homeland Security, there have been three stages in the evolution of risk assessment methodology as it pertains to homeland security. The third evolution appears in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and defines risk as "the combination of the frequency of occurrence, vulnerability, and the consequence of a specific hazardous event. In the context of the NIPP, risk is the expected magnitude of loss (e.g., deaths, injuries, economic damage, loss of public confidence, or government capability) due to a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other incident, along with the likelihood of such an event occurring and causing that loss"³.

According to the NIPP, risk is determined by combining potential direct and indirect consequences of a terrorist attack or other hazards, known vulnerabilities to potential attack vectors and general or specific threat information. Therefore, risk is represented by the following formula: **Risk = Threat (Vulnerability + Consequences)**.⁴

DHS has also expressed the risk formula as Risk = Threat X Vulnerability X Consequence⁵.

Regardless of which DHS risk formula a jurisdiction has used, the end result is a qualitative and quantitative measurement of risk, which in essence is a prioritization tool for identifying CI/KR of national impact. On a local level, the same modeling can be used for prioritizing local CI/KR and all information can be used for planning and operations.

³ National Infrastructure Protection Plan

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "FY2007 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance Application Kit," Office Of Grants and Training website www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy07_hsgp_guidance.pdf

⁵ Congressional Research Service- The Department of Homeland Security's Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress Feb 2, 2007



Vulnerability Assessment



When referring to CI/KR, vulnerability is a weakness in the design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system, or network, which can be exploited by an adversary or disrupted by a natural hazard or technological failure. A vulnerability assessment examines exploitable security weaknesses or deficiency at a facility, a venue, or of a person. Vulnerability assessment is a critical on-site physical examination and thorough inspection of an asset's perimeter, property within the perimeter, and building exterior and interior spaces to include all operational systems and procedures along with the security of a facility.

A Vulnerability Assessment requires an on-site review of the potential target and will include the active participation of personnel who are associated with the target, as well as subject matter experts. A vulnerability assessment is used to determine the following:

- The existing overall state of security for the asset
- An asset's overall vulnerability to attack
- The degree of protection provided by an asset's security, fire, and emergency protection systems
- Financial vulnerability of the enterprise
- The overall readiness of a community in relationship to the asset's security, emergency, crisis, and consequence response capabilities including its emergency plan
- Recommendations for establishing a total security program that is prioritized



Commonalities

There are several threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments that are recognized and used by the Department of Homeland Security, state, local and tribal government. Similarly, there are several assessment methodologies that are used in the private sector and within the 18 CI/KR Sectors identified by DHS. The 18 Critical Infrastructure Sectors are:

1. Agriculture & Food
2. Commercial Facilities
3. Dams
4. Energy
5. Information Technology
6. Postal & Shipping
7. Banking & Finance
8. Communications
9. Defense Industrial Base
10. Government Facilities
11. National Monuments and Icons
12. Transportation systems
13. Chemical
14. Critical Manufacturing
15. Emergency Services
16. Healthcare & Public Health
17. Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste
18. Water



The National Response Framework⁶ and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan⁷ acknowledge that the majority of critical facilities are privately held and stress the importance of governmental and private sector inclusion in emergency planning documents and training. Assessment tools utilized by government and private sector organizations contain many commonalities.

Regardless of what assessment is used, there are common elements of the various assessments that can be used in the development of plans and operations.

As the Review Process begins, it is assumed that agencies, departments, and/or organizations have already completed comprehensive threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments. If assessments have not been completed, this section will still be of benefit. Knowing what factors are common throughout assessments and what factors within an assessment are critical elements, the assessor will be better equipped to conduct an assessment and select applicable assessment tools.

⁶ National Response Framework-

⁷ National Infrastructure Protection Plan



Threat Commonalities

Threat assessments are primarily associated with law enforcement at the federal, state, local and tribal levels; however, threat assessments are also conducted by Emergency Management, Fire, Medical and other response disciplines as well as the private sector. Many threat assessments are associated with terrorist and/or criminal activity. Other threat assessments look at threats from an all hazards approach, and consider terrorism and crime as well as manmade and natural disaster. Some assessments look only at single issues such as earthquakes. Nonetheless, many of these assessments have common elements, which are important to the evaluation of threat and will be useful for planning and operations.

Definition of the Community and its Associated Missions – Threat assessments commonly identify, or name, the community that will be assessed. This is not necessarily limited to jurisdictional boundaries. A community can be defined as the United States, the State of Florida, Jackson County or the City of Atlanta, a corporation, a shopping mall, a single facility or an event.

Community Mission(s) – A community's missions further define the community and include the community's purpose and activities, which may include but are not limited to; the provision of government services, tourism, industry, and education. Threat assessments often include community missions because the mission may play a role in a Potential Threat Element's (PTE) relationship to the community. For example, a PTE may attack a college community to disrupt a mission involving animal research.

Geographical Boundaries – Threat assessments often identify boundaries of a community. This can include legal, geographic, perceived and changing boundaries. Infrastructure outside the boundaries that affects the identified community could also be included in an analysis of a community's geographic boundaries. Threat assessments often include geographical boundary information because threats including all hazards can be affected by boundaries.

Intelligence Exchange – In some instances, intelligence is passed down from a particular agency and is included in the threat assessment. Other assessments document the intelligence exchange process which includes observations about the communication of intelligence between various intelligence sources, local emergency responders, private industry, or between local and federal agencies. Descriptions of Fusion Centers, emergency alert systems and communications systems that are in place to disseminate information often fall under intelligence exchange.

Terrain Considerations – Terrain considerations are common to most Threat assessments. Terrain can include mountains, flat land, hills, high-rise buildings, lakes, rivers, and wooded areas. An area that is flat and includes many routes to facilitate high-speed ingress and egress may aid emergency responders in the response to an incident. The same terrain, however, may also aid criminal and terrorist mobility in the community. Terrain could also significantly impact the dispersal patterns of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and weather patterns.



For example: In the Lake Tahoe Region, new wood stoves and fireplaces were banned because inversions caused by the terrain trapped smoke low and within the Tahoe Basin. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency described the situation as follows: “Wood stoves and fireplaces are of particular concern in Lake Tahoe, due to wintertime inversion layers that prevent the smoke from leaving the Basin. These inversion layers trap smoke close to the ground resulting in elevated pollution levels, poor visibility and even contribute to the decline in lake clarity. Although the smoke from one wood stove or fireplace may seem minor, added together these stoves and fireplaces discharge tons of dangerous particulate matter, carbon monoxide and a family of cancer-causing chemicals known as polycyclic organic matter to the air each year.”⁸ PTE’s could use this information to help Identify where and when a chemical attack would be most successful. This naturally occurring event may aid in holding certain chemicals closer to the ground where a greater population would be affected.

In this example, trapped smoke causes health hazards. Similarly, a terrorist could take advantage of an inversion caused by terrain in the Lake Tahoe Region or any other jurisdiction that had similar terrain issues.

Weather Concerns – Weather will be of particular concern in most threat assessments. Consideration will be given to the effect various types of weather will have on a particular community. The community environment is affected by weather patterns. In certain cases, weather could considerably limit or aid the effectiveness of a weapon. In addition, bad weather could greatly influence evacuation and transportation of casualties. Potential Threat Elements may choose to attack during bad weather because of the effect it will have on the emergency response capabilities.

Assessments should contain weather characteristics pertaining to their defined community and its effect on community response providers. Weather characteristics for a defined community can be found in the almanac and web resources.

⁸ Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. Wood Stove Retrofit Information. Available at: <http://www.trpa.org/default.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=209>



Logistical Infrastructure – Threat assessments will often include logistical infrastructure, particularly when looking at specific sectors. The logistical infrastructure will include existing service-based industries, i.e., shipping and economic anchors located within the community, major thoroughfares, bridges, transportation hubs, etc.



Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource (CI/KR) – A list of CI/KR or critical facilities, infrastructures and events within the community is often included in the threat assessment. For federal reporting purposes, this list may be limited to critical infrastructure and key resources of national significance; however, when conducting an assessment for a jurisdiction, agency or organization’s use, the list should be comprehensive.

Even if the list does not appear in the threat assessment, most communities have compiled a list. The Critical Facility, Infrastructure and Event list may not be in any particular order. The infrastructure list will help identify threat groups that have a history of attacking like facilities, determine CI/KR that will be included in the risk or prioritization assessment and identify CI/KR that should be assessed for vulnerability.

Facilities/Infrastructure/Events	
	Beijing Capital Airport Athletics: Men's 800m 1st Round, Women's Hammer Throw Finals, Men's 5000m 1st Round, Final, Women's 4
	Kerry Centre Hotel Closing Ceremonies Gymnastics Artistic Men's Individual All-Around Finals
	Diving: Men's 3M Springboard Finals Swimming: Women's 50m Freestyle, Women's 4x100 Medley Relay, Men's 4x100m Relay Forbidden City Great Wall at Mutianyu Beijing Planning Hall Diving: Men's 10m Platform Prelims
	Olympic Hospitality Center Olympic Green Synchronized Swimming: Duet Free Routine Prelims Table Tennis: Men's Singles (1st round, 8 matches each)

Emergency Response Resources – Threat assessments often contain a description of emergency response resources and capabilities. Depending on the community defined, this may include federal, state, local and tribal government, non-governmental organizations, and private sector resources.

Additional Resources – In addition to emergency response resources, threat assessments also include observations regarding additional resources such as, health and medical considerations, strategic national stockpile, private security, and private sector participation.

Demographics – Demographic characteristics are common to most threat assessments and are important because the demographic makeup of the community can help determine how the Potential Threat Element (PTE) can operate within a defined community. A diverse community may allow a Potential Threat Element to blend into a community. Conversely, it may be difficult for a PTE to blend into a homogeneous community. The community may also be the home to a demographic the PTE is interested in attacking.

Threat assessments also contain demographic information because demographics can create considerations for emergency response and evacuation. For example, a population including a vast number of elderly residents should be considered when making evacuation plans. Special needs populations are also considered. A wide range of demographics may also create specific language or cultural difficulties that may hinder prevention, protection, response and/or recovery efforts.



Threat Groups – All threat assessments will include an analysis of threats. Some will provide threat information, and others will consider factors including the existence, intentions, capabilities, history, targeting, modus operandi and threat courses of action of groups, individuals or hazards, including manmade and natural disasters.

In most threat assessments, a section regarding history will be included. Threat assessments will often document terrorist incidents, criminal activities, weather events, and protests, etc. that have occurred and may include current intelligence even if an event has not yet occurred.

Common to threat assessments is the understanding that information will be credible. Assessments should contain credible information regarding specific Potential Threat Elements (PTE) and take into consideration the following factors when determining their capabilities; the PTE possesses the requisite training, skills, financial means, and access to resources necessary to develop, produce, or acquire a particular type of weapon in quantity and/or potency sufficient to produce mass casualties, combined with information substantiating the PTE's ability to safely store, test, and deliver the same. In the case of an all hazard event, the information must also be credible and must consider the capacity of the hazard.

It is important to remember that terms may change from assessment to assessment; for example, several documents may refer to the process of identifying groups as a “threat inventory” or the target selection as a “target assessment.” Regardless of the term used, the information requested or contained within the threat assessment is similar. Fusion Centers may offer assistance with streamlining terms used within a jurisdiction. At a minimum, they provide a platform for stakeholders to explain specific terms used by the government or private sector.

Behavior Identifiers – Threat assessments may include an analysis of activity that may be indicative of criminal activity and/or terrorism. In this portion of an assessment, which is specific to crime and terrorism, behavior is analyzed. Behaviors that are observed could include precursors to crime and terrorism such as: surveillance activity, suicide bomber, robbery, assassination, kidnapping, probing, and rehearsal of attack. Behavior indicators identified in the threat assessment may be specific to a larger community and take into consideration criminal analysis data, or may be specific to individual behaviors such as; sweating, fidgeting, and pacing, etc.

It is important to note that customs, culture, and ideology may play an important role when assessing behavior identifiers. Some Asian cultures may consider looking an authority figure in the face as a sign of disrespect. If this is not considered when evaluating behaviors the assessors conclusion maybe flawed.



Historical Data – Threat assessments often contain historical data including Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and Fire Service Predictive Tools. GIS can provide overlays such as crime data and intelligence information. GIS also provides the ability to merge data layers, enabling the assessor to easily see many attributes of a location, such as topography, streets, water and sewer lines, rivers, power lines, weather, and any other data the user wants to review. In many cases, information can be worked into other sections of a threat assessment such as crime analysis, intelligence, logistical infrastructure, CI/KR, weather, and terrain assessments. It also gives the assessor the ability to see potential problems that might exist in proximity to a critical location. This information can be used to assist with the prediction of future events which can assist with a variety of operational and emergency planning.

Trend analysis may be included within Historical Data and may articulate emerging trends. This information may be available within completed assessments. Threat assessments containing trend analysis may be housed in regional Fusion Centers.

Regulatory Oversight – Sources may have specific constraints on the collection, storage or sharing of information/intelligence with different entities, and originating agencies may have specific rules regarding dissemination to a third party. For additional information, contact the National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC)⁹, Freedom of Information Act at federal and state level, 28CFR part 23 Intelligence Sharing Guidelines and Fusion Center Guidelines¹⁰.

⁹ www.ncirc.gov

¹⁰ Fusion Center Guidelines – Developing and Sharing Information in a new era, 2006



Risk Commonalities

There are several risk assessments, or prioritization tools that are used to determine the likelihood of a loss. Risk assessments will often have the assessors rate infrastructure based on a criteria described on a numeric scale (Figure 2). The various scales will often be categorized into three categories, vulnerability, threat and consequence. As discussed, there are various equations utilizing this criterion, which will determine risk, or more accurately, determine priority. The following criteria are common to a wide range of “risk” or priority assessments.

Score	Accessibility Criteria
5	Easily accessible, no barriers
4	Limited access, easily defeated barriers
3	Good access control inside perimeter fence, climbing or lowering required
2	Substantial access control, multiple barriers
1	Not accessible or inaccessible without extreme difficulty

Figure 2 Risk Assessment Accessibility Criteria

Death and Injury/Population Data – Death and injury categories are reviewed within risk assessments from various perspectives which may include demographics, density, and population. In all cases, this information is critical to evaluate the impact on a facility or community which may be a consideration to criminal groups planning an attack.

Symbolism – Symbolism considerations will consist of the target’s value to the nation, community, or threat group.

Environmental – Environmental impacts may consider the impact of a particular weapons system; however, due to the large number of weapon systems, the majority of models evaluate the chemicals or materials within the facility or event attacked. Additionally, environmental impacts from naturally occurring events or disasters such as a hurricane will be considered.

Missions – A facility’s purpose or ability to continue operations will be evaluated in an assessment’s mission section. Assessments may also evaluate the impact of the loss of the facility as it relates to the community or on a larger scale, the national infrastructure.

Accessibility – A facility’s accessibility will be considered as a factor to determine the ease in which an attack could be carried out and to what degree the weapon will impact the facility’s operations. This differs from a mission impact as the consideration is focused on the ability to introduce the weapon system into the facility.

Recognition – Recognizability factors will evaluate the ease at which a facility can be located or its purpose identified. Data may include availability of maps, directions, company bios or customers, addresses, and photographs.

Economic – When looking at economic impact sections of risk assessment, indicators will address the financial loss a community would have if the facility were damaged or destroyed to the point that it could not function.



Hazard Indexing – These are common to risk assessments used by emergency management and the Fire Service to identify dangerous levels of chemicals or pollutants. Levels will be determined by relative hazard or quantity.

Recoverability – Recoverability is common to many assessments and measures the amount of time that it will take to replace, repair or by-pass the destruction or damage to the target.

Effect – Assessments may describe effect as a measure of military, political, economic, psychological, and/or sociological impact at the target and beyond.

Criticality – A variable common to assessments which is used to measure the value of a target. The value of the target is a primary consideration in targeting; a target is critical when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on military, political or economic operations.

Critical Infrastructure Impact – Common to risk assessments, Critical Infrastructure considers the impact the loss of a CI/KR will have on a community's infrastructure.

Proximity – The use of the term proximity may vary between assessments. In most cases, proximity measures the distance between target infrastructure and other CI/KR or population centers. Other assessments consider proximity to be a measure of how close a target may be to something that the Potential Threat Element considers important.

Fire Risk – Wildland fire spread is a prediction method for determining potential fire spread based on a specific point of ignition and a predicted set of conditions in terms of fuel, topography and weather conditions.¹¹

¹¹ National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Insurance Service Organization (ISO), and Uniform Building Codes



Vulnerability Commonalities

There are a great number of vulnerability assessments that are used by government and private sectors. Vulnerability assessments can be general and used to assess a wide variety of facilities, infrastructure and events or may be specific and focus on only one component. Whether general or specific, there are common elements for vulnerability assessments. A comprehensive assessment will address all hazards and is most effective when completed using a multidisciplinary approach.

Property and Facility Diagrams – Property diagrams are common to most vulnerability assessments. Beyond their value relating to the identification of weaknesses in the facility, they aid in identifying a variety of access or response needs. Property diagrams should identify key access, high occupancy rooms, safe rooms, alarms, fire sensors, exits, equipment or key resource locations, and hazardous materials locations.

Geographical Information Systems (GIS) – GIS systems are common to most vulnerability assessments. A GIS can provide a layered view of infrastructure, geopolitical features, and hazard zone information. Hazard zone information may include:

- Seismic
- Tsunami
- Flood
- Plume Modeling/Dispersion
- Wild Land Fire

Neighborhood/Surrounding Structures and Adjoining Property – Vulnerability assessments generally call for information about property located outside of the perimeter. Considerations outside the perimeter will include neighborhoods, surrounding structures, adjoining property, and other CI/KR. Assessments consider this information for the following reasons:

- Allow for surveillance of the facility being assessed
- Provide a launching point for an attack against the facility
- Provide access to the facility
- Increase collateral damage from an attack to include fire or natural disaster on the facility
- Cause facility being assessed to experience collateral damage from attack on adjoining CI/KR



In many assessments, assessors are prompted to consider the following questions:

- Are there locations outside the facility that allow viewing of sensitive operations?
- Are there higher elevation areas around the facility that enhance surveillance or attack scenarios (hills, buildings, parking structures, and other facilities, etc.)?
- Are there commercial, public, or private buildings nearby that allow long-term undetected surveillance?
- Are there normal activities occurring outside the facility that allow for close approach to restricted areas or the facility perimeter by unauthorized personnel?
- Is there pedestrian or auto access available for surveillance?

Assessments will often call for specific information regarding the adjoining properties, including contact information.

Key Resources – Assessments often consider key resources which are critical to the operation of a facility, infrastructure, event or even the community at large. Key Resources may be simply listed out or may include a full evaluation of the resource and its relevance. The resource may be critical to the community even though it may not necessarily be critical to the facility being evaluated. As an example, a large truck stored at a city garage may not be critical to the garage but could be critical to recovery operations or an emergency response for other facilities within the city.

Parking Areas – Assessments of parking facilities are common to most vulnerability assessments. Parking facilities may leave a CI/KR susceptible to a host of issues including; crimes against persons, employee theft, unauthorized activity, and accidents. In fact, the majority of civil lawsuits are generated from incidents occurring in parking areas¹². For the most part, it is lawful for individuals to be in a parking area where they can be easily overlooked; parking facilities adjacent to CI/KR can create an atmosphere that is conducive for Potential Threat Elements to conduct surveillance. In parking areas with unrestricted access, Potential Threat Elements are provided with access to government, company, employee and personally owned vehicles, as well as access to employees and visitors.

Helipad – Many vulnerability assessments will address the security of a helipad. Some assessments will include the helipad under tactical considerations or within landing zones. Other assessments which are specific to a CI/KR such as a hospital will have a stand-alone section regarding a helipad. Assessments will call for information such as the location of the helipad, access control to the helipad, or where a landing zone could be established on site.

¹² Premise Security – A Guide for Security Professionals and Attorneys



Rail Lines – Most vulnerability assessments will address rail transport in either stand-alone section or within sections that address outer perimeter, buffer zone, surrounding area considerations and transportation routes. Assessments will call for information regarding railway proximity to the CI/KR, and type of cargo i.e., people, HAZMAT, etc. Often, rail will enter the facility and trains will provide logistical support for the CI/KR. Assessments will request information about the material transported into and out of the facility. Additionally, there are specific vulnerability assessments that strictly focus on all aspects of rail transportation. Also, railways will be addressed in risk assessments where railways are identified and move through communities.

Bridges/Tunnels – Vulnerability assessments may request information about bridges and tunnels. Tunnels may be referred to in sections regarding underground access points. This section looks at the security measures in place. Bridges may be included in an assessment of CI/KR as they relate to the facility, infrastructure or event. In many cases, a bridge will be considered CI/KR, and will require a comprehensive vulnerability assessment.

Piers/Docks – Piers and Docks will be addressed in vulnerability assessments specifically designed for port assessments, however, pier and dock information may be implied in general vulnerability assessment sections which include, access control, waterborne access points, or other considerations. Specific information called for in vulnerability assessments may include pier and dock access control, underwater security, pier and dock lighting, signage, and pier parking limitations.

Access Control – Every vulnerability assessment considered by the Department of Homeland Security will address access control. Access control is the means or method of authorizing, denying and/ or limiting the use of a protected area by unauthorized entities. Access control mechanisms are used to protect resources.

A general category of access control may address several access points and related security including, but not limited to:

- Doors/Emergency Exits
- Windows
- Gates
- Locks
- Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
- Alarms
- Security Personnel

Some assessments will break down each category separately and consider access control in each applicable section.

Communications – Vulnerability assessments often address communications, including the ability to communicate between entities, physical issues that inhibit communication and interoperability. Communications can be addressed within a jurisdiction, facility, infrastructure, event and/or even particular rooms within a facility. Often, vulnerability assessments address this concern to ensure that radio communications can be accomplished during a response.



Additionally, many vulnerability assessments review communications' interoperability between emergency responders.

Communication Systems – A number of vulnerability assessments look at communication systems, not only from the aspect of telecommunications, but also the ability to communicate via radio, cell phone, or other technological communication devices from inside of the CI/KR to outside entities. This may specifically affect responders' ability to communicate with other responders from inside the CI/KR. Assessments may also consider the interoperability of responders' radio systems with the CI/KR.

Assessments may also consider communications systems that are designed to alert personnel, students and/or visitors to security issues, weather issues, or other pertinent information. Systems could include email alerts, phone alerts, text message alerts, sirens, or other alert systems.

Internet and Other Media – Vulnerability assessments will call for information regarding a CI/KR's exposure on the internet and other media outlets. Assessments will often call for information about the CI/KR website and advertisements in newspapers and other publications where information regarding facility schedules, events, or other information may be published. Assessments will also ask for information regarding a CI/KR's exposure of sensitive facility plans, blueprints, operating procedures, etc. available to the public via the Internet or public record.

Explosives Mitigation – Many vulnerability assessments will examine the systems in place to mitigate the amount of damage caused by an explosive device both to the building exterior and interior. In many cases, assessments will consider explosive mitigation in sections such as landscaping, standoff, access control, parking lots and garages, etc. Explosive mitigation may overlap with other sections such as landscaping and standoff. For example, trees may be noted in the landscaping sections as areas for cover and concealment or visibility issues; however, certain types of trees may be a mitigating factor in absorbing shock or shrapnel from explosives. Additionally, architectural designs may include features that may deflect a blast away from key areas of a facility.

Standoff Distance – Common to most vulnerability assessments is a section regarding standoff distance between potential improvised explosive devices, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices and/or individuals with weapons, and the CI/KR. This section of an assessment evaluates how close a person or vehicle can get to a building without being vetted.

Fencing/Walls/Barricades – Many vulnerability assessments will include a section regarding fencing, walls and barricades. They may be included in general categories such as a perimeter category or an access control category. When considering fencing, assessments will require observations such as: type, material, gauge, top guards, height, sturdiness, gates, fire access, locking mechanisms and distance from the bottom of the fence to the ground.

Assessments will also contain observations regarding walls and barricades. Again, the assessments will require information specific to the walls to include, height, material, gates and security mechanisms. Barricades will include bollards. Assessments will require information including; type, materials, features and portability.



Cover and Concealment – Cover and concealment will be addressed in various vulnerability assessments and may appear as a stand-alone category or be covered in specific categories such as landscaping, and visibility, or general categories such as perimeter, building exterior and building interior. Assessments will evaluate structures or locations which may provide protection when approaching or attacking a facility.

Landscaping – Landscaping will be addressed in many vulnerability assessment methodologies. Assessments will evaluate landscaping from the following perspectives which include: providing cover and concealment for both Potential Threat Elements and responders; being used to access facility property and assets; clear zones for exclusionary areas; ability to conceal improvised explosive devices; interference with lighting and closed circuit television; hindering or maximizing visibility of the facility; and will note the height of bushes, hedges, foliage, low hanging branches of trees, and their proximity to fencing, buildings, lighting, etc.

Outbuildings and Storage areas – Outbuildings and storage areas are commonly addressed during vulnerability assessments. Assessments concentrate on outbuildings and storage areas because they often provide an area for a Potential Threat Element to place an improvised explosive device and/or secondary explosive devices around a CI/KR. Assessments will look for specific information about what tools and/or chemicals are stored, what surveillance opportunities are afforded, and what critical pieces of infrastructure (breakers, gas, phone lines, etc.) are contained within.

Lighting – A section regarding lighting will appear in the vast majority of vulnerability assessments. Lighting is noted as one of the most effective deterrents to crime. Assessments will look at lighting from a three layered approach which includes: lighting at the perimeter and surrounding areas, lighting at the facility exterior and lighting at the facility interior.

Visibility – Vulnerability assessments will often evaluate the visibility of the CI/KR from the perimeter and the perimeter from the CI/KR. The variable of visibility may be addressed in a specified section of the assessment or may be addressed in other sections such as, cover and concealment, landscaping, parking areas, etc. In most cases, a clear view of the perimeter is most desirable allowing building occupants a view of unauthorized users as they enter the property. In some cases, an unobstructed view of the CI/KR from the perimeter is desirable and in other cases, particularly if the site requires anonymity, an obstructed view of the CI/KR, from the perimeter may be more advantageous.

Signage – Signs may appear in various sections of vulnerability assessments such as, access control, perimeter, building exterior, parking lots, etc., or appear as a stand-alone section. Assessments will evaluate signage issues such as; perimeter signage or lack thereof, directional signage, as well as signage that requires enforcement. Assessments may contain photographs and descriptions of signs, which can provide a great deal of information related to access control, chemical storage, mechanical rooms and secure areas.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) – CCTV will be included in most vulnerability assessments. Sections regarding CCTV will call for information including the type of cameras used, camera



locations, camera housings, accessibility of the camera from the ground, lighting and obstructions in the area of the cameras, camera monitoring, and recording capabilities.

Loading Dock – As loading docks are often considered the most vulnerable area of a facility, most vulnerability assessments will address the facility loading dock. Assessments will ask for information regarding access control for the loading dock and security measures in place. Other areas of vulnerability assessments will often overlap with the loading dock if the dock is not specifically mentioned. These areas may include parking, large vehicles' access to facility, dumpsters, visibility, CCTV, roof access, etc.

Waste Removal – Waste removal may appear in a variety of sections within a vulnerability assessment. Waste removal may be addressed when reviewing outbuildings and dumpsters. Waste removal may also be addressed in sections regarding scheduled pickups and deliveries. In some cases, assessments will call for information about waste removal in a free text format under general comments or janitorial/vendor contracts.

Fire Protection – Many vulnerability assessments will require information about fire protection and ask for detailed information regarding the following:

- Fire alarms
- Maintenance of fire detection and suppression systems
- Maintenance of life-safety systems
- Fire departments' capability of reaching the asset
- Quantity of available water for fighting fires
- Adequate number of fire hydrants to fight a fire
- Hydrant locations at the facility
- Water system pressure and flushing program
- Fire system types
- Access to city main/tanks/pumps/connections

Life Safety Systems – Many vulnerability assessments will evaluate life safety systems; often information regarding life safety systems is limited to their interoperability with security measures. Life safety systems considered in the assessment may also include life safety systems in place at facilities, locations of defibrillators, or other pre-staged equipment within or near a facility.

Incident Command System (ICS) – Although the vast majority of assessments may not require detailed information about incident command, critical information such as command post locations, staging areas and evacuation points for facility occupants may be identified. In addition, Relevant Essential Support Functions (ESF) and ICS Support areas may be identified, and will be relevant to incident command.



Evacuation – Vulnerability assessments may call for information regarding evacuation to include sheltering in place in a stand-alone section on evacuation, or may address evacuation routes in life safety, fire protection, and/or policy and procedures. Assessments will contain information about required evacuation facilitators, evacuation routes, rally points and of applicable alternate routes, points of exit and rally points. Additionally, sheltering in place may be included in a stand-alone section or be covered in evacuation, safe and high occupancy rooms and/or policies and procedures.

Shelter In Place/Lockdown Procedures – Many vulnerability assessments will address lockdown procedures in either a stand-alone section or within a policy and procedure section. Although not limited to schools, lockdown procedures are often associated with schools. Assessments will often call for a copy of the lockdown procedures. Issues that may be considered include doors, windows, furniture, communication capabilities, emergency kits and procedures related to a lockdown.

Hazardous Materials – Many vulnerability assessments will have a stand-alone section, or integrate a request for information regarding hazardous materials. Assessments will call for information such as; description, location, quantity, and security of chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and explosive materials that are on site.

Computer/Technology Applications – There are several vulnerability assessments that are stand-alone vulnerability assessments specifically addressing computer and/or technology applications. Other assessments integrate computer/technology applications into stand-alone sections within the vulnerability assessment. Assessments look at the vulnerabilities in facility and infrastructure computer systems that can be exploited or disabled by terrorists, criminals, hackers or even by an all hazard event. Most general vulnerability assessments call for information including the following:

- How computer technology is actively utilized
- Kind and size of external connectivity
- Operating systems
- Backup systems
- Internal networking
- Remote networking
- Internet logon



Utility Connections – Common to most vulnerability assessments is a section calling for information regarding utility connections to the CI/KR. There are several areas where utilities are connected to facilities and infrastructure. Utilities will include the following:

- Telecommunications/Phone
- Water
- Electrical
- Fuel

Assessments will call for information including: location of system, accessibility of the system, location of shut offs, redundancy in systems, security of connections and system, contingency plans regarding systems.

Emergency Power – Emergency Power is also a common element of most vulnerability assessments. For information regarding generators and ask specific details about the systems such as: the location of the generator, security of the generator, fuel source and security of fuel source, automatic start, manual start, connections from generator to building, and information regarding the servicing and maintenance of the generator.

Additionally, assessments will address backup power units such as battery power for specific systems, maintenance and testing of power unit, automatic transfer switches, and contingency plans for power outages.

Heating, Ventilation, & Air Conditioning (HVAC) – Most vulnerability assessments will address a facility's and/or infrastructure's HVAC system. Assessments will call for information regarding the location of the system, air exchange handlers, air intakes and exhaust, security of the system's components, filter capabilities, system maintenance, duct system, and shut off locations and procedures.

Water Demand – Vulnerability assessments will address water in several ways. In some assessments, water will be categorized with fire suppression systems and will contain fire related data including, the amount of water calculated to adequately fight a fire, the number of hydrants to adequately fight a fire, adequate water pressure, and flushing programs in place. In addition, assessments will call for information regarding a CI/KR water supply and its reliability and contingency plans for water outages.

Special Use Rooms – Vulnerability assessments, for the most part, will call for information regarding meeting rooms, high occupancy rooms, safe rooms, mail handling rooms or facilities, laboratories, etc. Assessments will ask for specific information including the following:

- Location of the rooms
- Occupants
- Security in place
- Emergency communication abilities
- Safety features
- Availability of emergency kits
- Emergency power considerations
- HVAC considerations and alarm systems



Ceiling/Floors – Vulnerability assessments will often call for information regarding ceilings and floors. Ceilings can be a point of entry to the facility or infrastructure, a place to conceal items such as improvised explosive devices, or people, and contain a large amount of utility connections. Therefore, security of ceilings is considered in many assessments. Floors and floor coverings are also considered in many assessments. A wide variety of utility connections are located under flooring, especially electrical and computer cables, as in the case of an emergency operation center. Additionally, floor coverings such as carpeting or tile can create tactical issues for responders.

Policies and Procedures – Common to most vulnerability assessments is a review of CI/KR policies and procedures. Assessments will call for information regarding the existence of security plans, policies and procedures. Assessments will ask questions regarding; security plans, employee identification badges, access control policy, temporary identification, key control, contractor and vendor access, check-in procedures, criminal background checks on employees, vendors and contractors, opening and closing procedures, evacuation planning, chemical and biological storage, exercises, bomb threat procedures, vehicle identification procedures, mail handling procedures, facility design, security inquiry procedures, cyber attack prevention and identification procedure, bus pick up and drop off, etc.

Suspicious Activity Policies and Procedure – Vulnerability assessments may request information regarding suspicious activity policy and procedure under the policy and procedure section or may call for the information in a stand-alone section. This information is often addressed under a terrorist indicators section. This section will examine the ability of CI/KR personnel to recognize indicators of terrorist activity or suspicious behavior; observe reporting protocol and determine if training in this area is adequate.

Vendors, Contractors and Non-Facility Tenants – Vulnerability assessments will call for information regarding vendors and non-facility tenants. In some assessments, vendors and tenants will be addressed in stand-alone sections and in other assessments may be included in sections such as policy and procedures, contacts and be included under other categories. Information asked for in the assessment may include a listing of all facility tenants, their company names, contact information, and point of contact in the facility. Vendor information may require the following:

- Vendor/contractor point of entry into facility
- Restrictions to areas within facility
- Check-in procedures
- Criminal background checks of vendors and contractors



Employee, Visitor, and Contractor Identification Badges – Vulnerability assessments may address identification badges under policy and procedures; however, some assessments will call for this information in stand-alone sections. Information requested may include the following:

- Are employees required to wear identification badges?
- Does identification badge include photo?
- Who is manufacturer of identification badges?
- Does identification badge include access control system; i.e., Weigand card, smart chip, proximity card, barcode, or magnetic stripe?
- What software is required for access control?
- What are temporary identification capabilities?
- Are visitor logs maintained?

Reception – Reception areas are covered in most vulnerability assessments and may appear in a stand-alone section or in an access control related section. The reception area should be the contact point for all visitors that are entering the facility; therefore, assessments look at security that is in place at the reception area. Assessments will call for information regarding a description of a receptionist's duties such as monitoring CCTV, issuing visitor badges, monitoring sign-in procedures, and answering the telephone.

The assessment will also call for information regarding the physical security of the reception area such as security controls in place at the reception area, physical security of the reception booth, alarm systems in place at the reception area, on-site security officer or police officer, physical characteristics of doors and locking mechanisms, CCTV cameras, communication capabilities, etc.

Financial Vulnerability – Although the majority of public sector vulnerability assessments do not include specific sections on financial vulnerability, many private sector assessments contain such sections. Assessments will call for information regarding applicable insurance coverage for the CI/KR. Although many assessments will not specifically call for financial vulnerability information, they will address loss and related security measures to prevent loss.

Recommendations – The majority of vulnerability assessments will provide a stand-alone section or integrate a recommendation section into each portion of the assessment. Recommendation sections may call for a prioritized list of recommendations, some will prioritize the list for the assessor and others will only provide space for recommendations in the order in which they are suggested. Some assessments will also provide space for findings, both positive and negative. In most cases, the recommendation section will include a comprehensive list of identified concerns. The recommendation section may be in various formats ranging from an executive summary to a simple list.

When vulnerability assessments are conducted in a detailed and comprehensive manner, the information becomes very powerful and is useful to emergency responders and the private sector throughout their operations.



Module 2 Summary

In this lesson participants learned:

That threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments are defined as;

- According to the NRF, threat is defined as any indication of possible violence, harm, or danger.
- Risk is the probability of loss and is often used to prioritize CI/KR list.
- Vulnerability is a weakness in the design, implementation, or operation of an asset, system, or network, which can be exploited by an adversary or disrupted by a natural hazard or technological failure.

Additionally, the commonalities between threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments were discussed and explained.



Module 3 – Analyze Information and Develop Plans

Duration

13 hours

Instructor to Participant Ratio

1:25 maximum 50

Scope Statement

There are plans and operations that are specific to each emergency response discipline, level of government, and the private sector. For each, there is corresponding threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment (TRVA) information. Here, the specific plan and/or operation are matched with the applicable information from the assessment. The analysis of information phase is the bridge between the review of assessments and the development of plans and operations. In the analysis phase, the assessor identifies applicable information from the assessment to the specific plan. Once the applicable information has been identified, it is applied to the Development of Plans and Operations.

Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO)

Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to analyze the information found in threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments to determine the applicability to the specific plan or operation and utilize the information to develop plans and operations.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)

- 3-1 At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to identify information that would be applicable when developing or completing each of the following tasks which assist with the overall daily missions of prevention, protection, response, and recovery.
 - a. Planning
 - i. Operational Planning
 - ii. Strategic Planning
 - iii. Emergency Planning
 - iv. Event Planning
 - v. Pre-incident and Post-incident Planning
 1. Continuity of Operation Plan, Continuity of Government, and Business Continuity Plan (COOP/COG/BCP)
 2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE)
 3. Crime Scene
 - b. Developing Community Programs
 - c. Information and Intelligence
 - i. Intelligence Cycle
 - ii. Terrorist Planning Cycle



- d. Resource Allocation
- e. Response to Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS) Color-Code Changes and Specific DHS Alerts
- f. Incident Response and Recovery Management
- g. Selection of Applicable Technology

3-2 At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to describe how the information gathered in the assessment process can be used to recognize the applicable capability-based preparedness elements from the National Response Framework.

3-3 At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to align the various assessments to make them more adaptive in the fluid, all-hazards decision-making environment.

Lesson Topics

Analyzing Information

Development of Plans and Operations

- Planning
 - Operational Planning
 - Strategic Planning
 - Emergency Planning
 - Event Planning
 - COOP/COG/BCP Planning
 - Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Planning
 - Crime Scene Planning
- Developing Community Programs
- Information and Intelligence
 - Intelligence Cycle
 - Terrorist Planning Cycle
- Resource Allocation
- Response to Homeland Security Advisory System Color-Code Changes and Alerts
- Incident Response and Recovery Management
- Selection of Applicable Technology

Instructional Strategy

Course content will be presented through structured PowerPoint® slides, instructor led discussion, video examples of concepts, and a series of small group practical exercises. The small group exercises will require participants to identify threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment categories and discuss how the various categories could be useful when applied to daily planning and operations.



Assessment Strategy

Practical exercises will measure the participants' understanding of the course materials. Participants will verbalize their understanding of assessments and their relation to planning and operations. Instructors will evaluate the participants understanding of the course materials during the presentation portion of the practical exercises.

Practical Exercise (PE) Statement

At various points, instructors will ask course participants to write down five sections from any combination of threat, risk, and/or vulnerability assessments and give an example of how each relates to planning or operations, and how they can or could have used this information during their response to the first practical. Participants will have 10 minutes to write their answers. Upon completion, each participant will present their examples.




Analyzing Information and Developing Plans

Analyzing Information



After reviewing assessments to determine if there is information that may be applicable to the specific plan and/or operation, the information must be analyzed. During the analysis phase, information will be evaluated to determine if it is pertinent, if it is needed, where the information will be used and how the information will be used in the plans and operations. Analyzing Information is the second step in the RADAR Process.



There are plans and operations that are specific to each emergency response discipline, level of government, private sector industry and sector. For each, there is corresponding threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment (TRVA) information. Here, the specific plan and/or operation are matched with the applicable information from the assessment. In essence, the analysis phase begins during the review, as the assessor looks through the assessments for information that may be applicable. During the analysis phase, the assessor formally vets the information. At this time, information is processed to determine the following factors:

- Are the assessments and/or information contained in the assessments pertinent to the plan and/or operation?
- What information is needed for the plan that is being developed for the operation under consideration?
- Where will the information be used in the plan and/or operation?
- How will the information be used in the plan and/or operation?



Each discipline may have a specific plan that they are developing. When analyzing information, one plan may be the only plan in which the TRVA information will be used. Emergency managers may have several plans that are being developed and may analyze the information for several plans. When analyzing information, it may be helpful to organize the information in an assessment analysis table. This table will help the planner organize the information for future use in planning and operations.


The screenshot shows the NDPCI PLANNING DOC application window. It features two tabs: 'Assessment Analysis' (selected) and 'Planning Development'. The 'Assessment Analysis' tab contains an 'Assessment Analysis Table' with the following fields: 'Assessment' (set to 'Threat') and 'Section - Threat' (set to 'Definition of the Community and its Associated Missions'). Below this is an 'Applicable Plan / Operations' section with a dropdown menu and 'Add', 'Delete', and 'Clear All' buttons. The 'Assessment Information' section contains a text area with the following text: 'The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games will take place from 8-24 August 2008 in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The Beijing Organizing Committee (BOCOG) has sold over 7 million tickets to 302 sporting events, and organizers expect hundreds of thousands of international visitors and millions of Chinese to visit the capital this summer. The event will be attended by a number of national leaders and high profile delegates. The overall threat level for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics is considered to be MODERATE. Presently, there are no indications that terrorist groups have operational level plans to strike during the Beijing Olympics. Law enforcement officials are currently working to protect the teams, spectators, sponsors, events, and critical infrastructure throughout Beijing and China. The Games traditionally attract protesters and isolated terrorist attacks. While China intends to blanket the city with nearly 100,000 security personnel, there still exist several security threats to the U.S. private sector during the Games. Threats to U.S. businesses include facility defacement by activists and leftist groups, demonstrations, and possible anarchist activity resulting in violence.'

The analysis of information phase is the bridge between the review of assessments and the development of plans and operations. In the analysis phase, the assessor identifies applicable information from the assessment to the specific plan. Once the applicable information has been identified, it is applied to the Development of Plans and Operations Phase of the RADAR process.



Development of Plans and Operations

The third phase of the RADAR process is the Development of Plans and Operations. Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment information is now utilized to develop plans and operations.





Development of Plans and Operations

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment information can be useful in the following categories of planning and/or operations, which include, but are not limited to:

- 1) Planning
 - b. Operational Planning
 - c. Strategic Planning
 - d. Emergency Planning
 - e. Event Planning
 - f. Pre-incident and Post-incident Planning
 - i. COOP/COG/BCP
 - ii. CBRNE
 - iii. Crime Scene
- 2) Developing Community Programs
- 3) Information and Intelligence
 - a. Intelligence Cycle
 - b. Terrorist Planning Cycle
- 4) Resource Allocation
- 5) Response to Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) Color-Code Changes and Specific Alerts
- 6) Incident Response and Recovery Management
- 7) Selection of Applicable Technology

A plan development tool can be used to organize information. Figure 1 is an example of a plan development tool that is being used to develop operational plans for a crime problem taking place in a tourist area. This type of tool can be used by any discipline for any type of planning or operation.

ID	datestamp	Assessment	Section	Plans
8	10/21/2008 8:14 AM	Threat	Definition of the Community a...	Emergency Planning
8	10/21/2008 8:14 AM	Threat	Definition of the Community a...	Operational Planning

Figure 1: Planning and Development Table



Planning

Planning is the establishment of goals, policies and procedures. A well developed plan provides a map to the realization of expected outcomes. Plans can be long range, medium range or short term. Plans include detailed subcomponents, such as problem statements, strategies, responsibilities, resource needs, and expected outcomes, which can all be fortified with information from the threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment information. Planning will not ensure success, but the lack of comprehensive planning, which should include information from the threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment, will almost guarantee failure.

“Plans are nothing; planning is everything”
~ Dwight D. Eisenhower

The following plans can be enhanced using the TRVA process which includes, but is not limited to:

- Operational Planning
- Strategic Planning
- Emergency Planning
- Event Planning
- General Pre-incident and Post-incident Planning
 - COOP/ COG/BCP =(Continuity of Operations Plan)/(Continuity of Government)/(Business Continuity Plan)
 - CBRNE
 - Crime Scene

Operational Planning

Operational planning can refer to a plan which identifies the yearly objectives for specific operational units or directed operations to a specific identified task. Operational plans are developed by all disciplines. Fire service may develop an operational plan for known hazards. The public health and healthcare sector may develop operational plans for pandemic influenza. Law enforcement may develop operational plans to address a current crime trend, while private industry may use an operational plan to address an internal theft problem.



Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments can provide important information for operational planning. For example: Threat assessments often contain information regarding all aspects of an identified community that will affect an operation. The areas within the threat assessment that should be considered include, but are not limited to the following:

- Weather – can be a factor regarding time of year in which the operation will commence
- Terrain- can affect ingress and egress of responders to the scene
- Critical Facilities, Infrastructure and Events/CI/KR – may be subject of operation, or be affected by the operation
- Current Intelligence Exchange- provides information about communication issues between responders involved in the operation
- Demographics – is there a demographic that may be adversely affected by the operation
- Emergency Response Capabilities- what response agencies can provide resources to the operation
- Health Care- will rescue be placed on standby for the operation and if there is an injury to a responder where will they be transported

Most often, operational plans are going to be focused on combating a threat, i.e., wildfire, flood, crime, street gangs, terrorists, hurricanes, etc. The threat assessment is one of the best sources of information regarding threats; including terrorism, both manmade and natural disasters, as well as technological threats.

Threat information applicable to the planning process will often include pertinent information about the threat that can affect the operation. Information can include, but is not limited to the following areas:

- Existence – does this threat exist in the community in which the operation is taking place (this may also consider fire fuels, wind speeds, and other hazards)
- History – what the threat has done in the past will help determine where the operation should focus
- Capabilities – the abilities of the adversary should be taken into consideration to help determine what resources are needed for the operation
- Targeting – the targets of the threat will often serve as the focal point of the operation
- Methods and Tactics- knowing the threat's methods and tactics, helps responders plan the operation
- Threat Courses of Action – provides a realistic picture of how the threat will attack a particular target, which will help determine a realistic time and location to hold the operation



Operational Plans frequently address the following categories:

Strategies – planned actions that support the achievement of an objective

- Strategies may have up to a one-year focus
- Strategies are closely connected to resource allocation
- Strategies must be realistic and specific

Details – a list of the key tasks or steps for implementing the strategy

- List is limited to the major objectives or tactics
- Monitoring progress of plans

Responsibility – the person or group responsible for achievement of the strategy

- Identifies a position holder rather than an individual
- Identifies the office holder not individual

Resources – include people, funds, equipment, and physical space

- Information is used for planning and budgeting purposes

Target Start & End Dates – the month/year a strategy is planned to begin and end

Measure – the method by which achievement of the strategy will be determined

- Measures include direct, indirect, quantitative, and qualitative.

Again, strategies can be based upon information contained in the TRVA. Continuing with the example of the threat assessment, the assessment provides information about the community and related threats that are realistic and specific. Additionally, the assessment should provide information about available emergency response resources. Resources can be found in a section that identifies emergency response capabilities.

The operation's start and end dates could be directly affected by variables such as weather considerations and events that draw upon resources. For example: An operation should not be scheduled at the same time as an event that draws upon emergency response resources.



Strategic Planning

Strategic planning is an organization's process of defining its mission and determining how resources, including staffing and capital will be used to facilitate the strategy. Strategic planning defines an organization's current status, determines the direction in which it desires to go, and provides a framework on how to get there. In government as well as private organizations, the strategic plan determines how an organization is going to develop over the next year, the next 3 to 5 years, or in some cases the next 20 years.

Strategic planning can be enhanced by using information obtained through the TRVA. Threat assessments provide a great deal of pertinent information regarding the community missions, which are directly related to the emergency response organization's mission. Risk assessments also give insight into the mission of the CI/KR within the community, which is also related to the mission of the agency. In the private sector, the missions of the organization are articulated in the threat assessment and are evaluated again in the risk assessment. Vulnerability assessments relate to the strategic plan when planning includes capital improvements. The vulnerability assessment will provide information regarding specific vulnerability issues which will require funding to secure and will be highlighted in the strategic plan.

All strategic plans answer at least one of 3 questions:

1. "What is the mission?" Pertinent information can be found in both threat and risk assessments and include, but are not limited to the following:
 - a. Threat Assessment
 - i. Mission of the Community
 - b. Risk Assessment
 - i. Mission of the Facility
 - ii. Critical Infrastructure Impact
2. "Who does the mission support?" Pertinent information can be found in both threat and vulnerability assessments and include the following:
 - a. Threat Assessment
 - i. CI/KR list
 - ii. Emergency Response Providers
 - iii. Current Intelligence Exchange
 - iv. Law Enforcement Considerations
 - v. Private Security Considerations
 - b. Vulnerability Assessment
 - i. Facility Contacts
 - ii. Vendors, Contractors, and Non Facility Tenants
3. "How is success measured?" In business planning this question could be phrased, "How can we beat or avoid competition?"¹³

¹³ Bradford and Duncan, page 1 Chandler House Press (Sep 1999).



The following diagram depicts the steps in the strategic planning process. The process includes; an analysis of the current status, determination of future goals, an analysis of gaps between the current status and the future needs, development of strategies to bridge the gaps, implementation of strategies, and monitoring of the strategies to ensure they are accomplishing the goal.



Strategic planning often incorporates business analysis techniques including SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) and PEST analysis (Political, Economic, Social, and Technological analysis).¹⁴

In the development of the analysis, threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment information will be provided that can be used to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. The threat assessment will assist with political, economic, social, and technological analysis.

¹⁴ Southern Police Institute, Command Officer Development Course, 2005



Emergency Planning

The Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) describes how people and property will be protected during a disaster or emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) cautions that emergency planning is not a one-time event and describes emergency planning as a continual cycle of planning, training, exercising, and revising. The goal of an EOP is to provide a means to utilize all available resources to PREVENT potential emergencies or disasters whenever possible, PREPARE to deal efficiently with the effects of inevitable events, RESPOND to the needs of saving lives and protecting property, and to promote a means to RECOVER rapidly from unavoidable damages and MITIGATE loss. Emergency Operation Plans are intended to be both "generic" and "hazard" specific, covering the entire range of both manmade and natural disaster including terrorism.

The threat assessment is a natural place to begin developing information for an emergency plan. The threat assessment describes the threat (emergency) in detail which aids in the development of plans to prevent an emergency or disaster. The threat assessment also provides information about the community, CI/KR, and responder capabilities that will be essential in the response, recovery, and mitigation. The risk assessment will help prioritize prevention, response, and recovery efforts. Vulnerability assessments, although site specific, also provide a great deal of information for emergency plans that will be helpful for prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation at the CI/KR.

There are four steps in the emergency planning process:¹⁵

Conducting a hazard analysis is the process by which hazards that threaten the community are identified, researched, and ranked according to the risks they pose and the areas and infrastructure that are vulnerable to damage. The outcome of this step is a written hazard analysis that quantifies the overall risk to the community.

- ✓ 1. A hazard analysis is essentially a combination of the threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment.
 - Threat assessments will not only identify the hazard and provide a thorough work up, but in some instances they will provide a ranking based upon the probability of attack.
 - Risk assessments will often provide the required information regarding a ranked order of critical facilities, infrastructures, and events.
 - Vulnerability assessments will identify the strengths and weakness at the CI/KR level.
2. Developing the EOP includes the basic plan, functional annexes, hazard-specific appendices, and implementing instructions. The outcome of this step is a completed plan, which is ready to be trained, exercised, and revised based on lessons learned from the exercise process.

¹⁵ FEMA: IS-235 Emergency Planning



3. Testing the plan through training and exercises.
4. Maintaining the plan and conducting revisions.

After the plan is complete, testing and exercises can be designed using a reasonable threat course of action identified in the threat assessment, based upon the National Planning Scenarios identified within the “target capability list”. These scenarios are designed to be the foundational structure for the development of national preparedness standards from which homeland security capabilities can be measured because they represent threats or hazards of national significance with high consequence.



Event Planning

Event planning is a form of operation planning that is used to plan security, and emergency response for events. An event plan is a formal written plan that identifies potential emergency conditions at the event site and prescribes the procedures to be followed to minimize or prevent loss of life and property.

An event is a planned and/or organized activity which includes; competition, festival, party, contest, or convention, which will place a large group of individuals in a defined geographical area.

Event plans are tailored to site-specific conditions and to the requirements of the agency/organization that owns or regulates the site of the event.

The threat assessment can play a significant role in developing event plans and will provide important information about variables that may affect the event, emergency response capabilities for the event, communication issues, demographics of attendees and of the area surrounding the event, law enforcement, private security, and medical considerations. In addition, the threat assessment will provide information about Potential Threat Elements or potential hazards that may target the event and provide a probable threat course of action.

The risk assessment will help planners evaluate and/or prioritize the resources that will be used at the event.

The vulnerability assessment, if completed on the event, will provide a wealth of information about the security of the event perimeter, exterior, interior and operations, all of which are essential to the event planning process.

Pre-incident and Post-incident Planning

There are several plans that fall under pre-and post-incident planning including:

Pre-Incident Planning

- Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP)
- Continuity of Government Plans (COG)
- Business Continuity Plans (BCP)
- Pre-Incident Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Planning

Post-Incident Planning

- Post-Incident Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Planning
- Post-Incident Crime Scene Plans



Continuity of Operations Plans, Continuity of Government Plans, and Business Continuity Plans

Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP), Continuity of Government Plans (COG), and Business Continuity Plans (BCP) share a common theme; they all ensure that the capability exists to continue operations and essential functions after a natural or manmade disaster including terrorism. While FEMA does not provide specific guidance for BCP plans, the purpose of the plan is similar to COOP and COG in that it also ensures the capability to continue operations and essential functions after a wide variety of hazards.

The threat assessment will provide pertinent background information for continuity planning, as well as identify all hazard threats which could create the need for the continuity plan.

The risk assessment will provide information regarding potential risk factors that should be considered when creating a continuity plan, such as:

- Death and Injury
- Environmental Impact
- Economic Impact
- Critical Infrastructure Impact
- Symbolism
- Mission of the Facility
- Demographics
- History of Attack
- Accessibility
- Recognizability
- Proximity to other CI/KR
- Psychological Impact

The vulnerability assessment provides essential information that is highlighted in the planning objectives and key elements required in the planning process.

COOP/COG planning objectives include:

- Ensuring continued performance of essential functions
- Reducing loss of life and minimizing damage
- Ensuring succession to office of key leaders
- Reducing or mitigating disruptions to operations
- Protecting essential assets
- Achieving a timely recovery and reconstitution
- Maintaining a test, training, and exercise program for program validation

Vulnerability assessments often contain information identifying the essential functions of an operation and their susceptibility to failure, identify vulnerabilities regarding life safety and property damage issues, and offer recommendations to reduce loss of life, minimize damage and protect essential assets.



COOP/COG Considerations/BCP Planning

According to FEMA,¹⁶ there are several critical planning considerations that any COOP/COG/BCP plan should include:

- Capability of implementation anytime, with and without warning, during normal business hours and non business hours.
- Provide full operational capability for essential functions not later than 12 hours after activation.
- Capability of sustaining operations for up to 30 days.
- Agencies, Governments and Organizations must train members of their emergency staff and practice COOP procedures to ensure their skills stay current.
- Equipment and communications must be tested periodically to ensure that they are operable.

FEMA indicates that there are nine elements needed to provide a complete and effective COOP/COG capability. The elements include:

1. Essential functions
2. Delegations of authority
3. Alternate facilities
4. Interoperable communications
5. Vital records and databases
6. Human capital management
7. Tests, training, and exercises
8. Devolution (transfer of authority)
9. Reconstitution



The vulnerability assessment may provide information that can help the planner create a COOP/COG and BCP plan. Assessments may contain information about the essential functions and their susceptibility to attack or failure, location of alternate facilities or need for alternate facilities, communication issues, including interoperable communications, dead zones within a facility and communication with employees and visitors, as well as security of vital records and databases and the need for offsite back up.

¹⁶ IS 546 Continuity of Operations (COOP) Awareness Course



Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Planning

According to the Department of Homeland Security, the probability of a terrorist group orchestrating a CBRNE attack is high. Incendiary or explosive devices continue to be the most likely Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Preplanning for CBRNE related events is an essential tool for prevention of, protection from, response to, mitigation of and recovery from a CBRNE attack. Planning for CBRNE includes planning for intentional and accidental events.

The threat assessment provides an abundance of information regarding CBRNE including, but not limited to the following threat assessment categories:

- Missions of the community that will be affected by a CBRNE incident - a mission of tourism may compound the magnitude of the event by involving a tourist population.
- Geographical boundaries and their effect on a CBRNE incident – may create issues regarding incident response and migration of the event across jurisdictional boundaries.
- Terrain characteristics and their effect on a CBRNE incident – may create inversions or affect dispersal patterns based upon terrain issues, such as waterways, large structures and mountain ranges.
- Weather characteristics and subsequent effects on a CBRNE incident – weather patterns may affect dispersal of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substance. Weather can work to the responders benefit or detriment.
- Demographic characteristics and their effect on a CBRNE incident – A demographic which includes a large special needs population may drain responder resources.
- CI/KR may be the target or in close proximity to the CBRNE incident.
- Emergency response providers and their response to a CBRNE incident- Responders may have limited capabilities and personnel, and need assistance from outside agencies from the onset of the event.
- Law enforcement considerations may include availability of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
- Private security considerations may include availability of response teams versed in Chem-Bio release.
- Health Care and Department of Health –availability of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and location of Point of Distribution (POD) sites.



A detailed plan for initial CBRNE response should include the following elements and can utilize information from threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments:

- Articulate operational protocols and procedures
- Define communication channels, coordination points and cooperation agreements
- Review of common responsibilities
- Identification of control zones and access control points and the placement of appropriate control lines
- Identification of recommended public protection action options
- Provisions for environmental monitoring of the hazard site for contaminants
- Creation of a site safety and control plan
- Identification of stakeholders
- Inclusion of safe operational procedures
- Identification of applicable Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) which is accessible and maintained
- Identification of appropriate agencies for notification
- Articulate decontamination and transportation plan
- Identification of proper incident command forms
- Identify protocols for crime scene preservation and evidence collection



Incident Crime Scene Planning

Incident crime scene plans are used by law enforcement and other emergency responders who have responsibility for protecting crime scenes, preserving physical evidence, and collecting and submitting the evidence for scientific examination. The collection and protection of physical evidence plays a critical role in the overall investigation and resolution of a suspected criminal act.¹⁷

Crime scene planning (CSP) begins prior to the initial response to an incident and takes into consideration the responder's first responsibility of life safety. The CSP takes into consideration legal issues of a search. For example, in some cases an investigator may need a search warrant and in other cases a search warrant may not be needed due to issues such as plain view, hot pursuit and exigent circumstances.

The CSP will consider the establishment of a secure perimeter. The perimeter considerations will include:

- Expansion and contraction of the perimeter as the crime scene progresses
- Irregular or changing perimeter in response to hazard
- Perimeter boundaries including natural landscaping, buildings, roads and crime scene tape
- Adequate manpower to maintain perimeter

Vulnerability assessments, if available for a facility, infrastructure or an event where a crime scene is located, will provide guidance on setting inner and outer perimeters and perimeter boundaries. Resources can be found in completed threat assessments.

A CSP often includes the establishment of a decontamination area. The plan will consider the presence of potentially hazardous materials, such as chemical, biological, nuclear, and explosives; the presence of human or animal bodily fluids, or the simple presence of trace evidence. The decontamination area helps keep trace materials from being transferred from the primary crime scene into an alternate search site, or the cross contamination of trace materials from the crime scene to a potential suspect. A decontamination area may be identified in a vulnerability assessment under tactical considerations.

The plan often includes evidence collection, and chain of custody, procedure and protocol to insure the evidence is properly and legally collected, packaged, marked, logged, transported and stored in accordance with rules of evidence.

¹⁷ Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement, <http://www.ncjrs.gov>, 2000



The CSP will establish a pre-arranged evidence storage site. The plan will consider the amount of evidence to be collected and may consider an independent storage facility to store evidence for large scenes. The plan may also consider security and access control systems for the storage site. The vulnerability assessment may provide information regarding nearby facilities and/or outbuildings that can be secured and used to store evidence. CSP contingencies for intelligence needs, such as the National Security Administration's (NSA) need to gather intelligence at a crime scene, supersedes law enforcement's need to protect evidence and should be addressed in the case of incidents of national significance.

Witness identification, collection, separation and interview will be included in the plan. The plan will also consider the possibility witnesses may have acquired trace evidence due to their proximity to the crime scene, or their travel through the crime scene. The threat assessment will provide information regarding the Potential Threat Elements. Potential Threat Elements may be at the scene and may be identified as witnesses. The threat assessment may provide a list of indicators that can link an individual to a group, such as tattoos, clothing, body language and/ or behavior.

Additionally, the plan may require collection of all video security camera recordings from facilities around the crime scene. The CSP may articulate a process for requesting subpoenas for telephone records from areas within several blocks to several miles from the area, and cell phones and records of incoming calls to the target facility. The vulnerability assessment will often provide information about camera locations, monitoring capabilities, recording capabilities, video storage and ability to provide still photographs.



Practical Exercise 2

Introduction: Module 3 exercise is designed to reinforce the class participants understanding of the information that can be obtained in a threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment and the applying of the information for an incident plan and operational response.

Action to be completed: Course participants will be required to write down five (5) examples of information found in the threat, risk, and/or vulnerability assessment that could be used to develop plans for response to the scenario presented at the beginning of day one (barricaded suspect at a school). *(An example is provided below)* Each class participant will be asked to verbally present one example to the class.

<i>Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Information:</i>	<i>Use in Planning and Operations</i>
<p><i>Threat Assessment:</i></p> <p>Threat group information indicates that a street gang with members attending Mountain View H.S. target emergency responders.</p>	<p>As a contingency to the emergency response plan for the school, a team is designated to clear potential staging areas and for secondary devices or threats.</p>

Time necessary to complete: The table top exercise is timed and will conclude within one (1) hour after its start. Fifteen (15) minutes will be dedicated to participants reviewing information in the threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments and creating their list of five (5) examples. The remaining time will be utilized for verbal presentation from class participants. Time may be adjusted to allow each participant to present their example.

Resources: An exercise worksheet and the assessments located in the Participant Guide.



Developing Community Programs

Community Programs are created by governmental, nongovernmental and private sector organizations to educate and/or increase awareness about issues that concern the community. Emergency Responders create a wide variety of programs which can range from Homeland Security to the prevention of communicable disease.

Development of community programs includes nine (9) key elements:

1. Problem Identification
2. Establishment of Goals and Objectives for the Program
3. Identification of the Target Audience
4. Development of Information to be Delivered
5. Identification of Delivery Technique(s)
6. Identification of Resources
7. Determination of Budget
8. Determination of Timeline
9. Measurement of Results

Threat assessments can be a valuable tool in developing community programs and relate to many of the key elements.

Problem Identification is the first step in community program development and is often accomplished by completing a formal or informal needs assessment. In many cases, the problem will be identified through statistics, such as an increase in number of auto thefts in a specific area, forest fires caused by negligence, or an increase in communicable disease in a particular city. However, a properly completed threat assessment will articulate and identify concerns within a community, including problems such as those mentioned above.

After a problem has been identified, goals indicating the desired outcome will be set and objectives to meet the goals will be determined. These goals and objectives will be the framework for which the community program will be based. The target audience may be identified after the goals and objectives are determined. In some instances, the target audience may be identified during the needs assessment and additional audience members identified after determining the goals and objectives. The threat assessment will also provide information about the target audience from different perspectives, such as demographic considerations and as targets of the Potential Threat Elements.



The development of information to be delivered will include input from various sources. Research may include review of periodicals, statistical information, internet, textbooks, professional journals, best practice information, and subject matter expert input. The information developed will consider the needs of the target audience and the goals and objectives of the program. The threat assessment contains baseline information for the development of the community programs. Again, missions, demographics, all hazard threat information, etc. is applicable. Solutions come from research that is based upon facts contained in the assessment.

Delivery techniques and related resources will consider the needs of the target audience. A community program regarding terrorism awareness may include a PowerPoint® presentation and lecture, while a community program about first aid may include many hands on exercises. Variables such as the primary language of the target audience may also be considered. Demographic information found in the threat assessment can play a role in deciding on how a program should be delivered. The target audience may be from a predominantly Spanish speaking community, therefore the program and related resources will be presented in Spanish and English. Resources will support the program's goals and objectives.

Budgeting is a primary consideration when developing community programs. Budgetary requirements are derived from the goals and objectives, delivery techniques, resource requirements and program development. A budget may be limited by a grant, an existing budget, or program developers may have to seek funding to support a community program. Once the budget has been determined, the community program may have to be adjusted to meet the budgetary constraints. Although assessments may not contain budget information, they contain information that will help justify a budget. In addition, the assessment may provide information that helps justify grant funding.

The development of a community program will require the creation of a detailed timeline that will consider program development, program approval, implementation, and review. In many cases the program will have a defined period of time in which it will be provided. In other cases, a program could exist in perpetuity.

A tool to measure the results of a community program should also be considered. In order to track the effectiveness of the program, the goals should be measurable. For example, if auto theft is a problem in a community, the goal of the program may be to reduce auto theft. An analysis of auto theft reports prior to, during, and after the community program should be conducted to measure the effectiveness of the program.



Information and Intelligence

Information and/or intelligence is used by emergency responders from multiple disciplines and the private sector, both vertically and horizontally, in order to detect, prevent, protect against, and mitigate all threats, all crimes, and all hazards to include terrorism. Information and Intelligence are terms that are commonly interchanged but have different meanings.



- Information is considered "fact based" with no effort on the part of the collecting agency or individual to validate such.
- Intelligence is produced through analysis or evaluation of pieces of information against a set of criteria. It is designed to tell the user something about the subject and their activities.

When discussing information and/or intelligence, it is important to note that sources may have specific constraints on the collection, storage or sharing of information and/or intelligence with other entities. Originating agencies may have specific rules regarding dissemination to a third party.¹⁸

The intelligence cycle is used as the process of developing unrefined information into polished intelligence for use by responders. The intelligence cycle consists of six steps, which include:

1. Requirements
2. Planning and Direction
3. Collection
4. Processing and Exploitation
5. Analysis and Production
6. Dissemination

¹⁸ For additional information contact the National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) at www.ncirc.gov.



Requirements

Requirements are identified information needs. Information needs are predominantly based upon a community's threat and risk assessment, and the agency's mission. Requirements also consider an agency's information and/or intelligence needs to share information and/or intelligence with, federal, state, local, tribal, CI/KR, and private sector entities.

Planning and Direction

Planning and direction is management of the entire effort, from identifying the need for information to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. It involves implementation plans to satisfy requirements levied on the agency or department, as well as identifying specific collection requirements based on agency or department needs. Planning and direction also is responsive to the end of the cycle, because current and finished intelligence, which supports decision-making, generates new requirements.

Collection

Collection is the gathering of raw information based on requirements. Activities such as interviews, technical and physical surveillances, human source operation, searches, and liaison relationships result in the collection of intelligence. Once information and/or intelligence are identified, a collection management plan (CMP) should be implemented to assist in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of criminal information/intelligence.



Collecting Information and/or Intelligence

Information/intelligence can be collected from a variety of sources to include the following:

Completed threat assessments	Political rallies
Completed vulnerability assessments	Law enforcement agencies
Open sources (libraries, newspapers, Internet, academic institutions, etc.)	Bureau of motor vehicles
Criminal information sources (local and state law enforcement agencies, CID, FBI, DEA, etc.)	Regulatory agencies
Intelligence (military, federal, SIPRNET, INTELINK)	State and federal tax agencies
Geographic information	Local clerks and records
Personal contact	Television, radio
Networking	Informants
Public forums	Human intelligence
	Weather experts
	Medical experts
	Intelligence sharing groups
	Additional sources

Processing and Exploitation

Processing and Exploitation involves converting the vast amount of information collected into a form usable by analysts. This is done through a variety of methods including decryption, language translations, and data reduction. Processing includes the entering of raw data into databases where it can be exploited for use in the analysis process.

Analysis and Production

Analysis and production is the conversion of raw information into intelligence. It includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing available data, and preparing intelligence products. The information's reliability, validity, and relevance is evaluated and weighed. The information is logically integrated, put in context, and used to produce intelligence. This includes both "raw" and "finished" intelligence. Raw intelligence is often referred to as "the dots"—individual pieces of information disseminated individually. Finished intelligence reports "connect the dots" by putting information in context and drawing conclusions about its implications.

Information and/or intelligence must be analyzed to determine if it is:

- Pertinent
- Reliable
- Applicable



Dissemination

Dissemination is the last step in the intelligence cycle. It is the distribution of raw or finished intelligence to the consumers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements. How information is disseminated may vary from agency to agency. The FBI, for example, uses the following standard formats: Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), FBI Intelligence Bulletins, and FBI Intelligence Assessments. Fusion Centers can greatly assist agencies and departments with disseminating information while maintaining control over who views the information.

Information and/or intelligence must be disseminated and disposed of properly. To ensure proper measures are taken into consideration, the following objectives should be considered:

- Determine the degree of classification (always consider using an unclassified version)
- Supply the documents to individuals who have a need to know/right to know
- Store information properly
- Destroy outdated/non-essential information properly
- Develop new requirements and sources of information

Types of Intelligence Produced in the Intelligence Cycle

There are three types of intelligence that will be produced from information processed in the intelligence cycle and include the following:

- Strategic Intelligence
- Protective Intelligence
- Tactical Intelligence

The classifications of intelligence range from an all encompassing perspective, intelligence that is specific to a particular target to intelligence that will be used to conduct an operation. Strategic Intelligence is intelligence required for forming policy and long term, broad based planning. Protective Intelligence is any intelligence used for the protection of CI/KR. It should predict a developing terrorist threat or provide a credible warning of a possible or probable terrorist attack. Tactical Intelligence is intelligence required for planning and conducting tactical operations.

Intelligence Cycle and Local Agencies

It is important to point out that not all small or even medium sized agencies or private entities have the capability/ability to process intelligence through the full cycle. However, each emergency response agency or private entity will likely be involved with at least one or more sections of the cycle. Local jurisdictions under population 50,000 make up a very large portion of the country and may depend on assistance from their federal, state, county, local, tribal and private industry partners in developing the full range of the intelligence cycle.



Threat Assessment and the Intelligence Cycle

The threat assessment integrates into the Intelligence Cycle. A properly completed threat assessment holds information that can be processed, as well as refined intelligence. The categories most applicable to the cycle include:

- Mission of the Community – Provides information about the community that the PTE may exploit.
- Demographics – May contain information about a group(s) that a PTE would target, blend into, or from which the PTE would stand out.
- Weather Characteristics – May contain information that in conjunction with other pertinent information may help determine timing for an attack.
- Logistical Infrastructure – Provides information about systems, such as transportation systems that would be of interest to the PTE.
- CI/KR List – Lists critical facilities, infrastructure and events that a PTE may target.

Threat assessments will provide a listing of PTE and identification factors that apply directly to the intelligence cycle. Threat factors for consideration include:

- Existence – identifies presence of the PTE
- History – provides information about documented incidents and activities in which the PTE has been involved
- Intentions – describes the overall goal of the PTE
- Capability - describes the training, skills, financial means, and access to resources possessed by the PTE
- Targeting – in conjunction with the CI/KR list and Risk Assessment, lists targets that the PTE may attack
- Methods and Tactics- defines the PTE normal operation and strategy
- Threat Course of Action- integrates threat factors to determine what the PTE is most likely to carry out in the community



Risk Assessment and the Intelligence Cycle

Risk assessment can also play a significant role in the intelligence cycle. The risk assessment is normally used to prioritize CI/KR from both the perspective of the responder and community as well as from the perspective of the PTE, to determine the overall impact of an attack on a given target. Therefore, it will relate to factors the PTE will consider when choosing a target, and will include the following:

- Mission – will look at how the mission of the facility relates to the community and how loss of the facility will affect the community's mission.
- Demography – will look at the demographics within a particular CI/KR that a PTE may target.
- Symbolism – will look at the symbolic aspect of a particular CI/KR from the perspective of the PTE.
- History – will look at the PTE history of attack on a particular CI/KR type.
- Accessibility – will measure the ability of PTE to enter a particular CI/KR with varying degrees of access control.
- Recognizability – will measure the ability of the PTE to recognize a particular CI/KR.
- Population – will list the numbers of individuals that will be within a particular CI/KR during peak times.
- Proximity – will describe the location of the CI/KR in regards to other CI/KR and/or population centers. In some cases, proximity will look at the location of property or individuals that the PTE considers untouchable in relation to or within the CI/KR.

Vulnerability Assessment and the Intelligence Cycle

The vulnerability assessment also holds information that can be useful in the intelligence cycle. Sections applicable within the assessment include:

- Purpose of the Site – describes a reason why the facility, infrastructure or event is considered CI/KR and relates to why it may be targeted by the PTE
- Threat Course of Action- describes what the PTE is most likely to attack at the particular CI/KR
- Outer Perimeter – will articulate the access controls that are visible to the PTE, allowing a PTE to determine if the target is a hard target or a soft target
- Building Exterior- will articulate access control points at the exterior of the building further helping the PTE to determine security controls at the CI/KR
- Facility Website – or other media sources may provide critical information about the CI/KR that can be exploited by the PTE
- Public Records – can provide critical information about CI/KR that can be exploited by the PTE
- Local Gathering Points – restaurants, pubs, etc. may be frequented by workers from the CI/KR. PTEs can gather sensitive information by listening to casual conversations.



Terrorist Planning Cycle

Just as emergency responders rely on information and intelligence, it has been identified that a terrorist also follows a planning cycle. Planning cycles are used by terrorists to minimize their risk and achieve the highest probability of success; avoid the opponents' strengths and concentrate on their weaknesses; and maximize target effects. The terrorist objectives include casualties, destruction and psychological impact.

The terrorist planning cycle includes seven (7) phases¹⁹.

1. Broad Target Selection
2. Intelligence and Surveillance
3. Specific Target Selection
4. Pre-attack Surveillance and Planning
5. Attack Rehearsal
6. Execution of Actions on the Target
7. Escape and Exploitation

Broad Target Selection

Terrorists will collect information on a large number of potential targets. Information gathered may include open source information from all media news sources and the internet. Terrorists choose targets based upon the same criteria we use to determine importance of targets such as symbolic value, psychological effect and potential casualties. It is important to review the Risk assessment to determine which targets the PTE is most likely to select.

Surveillance Indicators

- Standing at bus or train stops for extended periods
- Extended phone calls at phone booths
- Extended periods of time taking notes and drawing
- Work vans/vans with tinted windows parked for long periods of time outside target
- Joggers who stand and stretch for extended periods of time
- Individuals demanding a window seat in restaurant with a view of CI/KR and order little or no food
- Individuals who apply for position w/in CI/KR and after entering facility indicate that they are no longer interested in the position
- Loitering near CI/KR
- Individual disguised as a homeless person
- Photographing CI/KR
- Workers on crews looking at CI/KR and not working
- Family picnicking near CI/KR for extended periods
- Unknown individuals observing security drills, bomb threats, fire alarm pulls
- Individuals renting property requesting view of CI/KR

¹⁹ A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 2005



Intelligence and Surveillance Intelligence Gathering

Terrorists will gather information by observing practices, procedures and routines. They may watch for scheduled deliveries, work shift changes and access control procedures. They may gather information regarding facilities, including physical layouts. In addition, they may gather information about transportation routes, ingress and egress points, vehicles allowed on grounds and availability of transportation to the target site. Terrorists may also look at existing security measures such as:

- Presence of a security force
- Reaction time of response units
- Hardening of structures, barriers, or sensors
- Personnel, package, and vehicle screening procedures
- Type and frequency of emergency reaction drills
- Security of high occupancy areas
- Access control
- Security levels at different times

Vulnerability assessments help to identify where the PTE will gather intelligence, and conduct surveillance; i.e. parking garage across the street from the target.

Surveillance Characteristics

Terrorists will conduct surveillance of a facility, infrastructure and/or event. Although the word *surveillance* means "watching over,"²⁰ surveillance can include all forms of observation or monitoring, not just visual observation. Surveillance will include both fixed and mobile surveillance.

Fixed surveillance would be used to watch a facility, infrastructure and/or event and is accomplished using a static position, which may include an adjacent building, residence, parking garage, etc. A mobile surveillance is usually used to observe and follow individuals and/or vehicles. Mobile surveillance is accomplished using a vehicle.

Specific Target Selection

Terrorists will target a wide variety of facilities, infrastructure and/or events including all 18 sectors identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

²⁰ [Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary](#)



Terrorists may take several criteria into consideration when choosing a specific target to include the following:

- Does a success affect a larger audience than the immediate victim(s)?
- Will the target attract high profile media attention?
- Does success make the desired statement to the correct target audience?
- Is the effect consistent with the objectives of the group? (Such as economic, political, military, psychological, etc.)
- Does the target provide an advantage to the group by demonstrating its capabilities?
- What are the costs versus the benefits of conducting the operation?

Again, the risk assessment will provide a wealth of information regarding specific target selection.

Pre-attack Surveillance and Planning

Members of the cell or trained individuals will conduct the pre-attack surveillance and planning phases. During this phase, they will gather information about the specific target's patterns over a period of time. This phase allows the team to confirm the information gathered during the intelligence and surveillance stage.

Rehearsals

Terrorists may conduct rehearsals to improve their odds of success, confirm their planning assumptions, and develop contingency plans. In addition, probing will occur during the rehearsal phase in order to test security reactions to particular attack profiles. Members of the group or unwitting individuals may be used to test the reactions of the security force and/or responders.

The behavioral identifier section of a threat assessment or within a vulnerability assessment may illuminate a particular behavior that is present in a PTE participating in the rehearsal stage.

Execution of Actions on the Target

When executing actions against the target, terrorists want to minimize the time spent conducting the operation, to reduce the risk of being disrupted and/or caught by security forces.

The attackers try to employ the element of surprise by choosing the time, place and conditions of attack. Often the attackers will deploy diversions and secondary attacks and may attempt to impede the response of security forces.



Escape and Exploitation

The terrorist escape after the attack may also be rehearsed. Escape may be to enhance the effect of fear and terror, or may be to enhance the impact by their willingness to die. Exploitation is the primary objective of the operation. The act must be exploited and publicized in order to achieve the desired effect. Attackers may have prepared statements and media control measures timed to exploit a successful operation, which may include video and pictures of the event.

The threat assessment will articulate ingress and egress points applicable to the community and the vulnerability assessment will articulate ingress and egress points applicable to the specific target.



Resource Allocation

According to the National Preparedness Guidelines, planning and resource allocation involves application of common planning processes and tools by government officials, working with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and individual citizens to identify requirements, allocate resources, and build and maintain coordinated capabilities that are prioritized based upon risk.

Making decisions about resource allocation requires information about the resources available and their relative effectiveness for achieving the organization's goal. Resources include; people, materials, equipment, money, and information. A resource allocation plan directs available resources to achieve the organization's goals.

A resource allocation plan often consists of two parts; the basic allocation decision and contingency mechanisms.

The basic allocation decision is the choice of which resources are needed, the quantity of resources which are needed, and which resources are not essential for a particular operation.

There are two contingency mechanisms. The first contingency would include a list of prioritized resources that were not included in the initial operation, due to lack of availability, but should be utilized if they become available. The second contingency is a priority ranking of some resources included in the plan that could be sacrificed if total resources must be reduced.

Resource Typing

Resource typing should be considered when developing a resource allocation strategy. A national initiative is underway with the goal of establishing standards for resources. Under this system, if an agency orders a bomb squad, it will receive a known set of resources in terms of personnel, equipment and capabilities. Currently, tracking these resources can be done on a local, regional, statewide and national level. This allows response agencies to plan on where they will get specialized equipment as well as additional equipment needed for large or complex incidents.


Credentialing

Included in a resource allocation plan should be a mechanism for credentialing. Responders that come from, or are provided to other jurisdictions are expected to arrive ready to go to work. Knowing that a person is actually a qualified responder is important to the receiving agency. Allowing a member of the media or general public into a crime scene, due to their deception, can compromise a case and can endanger responders, therefore in a resource allocation plan, it is very important to include credentialing as a mechanism to identify resources (personnel).

Most of the information contained within the threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment relates to resource planning.



Response to Homeland Security Advisory System Color-Code Changes and Alerts



Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3) established the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), which alerts the Nation to adopt the appropriate level of preparedness and readiness. HSAS employs five color-coded threat levels, ranging from green or low threat risk to red or severe threat risk. The various levels reflect both the probability that an attack will occur and its potential severity.²¹

The HSAS is used by response agencies to guide protective measures when specific information to a particular sector or geographic region is received.

Homeland Security Threat Advisories contain actionable information about an incident involving, or a threat targeting, critical national networks or infrastructures or key assets. They could also relay newly developed procedures that, when implemented, would significantly improve security or protection.

The alerts may also suggest a change in readiness posture, protective actions, or response. Advisories are targeted to federal, state, and local governments, private sector organizations, and international partners.

Homeland Security Information Bulletins communicate information of interest to the Nation’s critical infrastructures that do not meet the timeliness, specificity, or significance thresholds of warning messages. Such information may include statistical reports, periodic summaries, incident response or reporting guidelines, common vulnerabilities and patches, and configuration standards or tools. It also may include preliminary requests for information. Bulletins are targeted to federal, state, and local governments, private sector organizations, and international partners.

The color-coded threat level system is used to communicate with public safety officials and the public at-large through a threat-based, color-coded system so that protective measures can be implemented to reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack. Raising the threat condition has economic, physical, and psychological effects on the Nation; so, the Homeland Security Advisory System can place specific geographic regions or industry sectors on a higher alert status than other regions or industries, based on specific threat information.

The DHS Terrorist Threat Guidelines, developed by the major city police chiefs and major county sheriffs, is a good example of how preventive measures for CI/KR can be implemented based upon color code changes.

²¹ Terrorist Threat Guidelines, 2004, U.S. Department of Homeland Security



Protective measures categories concerning CI/KR include the following:

- Identification and classification of CI/KR
- Roles and Responsibilities
- Planning and Assessment
- Training and Exercising
- Departmental Preparedness and Coordination
- Command and Control
- National Incident Management System (NIMS)
- Staffing
- Physical Security

Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment information is vital to implementing protective measures in response to HSAS Color Code changes. Changes are based upon threat and vulnerability. Therefore, it is critical to consider the threat with regard to the applicable community and the vulnerabilities identified at related CI/KR. **It is important to note, if a color code changes and specific information regarding a particular sector or CI/KR is articulated, that information should be added to the risk assessment and the assessment should be adjusted to reflect changes.**



Incident Response and Recovery Management

Incident management covers a broad area that ranges from the daily routine handling of incidents by local agencies up to multistate disasters. Incident response, recovery, and management is a function of all incidents. In small day to day incidents, this may be as simple as responding to a completed call and filing a report. In larger events such as a flood, hurricane or terrorist attack, the response will include a variety of disciplines with multiple functions and the recovery phase will likely be many months or years. The threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment provides critical information that can be used to help guide incident managers.

Incident management is a local responsibility no matter how large an incident becomes. The ability to achieve positive outcomes relative to the impacts of the event relate directly to the ability of incident managers to anticipate, mitigate and recover quickly from them.


Key Elements of Incident Management for Response and Recovery include:

- Incident Command System (ICS)
- Multiagency Coordination Systems (MACS)
- Agreements
- Public information systems
- Responder training
- Policies and procedures
- Incident and community communications systems
- Incident facilities
- Incident resource management
- Cost tracking and cost recovery
- Community recovery

Daily operations involving rescue or response to “routine calls” are often governed by operating procedures or policies. Larger incidents that are beyond routine in terms of size, scope, complexity, or may involve multiple agencies require a more defined management process. Managing these incidents involves processes such as planning, providing logistics, tracking costs, directly overseeing the efforts of multiple response elements and command of the overall incident scene. The incident command system is the national standard for incident management under NIMS. In addition, support efforts associated with larger incidents include the need to assure that public information systems function and that multiagency coordination systems are in place under NIMS.



Multiagency Coordination Systems (MACS) involve agency officials with decision level authority who will provide direction to on scene incident commanders and will coordinate the support of responders through prioritizing resources and reaching outside of the community to obtain resources or assistance. MACS allow incident commanders to focus on the incident and not be distracted by outside concerns. Public information systems include all the means for information dissemination to both the public and to agencies outside of the impacted area. A governor needs timely accurate information in order to request assistance from other states or from the federal government. Information provided to the media needs to be accurate and timely so that they can assist with getting evacuation information to the public.



The planning process at a large event involves gathering information and intelligence to enable incident managers to make critical decisions. Much of the information will come in terms of situational awareness from responders' feedback in the form of maps or reports. Other information will be gathered from existing sources such as GIS layers, pre-plans, facility diagrams and should come from the threat assessments and vulnerability assessments.

Incident action plans will be completed during each operational period to assist managers and organize objectives.

Resource tracking is also part of the planning process. Information regarding resources can be found in the threat assessment. Knowing where to find and order/secure personnel or equipment that is specific to an incident is a key feature of effective pre-planning. Tracking responders and resources from all involved agencies is a safety concern in terms of accountability, a legal consideration when crime scenes are concerned and a financial concern when it comes time to pay for or approach cost recovery for an incident.

Logistical concerns are noted early in a larger incident. The need to establish a place to stage equipment is an early consideration as is the need to establish a command post. Later considerations will often include water, food, fuel, shelter and restroom facilities for responders as well as briefing areas for both responders and the media. Pre-established locations are places that are safe, secure and have needed logistical support items. Vulnerability assessments may articulate applicable sites for command posts, and staging areas.



Financial cost tracking for reimbursement is a component of both daily operations and large incident management for many communities. The number of response elements and cost items to track is far greater in a large event and will often require significant effort during and after an incident.

Post Incident Debrief and After-Action Report (AAR) and capturing Lessons Learned

After Action Reports and debriefings summarize and analyze performance in both exercises and actual events. They are structured reviews for analyzing what happened, why it happened, and how it can be done better. Formal after action reviews were developed by the U.S. Army. After action reports and debriefings are used at all levels of government and within private industry.

The AAR occurs within a cycle of establishing the leader's intent, planning, preparation, action and review. Formal AAR meetings are normally run by a facilitator, and can be chronological reviews or tightly focused on a few key issues. A debriefing is a less formal after action review but equally important. Following the culmination of the incident, a complete debriefing of all hands should be conducted. Recording of the facts regarding response, personnel, equipment, and future response priorities should be included in updated plans. In both cases the focus is on lessons learned and improving future operational effectiveness. The lessons learned website was created as a national repository for submitting and sharing small and large scale events to build on best practices.

Current assessments can be used during the AAR to uncover areas that should have been addressed. For example, if during the event a command post was placed in an exposed area, the assessment may have suggested an alternate placement, further solidifying the need to have assessments available at the time of response.

The recovery process from a major disaster will occur on several phases. The first phase of recovery is to re-establish services such as law enforcement or fire protection. Roads will need to be opened or cleared allowing responders to access utilities such as power, water and sewer systems. Once a basic infrastructure is re-established, agencies can begin to open stores and get fueling facilities into operation. This must be completed before evacuees can be allowed within the disaster area. The restoration phase of damaged or destroyed infrastructure may take years. The economic recovery will depend on damage to local businesses or industries. Recreational and tourist industries may never recover in some cases. Anticipating impacts and pre-planning mitigation efforts will help speed recovery and possibly assure recovery in some cases.

Cost recovery is a key to local government's recovery. Most agencies can cover some unexpected costs, but few if any can pay for a large response that lasts for days or weeks without assistance. The impact on a tax base following an incident can also delay agency recovery to previous levels.

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments can provide essential information for effective and efficient incident response and recovery management.



Selection of Applicable Technology

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, federal, state, local and tribal agencies have been inundated by vendors selling technology. Stories of vendors selling chemical and biological detectors made from cardboard boxes covered in aluminum foil are commonplace. Therefore, it is important for agencies to make informed decisions regarding the selection and purchase of technology.

The first step in the selection of technology is to identify agency technology requirements. The Threat Assessment offers a wealth of information for determining technology requirements, as does the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment. Once identified, these requirements will become the foundation for technology selection. The following steps can be used in the selection of technology and related planning:

- Conduct a needs assessment, establish technology requirements, and describe current technology resources. Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments will often be the source of identification of need and identify technology requirements.
- Evaluate defined needs relative to current capabilities and select a solution that will meet the goals of the initiative
- Implement the selected technology solution and incorporate it into comprehensive technology as well as plans and operations
- Provide for the maintenance and support of technology solutions on an ongoing basis
- Train users to maximize the utility and efficiency of technology
- Integrate the technology resources and technology-based practices into the daily routines, work, and management of the organization

Technology Planning

Many emergency response agencies as well as the private sector have technology plans in place or should develop a technology plan. In most responder organizations, the overall goal of a technology plan is the successful integration of technology in support of emergency response. Achieving this goal often requires the purchase of new or upgraded technology. The technology plan, and the policies that derive from it, should guide decision-making. When an organization introduces new components to its technology system, plans and policies must be updated to reflect the change to the overall system. Moreover, when other changes occur within an organization (e.g., it develops new missions, such as Homeland Security), the technology plan must adapt accordingly.

Technology Policy and Procedure

Agency policies and procedures will establish the guidelines for technology planning and selection. Agency policy and procedure should serve as a guideline against which a technology plan is developed and carried out. Likewise, policies can be a product of new or existing technology plans. Planners should take into consideration policies and procedures that will



govern their efforts. Policy and procedures should include a review of threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments as a required, first step in the technology selection process.

e.g. → For Example, in 2007, the Belknap County Sheriff's Office and Laconia Police Department, in Laconia, New Hampshire conducted the HLS-CAM®, Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment to assess their community and CI/KR and used the assessments to select applicable technology to be tested at the 2007, 84th annual Motorcycle Week in Laconia, NH. The technology selected for testing included portable, wireless video surveillance cameras. However, at the time, New Hampshire State law indicated that video surveillance technology could not be used to determine the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of its occupants. Before the technology was purchased and used, a policy prohibiting the use of the technology to be used to read license plates was implemented. The law has since been rescinded but illustrates how policy and procedure can affect the purchase of technology.

New Hampshire State Statute
Highway Video Surveillance
Section 236:130

236: 130 Highway Surveillance Prohibited.

I. In this subdivision, ""surveillance" means the act of determining the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of a motor vehicle's occupants on the public ways of the state or its political subdivisions through the use of a camera or other imaging device or any other device, including but not limited to a transponder, cellular telephone, global positioning satellite, or radio frequency identification device, that by itself or in conjunction with other devices or information can be used to determine the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of a motor vehicle' s occupants...

Source. 2006, 107:1, eff. July 1, 2006.

Technology policies can include:

- Policies governing acquisition, maintenance, or disposal of equipment or applications
- Information security policies
- Acceptable use (or appropriate use) policies
- Policies concerning donated equipment
- Federal, state, local and tribal law

Developing a Technology Plan

Technology plans are the key to the deployment of new technology. A technology plan can be informal and be limited to the organization or can be very formal requiring a public hearing or formal procedure for receiving input and authority from various stakeholder groups.



A technology plan should meet the following criteria:

- The plan should establish clear goals and a realistic strategy for using technology to improve emergency response.
- The plan should include an assessment of the hardware, software, networking, human resources, and financial resources needed to improve emergency response.
- The plan should provide for a sufficient budget and schedule to acquire, maintain, and secure the hardware, software, and related issues (e.g., training) that will be needed to implement the strategy.
- The plan should have a professional development strategy to ensure that staff members know how to use these new technologies to improve emergency response capabilities.
- The plan should include an evaluation process that enables the organization to monitor progress toward the specified goals, and make midcourse corrections in response to new developments and opportunities as they arise.

Implementing a Technology Initiative

Technology planning is the cornerstone of developing a successful technology initiative. The concerns regarding implementation of a technology initiative include: staying on schedule when purchasing and installing equipment, training users, and evaluating each new technology introduced.

Evaluating a Technology Plan

It is important to evaluate the effectiveness of a technology plan both during and after implementation. Included in the plan policy should be a review cycle, a provision for revising a plan based on evaluation, which includes timelines and reporting expectations. Evaluators can analyze implementation benchmarks, budget trends, technical performance, utilization records, community support, and other issues deemed relevant. Specific indicators for assessing these topics should be identified during the planning stage. Possible methods for obtaining progress measures include responder feedback questionnaires, plan audits, focus groups, and user surveys.²²

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments provide crucial information applicable to the selection of technology.

²² *Forum Unified Education Technology Suite*, [National Forum on Education Statistics](#), 2003



Practical Exercise 3

Introduction: Module 3 exercise is designed to reinforce the class participants further understanding of the information that can be obtained in a threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment that deals with program planning, intelligence sharing, resource allocation, and purchasing technology along with response planning and how the information in the assessments would be applicable.

Action to be completed: Course participants will be required to write down five (5) examples of the aforesaid information found in the threat, risk, and/or vulnerability assessment and provide an example for each of their use when dealing with the scenario presented at the beginning of day one (barricaded suspect at a school). *(An example is provided below)* Each class participant will be asked to verbally present one example to the class.

<i>Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Information</i>	<i>Use in Planning and Operations</i>
<p>Vulnerability Assessment</p> <p>Vulnerability assessments for Mountain View H.S. indicated that there is not a current program for students to report suspicious or illegal activity anonymously.</p>	<p>A community program was developed to provide a phone number that students could call to report illegal or dangerous activity. Information was presented to students verbally and through pamphlets.</p>

Time necessary to complete: The table top exercise is timed and will conclude within one (1) hour after its start. Fifteen (15) minutes will be dedicated to participants reviewing information in the threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments and creating their list of five (5) examples. The remaining time will be utilized for verbal presentation from class participants. Time may be adjusted to allow each participant to present their example.

Resources: An exercise worksheet and the assessments located in the Participant Guide.



Module 3 Summary

In this lesson you learned:

To identify information from the threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments that would be applicable to the following:

- Planning
- Creating and delivering community programs
- Information and intelligence
- Resource allocation
- Response to Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS) color-code changes and specific DHS Alerts
- Incident response and recovery management
- Selection of applicable technology

To describe how the information gathered in the assessment process can be used to recognize the applicable capability-based preparedness elements from the National Response Framework.

To align the various assessments to make them more adaptive in the fluid, all-hazards decision-making environment.



Module 4- Apply and Review

Duration

4 Hours

Instructor to Participant Ratio

1:25 Maximum 50

Scope Statement

In the Application to Operation phase, plans that have been developed with integrated TRVA information are now exercised and/or implemented. TRVA information is also applied to daily operation, and integrated into our response capabilities. Having plans and operations in place with integrated TRVA information, the next step is to utilize our completed TRVA in all other aspects of our missions of prevention, protection, response and recovery.

Terminal Learning Objectives (TLO)

At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to integrate the results of the comparisons that were made across various missions, agencies and topics for which risk is assessed. Participants will be able to use the information and apply it to daily operations.

Enabling Learning Objectives (ELO)

4-1 Upon completion of this module, participants will understand and be able to apply, train, test, and/or exercise the plans created using threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments.

Lesson Topics

- Application to Daily Operations
- Application to Training and Exercising
- Review
 - Update Plans
 - Update TRVA
- Conclusion

Instructional Strategy

Instructors will present course content through a series of PowerPoint® slides, structured group discussion and a practical exercise.

Assessment Strategy

Participants will be evaluated based upon their performance during a table top exercise. Additionally, a post-test will be administered to determine participants' comprehension of course materials. The post-test will ask questions covering the same concepts addressed during the pre-test taken during Module 1.




Practical Exercise (PE) Statement

A table top exercise utilizing video and PowerPoint® will enable students to meet this course objective. This table top is designed to address a multidisciplined response to an emergency situation at a school. Participants, after being presented with a barricaded suspect at a school auditorium, will be required to develop a response plan for the incident. This scenario will be similar to the practical presented during Module 1; however, participants will be provided threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments for the school. The assessments will be specific to the school, and will be presented from the perspective of various emergency responders. By providing participants with assessments, participants from various disciplines will be able to develop an organized response that will illustrate the learning objectives from the previous modules.



Application to Operations

The fourth phase of the **RADAR** process is the **Application to Operations** Phase. In this phase, operations and plans are implemented with integrated Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment information included.



In the Application to Operations phase, plans that have been developed with integrated TRVA information are now exercised and/or implemented. Having plans in place TRVA information is also applied to daily operations, and all other aspects of our missions of prevention, protection, response and recovery.

Daily Operations

Daily operations involving prevention, protection, response and recovery, are common for emergency responders. “Routine Calls” are often governed by operating procedures or policies. Responders manage these with little need for a formal informational input or planning process. This does not mean that they operate without information inputs, but that the available information is communicated to them before they respond or while they are en route. The rest of their situational awareness is developed upon arrival. Threat assessments, risk assessments and vulnerability assessments offer informational inputs that should be considered as daily operations commence.



Law Enforcement conducts the activities of prevention, protection and response within their daily operation. A law enforcement officer on patrol will prevent crime, protect people and property, and respond to emergency situations in progress and completed crimes. Daily operations include directed patrols, building checks, arrests of suspects, interview and interrogation, preliminary investigation, or to support other units. Information provided to law enforcement will come from a number of inputs which include:

- Daily briefings
- Dispatch with historical data
- Dispatch with in-progress information
- Communication with other law enforcement officers
- Communication with citizens
- Communication with Potential Threat Elements
- Communication with individuals on scene
- Media outlets

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments also provide a wealth of information that should be considered. The threat assessment can provide valuable information regarding Potential Threat Elements which can be encountered on a daily basis, by providing specific information about the PTE. Risk assessments can help supervisors prioritize checks of facilities, infrastructure and events by providing a rank-ordered list of CI/KR.

In addition, law enforcement will also conduct tactical operations often in conjunction with patrol operations. Again, similar information input helps officers with tactical decision making. Tactical situations can include serving search warrants, arrest warrants, dynamic entry into facilities, hostage situations, in progress shooting situations, and barricaded suspects. Vulnerability assessments can help responders make tactical decisions when responding to CI/KR, by providing specific information regarding tactical entry, evacuation routes, covert areas to gain entry to the facility, weaknesses in the facility that must be protected, etc.

Daily operations can also serve a homeland security function. Daily law enforcement operations in the area of homeland security include, patrol of CI/KR perimeters and building exteriors, response to suspicious conditions and individuals around CI/KR, and contact with facility managers of critical facilities, infrastructures and events. The threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments are often the core element of a homeland security program. Additionally, law enforcement officers often work details in addition to their regular duties at critical facilities, infrastructures and events and also provide protection for individuals. Reviews of vulnerability assessments may help officers understand the facility that is being protected.

Common to response in most disciplines are seven (7) tasks which are critical to a successful response, regardless of the incident. In small incidents, a response may only require the first step, other incidents may require more steps and large incidents may require all of the steps.



1. The first task is to Assess the Situation. Responders must determine the following:
 - Nature of the incident
 - Location of the incident
 - Number of suspects
 - Type of weapons
 - Type of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive, if applicable
 - Establish communication with Communication Center
2. Responders must then establish the Danger Zone. Responders will:
 - Identify the dangerous area in order to limit exposure to responders and the public
 - Communicate the boundaries, to the communication center, other responders and public in the affected area
3. Establish an Inner Perimeter. Responders must control and maintain the inner perimeter:
 - Limit access to perimeter to only authorized response personnel
 - Post uniform personnel to control perimeter
 - Ensure there are positions of cover and concealment
4. Establish an Outer Perimeter. Responders will:
 - Limit and control access into the emergency incident area
 - Identify and secure safe routes of travel for emergency vehicles both to and from the scene
 - Prevent and control access to the inner perimeter
 - Establish a media information area
5. Establish an Incident Command Post between the inner and outer perimeter:
 - Command Post should be out of the line of sight of the danger zone
6. Establish a Staging Area to control the deployment of personnel and resources:
 - The staging area should never be in line of sight with the incident and should not be located near the command post
 - Personnel should be assigned specifically to the staging area and assume the position of staging officer
 - Staging area location and directions to the staging area should be given to the communication center
 - All unassigned units should report to the staging area
 - Mutual Aid responders should report to the staging area
7. Request Additional Resources. Responders should:
 - Assess the need for additional personnel, specialized units and/or other agencies



Tasks can be supported by the Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment.

When assessing the situation, responders who have knowledge of terrain, weather and demographics, all of which are available in the threat assessment, will be able to make a better assessment of the situation. Knowing that there is a special needs population in close proximity to the incident may be critical. Having knowledge about the terrain's ability to cause an inversion may help with initial decision making. Having knowledge about weather patterns may also help with initial decision making about evacuation. Information received during the assessment of the situation will provide the variables to establish the Danger Zone.



Establishing the inner perimeter can be facilitated with information gathered from the vulnerability assessment. Issues regarding the perimeter of the facility could either place responders in jeopardy or provide elements for cover and concealment. Similarly, concerns regarding the outer perimeter can be found in sections of the vulnerability assessment that address areas surrounding the facility.

Determining the incident command post location can also be facilitated by the vulnerability assessment. The assessment should provide locations of dumpsters, out-buildings and other variables that may prohibit the placement of the command post. Conversely, the assessment may articulate areas that are suitable for command post placement. Likewise, the establishment of the staging area location can be effected by similar variables articulated in the assessment.

The threat assessment will often provide a listing of emergency responders' capabilities and will be of assistance when determining where to get additional resources.

Tactical Considerations

Tactics are an integral part of both planning and daily operations. A wide variety of situations could illicit the need for tactical response. SWAT Teams (Special Weapons and Tactics) are often associated with tactical response, however tactical response can include a wide variety of situations and involve a number of response disciplines. Law enforcement officers responding to a school shooting may have to enter a building without the assistance of a SWAT team, Fire personnel may have tactical considerations when approaching a fire scene, and private sector security may have to initiate an evacuation with the intention of providing cover for evacuees.

The threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment are valuable tools that can provide vital information that should be considered when making tactical decisions. Threat assessments provide information that can assist in tactical decisions including information about terrain, weather, emergency response capabilities, communication issues, and health and medical considerations. The threat assessment may identify a Potential Threat Element involved in the incident and provide information regarding the PTE methods and tactics, history, and capabilities, all which should be considered.

The risk assessment also provides key information to be considered including: the number of individuals that can be in the facility; CBRNE considerations within the facility; Critical Infrastructure impact of the facility; demographics within the facility; accessibility for entry into the facility; and proximity of the facility to population centers.




The vulnerability assessment is perhaps the most important resource when it comes to making tactical decisions about a facility, infrastructure or event that has been assessed. The vulnerability assessment can provide the following tactical information:

- Perimeter and exterior
- Potential responder drop-off points
- Potential approaches to structure with best use of cover and/or concealment
- Potential hostage evacuation routes
- Potential exterior safe zones
- Provides potential primary & secondary staging areas
- Structural make up of the facility
- Potential breach points
- Potential obstacles for approach
- Potential Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) services staging areas
- Primary & secondary locations
- Potential vehicle crash-through points
- Potential emergency rally points
- Potential helicopter primary & secondary landing zones
- Potential primary & secondary decontamination zones or areas
- Potential media briefing location or facility outside the civilian perimeter
- Noise level of door locking devices
- Door opening direction
- Location of emergency key
- Window opening
- Building interior
- Buildings potential for covert entry
- Longest shooting range inside
- Weapon selection
- Elevators bypass
- Elevator shaft access points
- Stairs surface, carpet or hard surface
- Flooring surface

Categories within the vulnerability assessment which are applicable to tactical decision making are endless. The above list only highlights a few of the relevant categories.

There are several areas where TRVA can be applied and extended into our missions, for example:

 e.g. Assessment information integrated into a computer aided dispatch (CAD) system can serve several functions. CAD messages, based upon information in the assessment, can provide warnings that alert responders to hazards such as dangerous chemicals, sensitive information, or other critical concerns. Floor plans and photos from assessments can be available for response to CI/KR, providing responders with pertinent information prior to arrival.



Additional applications of TRVA include the following:

- Communication personnel can have access to TRVA information and send applicable information to responding units, as well as units that may respond from other jurisdictions.
- Mobile Command Posts can have electronic copies of TRVA and have information on-scene when responding to applicable CI/KR or incidents that would require community and threat information.
- Emergency Operation Centers should have electronic or hard copies of TRVA available for all applicable Emergency Support Functions, and incident command functions to include command, operations, planning, logistics and finance.
- Electronic copies of School TRVAs can be placed on responders' computers so that they have access to updated vulnerability assessment information, site plans and other information needed for response.
- TRVA can be reviewed and integrated when writing grants and applying for funding.
- TRVA can be integrated into briefings of multijurisdictional operations.
- TRVA can be integrated into briefings of town and city councils for any number of issues including justification for budgets.
-

Application to Training and Exercising

Additionally, training and exercise can be enhanced by incorporating applicable Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment information into the 15 National Planning Scenarios highlighted in the National Preparedness Goal. Trainers can include real tactics used by Potential Threat Elements and apply them to training scenarios.

- Trainers will find applicable PTE information to include “all hazards” in the threat assessment including; Methods and Tactics, Capability and History and can apply them to scenarios.
- The risk assessment will help trainers select training scenarios that are built around the most likely facility, infrastructure or event to be attacked.
- Vulnerability assessments will help trainers apply real life weaknesses that must be considered by personnel being trained or participating in the exercise.

Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device	
Scenario 2: Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax	
Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza.....	
Scenario 4: Biological Attack – Plague	
Scenario 5: Chemical Attack – Blister Agent.....	
Scenario 6: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals.....	
Scenario 7: Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent.....	
Scenario 8: Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion	
Scenario 9: Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake	
Scenario 10: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane.....	
Scenario 11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices.....	
Scenario 12: Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Devices.....	
Scenario 13: Biological Attack – Food Contamination	
Scenario 14: Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease)	
Scenario 15: Cyber Attack.....	

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments can be applied to any aspect of our operation.



Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment (OpValTRVA) Table Top Exercise Module 4

Introduction: The Module 4 table top exercise is designed to address a multidisciplinary response to an emergency situation at a school. The exercise will be based on the same scenario presented to the participants during Module 1. Groups will be asked to develop an emergency response plan to the school incident presented during Module 1. Additional information relating to threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments will be presented during the video. Samples of threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments will be provided to the groups during the exercise to assist with the planning process.

Action to be completed: Participants will be asked to review assessments based off the school scenario presented during Module 1 and discussed during the course. Participants will then review the scenario for a second time and take one (1) hour to identify information contained within the threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments that would be beneficial during a response to the scenario as a group. A spokesperson from each group will then present the information identified from threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments to the rest of the class.

Rationale: Participants will have been presented course materials and will have a clear understanding of what information is contained within assessments and how that information will assist them when developing plans and operations. Using sample threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment information participants will be able to develop a more comprehensive response plan that will improve their abilities to prevent, protect and recover from the scenario. This information and exercise will then translate to each participant's daily job function improving the overall daily operations.

Time necessary to complete: The table top exercise is timed and will conclude within two (2) hours after its start. One (1) hour will be dedicated for group planning and to review assessments. After reviewing assessments, each group will have approximately ten (10) minutes to present their plans.

Resources: Resources include aerial map, easel paper, markers, PowerPoint® driven video presentation and exercise materials located in the back of the Participant Guide


Participants should refer to the Mountain View map located on page 7.



Review



The fifth and final phase of the **RADAR** process is the **Review** Phase. In this phase, threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments are periodically reviewed and updated plans and operations are amended accordingly.



Review and Update Plans and Operations with Current TRVA Information

Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments are to be reviewed periodically; in most cases, there is a prescribed annual review. If plans and operations are based upon current TRVA information, it is very important for the plan and operation to be updated along with the applicable assessment.



A high school built in the early 1970s has had several additions to accommodate a growing population, and has been constructed in six (6) phases over the past 20 years. Each phase was added on, in the most conducive area for an addition at the time. Building materials for each phase were different and reflected the most common trends for construction when they were built. Room numbers on each phase reflected the phase in which the addition was built. In other words, in the first phase the room numbers began at 100, the second phase the room numbers began with 200 and so on. Because each phase was added on for convenience for construction, a responder entering the building would find no order to the numbering system of the rooms.

Plans must identify the numbering issue. If for instance, a school decides to fix the room numbering concern, this should not only be added to an updated vulnerability assessment, it must be updated in the plan. Additionally, if a new phase is added it must be added to the vulnerability assessment and applicable plan and/or operation.

Updates of TRVA Based Upon Plans and/or Operations

Plans and operations often uncover issues that relate directly to threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments. Assessments should be updated when information becomes available when creating plans and/or operations.

As responders complete their daily operations and/or implement plans, they may come across information that should be added to assessments. The process could be as simple as sending an email to the department, section or individual responsible for completing and updating assessments. For example:



Responders from various disciplines are either dispatched to calls or come in contact with critical facilities, infrastructure and events frequently. If on a call, or while at a facility, something is noted such as a hole in a fence, a new access control system, a reduction in guard force, a new policy for suspicious inquiry, etc., this information should be passed on and assessments should be updated accordingly.





Information that can be observed during daily operations or when implementing plans can include but not be limited to:

- Changing demographic information
- Current intelligence exchange between response agencies
- Emergency responder capabilities (increase or decrease)
- Threat information including:
 - Existence of new PTE and related information
 - Capabilities of PTE
 - Methods and tactics of PTE
- Death and injury concerns, increase or decrease in number of personnel in facility
- Environmental concerns, new chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological or explosives capabilities or substances on site
- Critical infrastructure impact, including changes in production capabilities
- Economic impact, including mergers and decreases in production
- Accessibility, including increase or decrease in access control
- Recognizability, including increases or decreases in the ability to recognize the facility
- Proximity, which may include an additional facility, infrastructure or event in close proximity that may increase the opportunity to attack, or severity of attack
- Vulnerability assessment information including:
 - Perimeter changes or concerns
 - Building exterior changes or concerns
 - Building interior changes or concerns
 - Policy and procedure changes or concerns
 - Contractor/tenant changes or concerns
 - Alarm issues (Fire, Security, Panic, etc.)
 - On site security issues (law enforcement on site, proprietary security, contract security, etc.)

Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, review of TRVA information included in plans and operations, provides insight into what information should be included when assessors complete TRVA assessments. Those involved in the process will have knowledge of what assessment information is needed to produce plans and be useful to the operation.

It is important to remember that plans, operations, threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments must be reviewed to reflect current information. This will ensure that the best information for responders is available to help responders complete their missions of Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery.



Conclusion

Throughout our nation, threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments are conducted by jurisdictions, agencies and organizations of all sizes, most often to satisfy mandates by local, tribal, state or the federal government. For the most part, they are done solely as a mandate to satisfy the U.S. Department of Homeland Security critical infrastructure protection initiatives.




Threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment information can be used in various ways including patrol and tactical operations, intelligence gathering, creating and delivering community programs, emergency planning, resource allocation, response to Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) color-code changes, and DHS Alerts, operational response and recovery, as well as writing grant proposals and for the selection of applicable technology.



Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, those responsible for assessments who apply relevant information to planning and operations will gain insight into what information should be included in TRVA assessments, because they will have knowledge of what information is needed to produce plans and be useful to the operation.

In order to extract TRVA information and apply it to planning and operation, a five step process was used. The process began with a **Review** of the Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment to find information that may be relevant to the planning process and/or operation. The second step of the process required information to be **Analyzed** to determine if it is pertinent and how information can be used in the operation. The third step is the **Development** of Plans and



Operations, where plans are developed based upon information found in the assessment and evaluated for applicability. The fourth step in the process is the **Application** to the Operation, where Operations and Plans are implemented with TRVA information included. The last step which correlates back to the first step is to **Review** updated TRVA information periodically, and ensure that plans and operations are amended accordingly.



The “Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment” (OpValTRVA) Training shows that information gathered in various threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment methodologies, regardless of the assessment used, can be very powerful and useful to the jurisdiction completing the assessments. Use of the available information enhances a jurisdiction’s capability to manage homeland security risks, by applying information from the various assessments to their daily operations of prevention, protection response and recovery to all hazards.



References

ASIS International Resources. Available at: <http://www.asisonline.org/auth/login.xml>.

ASME Innovative Technologies Institute. (2006). *Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP): The Framework*. Washington, DC: ASME Innovative Technologies Institute.

Emergency Management Institute. (2007). *IS-235 Emergency Planning* (FEMA Course). Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Overview available at: <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS235.asp>.

Emergency Management Institute. (2007). *IS-546 Continuity of Operations (COOP) Awareness Course*. (FEMA course). Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Overview available at: <http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is546.asp>.

HAZUS <http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/index.shtm>

Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM)

Masse, T., O'Neil, S., Rollins, J. (2007). The Department of Homeland Security's Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress. *Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress*. (Order Code RL33858). Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress.

Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary. Available at: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/>.

National Domestic Preparedness Coalition. (2006). *Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM)*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

National Infrastructure Protection Plan. (2009). Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.

National Forum on Education Statistics. (2003). *Forum Unified Education Technology Suite*. Washington, DC: US Department of Education.

New Hampshire State Statute. (2006). Title XX: Transportation. Chapter 236. Highway Regulation, Protection, and Control Regulations. Highway Video Surveillance. Section 236: 130. (2006, 107:1, eff. July 1, 2006). Available at: <http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/RSA/html/XX/236/236-130.htm>.

Office for Domestic Preparedness. *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program*. (NCJ 205686). Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Available at: <http://www.dem.dcc.state.nc.us/HomelandSecurity/library/HSEEPv1.pdf>.

Office of Grants and Training. *OG&T MGT-310*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security.



Office of Grants and Training. *OG&T MGT-315*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff. (2001). *Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (IVA): Integrated Process Team (IPT). Final Report*. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. Available at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/hd/assets/downloads/dcip/Studies/DoD/OSDJointStaff_IntegratedVAIPTFinalReport.pdf.

Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. (2005). *Universal Task List*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security.

RADAR (2008). Operational Value of Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment. National Domestic Preparedness Coalition

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. *Wood Stove Retrofit Information*. Available at:
<http://www.trpa.org/default.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=209>.

Terrorist Threat Guidelines, 2004, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

US Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2007). *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 2005*. (TRADOC Publication No. G2 Handbook No. 1). Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity – Threats.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2008). *Before and After: Prepare for Hanna, Recover from Gustav*. (FEMA HQ-08-183). Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Available at: <http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=45641>.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2008). *Buffer Zone Protection Program: Guidance and Application Kit (BZPP)*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Available at: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/bzpp/fy08_bzpp_guidance.pdf.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2008). *Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System (C/ACAMS)*. Available at:
http://www.dhs.gov/xinfo/share/programs/gc_1190729724456.shtm.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2007). *FY2007 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance Application Kit*. Washington, DC: Office of Grants and Training. Available at: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy07_hsgp_guidance.pdf.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2008). *Homeland Security Presidential Directives*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. Available at:
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/editorial_0607.shtm.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2008). *National Incident Management System*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Available at:
<http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/>.



US Department of Homeland Security. (2006). *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2007). *National Preparedness Guidelines*. (HSPD-8). Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2008). *National Response Framework*. (FEMA Publication P682). Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Available at: <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf>.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2005). Risk Assessment. A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings: Providing protection to people and buildings. (Risk Management Series, FEMA 452). Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security.

US Department of Homeland Security. (2007). Target Capabilities List: A companion to the National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security. Available at: <https://www.llis.dhs.gov/displayContent?contentID=26724>.

US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. *National Crime Intelligence Resource Center*. Available at: <http://www.ncirc.gov/>.

US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. (2000). *Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement*. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. Available at: <http://www.ncjrs.gov>



Appendix A Glossary of Terms

All-Hazards: Describing an incident, natural or manmade, that warrants action to protect life, property, environment, and public health or safety, and to minimize disruptions of government, social, or economic activities.

Assessment: The evaluation and interpretation of measurements and other information to provide a basis for decision making.

Catastrophic Incident: Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

Citizen Corps: A community-level program, administered by the Department of Homeland Security, that brings government and private-sector groups together and coordinates the emergency preparedness and response activities of community members. Through its network of community, State, and tribal councils, Citizen Corps increases community preparedness and response capabilities through public education, outreach, training, and volunteer service.

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101: Producing Emergency Plans: A Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning for State, Territorial, Local, and Tribal Governments: Guide that describes the intersection of the federal and state, tribal, and local plans and planning. Replaces State and Local Guide (SLG) 101.

Critical Infrastructure: Systems, assets, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national, regional, state, local and tribal economic security, national, regional, state, local and tribal public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

Demobilization: The orderly, safe, and efficient return of a resource to its original location and status.

Emergency Management: A subset of incident management, the coordination and integration of all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other manmade disasters.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC): A congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through EMAC, a disaster-affected State can request and receive assistance from other member States quickly and efficiently, resolving two key issues up front: liability and reimbursement.

Emergency Manager: The person who has the day-to-day responsibility for emergency management programs and activities. The role is one of coordinating all aspects of a jurisdiction's mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities.



Emergency Operations Center (EOC): The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement, and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., federal, state, regional, tribal, city, county), or some combination thereof.

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs): Used by the federal government and many state and local governments as the primary mechanism at the operational level to organize and provide assistance. ESFs align categories of resources and provide strategic objectives for their use. ESFs utilize standardized resource management concepts such as typing, inventorying, and tracking to facilitate the dispatch, deployment, and recovery of resources before, during, and after an incident.

Evacuation: Organized, phased, and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in safe areas.

Fusion Center: Facility that brings together into one central location law enforcement, intelligence, emergency management, public health, and other agencies, as well as private-sector and nongovernmental organizations when appropriate, and that has the capabilities to evaluate and act appropriately on all available information.

Hazard: Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome.

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP): A capabilities and performance-based exercise program that provides a standardized methodology and terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN): The primary reporting method (common national network) for the Department of Homeland Security to reach departments, agencies, and operations centers at the federal, state, local, and private-sector levels. HSIN is a collection of systems and communities of interest designed to facilitate information sharing, collaboration, and warnings.

HSPD-5: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, “Management of Domestic Incidents”

HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, “Critical Infrastructure, Identification, Prioritization, and Protection”

HSPD-8: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, “National Preparedness”



Incident: An occurrence or event, natural or manmade, that requires a response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response.

Incident Action Plan (IAP): An oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. It may include the identification of operational resources and assignments. It may also include attachments that provide direction and important information for management of the incident during one or more operational periods.

Incident Command: Entity responsible for overall management of the incident. Consists of the Incident Commander, either single or unified command, and any assigned supporting staff.

Incident Command Post (ICP): The field location where the primary functions are performed. The ICP may be co-located with the incident base or other incident facilities.

Incident Command System (ICS): A standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is a management system designed to enable effective incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. It is used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents. ICS is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, to organize field-level incident management operations.

Incident Management: Refers to how incidents are managed across all homeland security activities, including prevention, protection, response, and recovery.

Key Resources: Any publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.

Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group: Typically, administrators/executives, or their appointed representatives, who are authorized to commit agency resources and funds, are brought together and form MAC Groups. MAC Groups may also be known as multiagency committees, emergency management committees, or as otherwise defined by the system. A MAC Group can provide coordinated decision making and resource allocation among cooperating agencies, and may establish the priorities among incidents, harmonize agency policies, and provide strategic guidance and direction to support incident management activities.

Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreement: Written or oral agreement between and among agencies/organizations and/or jurisdictions that provides a mechanism to quickly obtain emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, and other associated services. The primary objective is to facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of emergency support prior to, during, and/or after an incident.



National Incident Management System (NIMS): System that provides a proactive approach guiding government agencies at all levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations to work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life or property and harm to the environment.

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC): As part of the National Operations Center, monitors the Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources on an ongoing basis. During an incident, the NICC provides a coordinating forum to share information across infrastructure and key resources sectors through appropriate information-sharing entities.

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP): Plan that provides a coordinated approach to critical infrastructure and key resources protection roles and responsibilities for federal, state, tribal, local, and private-sector security partners. The NIPP sets national priorities, goals, and requirements for effective distribution of funding and resources that will help ensure that our government, economy, and public services continue in the event of a terrorist attack or other disaster.

National Planning Scenarios: These scenarios are designed to be the foundational structure for the development of national preparedness standards from which homeland security capabilities can be measured because they represent threats or hazards of national significance with high consequence.

National Response Framework (NRF): Guides how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. The Framework documents the key response principles, roles, and structures that organize national response. It describes how communities, states, the federal government, and private-sector and nongovernmental partners apply these principles for a coordinated, effective national response. It also describes special circumstances where the federal government exercises a larger role, including incidents where federal interests are involved and catastrophic incidents where a state would require significant support. It allows first responders, decision makers, and supporting entities to provide a unified national response.

Nongovernmental Organization (NGO): An entity with an association that is based on interests of its members, individuals, or institutions. It is not created by a government, but it may work cooperatively with government. Such organizations serve a public purpose, not a private benefit. Examples of NGOs include faith-based charity organizations and the American Red Cross. NGOs, including voluntary and faith-based groups, provide relief services to sustain life, reduce physical and emotional distress, and promote the recovery of disaster victims. Often these groups provide specialized services that help individuals with disabilities. NGOs and voluntary organizations play a major role in assisting emergency managers before, during, and after an emergency.

Planned Event: A planned, non-emergency activity (e.g., sporting event, concert, parade, etc.)

Point of Distribution (POD): This is the location that is in most cases, pre-determined, for the distribution of emergency relief items. This may require multiagency coordination.



Prevention: Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property. It involves applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting, or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice.

Private Sector: Organizations and entities that are not part of any governmental structure. The private sector includes for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, formal and informal structures, commerce, and industry.

Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII): Is an information-protection program that enhances information sharing between the private sector and the government. The Department of Homeland Security and other federal, state and local analysts use PCII to analyze and secure critical infrastructure and protected systems, identify vulnerabilities and develop risk assessments, and enhance recovery preparedness measures.

Recovery: The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans; the reconstitution of government operations and services; individual, private-sector, nongovernmental, and public-assistance programs to provide housing and to promote restoration; long-term care and treatment of affected persons; additional measures for social, political, environmental, and economic restoration; evaluation of the incident to identify lessons learned; post-incident reporting; and development of initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.

Resources: Personnel and major items of equipment, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment to incident operations and for which status is maintained. Under the National Incident Management System, resources are described by kind and type and may be used in operational support or supervisory capacities at an incident or at an emergency operations center.

Response: Immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery

Risk: A method of estimating the anticipated or expected loss from the occurrence of an adverse event by using the quantitative and/or qualitative values which relate to exposure and a recognized threat and impact.

Section: The organizational level having responsibility for a major functional area of incident management (e.g., Operations, Planning, Logistics, Finance/Administration, and Intelligence/Investigations (if established)).



Short-Term Recovery: A process of recovery that is immediate and overlaps with response. It includes such actions as providing essential public health and safety services, restoring interrupted utility and other essential services, reestablishing transportation routes, and providing food and shelter for those displaced by a disaster. Although called "short term," some of these activities may last for weeks.

Situation Report: Document that contains confirmed or verified information and explicit details (who, what, where, and how) relating to an incident.

Situational Awareness: The ability to identify, process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about an incident.

Span of Control: The number of resources for which a supervisor is responsible, usually expressed as the ratio of supervisors to individuals. (Under the National Incident Management System, an appropriate span of control is between 1:3 and 1:7, with optimal being 1:5.)

Special Needs Populations: Populations whose members may have additional needs before, during, and after an incident in functional areas, including but not limited to: maintaining independence, communication, transportation, supervision, and medical care. Individuals in need of additional response assistance may include those who have disabilities; who live in institutionalized settings; who are elderly; who are children; who are from diverse cultures; who have limited English proficiency or are non-English speaking; or who are transportation disadvantaged.

Stafford Act: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended. This Act describes the programs and processes by which the federal government provides disaster and emergency assistance to state and local governments, tribal nations, eligible private nonprofit organizations, and individuals affected by a declared major disaster or emergency. The Stafford Act covers all hazards, including natural disasters and terrorist events.

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): Complete reference document or an operations manual that provides the purpose, authorities, duration, and details for the preferred method of performing a single function or a number of interrelated functions in a uniform manner.

Strategic National Stockpile (SNS): is a program developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to provide large quantities of essential medical supplies to states and communities who have exhausted local or regional supplies during an emergency.

Target Capabilities List: Defines specific capabilities that all levels of government should possess in order to respond effectively to incidents.

Terrorism: As defined under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, any activity that involves an act dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States in which it occurs; and is intended to intimidate or coerce the civilian population or influence or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or



kidnapping. See Section 2 (15), Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

Threat: An indication of possible violence, harm, or danger.

Universal Task List: A menu of unique tasks that link strategies to prevention, protection, response, and recovery tasks for the major events represented by the National Planning Scenarios. It provides a common vocabulary of critical tasks that support development of essential capabilities among organizations at all levels. The List was used to assist in creating the Target Capabilities List.

Vulnerability: An exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a facility, a venue, or of a person



Appendix B Acronyms

ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act
ASIS: American Society for Information Security
BCP: Business Continuity Plan
BZZP: Buffer Zone Protection Plan
C/ACAMS: Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System
CARVER: Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability
CBRNE: Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear or Explosive
CCTV: Closed Circuit Television
CID: Criminal Investigative Division
CI/KR: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
CMP: Collection Management Plan
COOP: Continuity of Operations Plan
CPG: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide
CSP: Crime Scene Planning
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
DOD: Department of Defense
ELO: Enabling Learning Objectives
EMAC: Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EOC: Emergency Operations Center
EOP: Emergency Operations Plan
ESF: Emergency Support Functions
FBI: Federal bureau of Intelligence
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO: Government Accountability Office
GIS: Geographic Information Systems
GOG: Continuity of Government
HAZUS: Hazardous United States
HAZMAT: Hazardous Materials
HLS-CAM: Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model
HSAS: Homeland Security Advisory System
H SEEP: Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
H SIN: Homeland Security Information Network
HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive



HVAC: Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
IAP: Incident Action Plan
ICP: Incident Command Post
ICS: Incident Command System
MAC: Multiagency Coordination
MSRAM: Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
NCIRC: National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center
NDPCI: National Domestic Preparedness Coalition Inc.
NGO: Nongovernmental Organization
NICC: National Infrastructure Coordinating Center
NIMS: National Incident Management System
NIPP: National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NRF: National Response Framework
OG&T MGT-310: Office of Grants and Training, Threat and Risk Assessment Course
OG&T MGT-315: Office of Grants and Training, Enhanced Threat and Risk Assessment Course
PCII: Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
PE: Practical Exercise
PEST: Political, Economic, Social, and Technological analysis
POD: Point of Distribution
PPE: Personal Protective Equipment
PTE: Potential Threat Element
RADAR: Review assessments, Analyze assessment information, Develop plans and/or operations, Apply plans and/or operations in the field, and conduct periodic Reviews of the plans and assessments
RAMCAP: Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection
RAVAR: Rapid Assessment of Values-at-Risk
SIPRNET: Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SLG: State and Local Guide
SNS: Strategic National Stockpile
SOP: Standard Operating Procedure
SWOT: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
TLO: Terminal Learning Objectives
TRVA: Threat, Risk, and Vulnerability Assessment
VA: Vulnerability Assessment
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction



Appendix C Threat Assessment Sample

Mountain View, FL Threat Assessment



www.ndpci.us

Prepared By: Lieutenant David Law, Mountain View Police Department

Date: 03/27/2008



Assessment Report

Table of Contents

Introduction	117
Community Information:	117
Assessment Conducted by:.....	118
Characteristics of the Community Environment/Mission	118
Geographical Boundaries	120
Terrain Characteristics	121
Weather Characteristics	122
Historical Data.....	122
Demographic Characteristics	123
Critical Facility, Infrastructure and Event (CI/KR) List	125
Logistical Infrastructure Characteristics	129
Emergency Response	131
Behavior Identifiers	131
Regulatory Oversight Note for Current Intelligence Exchange.....	131
Current Intelligence Exchange	132
Emergency Response Resources	135
Private Security Consideration	138
Medical Considerations	138
Health Care Facilities	139
Health Department Locations	139
Hostile Criminal & Terrorist Groups Operating within the Community	140
Existence	140
History.....	141
Intentions	143
Capability	144
Targeting.....	147
Methods and Tactics	148
Step 4 Threat Course of Action	149
Criticality Assessment	153
Categories of Consequence Scale	153
M/D-SHARPP Matrix	158
Categories of Consequence Scale	159
Community Priority Assessment Plan	165
Facility Information	173
Threat Course of Action (TCOA)	180
Outer Perimeter	186
Assessment Conducted by.....	186
Neighborhood	186
Signage/way finding.....	202
Building Exterior	210



Assessment Conducted by.....210

Building Exterior Photos210

Standoff Distance around the building for Vehicles/Pedestrians.....212

Utility Connections to Building217

Propane Notes:219

Propane Tank Fire & Bobtail BLEVE* from <http://www.chemaxx.com/explosion18a.htm>220

Emergency Power.....225

Building Ventilation Intake230

Doors230

Loading Dock233

Windows (accessible).....236

Building Interior238

 Assessment Conducted by.....239

 Doors239

 Restrooms.....241

 Fire Protection.....242

 Reception Area247

 Interior Closed Circuit TV249

 Internal HVAC252

 Elevators254

Non-Agency Tenants258

 Assessment Conducted by.....258

Computer Applications.....258

 Assessment Conducted by.....258

Hazardous Materials261

 Assessment Conducted by.....261

Security/Alarm System262

 Assessment Conducted by.....262

Policy/Procedures.....264

 Assessment Conducted by.....264

Recommendations271

 Recommendations271

Mountain View High School Gymnasium/ Auditorium280

Facility Information280

Mountain View High School Gymnasium/ Auditorium284

Facility Information284

 Emergency Power.....305

 Emergency Power.....305

 Utility Connections to Building306

 Roof308

 The roof is fabricated from corrugated steel sheets covered with a rubber roofing system.

 The roof over the extension on the north side is metal sheeting.308

 Doors310

 Loading Dock312

 Windows (accessible).....313

 Building Ventilation Intake317

Building Interior319

 Doors319



Restrooms.....330

Fire Protection.....331

Fire Protection.....331

Reception Area336

Interior Closed Circuit TV337

Internal HVAC341

Elevators342

Hazardous Materials345

 Assessment Conducted by.....345

Policy/Procedures.....346

Recommendations348

 Recommendations348



Introduction

- Threat Assessment - examines and defines a community, identifies critical facilities, infrastructures and events, identifies threat groups, determines the likelihood that, given the current intelligence or designated federal, state or local threat levels, a specific target will be subject to terrorist or hostile criminal attack.

Threat Assessment

Community Information:

Jurisdiction	Town of Mountain View
Population	24,837 [2005]
State	AP
County	Rockin
City	Mountain View
Latitude/Longitude (Center of Site)	42 d, 52 mins, 42.672 secs; 71 d, 22 mins, 51.672 secs [Mammoth near Otterson]
Coordinating Agency	Mountain View Police Department
24 hour Contact Telephone Number	333-432-1118
Contact Facsimile Number	333-432-1117
Contact Person Email Address	pAllone@MountainViewFL.org
Policing Jurisdiction	Town of Mountain View and Mapel-Boatman Regional Airport
FBI Field Division	Boatman Regional
Division Office	Beever, FL
24 hour Contact Telephone Number	333-742-5533
Contact Facsimile Number	333-471-9419
Contact Person Email Address	Beever.bs@fbi.gov
Designated Joint Terrorism Task Force	Beever, FL office
Name	Special Agent Mark Alford
24 hour Contact Telephone Number	333-365-812



Contact Facsimile Number	333-471-9419
Contact Person Email Address	Beever.bs@fbi.gov
Designated State Terrorism Task Force	FL State Police Terrorism Intelligence Unit
Name	Lt. Dave Bleugill
24 hour Contact Telephone Number	333-271-3636
Contact Facsimile Number	333-271-0303
Contact Person Email Address	dBleugill@safety.state.FI.us
Date of Assessment	January 25, 2008 – March 27, 2008

Assessment Conducted by:

Project Leader:

Name: Paul D. Allone Phone (333) 432-1118 pAllone@MountainViewFI.org

Position/Title: Lieutenant, Homeland Security, Mountain View Police Department

Secondary Point of Contact:

Name: William Allison Phone (333) 432-1118 wAllison@MountainViewFI.org

Position/Title: Captain, Support Services, Mountain View Police Department

Characteristics of the Community Environment/Mission

Characteristics of the Community/Mission	Observation
--	-------------

A community’s missions further define the community and include the community’s purpose and activities, which may include but are not limited to; the provision of government services, tourism, industry, and education. Threat assessments often include community missions because the mission may play a role in a Potential Threat Element’s (PTE) relationship to the community. For example, a PTE may attack a college community to disrupt a mission involving animal research.

General Description

The history of the town of Mountain View dates from 1718 when a group of Irish immigrants visited the area then called Nutshells and decided it would be a good site for a community. Four years later, in June 1722, the Nutshell area was incorporated as a township and renamed Mountain View after the city in Ireland from which most of the settlers had come.



The original Mountain View township was later divided into the towns of Drew, Mountain View, Wind and parts of Malaster, Salem, and Hope. These towns have a rich history with many famous sons including: Revolutionary War Hero General John Stake, signer of the Declaration of Independence Matt Tom and poet Rob Fost.



People come from all over the world to enjoy Florida's White Mountains, picturesque sea shore, and our numerous lakes and rivers. Mountain View has tennis courts, several playgrounds, and athletic fields and sports teams for all ages. There are 27 public and private golf courses in the area. The town also has an extensive conservation area with hiking trails.

Mountain View offers a quiet rural lifestyle firmly rooted in its agricultural past. In 1719 when the first Scotch-Irish settlers arrived in Mountain View, they planted apple trees, which would become a major crop for local farmers. Mountain View has five orchards – Woods, Sunnyoak, Elwood, Mouse Lake, and Mike’s in North Mountain View – which are a vital part of what makes Mountain View special. Mountain View’s apple growers not only contribute to the local economy, but also provide valuable open spaces. Mountain View’s Apple Way, a designated Florida Scenic and Cultural Byway, winds past orchards, old farmhouses and local landmarks, reminding residents and visitors alike of our heritage.

(Town of Mountain View Web-site, 2008) <http://www.Mountain ViewFl.org>

Mountain View Provides Effective Government

The principal mission of the Town of Mountain View is to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the town’s residents. The Town is run by a Town Council form of government with a 5-member council. There is an annual town meeting to adopt a town budget and warrant articles. Numerous volunteer boards steer the direction of the town, including the Planning Board, Zoning Board of Adjustment, and Budget Committee, Conservation Commission, Recreation Commission, Elder Affairs and others. Town Hall functions include departments of Assessing, Finance, Building, Planning and Economic Development, Public Works, School, Library, Town Clerks/Tax Office and Police and Fire/Rescue service. Mountain View Police provides police coverage to the Mapel Boatman Regional Airport. The Department of Public Works is responsible for maintaining 181 miles of roads.

Mountain View Provides A K-12 Public Education For Residents

MVP 12 provides education for K-12 students in Mountain View. In 2003, there were 2,586 elementary students, 1,382 middle school students and 1,732 high school students. There is one kindergarten school in Mountain View (Mouse Hill School), three elementary schools (grades 1-5, Matt Thom School, South School and North School), one middle school (grades 6-8, Mountain View Middle School) and one High school (grades 9-12, Mountain View High School). Quality of education is considered very good. Mountain View High School has a marching band that performs around the country and student athletics include track and cross country, soccer, field hockey, football, volleyball,



basketball, gymnastics, swimming, cheerleading, wrestling, baseball, softball, tennis and lacrosse. Playing fields are available at each school. Several high profile families attend the middle and high schools.

Mountain View Is Charged With Maintaining Public Infrastructure

The Town of Mountain View has 181 miles of public roads and is responsible for maintaining drainage and sewer infrastructure along the rights of way. The Department of Public Works Highway Division is responsible for clearing the roads and the Sewer Division maintains the sewer structures. Water supply is provided by either local wells or by Apple Water Works in the northern part of town and Pencil Water Works in the southern part of town. Mountain View has been upgrading town facilities of late. A new, state of the art Police Station was opened in 2004, a new Town Hall opened in 2005, a new South Fire Station opened in 2006 and plans are underway for a new North Fire Station. Likewise, the schools have undergone expansions or renovations.

Geographical Boundaries

Threat assessments often identify boundaries of a community. This can include legal, geographic, perceived and changing boundaries. Infrastructure outside the boundaries that affects the identified community could also be included in an analysis of a community's geographic boundaries. Threat Assessments often include geographical boundary information because threats including all hazards can be affected by boundaries.

Boundary	Descriptions
Municipal Boundary, Town of Mountain View	Mountain View consists of 42.1 square miles of land area. The town is bordered by Mapel and Autium to the North, Driery and Windstorm to the east, and Gulf and Latch to the west. It is located 30 miles south of the City of Condor and about eight miles north-east of the City of Natto. Interstate 193, along with N.H. Routes 128, 28, and 12 provide primary highway access to the Town. The one natural boundary is Beaver Brook in the south-east part of town which separates Mountain View from Windstorm. Mountain View is part of the Natto-FL metropolitan area. The town falls within the Merrimack Valley region of Florida. The closest urban areas include Mapel, FL (10 miles), Natto, FL (10 miles) and Lawrence, FL (18 miles).

Boundary	Descriptions
Municipal Boundary, Town of Mountain View	Mountain View consists of 42.1 square miles of land area. The town is bordered by Mapel and Autium to the North, Derry and Windstorm to the east, and Son and Lunchville to the west. It is located 30 miles south of the City of Cotton and about eight miles north-east of the City of Natto. Interstate 193, along with N.H. Routes 128, 28, and 12 provide primary highway access to the Town. The one natural boundary is Beaver Brook in the south-east part of town which separates Mountain



View from Windstorm. Mountain View is part of the Natto-MA metropolitan area. The town falls within the Merrimack Valley region of Florida. The closest urban areas include Mapel, FL (10 miles), Natto, FL (10 miles) and Lawrence, MA (18 miles).

Boundary	Descriptions
Municipal Boundary, Town of Mountain View	Mountain View consists of 42.1 square miles of land area. The town is bordered by Mapel and Autium to the North, Derry and Windstorm to the east, and Son and Lunchville to the west. It is located 30 miles south of the City of Cotton and about eight miles north-east of the City of Natto. Interstate 193, along with N.H. Routes 128, 28, and 12 provide primary highway access to the Town. The one natural boundary is Beaver Brook in the south-east part of town which separates Mountain View from Windstorm. Mountain View is part of the Natto-MA metropolitan area. The town falls within the Merrimack Valley region of Florida. The closest urban areas include Mapel, FL (10 miles), Natto, FL (10 miles) and Lawrence, MA (18 miles).

Terrain Characteristics

Terrain considerations are common to most Threat Assessments. Terrain can include mountains, flat land, hills, high-rise buildings, lakes, rivers, and wooded areas. An area that is flat and includes many routes to facilitate high-speed ingress and egress may aid emergency responders in the response to an incident. The same terrain, however, may also aid criminal and terrorist mobility in the community. Terrain could also significantly impact the dispersal patterns of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and weather patterns.

The Town of Mountain View is a gently rolling topography, dotted with wetlands and streams with few significant choke points. The terrain ranges from a low point of approximately 130 feet above sea level at the western side of town, along a channel formed by Little Cohas Brook to a high point of approximately 520 feet in the vicinity of the Parrish Hills community. Wetlands and streams comprise approximately 10% of the town’s land area. These areas can be prone to flooding during high storm events. Beaver Brook, which serves as the boundary between Mountain View and Windstorm, is bridged at 3 locations. Power transmission lines run through the center of town and effectively bisect the area north and south although they do not hinder the flow of traffic. Prevailing winds are from the north and west. There are numerous points of access from all sides of town, principally along state routes, and I-193. Large forest blocks on the western side of town, along the Lunchville town line limit mobility to a certain degree as they are only accessible via ATVs. In 2006, a culvert washout limited the easiest access to Mapel Airport along Industrial Drive. The absence of this route, taken by many Mountain View residents, added as much as 20 minutes to the drive time to Mapel Airport.

The Squash Area, west of Range Road and North of Walley Hill Road is a contiguous forest block greater than 1,000 acres. This area is used for passive recreation including hunting. In addition, the eastern side of town, north of Rockin Road and south of Old Dairy Rd exceeds 500 acres.



Weather Characteristics


Weather will be of particular concern in most threat assessments. Consideration will be given to the effect various types of weather will have on a particular community. The community environment is affected by weather patterns. In certain cases, weather could considerably limit or aid the effectiveness of a weapon. In addition, bad weather could greatly influence evacuation and transportation of casualties. Potential Threat Elements may choose to attack during bad weather because of the effect it will have on the emergency response capabilities.

Mountain View is subject to seasonal climate changes, with an average high temperature of 82.6 degrees and an average low of 9.0 degrees (FL averages). Temperatures during the month of July range from an average high of 82.1 degrees Fahrenheit to an average low of 54.6 degrees. January temperatures range from an average high of 32.3 degrees to an average low of 5.2 degrees. Prolonged periods of severe cold are rare. Annual average precipitation is 39.82 inches.

Weather related accidents along Interstate 193 occasionally put stress on the local emergency response providers. There are significant areas of town that are within the 100 year floodplain, including Beaver Brook, particularly in the vicinity of Brook Drive and Chappy Lane, Big Kohas Brook in the vicinity of Hall Road and South Perimeter Road, and the Peat Bog along FL Rte 28. Extraordinary flooding in 2005 caused road closures on Adams Road, Industrial Drive, and the voluntary evacuation of residents on Brookview Drive. Summer events include occasional tornado touchdowns. Finally, extreme weather conditions can cause problems for special needs populations or neighborhoods with single entry and egress points.

Historical Data

Threat Assessments often contain historical data including Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and Fire Service Predictive Tools. GIS can provide overlays such as crime data and intelligence information. GIS provides the ability to merge data layers enabling the assessor to easily see many attributes of a location, such as topography, streets, water and sewer lines, rivers, power lines, weather, and any other data the user wants to review. In many cases, information can be worked into other sections of a threat assessment such as crime analysis, intelligence, logistical infrastructure, CI/KR, weather and terrain sections of assessments. It also gives the assessor the ability to see potential problems that might exist in proximity to a critical location. This information can be used to assist with the prediction of future events which can assist with a variety of operational and emergency planning.



Demographic Characteristics

Demographic characteristics are common to most threat assessments and are important because the demographic makeup of the community can help determine how the Potential Threat Element can operate within a defined community. A diverse community may allow a Potential Threat Element to blend into a community. Conversely, it may be difficult for a threat element to blend into a homogeneous community. The community may also be the home to a demographic the PTE is interested in attacking.

The latest population estimate for Mountain View is 24,837 (2005) which is approximately 590 persons per square mile. Specific demographic information is available from the year 2000 US Census. The population of Mountain View was 23,236, an increase of approximately 71 percent since 1980 and 335 percent since 1970. The racial breakdown is 97% white, with 1.5% Hispanic, 1.2% Asian and 0.5% black. Mountain View is a young, affluent community. The median age is 35 and the median household income was \$70,501.



Age	Population
Under 5 years of age	1,726
Over 65 years of age	1,233
White	22,521
Black or African American	129
American Indian	40
Asians	269
Native Hawaiian	6
Middle Eastern	Unknown at this time
Persons reporting other race	75
Persons of Hispanic or Latino race	356
Total Residents	23236
Total Student Population	6500*
Annual Visitors	Airport to Provide
International Visitors	Airport to Provide



Critical Facility, Infrastructure and Event (CI/KR) List

A list of CI/KR or critical facilities, infrastructures and events within the community is often included in the threat assessment. For federal reporting purposes, this list may be limited to critical infrastructure and key resources of national significance; however, when conducting an assessment for a jurisdiction, agency or organization’s use, the list should be comprehensive.

Even if the list does not appear in the threat assessment, most communities have compiled a list. The Critical Facility, Infrastructure and Event list may not be in any particular order. The infrastructure list will help identify threat groups that have a history of attacking like facilities, determine CI/KR that will be included in the risk or prioritization assessment and identify CI/KR that should be assessed for vulnerability.

Critical Faculty Infrastructure and Event List (CI/KR) Alphabetical

Name	Type	Description	Jurisdiction	Comments/Capabilities
Adventures In Learning	Education	Pre-school and child care; residential building; near Game time; flood area	Mountain View	Minimal security
As/ Granite Ridge	Energy	Very large facility; generates electricity; sells to market; multilevel machines and office/comms/ operations section	Mountain View	Houses numerous large tanks of chemicals, hydrogen; 20" gas line from keyspan pump station; largest user of gas in area; minimal employees; aerial photo [2004]; Acids, Bases, liquid ammonia
Applewood Learning Center	Education	Pre-school and child care; in commercial building; shared office space; limited vehicle access; set back of Rte 12; low visibility	Mountain View	Near Rte 38/Exit 4; no security on site
BSP Trucking	Postal and Shipping	Shipping; ground only; smaller facility;	Mountain View/ regional	Alarmed
Cell Towers	Communication Facilities	Cell towers located throughout town	Mountain View	Communications/ cell capabilities
Cen-Com	Communication Facilities	Commercial business; repairs, distributes; maintains mobile radios, portables and cellular communications	Mountain View/ regional	Supplies and is a main vendor for local police/ fire agencies; has large amount of radio supplies on site; frequencies, etc. are on file



Central Fire Department	Emergency Services	Main fire building; communications; largest number of firefighters; most equipment; across from the high school; 1/10 mile from police department	Mountain View	Three buildings in separate sectors of the town; two ambulances; EMS; part of Haz-Mat team; daily and emergency fuel storage in rear; secondary EOC
Citgo 7-11				
Citizens Bank	Banking and Finance	Single story bank w/ drive-thru; on Rte 12; no private security; close to Rte 193	Mountain View	Floor plans on file; aerial photo [03]; 7 tellet stations; nine rooms/offices; cameras; alarms; secure doors to non-public side
Coca-Cola Plant	Food (Other Than Meat, Poultry, Egg Products)	Large manufacturing site; Coke products	Mountain View/regional	One access road; key card - gated; security on-site; Haz-Mat chemicals; AFlydrous Ammonia [13,500 gal]; large employer; large parking; TT unit delivery; long setback, about 600 yards; surrounded by woods
Ell Hospital Annex	Public Health/Health Care	New construction; opening soon; doctors' offices and emergency care	Mountain View	Close to south fire station; busy intersection; large, multilevel building; ambulance service imported
Exxon 12				
FA A Control Radar Tower	Communication Facilities	Main NE radar beacon; low visibility; fenced; one access gate; near orchards/ fields	Mountain View	Main beacon for NE traffic to Natto, Boatman, Mapel, etc;
FAS Radion Tower	Communication Facilities	Radio comms; FAA traffic control; wireless	Mountain View	Fenced; no alarm;
FedEx	Postal and Shipping	Shipping; internationally known; multibuildings; multilevel; garage bays	Mountain View/regional	TT unit and other size trucks on site; aircraft; alarmed; cameras
First FL Bank Of New Ipswich	Banking and Finance	Single story building; drive-thru; public banking; high visibility; on side road, but close to Rt. 12	Mountain View	No private security; alarms; cameras; drive-thru
Freedom Fuel	Energy	Gas station; public	Mountain View	High visibility;
Frito Lay	Food (Other Than Meat, Poultry, Egg Products)	Large building; TT unit/ distribution trucks	Mountain View	Nationally known; distribution site; low visibility; alarmed; fenced; gated; no private security on site; no cameras
Denfur-NOK	Chemical	Manufacturer of vehicle gaskets, etc; Large facility	Mapel/ Mountain View	Close to AOA and terminal; limited access; alarmed; 24/7 employees; chemicals: acids, bases, toxic and flammable



Grey Mountain Explosives/ Maine Drilling And Blasting	Explosives storage	The main businesses are located in Autium, just over the line; however the explosive storage bunkers, etc. are also located in Mountain View; access is limited; large amounts of explosives and explosive mixtures are stored; vehicles are also parked within Mountain View	Mountain View	Limited access; dirt roadways; different companies have separate storage spots; surrounded by woods; only alarms on storage bunkers; one gate [padlocked] for entrance; no cameras; no private security; high and low explosives; boosters; ANFO slurry; etc; explosive storage area is spread over many acres
High School Events/Sporting	Events			
High School Graduation	Events	Annual event; usually held outside; very large crowd	Mountain View	Held at stadium @ LHS; not enough parking; overcrowded lots and Mammoth Road
Kinder Care	Education	Pre-elementary age care center; newer construction; located at the Rte 1193/Exit 4 Park n' Ride; about 100' off Rte 12; busy facility	Mountain View	
Korean Methodist Church	House of Worship	Church; emergency shelter	Mountain View	
Mountain View Baptist Church	House of Worship	Church; emergency shelter	Mountain View	
Mountain View Christian Church	House of Worship	Church; emergency shelter	Mountain View	
Mountain View Freezer Warehouse	Chemical	Cold storage warehouse for trucking industry; drop-off/ travel route	Mountain View/ regional	Chemicals used to maintain the cold temperatures [Haz-mat]
Mountain View High School	Education	Large main building; one outer building; cable station building; on main road; across from PD; 1500 students	Mountain View	Mountain View has one of the largest school systems in the state; marching band is nationally known; multilevel buildings; section wings; large cafeteria; gym in separate building; all schools have aerial photos [2004]; emergency shelter; POD site [?]
Mountain View Middle School	Education	Large building; mult-level; 1800 students	Mountain View	One road in and out; one pathway behind to the high school; emergency shelter
Macks Orchards	Agriculture	Large apple orchard; draws large crowds during apple season; store	Mountain View	Orchards reach throughout the town center; close to PD, schools and recreation areas; pesticides



Mapel-Boatman Regional Airport	Transportation Systems	City of Mapel business; however LPD covers police function; 85% of land falls within Mountain View including the terminal building; the airport description will be provided in a separate document	Mountain View/Mapel	15 gates; large parking garage; outer/ satellite parking areas; multilevel terminal; food/entertainment; rental car companies on site; large commercial shipping on site; one access road in and out of terminal; FAA tower on site; general aviation; private ownership areas/ hangars; BAE attached
Market Basket Supermarket	Food (Meat, Poultry, Egg Products)	Large food market; high visibility; connected to other businesses in strip mall; large parking lot	Mountain View/regional	Loss prevention personnel; no unarmed/armed security; alarmed; 1 /12 story; office space in rear and front
North Fire Station	Emergency Services	Multilevel building; two main stall garage; one rear garage; ambulance; engine; on side road	Mountain View	Closest fire station to Airport
North School	Education	Elementary school level; single level; one building; on side road; low visibility	Mountain View	Off on a side road; about 500' from the keyspan pump station; near power lines
Nu-Cast	Chemical	Manufacturer of ??; secluded; away from large residential area	Mountain View	Chemicals: 30,000 gal propane
Mountain View Police Department	Emergency Services	Police building; multilevel; houses all police functions; out building garage	Mountain View	Houses all police functions; command vehicle; ATV; M/C; communications; designated EOC; nearly 90 personnel; aerial photo [2005]
FL Power Station	Energy	Very large electrical station; newly renovated; additional towers and sub-station; low-visibility; on dirt, non-town road	Mountain View/Derry	Very large facility; perimeter fence; gate control; pad locks; cell tower within 100'; two other sub-stations within 500'; one or six of its size in the state; north/south and east/west towers/lines; to Boatman; to Vermont Yankee; to Seabrook PS; 345 KV before renovation/addition], and 12KV [Derry]; aerial photo [2008]
FL Sub-Station	Energy	Smaller sub-station		
School District	Education	Older building; houses administrative offices for school system	Mountain View	Sits next to town offices and police department building
Sewer Pump Stations	Waste Water Treatment Systems	Sewer treatment and pump stations located throughout town	Mountain View	Pump stations maintain movement; treatment facility just over line in Derry
Sewer System	Waste Water Treatment Systems	Newer systems; follows Mammoth Road as well as Rt. 12 at Derry line; pump stations throughout town [see sewer system/ pump	Mountain View/Derry/ regional	Newly added to the town's infrastructure; business and residential



stations]

Shaws Supermarket	Food (Meat, Poultry, Egg Products)	Large food market; high visibility; connected to other businesses in strip mall; large parking lot	Mountain View/ regional	Loss prevention personnel; no unarmed/armed security; alarmed; 1 /12 story; office space in rear
South Fire Station	Emergency Services	Single level building; small size; right on main road at major intersection	Mountain View	Located at one of the busiest intersections in town; about 1.5 miles from Rt 3193
Suburban Propane/ Americgas	Energy	Natural and propane gas storage site; large tanks; above ground	Mountain View/ regional	Delivery location; close to Autium Road/ residential area; fenced perimeter; gate; alarmed
Telephone Exchange Houses	Communication Facilities	Telephone exchange and relay stations	Mountain View/ regional	Brick or cement buildings; small; no alarms
Tennessee Pipeline	Energy	Natural gas pipeline; distributes through a main line from a pump station	Mountain View	Pipeline runs from north to south; pump station is near North Elementary School and the lines run directly behind four other schools; AES is the largest purchaser; aerial photo [2005]
Triangle Mobil	Energy	Gas station; public; limited parking;	Mountain View	High visibility
Ups	Postal and Shipping	Shipping; internationally known; multibuildings; multilevel; garage bays	Mountain View/ regional	TT unit and other size trucks on site; aircraft; alarmed; cameras
Us Armed Forces Reserve Center	Department of Defense	Large building; motor pool in back; newer construction; very close to airport; large number of daily employees	Mountain View	Houses two [2] large weapons safes; limited munitions; military vehicles; no armored; newly constructed perimeter fence, gates and barriers; limited recruiting station; deployment point; aerial photo [2003]; fuel [small amount]
Water Pump Stations	Drinking Water	Pump stations throughout town	Mountain View	
Water Storage Tank	Drinking Water	Gallons??	Mountain View	Large storage tank; on high ground; good visibility
Water System	Drinking Water	Mapel/ Pennechuck; follows Mammoth Road from Mapel system	Mountain View/ regional	Lines run through middle of town; pump stations; etc.

Logistical Infrastructure Characteristics

Threat Assessments will often include logistical infrastructure, particularly when looking at specific sectors. The logistical infrastructure will include existing service-based industries, i.e., shipping and economic anchors located within the community, major thoroughfares, bridges, transportation hubs, etc.



Town of Mountain View:

Mountain View is home to a diverse economic environment. The availability of industrial land in close proximity to Mapel Boatman Regional Airport and Interstate 193 have been important factors in business location. This has led to growth in Mountain View of mail and delivery industries including FedEx, UPS, and Land Air, among others. On a similar note, Mountain View has two freezer warehouses that receive and distribute food throughout the region. Mountain View has a significant manufacturing environment including firms such as Stoneyfield Yogurt, Harvey Industries, out-of-sight Technology and Sum Packing, which distribute products throughout the country. These provide valuable jobs for residents and tax revenue for the local property tax. FL Route 12 in the vicinity of Exit 4 is a major retail area including 3 supermarkets, Home Depot, Staples, Sears, and several banks, pharmacies, restaurants and specialty stores.

FL has a major power distribution facility [300 KV] near Scobie Pond road which was recently upgraded. Power transmission lines run in an east-west direction through the middle of Mountain View and a north-south direction through the southwestern part of town. The Keyspan natural gas line runs north-south through the middle of Mountain View roughly following the FL Route 128. This is a main distribution line that serves the industrial areas and the AES electrical plant. AES is a 720 MW gas fired power plant located off of Wentworth Avenue. AES is among the largest taxpayers in town. Mountain View is also home to an Army National Guard Reserves Center on Harry Road.

Public water (where available) is supplied by Mapel Water Works, Pencil Water Works and Derry Water Works. Most public water enters Mountain View via main lines at the Mapel town line. Pencil Water Works manages a number of small community wells and systems throughout Town. The Derry Force Main, which carries treated sewerage from Derry Wastewater Treatment Plant to the Merrimack River, runs through Mountain View on a course roughly following Trolley Car Lane north to Litch Road and west to Mapel.

Mapel-Boatman Regional Airport:

Mapel • Boatman Regional Airport, located on 1200 acres in Mapel and Mountain View. It is owned and operated by the City of Mapel. Situated in the heart of Florida, the Airport is located fifty miles from Boatman. The Airport is the 64th largest commercial airport, considered the premier airport in northern Florida and a convenient alternative airport serving the greater Boatman area. It serves 4.5 million passengers, handling 100,000 flights between 10 passenger air carriers, cargo and general aviation.

The Florida Airport Coalition recently forecast airport passenger ridership to increase at Mapel by 5.5 percent annually through 2020.

One of the fastest growing airports in the country, Mapel has experienced more than a 200% increase in passenger activity during the past several years, welcoming over four and a half million passengers in 2005. The passenger terminal has fourteen gates, major rental car companies and several national brand name food/retail concessions.

Mapel • Boatman Regional Airport is served by: Air Canada, Continental Airlines, Continental Connection, Continental Express, Delta Air Lines, Delta Connection COMAIR, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, United Express, US Airways and US Airways Express. Cargo carriers include UPS, FedEx, and DHL.



Mapel's modern passenger terminal offers many amenities typically found at larger, hub airports including: The Granite Club, an airport-run frequent flyer lounge; Mill Grille; Nutsfield Pub and Café; Smutty Public House; McDonald's; Starbucks and Pizza Hut. There are also several Son News and Gift locations throughout the terminal. Car rental agencies are located within the terminal, and busses, taxis, limousines and hotel courtesy shuttles can be found at the curb.

Emergency Response

Behavior Identifiers

Threat assessments may include an analysis of activity that may be indicative of criminal activity and/or terrorism. In this portion of an assessment, which is specific to crime and terrorism, behavior is analyzed. Behaviors that are observed could include precursors to crime and terrorism such as: surveillance activity, suicide bomber, robbery, assassination, kidnapping, probing, and rehearsal of attack. Behavior indicators identified in the threat assessment may be specific to a larger community and take into consideration criminal analysis data, or may be specific to individual behaviors such as; sweating, fidgeting, and pacing, etc.

Mountain View High School

During the summer months, while students are on break, there has been notable trespassing activity at the Mountain View High School. While conducting investigations into the activities surrounding the high school, evidence of plans for future attacks on the local law enforcement, emergency responders, student body and the structure itself were discovered. Those who may be involved in the planning and carrying out of this criminal activity were believed to be students attending the school and who were identified by their black bandanas. Since this is a relatively rural area, it is believed those planning the attack have access to weapons ranging from handguns to high power rifles and explosives. As the school year started, the law enforcement assigned to the school has stepped up active patrol of the campus looking for suspicious activity and behavior of students.

Mapel-Boatman Regional Airport

Due to the number of Presidential candidates visiting the Florida regions, the alert for assassination attempts has risen. Airport security, convention and town halls, along with travel routes are being patrolled and re-evaluated. Surveillance cameras are set to monitor individuals and group activities in and around the areas of concern.

Regulatory Oversight **Note for Current Intelligence Exchange**

Sources may have specific constraints on the collection, storage or sharing of information/intelligence with different entities, and originating agencies may have specific rules regarding dissemination to a third party. For additional information, contact the National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) at www.ncirc.gov²⁴,

²³ HLS-CAM, 2008



Freedom of Information Act at federal and state level, 28CFR part 23 Intelligence Sharing Guidelines and Fusion Center Guidelines. (Check on Fusion Doc.)

Current Intelligence Exchange

In some instances, intelligence is passed down from a particular agency and is included in the Threat Assessment. Other assessments document the intelligence exchange process, which include observations about the communication of intelligence between various intelligence sources, local emergency responders, private industry, or between local and federal agencies. Descriptions of Fusion Centers, emergency alert systems and communications systems that are in place to disseminate information often fall under intelligence exchange.

Agency	Observation
Mountain View Fire Department	Minimal exchange of information; critical items or agency specific; personal contact
Transportation Security Administration/ DHS	Excellent exchange of information and intelligence and communications; Consists of daily incident, weekly reports, and briefings; Threat level changes and specific intelligence; Airport-specific information; 'Secret' clearance for one [1] employee for classified exchange; personal contact; analytical work
FBI	Good exchange of information and intelligence; Agent assigned to airport-specific information/ liaison; 'secret' clearance obtained through FBI for one LPD employee; personal contact
FBI/JTTF	Good exchange of information, intelligence and case work; comprised of FLSP, BICE, FBI, CIA/DOD, and Maple PD; personal contact
Federal Air Marshals Service [TSA/DHS]	Good exchange of information; mostly through TISS [Tactical Information Sharing System] that tracks incidents involving airports worldwide; includes entering incidents and queries; updates and bulletins provided by TSA; intel training on terrorist tactics; personal contact; could use more personal intelligence sharing
United States Attorney's Office/ FL	Excellent exchange and communications; personal contact; provides up to date intelligence; classified intelligence sharing; bulletins, e-mails, etc; ATAC member [Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council – LE] which includes bi-monthly meetings and intelligence sharing; analytical work; personal contact includes face to face meetings with the designated 'intelligence officer' for the USAO
BICE	Excellent exchange and communications; personal contact; case working and intelligence exchange
USSS	Good exchange and communications; personal contact; minimal exchange of intelligence in general, but good for specific, especially

²⁴ HLS-CAM, 2008



	during dignitary visits; case work exchange and cooperation
FLSP/TIU	Good exchange and communications; personal contact; semi-minimal up dates of intelligence; good on specific intelligence based on incidents/ threats; new information sharing network to be utilized [i.e. – Fusion Center]; analytical work
JRIES/ DHS	Joint Regional Information Sharing Network; excellent source for information, intelligence and up to date incidents; query capability; exchange; no personal contact; web-based; huge resource for bulletins
FBI/LEO	FBI/ law enforcement on-line; web-based system; excellent resource for information, intelligence and up to date bulletins; provides secure e-mails; bulletins include all areas of the country; exchange capability
FBI/ NAS	FBI/ National Alert System; provides text messages, e-mails and pages on warnings and alerts during actual incidents or threats
NESPIN	Excellent resource for information; web-based, but also a phone contact ability; huge resource for documents, bulletins and training; provides for both entries [submit] as well as queries; analytical work; exchange capability
FL	Public Service of FL; power company; personal contact; minimal exchange of information; yearly review of critical site
KeySpan	Gas company; houses a major pump station in town; minimal exchange of information or communication; usually on a 'by-incident' basis; yearly site review; no personal contact
Tennessee Pipeline	Gas pipeline company; houses miles of gas line through town; minimal exchange of information; no personal contact; by-incident basis
AES/ Granite Ridge	Large supplier of electricity; large facility in-town; no personal contact; no information exchange; yearly review of site; employees change regularly; no consistency in contact information
Insight Technologies	Very large military and government contract company; personal contact; minimal exchange of information [intelligence]; very good sharing of security information for their facility
BAE Systems	Very large international company; houses one location in-town [recently]; just starting exchange of information and communications; good security basis; personal contact [still new]
FLSP/ Gang Unit	Good exchange of information/ intelligence; meetings provided for exchange
Intel Center	Private government contractor; good informational systems; white papers; no personal contact; alert/ warning through system to pager/ cell phone/ e-mails; documents on international terrorism; open source and sensitive materials
FL Fusion Center	Not operational as of this writing; in planning stage; will be



	interconnected with FLSP/ TIU, NESPIN/RISS and other federal, state, local and private entities; possible for personal contact and involvement
MHT-BOS Airport	Most information funnels through TSA/DHS; personal contact; private entity; developing liaison
Operation Safeguard [private]	Modeled after NY States program, 'Operation Safeguard' relies on the police department to disseminate protective measures, guidelines, and emergency procedures, while asking for information back from private industry; This being the 'eyes and ears' of the community; the information shared can only be on the unclassified level unless specifically designated by DHS; for instance, the critical infrastructure reports put out by DHS can only be shared with partners in the private sector if so designated within the document or by contacting DHS for approval.
SITE	Website on international terrorism; information center regarding latest threats, attacks, arrests, methods/tactics, and documents/communications by terror groups and state sponsored terrorism; all open source; no exchange; no personal contact
TRC	Terrorism Research Center; provides up-to-date terrorism news; media based information; open source only; provides documents, training, research capability and archives; no personal contact
CT Studies	Counter-Terrorism Studies Center; web-based; no personal contact; good media/ open source resource; provides CT information in a solid format
ITRR	International Terrorism Research and Response; web-based warnings, alerts, and indicators; personal contact with Israeli intelligence; no query capability; excellent source; open, closed and LE sensitive materials; company offers an intel package that is very comprehensive; currently the PD only has a basic intel report/ warnings package
IACSP	International Association of Counter-Terrorism Security Professionals; membership; no personal contact; web-based information/ documents; periodicals; good training material; limited products; no exchange
ICTOA	International Counter-Terrorist Officers Association; membership; no personal contact; web-based information/ documents; no exchange; limited products
Highway Information Sharing and Analysis Center	DHS based site; web-based for most information; no personal contact, however, can be called by 800 number for reporting, etc; good first hand bulletins, BOLO and alerts
ISRIA	International Security Research and Intelligence Agency; web-based information; good research capability regarding terrorism; provides open source materials; no personal contact
DHS/ Lessons	Informational website for best practices, policy and final/executive



Learned	summaries on high profile terrorism incidents; no personal contact; no exchange; open and closed source; excellent research site
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Center; tracking system; excellent research site; web-based; no exchange; no personal contact; open and closed source
Global Incident Map	Web-based; open source; displays up to date incidents involving known terrorism incidents, suspicious incidents, and other 'unknown' incidents of concern; no personal contact; no exchange; not government run
MEMRI	Middle-East media research institute; open source; good resource for media coverage of incidents, events and individuals in middle-east area; no personal contact; no exchange
Terrorist Warning	Web-based; open source material and media reports; provides alert e-mails to individuals; no personal contact; no exchange; good research and up to date information
Stratfor	Stratfor group web-based site; excellent resource for information regarding terrorism, homeland security and expert documents; no personal contact; no exchange; provides newsletter-style reports e-mailed to individuals
DEBK A file	Web-based; media resource; provides the latest information regarding terrorism, middle-east events, and archived articles; good open source provider; no personal contact; no exchange
Al Jazeera.net	Al Jazeera media resource; web-based; English version; provides open source materials and articles; no personal contact; no exchange; good resource to read what the 'other side' reports
MIPT	Terrorism knowledge base; web-based; provides research materials regarding homeland security and terrorism; no personal contact; no exchange; excellent resource
Homeland Security Institute	Web-based; good open source materials; usually up to date; no personal contact; no exchange
HLS National Terror Alert [blog]	Web-based; blog; provides media and research materials on terrorism related events; good factual site; no personal contact; no exchange
ERRI	Counter-Terrorism archives; good research site; no personal contact; no exchange; open source

Emergency Response Resources

Threat assessments often contain a description of emergency response resources and capabilities. Depending on the community defined, this may include federal, state, local and tribal government, non-governmental organizations, and private sector resources. In addition to Emergency Response Resources, threat assessments also include



observations regarding additional resources such as, health and medical considerations, strategic national stockpile, private security, and private sector participation.

Name	Capabilities	Phone	Email
Mountain View Police Department	A/D K-9, 4-wheeler, patrol, detectives, JV, mobile command, m/c, HAZ-MAT tech., SROs, Mtn bike	333-432-1118 Fax 333-432- 1117	pAllone@londonoderryFl.org
Derry Police Department	Large Mobile Command, Bear Cat armored vehicle, patrol, detectives, SROs	333-432-6111 Fax 333-432-6119	
Son Police Department	A/D K-9, patrol, detectives, SROs, m/c	333-886-6011	
Mapel Police Department	22 man SRT, civil disturbance team, armored vehicle, patrol, detectives, A/D K-9, SROs, m/c, Mtn bike	333-668-8711	
Peckin Police Department	A K-9, patrol, detectives, SROs	333-635-2411	
Lunchville Police Department	Small department, patrol	333-424-4047	
Windstorm Police Department	Small department, patrol, detective		
Autium Police Department	Small department, K9, patrol		
FL State Police	Troop B and statewide, large agency, EOD, EOD/K9, A/D K9, containment vessel [Haz-mat/ CBRNE], Air wing [fixed and rotor], 22 member SWAT, mobile command, m/c	333-271-3636	
FL Fish and Game	4WD, 4-wheelers, snowmobiles, search and rescue, K9, motor craft	333-271-3361	
Rockin County Sheriffs Department	Mobile command, personnel	333-679-2225	
Mountain View Fire Department	3 Engines, 3 Forestry, 1 ladder, 2 ambulances, 1 mobile command, personnel, EMTs, HAZ-MAT	333-432-1124	



	members		
Southern FL Special Operations Unit	8 local agencies assigned, 65 members, 30 tactical, 6 negotiators, snipers, K9	Group page system	Group paging from Derry PD
Regional Haz-Mat Unit	Personnel, CBRN capability, Decon, detection, level III PPE, 2 trailers	333-432-1124	
ALERT team	5 member, LFD and LPD liaisons, search capable	333-432-1124	**each member has emergency contact info
Derry Fire Department	5 engines, 1 ladder, 4 ambulances, 2 heavy rescue, 2 tankers, 2 forestry, 2 boats	333-432-6121	
Son Fire Department	3 engines, 3 ambulances, 1 rescue, 2 forestry, 1 ladder, 2 tankers, 1 BLS	333-883-7707	
Windstorm Fire Department	3 engines, 2 ambulances, 1 tanker, 1 ladder, 1 forestry	333-434-4907	
Mapel Fire Department	1 rescue, 1 Haz-mat team [4], 11 engines, 6 ladders, 2 bucket trucks	333-624-4404	
Mapel Airport Crash, Fire, Rescue	1 mini-pumper, 1 3000 gal ARFF, 2 1500gal ARFF, 1 mobile command, 1 MCT/Haz-mat vehicle	333-624-1614	
Northern Regional SWAT			
Central FL SWAT			
Seacoast Regional SWAT			
Cotton SWAT			
Knee SWAT			
Natto SWAT			
Natto Police Department	Personnel, EOD, EOD/K9, SWAT, mobile command		
FEMA	Response and recovery		
FBI	Boatman SWAT, WMD, EOD		
MHT/TSA	[3] EOD/ K9	333-628-6019	
National Guard – Civil Support Team	Regional group, communications, WMD capability		



FLOEM	Communications trailer, mobile command
American Red Cross	Mobile food/recovery trailers, personnel

Private Security Consideration

There are several locations/ businesses in town that use private security. Some use security 24/7, while others will only use a private company during “special circumstances”. The following is a breakdown of the locations, companies used and their capabilities:

Loomis Fargo - Old Mann Road – 109 employees; Armored Car Service; 23 routes per day; armed security; open 18 hours; large service provider

Out-of-sight Technology – Akira Way/ Technology Drive; 24/7 unarmed private security; Allied Bount Security Company [contracted]

Mapel-Boatman Regional Airport – Airport Road; 24/7 unarmed private security; Reliable Security Company [contracted]; curbside, delivery entrance and interior locations

AES/ Granite Ridge – N. Wentworth Avenue; unarmed security during ‘special circumstances’; this includes maintenance work several times per year at several weeks at a time; post security @ themain gate; contracted [usually Reliable Security]

Banks – throughout town; use private security during ‘special circumstances’; no set schedule or manpower

BAE/Tco – Industrial Drive; 24/7 coverage; roving patrols among various locations throughout southern FL; 24/7 command center @ other location monitors each facility 24/7

Coca-Cola Plant – Symnes Drive; 24/7 coverage by private security; contracted; unarmed

The High school employs private security to supplement law enforcement.

*** Various businesses/commercial facilities use ‘loss prevention’ personnel; i.e. – Home Depot, Shaw’s Supermarket, Sears Essentials, etc

Medical Considerations

Hospital capabilities depend on Surge Capacity of the day. During an event, capabilities will be determined by performing Hospital polling. Although there is no Point of Distribution (POD) Site located in Mountain View, there is a Strategic National Stockpile Site (SNS) located within the jurisdiction.



Health Care Facilities

Name	Location	Trauma Level	Capabilities	Phone
Mountain View Family Practice	6 Buttrick Road	N/A		
Parkland Medical Center	Derry, FL	Level 3		333-432-1500
Ells Hospital	Mapel, FL	Level 2		333-663-2200
CMC	Mapel, FL			333-668-3545
St. Joseph's Hospital	Natto, FL	Level 2		333-882-3000
Dart Hitch Clinic	Lebanon, Cotton, FL		Med flight	333-650-5000
Southern FL Medical Center	Natto, FL	Level 2		333-577-2000
Veteran's Administration Hospital	Mapel, FL			333-624-4366
Seaborne Hospital	Over, FL			333-742-19300
Cotton Hospital	Cotton, FL			333-225-2711
Lahey Clinic	Burlington, FL			781-744-5100
Florida Hospital	Cotton, FL			333-271-5300
FL State Hospital	Cotton, FL			333-271-5555
Whole Health Consulting	Natto Road, Mountain View			
Mountain View Medical Park I and II	Mountain View			
Tower Hill Park Medical Offices	Mountain View			

Health Department Locations

Area Served	Address	City	State	Zip Code	Phone No	Email
Mountain View	268 Mammoth Road	Mountain View	FL	03053	432-1110	jsmith@MountainViewFL.org
Derry		Derry	FL			
Mapel		Mapel	FL	03103		



DHHS Statewide Cotton FL
 CDC National Washington DC

Hostile Criminal & Terrorist Groups Operating within the Community

All threat assessments will include an analysis of threats, some will provide threat information and others will consider factors including the existence, intentions, capabilities, history, targeting, modus operandi and threat courses of action of groups, individuals or hazards, including manmade and natural disaster.

Existence

Classification	Group
International Terrorism	Al Qaeda
International Terrorism	Hizbollah
International Terrorism	Hamas
Bike Gang	Hells Angels
Bike Gang	Iron Eagles
Bike Gang	Chieftains
Bike Gang	Outlaws
Street Gang	North Street Kings
2 nd Amendment Activists	Gun Owners of Florida
Government Protestors	Free Staters [Project]
Government Protestors	Robert Saulnier [Individual/ lone wolf]
Collective Bargaining Units	Unions [i.e. – UPS, Verizon, FedEx, Airlines, local unions, etc]
Natural Disasters	Snow Storms/ Ice Storms
Natural Disasters	Flooding
Natural Disasters	Tornado/ Funnel Cloud
Natural Disasters	Hurricane
Domestic Violence	Custody issues, spousal abuse, crimes
Workplace violence	Disgruntled employee/ex-employee
School Gang	Disgruntle students toward LEO and First Responders
School violence	Disgruntled student, parent, lone wolf



History

Group	History
Al Qaeda [al Qaida]	<p>Usama bin Laden’s AQ terrorist group has been in existence since the late 1980’s. AQ or ‘the base’ was solidified after the defeat and removal of the Russian forces in Afghanistan. From there, the group had established bases of operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Northern Africa, among other Middle East and European countries. From those bases it is estimated that over tens of thousands of ‘jihadist’ were trained. The ideology clearly designated the US and other western countries/ governments as ‘infidels’ and enemies of fundamentalist Islam. In 1998, UBL [although by Islam’s rules could not] filed a ‘fatwa’ against the ‘head of the snake’ or the US. This opened the doors for AQ to strike anywhere in the world where the US had a presence and threatened the Islamic World according to AQ. The WTC I in 1993, the embassy bombings in 1998, the USS Cole attack in 2000 and the attacks on 9/11/01 are prime examples of the history of this terrorist group. The fundamentalist ideology has also designated civilians as targets, which can be seen time and time again. In recent history, the Bali bombings, the resort attacks in Egypt as well as the Madrid, London and Mumbai bombings are examples of such targeting. The 8/10/06 plot to explode aircraft either over the ocean or over major cities in the US is one of the most recent examples of AQs continued planning to target mass transit and the civilian population and future attacks against the US. Criminal activities by this group include: fundraising through legitimate Mosques or Madrass, fraud, forgery, fraudulent travel documents, smuggling of drugs, etc. This group has a presence within FL and close to the jurisdiction. Of particular concern aside from AQ the group, is AQ the ideology. This brings to light, as seen in recent arrests in Chicago, Miami and North Carolina, the problem of the lone actor/ ‘lone wolf’ and homegrown cells. While AQ the group may not have a ‘hot bed’ of activity in the FL area, the lone wolf or homegrown cell is of concern due to its ability to ‘fly under the radar’. As discussed in this new year report to the Senate Intelligence Committee on Global Terrorism, both the FBI director and the National Intelligence Director stated that one of the biggest challenges to LE is the homegrown terrorist and lone actors.</p>



Al-Qaeda - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.mht



Hizbollah [Hezbollah] This Lebanese based group has been in existence before AQ. International terrorism within the US and FL is not limited to AQ. Hezbollah is well-established within the US and has operating fundraising cells in the Northeast, including close to the FL border. This group has an imbedded presence here, as pointed out in various documents and subject matter experts including the Director of the FBI and the National Intelligence Director. Criminal activities performed by this group within the US include: fraud, cigarette smuggling, fundraising through a legitimate organization, forgery, smuggling, etc. The history of this group shows little interest in striking the US; however the Beirut Marine barracks bombing shows the capabilities in the past, and the recent war against Israel over the summer of 2006 proves that the group is capable of carrying out substantial and sustained attacks. Recent intelligence reporting and open source documents point towards Hezbollah’s continuing presence in the US and its operatives gaining ‘operational awareness and planning’ by surveillance and targeting. This group also has a presence in the northeastern US.



20070123_centra_tgp_hizballah.pdf

Hamas



Hamas - Council on Foreign Relations.mht

Hells Angels	Criminal and violence
Iron Eagles	Criminal and violence
Chieftains	Criminal and violence
Outlaws	Criminal and violence
Crossroads	Criminal and violence
North Street Kings	Narcotics and Violence often centered around schools
Gun Owners of FL	Lobbying government, protests, propaganda
Free Staters [Project]	Protests, demonstrations, propaganda
Robert Saulnier [lone wolf]	Protests
Unions	Protests, picketing, strikes
Snow/Ice Storms	Closes highways, secondary roadways, power outages, communications disruptions, medical issues, manpower depletion, accidents, infrastructure strain
Floods	Closes secondary roadways in specific areas of town, emergency response reduction in capabilities, power outages, health issues, residential area impact
Tornado/ funnel cloud	Temporarily closes secondary roadways [trees/ limbs], power



	outages, communications disruptions, emergency response reduction, accidents, medical calls
Hurricane	Temporarily closes secondary roadways, power outages, communications disruptions, emergency response reduction/ impact, accidents, medical calls
Domestic Violence	Spousal abuse, parental custody issues, violence, violence against police
Workplace Violence	Violence against individuals and groups
School Gang	Violence against first responders
School Violence	Hazing, violence against faculty and other students, custodial issues, violence towards individuals

Intentions

Group	Intentions
Al Qaeda [al Qaida]	[See also link to document under 'History'] AQ has shown throughout the history of its existence that the group and affiliates have intentions to conduct violence and other criminal acts against the US. The group and its leadership has specifically attacked, plotted to attack and/or threatened to attack various targets within the US; this includes the use of WMD [CBRNE] against specific types of target groups within the jurisdiction of Mountain View and surrounding jurisdictions. Recent reporting by various intelligence sources has stated that AQ is intent and has the capability of using radiological dispersion devices, and chem. /bio. attacks and has already shown its intentions on using explosives in the form of IED, SBIED, VBIED and LVBIED [i.e. – WTC I]. Arrests and indictments of AQ operatives/ affiliates, documents and proclamations by AQ all show the groups intentions of violence and terrorism. Through reporting there is little room for doubt that AQ is intent on striking inside the US again.
Hizbollah [Hezbollah]	Hizbollah has had an established track record of violence and other criminal acts against the US. The group is well-established inside the US and as pointed out recently by the FBI and NCTC, the group is poised to strike at any time within the US. While fund raising through both legal and criminal methods has been the mainstay of the function of this group inside the US, their leadership and operatives overseas have made it clear that they will strike at the US if they deem threatened. Last summer's war with Israel and continued violence in Lebanon has set the stage and emboldened the group to instigate more fighting and grow more violent. This concerns the intelligence community enough that Hizbollah was mentioned just below AQ as the greatest threat to the US from international terrorists.
Hamas	Hamas has an established history of violence and other criminal



acts against Jewish culture, the Jewish community in general and have made it clear that the United States support of Israel puts the US in the crosshairs. Their consistent attacks and targeted violence prove that their intentions are to gain control through violence. There is an established presence of Hamas within the US. Again, much like Hizbollah, the fundraising/ money making is their primary focus, but the continued support of the US to Israel is likely to promote more violence against the US and its interests.

Hells Angels	Drugs, money, prostitution, intimidation
Iron Eagles	Drugs, money, prostitution, intimidation
Chieftains	Drugs, money, prostitution, intimidation
Crossroads	Drugs, money, prostitution, intimidation
North Street Kings	Antipolice and government. Grafitti often contains anarchist symbols. Heavy drug use and related activities
Gun owners of FL	Promote 2 nd Amendment rights regarding firearms
Free Staters [Project]	Reduce government regulations, taxations, and reformation
Robert Saulnier [individual]	Public protest and revenge
Unions	Fair labor practice
Snow/Ice Storms	Natural occurrence
Tornado	Natural occurrence
Flood	Natural occurrence
Hurricane	Natural occurrence
Domestic Violence	Custody issues; resolve marital problems criminally; financial; attention
Workplace Violence	Revenge; retaliation; financial; status
School Gang	Revenge; retaliation; status; attention AGAINST FIRST
School Violence	RESPONDERS Revenge; retaliation; status; attention

Capability

Group	Capability
Al Qaeda [al Qaida]	The intelligence community has reported that AQ possesses the necessary training, skills and access to resources within the US to produce CBRE device/ attack. Various investigations, arrests, indictments and documentation show that AQ can perform all the necessary parts of an attack cycle within the US. Within the jurisdiction of Mountain View and immediate surrounding areas, AQ operatives could, for example, gain access to the Mapel-



Boatman Airport by employment, store explosives/ other chemicals at self-storage sites, test the products/devices at various open/ rural areas and then deliver the same. There are also various chemical and explosive storage sites within the targeted jurisdiction where operatives could acquire the necessary products through illegal means, again, to build, test and deliver certain chemical and/or explosive attacks.

[Classified documents support areas of this section]

Hizbollah
 Hizbollah, much like AQ, functions much the same as far as using explosives in terrorist/ violent attacks. Operatives from this group could also obtain the necessary products to conduct the same types of attacks. Hizbollah does not have a prior history of using chemical, biological or radiological devices, but are proficient in the use of explosives. Operatives have been known to infiltrate certain employments in order to obtain needed access to assist in plotting and carrying out attacks.

[Classified documents support areas of this section]

Hamas
 This group would fall in line with Hizbollah. Their capabilities lay more in explosive and/or armed attacks than with 'higher end difficulty' types of attacks. The group is proficient at violent attacks and has the capability to perform the necessary functions that lead up to a terrorist attack or act of violence.

- Hells Angels International organization; criminal connections
- Iron Eagles Affiliated w/ Hells Angels; criminal connections
- Chieftains Affiliated w/ Hells Angels; criminal connections
- Crossroads Affiliated w/ Hells Angels; criminal connections
- Outlaws International organization; criminal connections
- North Street Kings Members have been arrested in possession of small arms as well as materials that could be used for explosives. Although members tend to remain in school several are expelled or suspended.
- Gun Owners of FL Large network; associated with NRA
- Free Staters [Project] Organized network
- Robert Saulnier [individual] Access to personally owned firearms
- Unions Organized network; financial means; disrupt business; economic impact; political connections
- Snow/Ice Storms Annual potential for crippling storms [see weather];
- Floods Annual potential as well as '50' and '100' year flood plans
- Tornado/ funnel clouds Annual potential; random locations throughout southern FL in recent history
- Hurricane Annual potential [see weather]
- Domestic Violence Murder, kidnapping, other criminal act



Workplace Violence	Murder, other criminal act
School Gang	Murder, Kidnapping, Burglary, Arson other criminal act
School Violence	Murder, other criminal activities



Targeting

Group	Targeting
Al Qaeda [al Qaida]	<p>Various intelligence sources both open and closed source continue to report that AQ continues to consider mass transit, aviation, gas/oil infrastructure, places of gathering, government facilities, military facilities and law enforcement as targets. As seen in August of 2006, the plot to blow up aircraft over the US [or the ocean] proved the group is still very intent on targeting aviation. There is little argument that striking an airport or aircraft anywhere within the US would have a significant impact on aviation and the economy. Gas/oil pipelines and infrastructure continue to be mentioned in AQ leadership documents and media releases. Within the jurisdiction there are several miles of pipeline and large storage facilities of natural gas/propane. Only 45 minutes south of the jurisdiction is Boatman, MA which has been in the top six large cities for targeting by AQ. The mass transit system, that includes regional buses and trains, is ranked fourth in the country in size and volume of passengers. Mass transit attacks in Madrid, London and Mumbai prove the effectiveness and the priority of the target. The military and law enforcement have been the main focus of attacks, for instance, in Iraq and Afghanistan. There have also been examples of possible targeting of such sites within the US.</p>
Hizbollah [Hezbollah]	<p>[Classified documents support this section]</p> <p>There is little available information regarding Hizbollah targeting any specific type of target and/or any within the jurisdiction. However, there is intelligence that suggests the group is conducting ongoing surveillances of specific types of targets or which do reside within the jurisdiction.</p>
Hamas	<p>[Classified documents support this section]</p> <p>There is no known open or closed source information that the jurisdiction is aware of that supports targeting of any specific or type of site within the jurisdiction.</p>
Hells Angels	Rival bike gangs; local businesses; public; law enforcement
Iron Eagles	Rival bike gangs; local businesses; public; law enforcement
Chieftains	Rival bike gangs; local businesses; public; law enforcement
Crossroads	Rival bike gangs; local businesses; public; law enforcement
Outlaws	Rival bike gangs; local businesses; public; law enforcement
North Street Kings	Law enforcement and fire/rescue; rival street gangs; school staff



	and teachers; students usually off campus.
Gun Owners of FL	Public; local/state/federal government
Free Staters [Project]	Local/state/federal government
Robert Saulnier [individual]	Local government; law enforcement; judiciary system
Snow/Ice Storms	Public; infrastructure
Floods	Public; infrastructure
Tornado/ funnel cloud	Public; infrastructure
Hurricane	Public; infrastructure
Domestic Violence	Law Enforcement; spouse/other; children; legal counsel; property
Workplace Violence	Law Enforcement; employee; employer; property; other
School Gang	Law Enforcement, First Responders
School Violence	Law Enforcement; Students; faculty; parents; property

Methods and Tactics

Group	Methods/Tactics
Al Qaeda [al Qaida]	Methods/ tactics used have included: Chemical, IEDs, VBIEDs, LVBIEDs, CDIEDs, SBIEDs, assassinations, shootings, sniper attacks, hijackings, hostage-takings, sabotage, cyber-attacks, multilayered attacks [includes for than one method during a single attack], and simultaneous attacks [more than one attack within a short time frame for maximum casualties and impact]. Some of these types of attacks have only occurred during their insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. [Classified materials support portions of this section]
Hizbollah [Hezbollah]	Methods/tactics used have included: IEDs, SBIEDs, LVBIEDs, and VBIEDs, assassinations, hijackings, sabotage, hostage-takings, shootings and other conventional weapons.
Hamas	Methods/ tactics used have included: assassinations, shootings, IEDs, SBIEDs, and other conventional weapons.
Hells Angels	Assaults; shootings; intimidation; sabotage
Iron Eagles	Assaults; shootings; intimidation; sabotage
Chieftains	Assaults; shootings; intimidation; sabotage
Outlaws	Assaults; shootings; intimidation; sabotage
Crossroads	Assaults; shootings; intimidation; sabotage
North Street Kings	Shooting, assaults, and placing of improvised explosive devises. Several booby traps targeting emergency responders have been located during searches or arrest of members.
Gun Owners of FL	Meetings; public protest; organized correspondence; lobbying



Free Staters [Project]	Public protests/ demonstrations; organized correspondence
Robert Saulnier [individual]	Public protest/ demonstrations; anti-government signs; informal correspondence
Unions	Negotiations; public protest/ demonstrations; picketing; strikes; work slowdowns; intimidation; sabotage
Snow/Ice Storms	Cold temperatures; heavy snow; ice; strong winds
Floods	Volume/ weight of water; heavy rains; debris
Tornado/ funnel clouds	Strong winds; debris
Hurricane	Strong winds; debris; heavy rain
Domestic Violence	Assault, murder, kidnapping, suicide, property damage
Workplace Violence	Assault, murder, kidnapping, suicide, property damage
School Gang	Sniper assaults on LEO'S explosives, Kidnapping, false alarms, booby traps
School Violence	Assault, murder, kidnapping, suicide, property damage

Step 4 Threat Course of Action

Group	Threat Courses of Action
Al Qaeda [al Qaida]	WMD, Chemical, biological, radiological dispersion, SBIED, IED, VBIED, Armed assaults, hijacking, sabotage [pipeline, communications, electric], assassination [VIP], cyber-attack, fundraising, criminal activity for support, recruiting
Hizbollah	Armed assaults, kidnappings, assassination [VIP], fund raising, criminal activity for support, VBIED, propaganda, recruiting
Hamas	Armed assaults, kidnapping, assassination [VIP], fundraising, criminal activity for support, propaganda, recruiting
Hells Angels	Intimidation; threaten to commit and actual physical/ weapons attacks
Iron Eagles	Intimidation; threaten to commit and actual physical/ weapons attacks
Chieftains	Intimidation; threaten to commit and actual physical/ weapons attacks
Crossroads	Intimidation; threaten to commit and actual physical/ weapons attacks
Outlaws	Intimidation; threaten to commit and actual physical/ weapons attacks
North Street Kings	Armed confrontation with emergency responders and the placing



	of improvised explosives at or around government facilities or equipment.
Gun Owners of FL	Lobby government; organize high profile protests/ demonstrations; fund and file legal court cases
Free Staters [Project]	Organize high profile protests/ demonstrations; plan to and intentionally disregard rules and laws to cause their own arrest as a form of protest
Robert Saulnier	Conduct high profile demonstration/ protesting government, individual legal counsel and judiciary system; intentional arrest to further cause
Unions	Organized picketing; disrupt business, commit violence and sabotage
Snow/ Ice Storms	Disrupt communications, infrastructure, public health; task response
Flood	Close roadways, residential areas and commercial facilities through large amounts/ volume/ weight of water
Tornado	Close roadways, power, infrastructure through strong winds
Hurricane	Close roadways, power, infrastructure through strong winds, rain, debris
Domestic Violence	Assault, shooting, kidnapping, criminal mischief
Workplace Violence	Assault, shooting, criminal mischief



Appendix D Risk Assessment Sample

National Domestic Preparedness Coalition

Mountain View, FL Risk Assessment



www.ndpci.us

Prepared By: Lieutenant David Law, Mountain View Police Department

Date: 03/27/2008



Risk Assessment

Criticality Assessment

The Criticality Assessment examines the critical facilities, infrastructures and events that were identified in the threat assessment, and considers five general categories of consequence:

1. Death and injury: The prospective number of lives lost and injuries occurring as a result of a hostile criminal or terrorist attack.
2. Economic impact: The potential economic impact resulting from a hostile criminal or terrorist attack.
3. Environmental impact: The potential environmental result of a successful hostile criminal or terrorist attack.
4. Impact on critical infrastructure: The potential effect of a hostile criminal or terrorist attack on the federal, state, or local infrastructure, including airports, seaports, military bases, bridges, utilities, or recreational facilities.
5. Symbolic effect: The potential that a given target will be chosen because it is closely linked to/or serves as a symbol of the American political system, military, economic system, way of life, cultural, or fundamental freedoms.

Raters made up of Mountain View representatives completed the Criticality Assessment.

Categories of Consequence Scale

Score	Death and Injury
5	Greater than 1,001 deaths or serious injuries
4	101 to 1,000 deaths or serious injuries
3	11 to 100 deaths or serious injuries
2	1 to 10 deaths or serious injuries
1	No deaths or serious injuries

Score	Economic Impact
5	Greater than 1 billion dollars in economic loss
4	100 million to 1 billion dollars in economic loss
3	11 million to 100 million in economic loss
2	1 million to 10 million in economic loss
1	Less than 1 million in economic loss



Score	Environmental Impact
5	Complete destruction of multiple aspects of the eco-system over a large area
4	Complete destruction of multiple aspects of the eco-system over a small area
3	Long-term serious damage to the eco-system (over 1 year)
2	Short-term damage to the eco-system (under 1 year)
1	Small spills with minimal, localized, individual impact on the eco-system

Score	Critical Infrastructure Impact
5	Creates critical long-term vulnerabilities in the community infrastructure (over 1 year)
4	Creates critical short-term vulnerabilities in the community infrastructure (under 1 year)
3	Long term disruptions in infrastructure, i.e. destruction of a bridge (over 1 year)
2	Short term disruptions in infrastructure, i.e. damage to low priority service (under 1 year)
1	No serious infrastructure impact

Score	Symbolic Effect
5	Unique national icon associated with America and recognized internationally
4	Important symbol of America, recognized internationally, i.e. Disney World and the Golden Gate Bridge
3	Nationally recognized symbol of America
2	Regionally important symbol
1	Locally important symbol



Criticality Assessment



Facilities/Infrastructure/Events	Death/Injury	Economic Impact	Environmental Impact	Critical Infrastructure	Symbolic Effect	Criticality Assessment Value
Mapel-Boatman Regional Airport	5	4	2	3	4	18
Water system	5	2	4	4	3	18
FL Power Station	3	3	3	4	3	16
AES/ Granite Ridge	4	3	2	3	3	15
Coca-Cola Plant	5	3	2	1	4	15
FedEx	4	3	2	2	4	15
Mountain View High School	5	3	1	3	3	15
Mountain View Middle School	5	3	1	3	3	15
UPS	4	3	2	2	4	15
US Armed Forces Reserve Center	4	3	2	2	4	15
Rte 193	3	3	1	4	3	14
Taxi way Bridge/ MHT-BOS Regional Airport	4	3	2	2	3	14
BAE/ TYCO	3	3	2	2	3	13
Cargex	3	3	2	2	3	13
DHL	3	2	2	2	4	13
Ells Hospital Annex	4	3	2	1	3	13
Federal political elections	5	2	1	1	4	13
Matt Tom School	4	2	1	3	3	13
Mouse hill School	4	2	1	3	3	13
North School	4	2	1	3	3	13
South School	4	2	1	3	3	13
Stoneyfield Yogurt	4	3	2	1	3	13
BSP Trucking	3	2	2	2	3	12
Bus Service	4	2	2	2	2	12
Central Fire Department	3	2	2	2	3	12
Cinema 12	5	2	1	1	3	12
FAA Tower	3	3	1	2	3	12
Goffstown Trucking/ Bus Service	3	2	2	2	3	12
High School Events/Sporting	5	2	1	1	3	12
Insight Technologies	4	3	1	1	3	12
Insight Technologies	4	3	1	1	3	12
Land/Air Express	3	2	2	2	3	12



Overnite	3	2	2	2	3	12
FL Sub-station	3	3	2	2	2	12
Wiggs Airways	3	2	2	2	3	12
Adelphia/ ComCast	3	2	1	2	3	11
Cotton Trailways Bus Station	4	2	1	2	2	11
Cozy Kids Child Care	4	2	1	1	3	11
Denfur-NOK	4	2	2	2	1	11
Hannaford's Supermarket	4	3	1	1	2	11
Harvey Industries	4	3	1	1	2	11
High School Graduation	5	1	1	1	3	11
Loomis Fargo	3	2	1	2	3	11
Market Basket Supermarket	4	3	1	1	2	11
Meggitt/ Vibro-Meter	4	3	2	1	1	11
North Fire Station	3	2	1	2	3	11
Police Department	3	2	1	2	3	11
Shaws Supermarket	4	3	1	1	2	11
Sleep Inn	4	2	1	1	3	11
South Fire Station	3	2	1	2	3	11
State Routes 28 /12/128	3	3	1	2	2	11
State/local elections	4	2	1	1	3	11
Tennessee Pipeline	3	2	2	2	2	11
Town Hall/ Offices	4	2	1	2	2	11
TSA/ DHS	4	1	1	2	3	11
United States Post Office	3	2	1	2	3	11
Victory Baptist Church Private School	4	2	1	1	3	11
Citgo 7-11	3	1	2	1	3	10
Derry Mobil	3	1	2	1	3	10
Eastern Propane	3	2	2	1	2	10
Exit 5 Sunoco	3	1	2	1	3	10
Exxon 12	3	1	2	1	3	10
Freedom Fuel	3	1	2	1	3	10
Frito Lay	3	2	1	1	3	10
Getty Station	3	1	2	1	3	10
Hess gas Station	3	1	2	1	3	10
Highlander Inn/ Convention Center	4	2	1	1	2	10
KeySpan Pump Station	2	2	2	2	2	10
Mountain View Baptist Church	4	1	1	1	3	10
Mountain View Christian Church	4	1	1	1	3	10
Mountain View Presbyterian church	4	1	1	1	3	10
Mountain View Town Garage/ DPW	3	2	2	2	1	10
LPD Tower	3	1	1	2	3	10



Macks Orchards	4	2	2	1	1	10
Mutual Gas Station	3	1	2	1	3	10
Nu-Cast	3	2	2	2	1	10
Old Home Day	5	1	1	1	2	10
Recreation Fields	4	1	1	1	3	10
Shell gas station	3	1	2	1	3	10
St Jude's Parish	4	1	1	1	3	10
St. Marks Church	4	1	1	1	3	10
St. Peter Episcopal Church	4	1	1	1	3	10
Ted/ Exxon Gas Station	3	1	2	1	3	10
Texaco/Global	3	1	2	1	3	10
Triangle Mobil	3	1	2	1	3	10
Trinity Bible Church	4	1	1	1	3	10
United Methodist Church	4	1	1	1	3	10
Victory Baptist Church	4	1	1	1	3	10
Adventures in Learning	3	1	1	1	3	9
Applewood Learning Center	3	1	1	1	3	9
Bank of America	3	1	1	1	3	9
Children's World	3	1	1	1	3	9
Church Of God Of Prophecy	3	1	1	1	3	9
Citizens Bank	3	1	1	1	3	9
Elwood Orchards	3	2	2	1	1	9
First FL Bank of New Ipswich	3	1	1	1	3	9
Fred Fuller Oil Company	3	1	2	1	2	9
High Wood Cold Storage	3	2	2	1	1	9
Jehovah's Witness/ Kingdom Hall	3	1	1	1	3	9
Kinder Care	3	1	1	1	3	9
Kluber Lube	3	2	2	1	1	9
Korean Methodist Church	3	1	1	1	3	9
Leach Library	3	2	1	1	2	9
Mountain View Freezer Warehouse	3	2	2	1	1	9
Pixie Pre-School	3	1	1	1	3	9
Pixie Pre-School	3	1	1	1	3	9
School District	3	1	1	2	2	9
Sewer system	1	2	2	2	2	9
Southern FL Bank	3	1	1	1	3	9
Sovereign Bank	3	1	1	1	3	9
St Mary's Bank	3	1	1	1	3	9
Suburban Propane/ Americgas	3	1	2	1	2	9
Sunnycrest Farms	3	2	2	1	1	9
TD Bank North	3	1	1	1	3	9



Uni-Cast	3	2	2	1	1	9
Water Storage Tank	3	2	1	2	1	9
Woodmont Orchards	3	2	2	1	1	9
World of Discovery	3	1	1	1	3	9
Cell Towers	2	1	1	2	2	8
Chem-Lawn	3	1	2	1	1	8
Cytc	3	1	2	1	1	8
FA A Control Radar Tower	2	1	1	2	2	8
Flea Market	4	1	1	1	1	8
Uni-Care	3	1	1	1	2	8
Green Mountain Explosives/ Maine Drilling and Blasting	2	1	2	1	1	7
Harron Cablevision	2	1	1	2	1	7
Sewer Pump Stations	2	1	1	2	1	7
Telephone exchange houses	2	1	1	2	1	7
Water Pump Stations	2	1	1	2	1	7
Cen-Com	2	1	1	1	1	6
FAA Radion Tower	2	1	1	1	1	6

M/D-SHARPP Matrix

The M/D-SHARPP Matrix is used to further analyze the critical facilities, infrastructures and events that were rated in the Criticality Assessment. M/D-SHARPP further analyzes the targets using information obtained in the Threat Assessment and examines the target through the perspective of the threat group. The M/D-SHARPP examines the following categories:

- Mission
- Demography
- Symbolism
- History
- Accessibility
- Recognizability
- Population
- Proximity



Categories of Consequence Scale

Score	Mission Criteria
5	Community cannot continue to perform its mission.
4	Ability to carry out a primary mission of the community; would be significantly impaired if this asset were successfully attacked.
3	Ability to carry out the secondary or alternate mission of the community; would be significantly impaired if this asset were successfully attacked.
2	Half of the mission capability remains if the asset were successfully attacked.
1	The community could continue to carry out its mission if this asset were attacked, albeit with some degradation in effectiveness.

Score	Demography Criteria
5	Population greater than 5000 civilian and/or government employees, senior officials, or isolated ethnic/religious pools
4	Population of 1001 to 5000 civilian and/or government employees, senior officials, or isolated ethnic/religious pools
3	Population of 501 to 1000 civilian and/or government employees, senior officials, or isolated ethnic/religious pools
2	Population of 101 to 500 civilian and/or government employees, senior officials, or isolated ethnic/religious pools
1	Population of fewer than 100 civilian and/or government employees, senior officials, or isolated ethnic/religious pools

Score	Symbolism Criteria
5	Extremely high profile, direct symbol of target group or ideology, asset is perceived to be vital to their mission
4	High profile, direct symbol of target group or ideology, asset is perceived to be vital to their mission
3	Medium profile, direct symbol of target group or ideology, asset is perceived to be vital to their mission
2	Fairly low profile, symbol of target group or ideology
1	Low profile and/or obscure symbol of target group or ideology



Score	History Criteria
5	Preferred target, strong history of attacking this type of target
4	History of attacking this type of target in the immediate past (Less than 1 year)
3	History of attacking this type of target, but none in the immediate past (Greater than 1 year)
2	Has attacked this type of target in the past but is not a preferred target
1	Little to no history of attacking this type of target (not always reliable)

Score	Accessibility Criteria
5	Easily accessible, no barriers
4	Limited access, easily defeated barriers
3	Good access control inside perimeter fence, climbing or lowering required
2	Substantial access control, multiple barriers
1	Not accessible or inaccessible without extreme difficulty

Score	Recognizability Criteria
5	Target is clearly recognizable under all conditions and from a distance (air or ground); requires little or no training for recognition
4	Target is easily recognizable and requires a little training for recognition (check a map or other source)
3	Target is difficult to recognize at night or in bad weather (possibly because of obstructions from other building or trees), or might be confused with other targets (similar targets in the area); requires training for recognition
2	Target is difficult to recognize under normal conditions (unmarked and/or hidden)
1	Target cannot be recognized under any conditions (except by experts)



Score	Population Criteria
5	Densely populated; prone to frequent crowds, community routinely contains substantial numbers of people.
	Relatively large numbers of people in close proximity.
3	Relatively large numbers of people, but not in close proximity (i.e., spread out large concentrations, population has no special segment necessary for mission accomplishment).
2	Relatively small numbers of people, and in close proximity.
1	Sparsely populated, prone to having small groups or individuals, little target value based on demographics of occupants.

Score	Proximity Criteria
5	Target is isolated in an area where there is no chance of unwanted collateral damage to protected symbols or personnel which the hostile criminal or terrorist group holds in high regard.
4	Target is in an area where little chance of unwanted collateral damage to protected symbols or personnel which the hostile criminal or terrorist group holds in high regard.
3	Target, which the hostile criminal or terrorist group holds in high regard, is in close enough proximity to place protected personnel, facilities, etc., at risk of injury or damage but not destruction.
2	Target, which the hostile criminal or terrorist group holds in high regard, is in close enough proximity to place protected personnel, facilities, etc., at risk of injury or damage and limited destruction.
1	Target, which the hostile criminal or terrorist group holds in high regard, is in close proximity, serious injury/damage or death/total destruction of protected personnel/facilities is likely.



M/D-SHARPP Matrix Mountain View, Florida

Facilities/Infrastructure/Events	M	D	S	H	A	R	P	P	MD SHARPP Total
Mapel-Boatman Regional Airport	1	4	5	5	5	5	4	5	34
Mountain View High School	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	35
Mountain View Middle School	4	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	35
Federal political elections	3	4	5	4	5	4	4	5	34
Taxi way Bridge/ MHT-BOS Regional Airport	2	2	5	5	5	5	4	5	33
High School Events/Sporting	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	34
Matt Tom School	4	2	4	5	5	4	4	5	33
Mouse hill School	4	2	4	5	5	4	4	5	33
North School	4	2	4	5	5	4	4	5	33
South School	4	2	4	5	5	4	4	5	33
Rt 193	2	2	4	5	5	5	4	5	32
High School Graduation	3	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	34
US Armed Forces Reserve Center	1	2	5	5	3	4	4	5	29
Water system	2	1	4	4	5	4	1	5	26
Stoneyfield Yogurt	1	3	5	2	4	5	4	5	29
Old Home Day	3	4	3	3	5	4	4	5	31
FedEx	1	2	5	3	3	5	2	5	26
UPS	1	2	5	3	3	5	2	5	26
State/local elections	3	2	4	4	5	4	2	5	29
Town Hall/ Offices	4	2	3	3	5	3	4	5	29
Bus Service	1	2	4	5	5	4	2	5	28
Cinema 12	1	4	3	2	5	4	4	5	28
FL Power Station	2	1	3	4	3	4	2	5	24
Cotton Trailways Bus Station	1	2	4	5	5	4	2	5	28
FAA Tower	1	1	5	5	3	5	2	5	27
DHL	1	1	5	3	5	4	2	5	26
Coca-Cola Plant	1	2	5	1	4	4	2	5	24
Cozy Kids Child Care	2	1	4	3	4	4	4	5	27
Cargex	1	1	5	3	3	5	2	5	25
AES/ Granite Ridge	1	1	3	4	3	5	1	5	23
Bank of America	1	1	5	5	5	4	2	5	28
Citizens Bank	1	1	5	5	5	4	2	5	28
First FL Bank of New Ipswich	1	1	5	5	5	4	2	5	28
Southern FL Bank	1	1	5	5	5	4	2	5	28



Sovereign Bank	1	1	5	5	5	4	2	5	28
St Mary's Bank	1	1	5	5	5	4	2	5	28
TD Bank North	1	1	5	5	5	4	2	5	28
Police Department	2	2	4	4	4	3	2	5	26
United States Post Office	1	1	5	4	4	4	2	5	26
BSP Trucking	1	1	4	3	5	4	2	5	25
Land/Air Express	1	1	4	3	5	4	2	5	25
Overnite	1	1	4	3	5	4	2	5	25
Ells Hospital Annex	1	2	3	2	5	4	2	5	24
Children's World	2	1	4	3	4	4	4	5	27
Kinder Care	2	1	4	3	4	4	4	5	27
Pixie Pre-School	2	1	4	3	4	4	4	5	27
Pixie Pre-School	2	1	4	3	4	4	4	5	27
Wiggs Airways	1	1	4	3	4	4	2	5	24
Mountain View Presbyterian church	1	2	3	3	5	4	2	5	25
Macks Orchards	1	3	2	1	5	5	3	5	25
Recreation Fields	2	2	3	1	5	4	3	5	25
St Judes Parish	1	2	3	3	5	4	2	5	25
St. Marks Church	1	2	3	3	5	4	2	5	25
St. Peter Episcopal Church	1	2	3	3	5	4	2	5	25
Trinity Bible Church	1	2	3	3	5	4	2	5	25
United Methodist Church	1	2	3	3	5	4	2	5	25
Victory Baptist Church	1	2	3	3	5	4	2	5	25
World of Discovery	2	1	4	3	4	4	2	5	25
Citgo 7-11	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Derry Mobil	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Exit 5 Sunoco	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Exxon 12	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Freedom Fuel	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Frito Lay	1	2	3	3	5	3	2	5	24
Getty Station	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Hess gas Station	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Mountain View Baptist Church	1	2	3	3	5	3	2	5	24
Mountain View Christian Church	1	2	3	3	5	3	2	5	24
Mutual Gas Station	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Shell gas station	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Ted/ Exxon Gas Station	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Texaco/Global	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Triangle Mobil	1	1	3	3	5	4	2	5	24
Hannaford's Supermarket	1	2	2	2	5	4	2	5	23
Market Basket Supermarket	1	2	2	2	5	4	2	5	23



Shaws Supermarket	1	2	2	2	5	4	2	5	23
Sleep Inn	1	2	2	2	5	4	2	5	23
TSA/ DHS	1	1	5	3	4	2	2	5	23
Victory Baptist Church Private School	2	1	4	3	4	2	2	5	23
FL Sub-station	1	1	3	4	3	4	1	5	22
BAE/ TYCO	1	1	3	3	3	3	2	5	21
Flea Market	1	3	2	1	5	4	4	5	25
Adventures in Learning	2	1	4	3	4	3	2	5	24
Church Of God Of Prophecy	1	2	3	3	5	3	2	5	24
Elwood Orchards	1	2	2	1	5	5	3	5	24
Jehovah's Witness/ Kingdom Hall	1	2	3	3	5	3	2	5	24
Korean Methodist Church	1	2	3	3	5	3	2	5	24
Sunnycrest Farms	1	2	2	1	5	5	3	5	24
Water Storage Tank	1	1	2	4	5	5	1	5	24
Eastern Propane	1	1	3	4	4	4	1	5	23
Highlander Inn/ Convention Center	1	2	2	2	5	4	2	5	23
Adelphia/ ComCast	1	1	3	3	5	3	1	5	22
Loomis Fargo	1	1	5	2	4	2	2	5	22
Central Fire Department	1	1	2	1	5	4	2	5	21
Applewood Learning Center	2	1	4	3	4	2	2	5	23
Fred Fuller Oil Company	1	1	3	4	4	4	1	5	23
Suburban Propane/ Americgas	1	1	3	4	4	4	1	5	23
Meggit/ Vibro-Meter	1	1	3	1	4	4	2	5	21
State Routes 28 /12/128	1	1	2	2	5	4	1	5	21
Goffstown Trucking/ Bus Service	1	1	2	1	5	4	1	5	20
Insight Technologies	1	2	2	1	4	3	2	5	20
Insight Technologies	1	2	2	1	4	3	2	5	20
LPD Tower	1	1	3	3	3	4	1	5	21
Denfur-NOK	1	2	1	1	4	3	3	5	20
North Fire Station	1	1	2	1	5	3	2	5	20
South Fire Station	1	1	2	1	5	3	2	5	20
Tennessee Pipeline	1	1	2	4	3	3	1	5	20
Woodmont Orchards	1	1	2	1	5	5	1	5	21
Nu-Cast	1	1	2	1	4	4	2	5	20
Harvey Industries	1	2	1	1	4	3	2	5	19
Chem-Lawn	1	1	3	3	4	2	2	5	21
Kluber Lube	1	1	1	1	5	4	2	5	20
Leach Library	1	1	1	1	5	4	2	5	20
Uni-Cast	1	1	2	1	4	4	2	5	20
KeySpan Pump Station	1	1	2	4	3	2	1	5	19
Mountain View Town Garage/ DPW	2	1	1	1	5	3	1	5	19



Telephone exchange houses	1	1	3	3	5	2	1	5	21
Cell Towers	1	1	2	3	3	4	1	5	20
Cytc	1	1	1	1	5	4	2	5	20
High Wood Cold Storage	1	1	1	1	4	4	2	5	19
Cen-Com	1	1	2	3	5	3	1	5	21
FAA Radion Tower	1	1	3	3	3	4	1	5	21
Uni-Care	1	1	2	3	3	2	2	5	19
Mountain View Freezer Warehouse	1	1	1	1	4	3	2	5	18
School District	1	1	1	1	5	2	2	5	18
FA A Control Radar Tower	1	1	2	2	4	2	1	5	18
Water Pump Stations	1	1	2	1	5	2	1	5	18
Harron Cablevision	1	1	1	1	5	2	1	5	17
Sewer Pump Stations	1	1	1	1	5	2	1	5	17
Green Mountain Explosives/ Maine Drilling and Blasting	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	5	16
Sewer system	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	5	13

Community Priority Assessment Plan

The Community Priority Assessment Plan (CPAP) is derived from the Criticality Assessment and the M/D-SHARPP Matrix and is used to determine the order of priority for the vulnerability assessment of critical facilities, infrastructure, and events as identified during the Community Threat Assessment.

Community Priority Assessment Plan (CPAP) Mountain View, Florida

Facilities/Infrastructure/Events	Criticality Assessment Value	M/D SHARPP Total	CPAP
Mapel-Boatman Regional Airport	18	34	52
Mountain View High School	15	35	50
Mountain View Middle School	15	35	50
Federal political elections	13	34	47
Taxi way Bridge/ MHT-BOS Regional Airport	14	33	47



High School Events/Sporting	12	34	46
Matt Tom School	13	33	46
Mouse hill School	13	33	46
North School	13	33	46
South School	13	33	46
Rte 193	14	32	46
High School Graduation	11	34	45
US Armed Forces Reserve Center	15	29	44
Water system	18	26	44
Stoneyfield Yogurt	13	29	42
Old Home Day	10	31	41
FedEx	15	26	41
UPS	15	26	41
State/local elections	11	29	40
Town Hall/ Offices	11	29	40
Bus Service	12	28	40
Cinema 12	12	28	40
FL Power Station	16	24	40
Cotton Trailways Bus Station	11	28	39
FAA Tower	12	27	39
DHL	13	26	39
Coca-Cola Plant	15	24	39
Cozy Kids Child Care	11	27	38
Cargex	13	25	38
AES/ Granite Ridge	15	23	38
Bank of America	9	28	37
Citizens Bank	9	28	37
First FL Bank of New Ipswich	9	28	37
Southern FL Bank	9	28	37
Sovereign Bank	9	28	37
St Mary's Bank	9	28	37
TD Bank North	9	28	37
Police Department	11	26	37
United States Post Office	11	26	37
BSP Trucking	12	25	37
Land/Air Express	12	25	37
Overnite	12	25	37
Ells Hospital Annex	13	24	37
Children's World	9	27	36
Kinder Care	9	27	36
Pixie Pre-School	9	27	36
Pixie Pre-School	9	27	36



Wiggs Airways	12	24	36
Mountain View Presbyterian church	10	25	35
Macks Orchards	10	25	35
Recreation Fields	10	25	35
St Jude's Parish	10	25	35
St. Marks Church	10	25	35
St. Peter Episcopal Church	10	25	35
Trinity Bible Church	10	25	35
United Methodist Church	10	25	35
Victory Baptist Church	10	25	35
World of Discovery	9	25	34
Citgo 7-11	10	24	34
Derry Mobil	10	24	34
Exit 5 Sunoco	10	24	34
Exxon 12	10	24	34
Freedom Fuel	10	24	34
Frito Lay	10	24	34
Getty Station	10	24	34
Hess gas Station	10	24	34
Mountain View Baptist Church	10	24	34
Mountain View Christian Church	10	24	34
Mutual Gas Station	10	24	34
Shell gas station	10	24	34
Ted/ Exxon Gas Station	10	24	34
Texaco/Global	10	24	34
Triangle Mobil	10	24	34
Hannaford's Supermarket	11	23	34
Market Basket Supermarket	11	23	34
Shaws Supermarket	11	23	34
Sleep Inn	11	23	34
TSA/ DHS	11	23	34
Victory Baptist Church Private School	11	23	34
FL Sub-station	12	22	34
BAE/ TYCO	13	21	34
Flea Market	8	25	33
Adventures in Learning	9	24	33
Church Of God Of Prophecy	9	24	33
Elwood Orchards	9	24	33
Jehovah's Witness/ Kingdom Hall	9	24	33
Korean Methodist Church	9	24	33
Sunnycrest Farms	9	24	33
Water Storage Tank	9	24	33



Eastern Propane	10	23	33
Highlander Inn/ Convention Center	10	23	33
Adelphia/ ComCast	11	22	33
Loomis Fargo	11	22	33
Central Fire Department	12	21	33
Applewood Learning Center	9	23	32
Fred Fuller Oil Company	9	23	32
Suburban Propane/ Americgas	9	23	32
Meggitt/ Vibro-Meter	11	21	32
State Routes 28 /12/128	11	21	32
Goffstown Trucking/ Bus Service	12	20	32
Insight Technologies	12	20	32
Insight Technologies	12	20	32
LPD Tower	10	21	31
Denfur-NOK	11	20	31
North Fire Station	11	20	31
South Fire Station	11	20	31
Tennessee Pipeline	11	20	31
Woodmont Orchards	9	21	30
Nu-Cast	10	20	30
Harvey Industries	11	19	30
Chem-Lawn	8	21	29
Kluber Lube	9	20	29
Leach Library	9	20	29
Uni-Cast	9	20	29
KeySpan Pump Station	10	19	29
Mountain View Town Garage/ DPW	10	19	29
Telephone exchange houses	7	21	28
Cell Towers	8	20	28
Cytyc	8	20	28
High Wood Cold Storage	9	19	28
Cen-Com	6	21	27
FAA Radion Tower	6	21	27
Uni-Care	8	19	27
Mountain View Freezer Warehouse	9	18	27
School District	9	18	27
FA A Control Radar Tower	8	18	26
Water Pump Stations	7	18	25



Appendix E Vulnerability Assessment Sample



Mountain View High School Vulnerability Assessment



Prepared By: Lieutenant Paul Allen, Mountain View Police Department

Date: 03/27/2008



Vulnerability Assessment Tool

The purpose of this assessment is to provide security observations. This report is only advisory and is not intended to identify all security weaknesses or to warrant the adequacy of all present and future security measures whether or not recommended.

Information contained in this report is confidential pursuant to applicable federal, state, and local statutes. The following assessment contains Homeland Security related information and should be maintained as law enforcement sensitive.



Vulnerability Assessment Report





Facility Information

Facility Name	Mountain View High School
Street Address	Mammoth Road
City	Mountain View
State	Florida
Zip Code	03053
County	Rockingham
Local Jurisdiction	Town of Mountain View
Latitude (Center of Site)	42.86887
Longitude (Center of Site)	71.37757
Boundaries	Side 1 – Mammoth Road; Side 2 – wooded area; Side 3 – field to wooded; Side 4- fields to wooded; 135 acres total area.
Emergency Contact Person	Pate Greyberk [Super] 222-234-6920
24/7 Contact Telephone Number	Pager # (222) 564-4495
Contact Facsimile Number	222-425-1049
Contact Person Email Address	ngreenberg@MountainViewFL.org
Policing Jurisdiction	Town of Mountain View
Location of Police/Fire/ Rescue in Relation to Facility	Across the street; Central Fire - 104 M; Police to side 1 main entrance – 256 M; to ½ corner – 204 M;
Regulating Agency	Town of Mountain View; School District Office
Regulating Agency Phone Number	222-234-6920; fax – 222-435-1049
Average Number of Employees on Site Daily	250 employees; 1800 students
Average Number of Visitors on Site Daily	50 -60 VISITORS PER DAY
Do Employees or Visitors occupy the Site 24 hours per day?	Yes, maintenance
Hours of Operation	24 hours on site [faculty and/or maintenance] School Hours 0745 - 1415
Primary Contact	Jim Elephante
Type of Construction	
Mountain View High School is a structure that has grown in sections since 1972 from	



a single-story frame “open format” structure to a large facility. There are a number of different major “components” which make up the present facility, each with slightly different construction reflecting the building code of the time in which it was built. As the years have passed, the older portions of the structure have been retrofitted to meet new building and life safety codes. These descriptions are summaries only, for detailed construction descriptions see the table that follows these paragraphs.

The oldest portion of the structure, located on the north side of the facility, is a wood frame structure built in 1972 over an un-floored basement. The exterior walls feature stone veneer accents with stained wood vertical sheathing, eaves and overhangs. This section’s rooms are designated by 100 series numbers and contain classroom spaces, offices, conference rooms and restrooms. This space also houses special education classrooms. The structure was first constructed as an “open learning plan” facility, an educational craze of the 1970’s. Since that time the open plan has been replaced with two hallways and a number of classrooms partitioned off by wood frame construction and wall panels. The positioning of this structure in the complex cuts off two small courtyard areas between it and the commons area of the main entrance and another between it and the newest portion of the facility.

The second portion to be constructed is now designated by room numbers in the 200 range. This structure was constructed of fire-resistive steel-reinforced concrete block in 1975 to provide additional classroom space. In 1977-78, an extension which now is designated phase 3 and 4 contains rooms in the 300 and 400 series. When constructed it also contained a gymnasium/auditorium (now the 600 series rooms covered later in this section). This section is generally two stories in height and it contains general classrooms, technical education shops, vocational education classrooms, music and art rooms as well as a storage area for maintenance. As mentioned, originally, this portion of the facility had a gymnasium/auditorium in the 2/3 (southwest) corner, which has now been converted to additional classroom space. Built of steel-reinforced concrete block this area is of fire resistive type construction, but it also has wood and steel sheathing on the exterior. A new single story fire-resistive portion of decorative steel reinforced concrete block was added to the east (#1) side in 1997 which added science laboratories and lecture rooms as well as a cafeteria and kitchen. The classrooms and labs are designated by the number 500 series.

In 2003, major renovations were undertaken at the facility. A second story was added to the 500 block adding more science classrooms. A decorative clock tower was added to the south corner of the entrance along with a small cafeteria extension. In the south east (2/3) corner of the main structure (part of the 1977-78 construction) the gymnasium/auditorium was converted to a two story block of classrooms which are designated by 600 numbers. All this construction was of fire resistive type, steel reinforced concrete block construction. To replace the lost gymnasium/auditorium space a new standalone gymnasium/auditorium was constructed to the south of the main structure, which is covered by a separate document.



Phase One was built in 1972. This structure is generally a wood frame structure with some steel I beams supported by H columns in the basement.				
Area	Floor	Walls	Ceiling	Notes
Halls	Wall to wall carpet over plywood.	Vinyl covered gypsum board	2 X 4 suspended tile	
Connector 100 to 500	Carpet	Painted concrete block	2 X 2 suspended tile	All doors are 1 ½ hour fire rated. Connecting door is not fire door
Rest Rooms	12" X 12" vinyl tile	Gypsum board	12" X 12" acoustic tile	
Classrooms	Wall to wall carpet over plywood.	Vinyl covered gypsum board	2 X 4 suspended tile	
Stairs to basement	Steel			
Offices	Wall to wall carpet over plywood.	Vinyl covered gypsum board	2 X 4 suspended tile	
Basement – Crawl Space	Sand, mostly unexcavated.			
Roof – Rubber roof with 2 plumbing stacks, 1 HVAC unit and 1 mushroom vent.				

Location	Photo	Description
Phase 1 Basement	Main Basement Floor View	View of the basement of the 100 wing structure.
Main Basement Floor Underside	Main Basement Floor Underside	Basement floor underside of the 100 wing.

Phase Two was built in 1975 of fire resistive construction with concrete foundations.				
Area	Floor	Walls	Ceiling	Notes
Main Entrance	Ceramic Tile	Decorative Block/Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling with one skylight	
Common Area and Halls	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling with one skylight	



Cafeteria/Kitchen	12" X 12" commercial grade vinyl tile over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Dish Room	Concrete and poured resin floor	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Galley/Serving Line	Concrete and poured resin floor	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	Stove hood has a fire suppression system built in.
Maintenance Area	Painted Concrete	Painted Concrete Block	Steel sheathing or suspended tile.	
Restrooms	Concrete with epoxy painted coating	Painted Concrete block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Classrooms/Offices	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
<p>Roof – Over the lobby and connecting hallways, rubber with stone covering, other areas are rubber, 2 skylights, 2 square vents and electrical conduits. Main section - Rubber roof, 2 HVAC large units with A/C units, 12 mushroom or other ventilators, 2 smoke stacks for boilers, 12 plumbing stacks and one access hatch from the boiler room.</p>				

Phases Three and Four were built in 1977-78 of fire resistive construction with concrete foundations.				
Area	Floor	Walls	Ceiling	Notes
Halls	Concrete with carpet	Concrete block some painted	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling and metal deck roofing in places.	
Rest Rooms	Concrete with epoxy painted coating	Painted Concrete block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Classrooms	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Stairs	Rubber tread	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	



Offices	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Connecting Ramp	Poured Concrete with carpet	Gypsum Wall board, Concrete block with metal uppers	Metal sheathing and glass	
Roof – Rubber roof – 8 plumbing stacks vents, 1 access hatch, 6 mushroom type vents, and 7 HVAS units.				

Phase Five first floor was built in 1997				
Area	Floor	Walls	Ceiling	Notes
Halls	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block with gypsum board soffit above the hall lockers.	2' X 2' Suspended tile ceiling	Emergency lighting
Rest Rooms	Concrete and poured resin floor	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 2' Suspended tile ceiling	
Classrooms	12" X 12" commercial grade vinyl tile over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	Room 518 is a mess
Stairs	Rubber skid resistant treads and landings with metal inset mat at north exit door	Painted concrete block	2' X 4' suspended tile ceiling	
Labs	12" X 12" commercial grade vinyl tile over poured concrete and some low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted concrete block	2' X 4' suspended tile ceiling	Labs have eye wash and shower stations
Offices	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted concrete block	2' X 4' suspended tile ceiling	

Phase Five second floor was built in 2003



Area	Floor	Walls	Ceiling	Notes
Halls	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block with gypsum board soffit above the hall lockers.	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	Emergency lighting
Rest Rooms	Ceramic tile on concrete	Painted Concrete Block	Gypsum board ceilings	
Classrooms	12" X 12" commercial grade vinyl tile over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Stairs	Rubber skid resistant treads and landings with metal inset mat at north exit door	Painted concrete block	2' X 4' suspended tile ceiling	
Labs	12" X 12" commercial grade vinyl tile over poured	Painted concrete block	2' X 4' suspended tile ceiling	Labs have eye wash and shower stations
Offices	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted concrete block	2' X 4' suspended tile ceiling	
Library	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted concrete block	2' X 4' suspended tile ceiling	
Roof – Rubber roof with two access scuttles, one to the library office and the other to the library work room ceiling. There are three air handlers, 2 a/c units, 4 mushroom vents, 4 vent hoods for science labs, 8 plumbing vents. Clock tower and entrance have metal roofs.				

Phase Six was built in 2003				
Area	Floor	Walls	Ceiling	Notes
Halls	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Rest Rooms	Tile	Painted Concrete Block		
Classrooms	Low pile carpet over poured concrete	Painted Concrete Block	2' X 4' Suspended tile ceiling	
Stairs	Rubber skid	Painted	2' X 4'	



	resistant treads and landings with metal inset mat at north exit door	Concrete Block	suspended tile ceiling	
Music Rooms	Vinyl Tile	Painted Concrete Block and some wallboard	Metal roof underside	
Band Room	Vinyl Tile	Painted Concrete Block and some wallboard.	2' X 4' suspended tile ceiling	
Roof Rubber roof with 2 mushroom vents, 1 HVAC and A/C unit, and 2 plumbing vents. Sections are also covered with asphalt shingles and one section has a metal roof.				

Location	Photo	Description
Main Corridor 600 Phase	Main 600 Wing Corridor	Corridor view in the 600 Phase
Main Note Asphalt Shingles	Main Close Up of Roof Access	Asphalt shingle roof covering on 600/300/400 area.
Main Wood And Sheathing	Main Wood and Sheathing	View of wood and steel sheathing at the sides of the 600 wing.

The campus is crossed by the Tennessee pipeline which must be a consideration in all planning.

Location	Photo	Description
Athletic Field And Outbuilding Close To Pipeline	Tennessee Pipeline	Tennessee pipeline passes very close to the campus structures as this photo of the pipeline indicates.
Tennessee Pipeline	Main Gas Pipeline Warning Post Loose in Field	Pipeline markers at the back of the school buildings near the athletic fields.

Purpose of Site (Brief description of the reason that the site is considered a CI/KR site)	Education – High School level; sports venue; major elections; emergency shelter; possible POD [not designated]; large scale meetings
Description of Site: (Insert details of operations, modes of transportation used, inherently dangerous commodities or activities at the site, and other information that may increase the understanding of the critical site)	Mountain View High School is the only High School in Mountain View, Florida. In addition to educational activities, the High School has an accomplished Band program. The School Band has received National recognition and plays in National events. The School provides well maintained playing fields with the capability of seating spectators at most fields. The



qualities.)	school also holds several events which attract large numbers of people. Events include Graduation, Baseball and Football games as well as large meetings.
Strategic Importance of the Facility: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic • Socio-Political • Infrastructure Support 	The High School Gym/Auditorium is used as the only polling place for local, state and national elections in Mountain View, Florida. Political candidates, including Presidential candidates use the Gym/Auditorium to hold rallies and meetings. The Gym/Auditorium is used for high profile events such as sporting events, and other large crowd venues.
Populated Areas Around Facility	There are three (3) other schools within ¼ mile; residential area within ¼ mile; wooded
Major Transportation Routes (i.e., roads, rail lines, waterways)	Mammoth Road; Phillis Road
Date of Assessment	March 5 th – 9 th , 2007
HAZMAT Team Coordinator/Contact #:	Captain James Roger – LFD 234-1124
HAZMAT LHS Team Coordinator/Contact #:	Anna Macking, Teacher, Science Department, Mountain View High School, (222) 234-6941 amanning@MountainView.org
Urban Search & Rescue Point of Contact #:	Mountain View Fire Department

Threat Course of Action (TCOA)

TCOA # 1:

Student/ Disgruntled Employee: Active Shooter, Hostage/ Barricaded Subject, IED, Bomb Threat, Assault, Sniper... *This is the primary and a valid threat scenario. On campus, active Student Gang has a history of violence against first responders in the town of Mountain View.*

Comments: The school, as are all schools, is vulnerable to an attack by a Student or Disgruntled Employee. An active shooter incident is a primary concern due to the overwhelming logistics involved in a response and the need for immediate intervention [due to the potential for large numbers of occupants in the building]. Hostage/barricaded subject incidents are of concern with Students/employees, but the situation leads to a ‘slower’ response to an end. IED incidents and threats pose a special risk, due to the amount of response needed to come to a safe conclusion, the possible impact area of an actual IED and evacuations. The scenario reads as a diversion for Sniper incidents outside and around the campus targeting first responders. This type of incident poses more of a problem for LE response than it could for the population inside the school, who would be well protected in a ‘lockdown’ shelter in place situation.

1A:



Auditorium/GYM Specific: The same threat courses of action are present at the Auditorium/Gym as listed above for the main building. The only added comments are that this facility is used for high profile events such as; local, state and national elections, campaigning, sporting events, and other large crowd venues.

TCOA # 2:

Domestic Violence: Assaults, Kidnappings, Hostage/ Barricaded Subject, Active Shooter...

Comments: Family/relationship issues, problems amongst family members, divorced/separated spouses, co-habitants, boy/girl friend relations, and custody issues pose an ever growing problem for schools. The high risk incidents that can stem from a disgruntled parent/student over domestic problems have led to many violent incidents inside and outside school grounds. Assaults, kidnappings, hostage/ barricaded subject, and active shooter incidents can stem from these issues. LE response will be regulated as listed above.

TCOA # 3:

International Terrorism: Large Scale Hostage Situation; Active Shooter, Kidnappings, IED Attacks, VBIED Attack, SBIED Attack, Sniper Incidents, CBRN...

Comments: International Terrorist organizations, sympathizers and lone actors all pose a very real and growing threat to our nation's schools. The Town of Mountain View has many attributes that would be attractive to meet the terrorist goals and objectives. Beslan, Russia showed the world that not only are schools a target, but that it does not have to be a school in a major metropolitan area.

Intelligence/information on both classified and unclassified has repeatedly shown that terrorists continue to plan and attack schools around the world. These types of incidents prove the most difficult to counter due to the extensive planning, training and commitment of those responsible for carrying out the attack.

Negotiations may not be an option. SWAT and patrol need to be aware that the only possible response to a terrorist incident may be immediate intervention. IEDs of any size pose a risk to any structure. Stand-off distances, school bus loading/unloading, parking lanes and delivery areas are all vulnerable to this type of attack. SBIED [Suicide/ carrying or wearing] pose the most unique and difficult attack to prevent. Intelligence sharing amongst LE, the school and, in some cases, parents, needs to be ongoing and at the highest level possible.

Experience in foreign countries who have the continual threat of SBIED attacks have proven that intelligence is one of the primary ways to stop such an attack. The SRO and immediate response from the PD to the LHS will likely be the ones first responding to a SBIED incident [both pre- ad post]. CBRN incidents could also be used against the population within a school or outside [RDD incidents], but the other courses of action pose the greater, most likely threats. If a



CBRN incident occurred, the logistics and responses would change drastically and pose a greater problem to the first responders and the population.

Facility/Infrastructure Type (check only one)

<input type="checkbox"/> Government Facility <input type="checkbox"/> State <input type="checkbox"/> Federal <input type="checkbox"/> County <input type="checkbox"/> City/local <input type="checkbox"/> Embassy/Consulate <input type="checkbox"/> Military Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Base <input type="checkbox"/> National Guard Armory <input type="checkbox"/> Bombing range <input type="checkbox"/> Educational Facility <input type="checkbox"/> College/university <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> High School <input type="checkbox"/> Middle School <input type="checkbox"/> Elementary School <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital <input type="checkbox"/> Other medical facility <input type="checkbox"/> Fire Department <input type="checkbox"/> Law Enforcement <input type="checkbox"/> Federal <input type="checkbox"/> State <input type="checkbox"/> County <input type="checkbox"/> Municipal <input type="checkbox"/> Correctional Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Recreational Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Stadium/arena <input type="checkbox"/> Amusement park <input type="checkbox"/> Beach <input type="checkbox"/> Shopping mall	<input type="checkbox"/> Transportation Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Airport <input type="checkbox"/> Interstate highway <input type="checkbox"/> Airfield <input type="checkbox"/> Bridge <input type="checkbox"/> Port <input type="checkbox"/> Tunnel <input type="checkbox"/> Bus station <input type="checkbox"/> Lock/dam <input type="checkbox"/> Railway <input type="checkbox"/> FAA navigation <input type="checkbox"/> Truck terminal <input type="checkbox"/> Critical federal facility <input type="checkbox"/> Business/corporate facility <input type="checkbox"/> Industrial complex <input type="checkbox"/> Nuclear plant <input type="checkbox"/> Chemical storage facility <input type="checkbox"/> Crude oil refinery <input type="checkbox"/> Oil tank <input type="checkbox"/> Fuel depot <input type="checkbox"/> Power grid <input type="checkbox"/> Reservoir/water supply <input type="checkbox"/> Food storage/distribution center <input type="checkbox"/> Transmitter facility <input type="checkbox"/> Cable <input type="checkbox"/> Open air television <input type="checkbox"/> Radio <input type="checkbox"/> Network service provider <input type="checkbox"/> Phone relay system <input type="checkbox"/> Financial institution <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please list)
---	--

Facility/Infrastructure Category (check all that apply)

<input type="checkbox"/> Telecommunications <input type="checkbox"/> Electrical power systems <input type="checkbox"/> Gas and oil production, storage, transportation <input type="checkbox"/> Banking/finance <input type="checkbox"/> Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/> Water supply systems <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency services <input type="checkbox"/> Continuity of government services <input type="checkbox"/> Commerce <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Educational facilities
---	---

Facility/Infrastructure Commodities (check all that apply):

<input type="checkbox"/> Phone relay system <input type="checkbox"/> Cable <input type="checkbox"/> Cell phone relay tower(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Systems supplying power to 10,000+ <input type="checkbox"/> Systems supplying power to metropolitan areas <input type="checkbox"/> Supply electrical power for nuclear plants <input type="checkbox"/> Gas facilities servicing 10,000 + <input type="checkbox"/> Oil tanks <input type="checkbox"/> Pipelines/natural gas transmission lines <input type="checkbox"/> Computer mainframe(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Centralized information system(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Water supply <input type="checkbox"/> Hazardous materials	<input type="checkbox"/> Main aquifer(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Water holding tanks <input type="checkbox"/> Airplanes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Buses <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution vehicles <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency vehicles <input type="checkbox"/> Law enforcement <input type="checkbox"/> Governor/state officials <input type="checkbox"/> Key government officials <input type="checkbox"/> Ship(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Medical supplies <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> Power lines <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please list)
---	---




--	--

Facility/Infrastructure Impact (check one)

National <input type="checkbox"/>	State <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Regional <input type="checkbox"/>	Local <input type="checkbox"/>
--------------------------------------	--	--------------------------------------	-----------------------------------



Property Diagram: The Town of Mountain View web-site will allow the user to zoom in on aerial photos of the High School. This is an excellent resource that should have restricted access.
<http://www.Mountain ViewFl.org/Mountain Views/>






Facility Diagram:

Aerial Photographs, Detailed Schematic Drawings, and Other Pictorial Representations of the Site

Other Comments: Photo: [LHS Main Building Floor Plans](#)





Outer Perimeter

Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Phone	Email
Lt. Paul D. Allen	MVPD	(222) 234-1118	pAllen@MountainViewFL.org
Ken Patriot	NDPCI	(411) 650-0707	KPatriot-ndpci@cfl.rr.com
Date of Assessment	03-05-07 to 03-09-07		

Neighborhood

Neighborhood Type:

Surrounding Structure Types:

Side	Description
1 East	The Side one perimeter is bordered by Mammoth Road (State Road Route 128) which runs North/South and is located approximately 143' from the Main entrance to the school.
1	To the Northwest of the school on Mammoth Road there are light residential neighborhoods including light residential on Otterson Road located just North of the School. Otterson Drive leads to Nelson Road which runs parallel to Route 128. On the South end of Nelson Road, there is a foot path that runs parallel to Route 128 in a wooded area across from the school. The path continues to Sargent Road, an East/West Road that terminates at Route 128. This path is used by students. There have been reports of incidents occurring on this path which range from fights to smoking.
1	There is a Farm located between Otterson Drive and the Peabody Funeral Home. There is a heavily wooded area that is adjacent to Route 128 offering an area of concealment for an adversary to conduct surveillance of the Main Entrance to the School and provides an area where the adversary could shoot into the bus drop off area and main entrance to the building.
1	The Peabody Funeral Home, 290 Mammoth Road, is located on the East side of Route 128 across from the North East corner of the school. There is a heavily wooded area that separates the Funeral Home Parking lot from Route 128 and there is visibility of the school from the wooded area. An adversary can use the Funeral Home parking area to gain access to the woods and use the woods as concealment to conduct surveillance or as a vantage point to shoot into the school area.



- 1 Adjacent to the Peabody Funeral Home between the 290 Mammoth Rd and Sargent Road is a heavily wooded parcel of land. This land could be used by an adversary as an area of concealment to conduct surveillance or as a vantage point to shoot into the school area. This wooded area is located at 5 Sargent Road and is owned by E – C Peabody, LLC.
- 1 The Mountain View Fire Department, 280 Mammoth Road, is located in front of the school on the East side of Route 128. The front of the Fire Department provides a good observation point of the Main Entrance to the School. SWAT Team Snipers could be positioned on the roof of the Fire Department and have a good view of the main entrance to the school. Additionally, surveillance of the School's front entrance could be conducted from the Fire Department. The school can also be viewed from the rear of the Fire Department.
- 1 The Mountain View Library and School District Office, 268 Mammoth Road, is located across from the South West Corner of the School (1/2 Side) and directly across from the Main Entrance Road (Day Boulevard). Surveillance can be conducted by both law enforcement and the adversary from this vantage point.
- 1 The Mountain View Police Department is also located across from the South West Corner of the School (1/2 Side). The Police Department offers a vantage point of the South West corner of the school.
- 2 South The South perimeter for Mountain View High School is located approximately 475' from the Southernmost portion of the Main building and runs East/West.
- 2 Mathew Thornton Elementary School is located on the South East corner of the perimeter of the property approximately 465' from the South side of Robert Lincoln Way, the Main Entrance Road on the South Perimeter of the property.
- 2 Mountain View Access Center, Cable Television Building, is also located within the South perimeter boundary and offers an area of cover and concealment for both Law Enforcement and the adversary. The Cable building is located approximately 65' from Robert Lincoln Way and is approximately 246' from the Main Building.
- 2 The High School Gym/Auditorium is located within the perimeter boundary approximately 200' from the main building, and also offers an area of cover and concealment for an observation point of the Main building. The Gym/Auditorium will be addressed separately in an attachment to this report.
- 2/3 Moose Hill Kindergarten is located at the South West corner of the perimeter approximately 1064' from the main building.
- 3 West The playing fields are located within the West Perimeter. The border of the West perimeter is heavily wooded. Gas Lines run along the West perimeter of the property and are approximately 1090' from the North Side of the School and approximately 1010' from the West side of the Gym/Auditorium.
- 3 The woods are approximately 1200' deep and abut residential neighborhoods to the West. Isabella Drive, East Woodbine Drive, Sherwood Drive and Holton Circle are located to the far West.
- 3 There are dirt access roads that run along the West perimeter. The roads are being used for trucks clearing the area and access to the Gas Lines.



- 4 North There is a residence located between the High School Perimeter and the Middle School Perimeter. This residence is located approximately 1000' from the Main School building. There is heavy foliage around the residence making it a good area to observe the North side of the school and main entrance roadway.

- 4 There are playing fields within the perimeter on the East side of the school property and there are heavily wooded areas between fields.

- 4 The Mountain View Middle School is located outside of the North East Perimeter of the property.

Fencing/Walls/Barricades

Side	Description	Observation
1	There is no fencing, walls or barricades along the East side perimeter.	
2	There is no fencing, walls or barricades along the South side perimeter.	
3	There is no fencing, walls or barricades along the West side perimeter.	
4	There is chain link fencing surrounding the Venture Course on the North perimeter. The fencing is approximately 6' in height and has open salvage on the top. There is no fencing, or barricades along the North East side perimeter or the North West side perimeter.	Although the venture course and fencing is between the Middle School and High School Property, a vehicle can be driven around the fencing on both the East and West Side of the Venture Course and enter the High School or Middle School Property. The fencing on the Venture course is damaged in areas and allows individuals to gain access. At the Main Gate to enter the course on the High School Side, the gate is in disrepair and allows an individual an easy access to the Venture Course even though the gate is locked. Students have entered the Venture Course and have used the area to use drugs and alcohol. Photo: Venture course hole in fence on south Photo: venture course sign



4	There is a 3' stone boundary wall along the North East Perimeter that separates the South East Middle School Perimeter from the North East High School Perimeter.	This stone wall provides cover and concealment for Law Enforcement and can be used as an observation point. The wall could also be used as an area of cover for an adversary.
---	---	---

Parking Lot/Garages/Entrances/Exits

Note: It is important to note the access controls at the entrances and exits to the parking lots and parking garages for the facility. The assessors should note all entrances and actually walk the perimeter to ensure there are no entrances that they have missed. Often, there are dirt road entrances to large properties for construction and other vehicles. These entrances often offer the greatest vulnerability because there is no access control point.

The threat is most likely to enter a facility where there is little or no access control.

Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
1	4	No	None	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield. Not Enforced

Observation

The Main Entrance Road to the Visitor /Administration and Parking Area runs directly in front of the Main building and Main entrance to the building. The entrance to the parking lot is located on Mammoth Road, North of the main building and splits to a roadway which continues West to a student parking lot and the North and West portion of the building. The entrance also splits to the South and is a one way road that provides access to the main entrance and continues to Robert Lincoln Way. There is also an entrance road that runs North and South and intersects with Robert Lincoln Way on the South portion of the Main entrance road. There are approximately 53 parking spaces that are located on the East side of the roadway approximately 30' from the North East wing of the Main building to approximately 60' away from the South East wing of the Main building. There is also a pedestrian walkway from Mammoth Road directly across from Sargent Road that provides access to the Main Entrance road and the school's main entrance. There are no access control points.

Spaces	Description	Comments
8 North to South	Visitor Parking Spaces	Good practice; however there should be signage at the main entrance directing visitors to these parking spaces.
1	Dollars for Scholars Parking	
1	Special Ed Coordinator Parking	



1	Guidance Director Parking	Identifying key personnel by signage at the parking space places the personnel at risk from attack by individuals who are upset by the personnel.
1	Administrative Assistant Parking	Identifying key personnel by signage at the parking space places the personnel at risk from attack by individuals who are upset by the personnel.
1	Assistant Principal Parking	Identifying key personnel by signage at the parking space places the personnel at risk from attack by individuals who are upset by the personnel.
1	Principal Parking	Identifying key personnel by signage at the parking space places the personnel at risk from attack by individuals who are upset by the personnel.
2	Handicap Parking Spaces	
1	School Resource Officer Parking Space	
1	Fire Hydrant: There is a fire hydrant that is located between the School Resource Officer Parking space and the 1 st General Parking space. The hydrant is located on the East edge of the road and is protected by two wooden telephone pole bollards. The School Resource Officers' vehicle is parked within two (2) feet of the hydrant and only two (2) feet from the general parking space. Florida State Law indicates that there should be "no parking" within 15' of the fire hydrant.	
35	General Parking Spaces	



How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?

Parking spaces are located approximately 40' from the Main building entrance; however, at any point along the main access road, vehicles can park against the curb or jump the curb and park against the school.

Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
2	3	No	N/A	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield. Not Enforced
Observation				



Robert Lincoln Way provides access to side 2 from Mammoth Road. As indicated on Side 1 description, there is no access control point.

Additionally, there is an access road that runs North and South from the South side of Robert Lincoln Way to the Elementary School. There is no access control point at the intersection of the North South road and Robert Lincoln Way.

There is a third access road on the South West Perimeter which is accessible from the Elementary School and runs between the Soccer Field and the West side of the Gym/Auditorium. This access road is used by emergency vehicles and is not plowed during the winter. There is no access control point.

There is a small access/parking area located between the Main building at the cafeteria, the kitchen and the Maintenance Offices/Boiler Room/Classrooms. This parking area is accessed from the entrance on Robert Lincoln Way. The dumpsters, generator and refrigeration unit are all housed within this area.

- On the South side of the cafeteria, there are approximately 16 parking spaces.
- On the South side of the kitchen, there are approximately 4 parking spaces with one space located against the kitchen and cafeteria.
- On the East side of the 200 block of classrooms are spaces for approximately 7 vehicles. These vehicles are parked up against the building.
- Semi Trailer trucks also back into the kitchen area at this point.

Parking in this area should be reconsidered due to lack of stand-off in such critical areas, such as the high occupancy cafeteria and the 200 block classrooms.

Consideration should also be given to fencing this area and restricting access to authorized deliveries only.

How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?

Vehicles can park against the Cafeteria and Phase 3 building.



Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
2	5	None	N/A	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield. Not Enforced

Observation

The Student Parking Lot is located on the East side of the gymnasium/auditorium and on the South side of the Main School buildings. The parking lot has 4 entrances/exits on the North side from Robert Lincoln Way and one entrance/exit on the South side to an access road leading to a second gymnasium/auditorium parking lot on the South side of the gymnasium/auditorium. There are no access control points for the gymnasium/auditorium parking lot.

The Student Parking lot is approximately 367' on the North and South side and approximately 200' on the East and West side.

Number of Spaces	Location	Comments
16 General Parking	East Side of Parking Lot	Facing Cable TV Building
160 General Parking	Center Sections Of Parking Lot	32 spaces per row 10 Rows
10 General Parking	North East Corner of Parking Lot	
2 Handicap Parking	North East Corner of Parking Lot Close to the North East Corner of the Gymnasium/auditorium	
28 General Parking	South Side of the Parking Lot	There are 28 designated spaces; however there are approximately 6 spaces where vehicles could park on the South East corner.

How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?

Vehicles can park approximately 50' from the building on the East Side Main Entrance of the Gymnasium/auditorium; however, vehicles can park against the building at the main entrance because there are no barriers to prevent vehicle entry.

Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
2	1	No	None	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield. Not Enforced



Observation				
There is a parking lot located on the South side of the Gymnasium/auditorium for Gymnasium/auditorium Staff.				
Number of Spaces	Location			Comments
10 General Parking	South side of the Gymnasium/auditorium approximately 30' from the building at the bottom of an incline of approximately 15' to the exterior of the building. Spaces are on the North side of the parking lot.			It would be difficult for all but a four wheel drive vehicle to access the building exterior on side two of the Gym/Auditorium.
1 Handicap Parking	Space is closest to Main Entrance which is located on the East side of the building.			
10 General Parking	South side of parking lot along access road.			
How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?				
Vehicles can park approximately 30' from the building on the South Side of the Gymnasium/auditorium.				
Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
3	Open From Access Road	No	None	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield. Not Enforced
Observation				
There is a parking lot located on the West side of the 300 Phase Building Exterior and Maintenance Shop.				
Number of Spaces	Location			Comments
14 Staff Parking	Center of parking lot in front of the West side of the 300 Phase building exterior.			There is no designated parking; however Maintenance Staff appear to use these spaces. The spaces close to the building allow vehicles to park within a few feet of the building.
Unauthorized Parking	Vehicles are parked in the no parking zone just North of the authorized parking spaces.			Parking zone violations do not appear to be enforced.



12 General Parking	Parking spaces are located on the North West corner of the Phase 3 building.	The spaces allow for vehicles to park against the building.
--------------------	--	---

How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?

Vehicles can park against the building at the closest point to the Phase 3 building.

Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
3	3	No	None	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield. Not Enforced

Observation

There is a parking lot located on the North side of the Phase 3 building across the access road and on the West side of the Phase 1 building across the access road. This parking lot has 2 entrances/exits, one (1) on the West side and two (2) on the East side. There is a heavily wooded area that separates the parking lot from the fields on the North West corner of the parking lot and there is a secondary parking area on the West side of the wooded area. The parking lot is approximately 175' X 75'. It should be noted that vehicles park along the West side of the access road.

Number of Spaces	Location	Comments
17 General	South Side of the Parking Lot	
34 General	Center of the Parking Lot	
7 General	North Side of the Parking Lot	
4 General	Within the Wooded Area West of the Wooded Area West of the Authorized Parking Lot.	Parking in this area is dangerous because of the concealment the woods create.

How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?

Vehicles can park approximately 50' at the closest point to the West Side of the Phase 1 building.

Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
4	2	No	None	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield. Not Enforced

Observation



There is a student parking lot located on the North side of the Phase 1 and 5 buildings across the access road. The main entrance/exit are located on the South side of the parking lot and on the South side of the access road. The driveway opening is approximately 45'. The second entrance/exit is located on the North West corner of the parking lot and provides access to the football and baseball fields.

Number of Spaces	Location	Comments
Approximately 200	Throughout Student Parking Area	More vehicles could be parked in this parking lot.
How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?		
Vehicles can park approximately 78' at the closest point to the Phase 1 building.		

Is there a designated parking area for non-employees?:

Side	Description	Locked/Secured
1	The Visitor Parking Area is directly in front of the Main building and to the South of the Main entrance to the building located on the East side of the entrance road. There are 8 designated visitor parking spaces.	Not locked or Secured
2	There are no designated visitor parking areas at the Gymnasium/auditorium.	N/A
3	None	N/A
4	None	N/A

Are there outbuildings and/or storage buildings, dumpsters?:

Note: It is very important to observe the security in place at outbuildings and storage areas on the perimeter of the facility. Often these areas are unsecured and provide a place for the threat to place explosives or secondary devices.

Side	Description	Locked/Secured
1	There is a small fenced enclosure that houses a Propane Tank Fill Valve located approximately 85' south of the South East corner of the cafeteria and approximately 12' from the West side of the entrance road. The valve is secured by a 6' chain link fence with open salvage on the top. The gate to the enclosure was locked with a Master Lock.	Yes



- | | | |
|-----|--|----|
| 1 | <p>There is a large fenced enclosure that houses a Propane Tank Vent Area. This fenced area is located approximately 93' south of the South side of the cafeteria and approximately 31' from the West side of the Main Entrance road.</p> <p>The enclosure is secured by a 6' chain link fence with open salvage at the top. The fence has been lifted up on the North side and looks like it has been crawled under. The gate was not locked. An individual can access the underground propane tank and fill port at this point.</p> | No |
| 1 | <p>There is a fenced enclosure that houses three Propane Tank pressure reductions, vapor burners. The burners are located approximately 60' from the South West Corner of the cafeteria and approximately 70' from the West side of the Main Entrance road and 14' from the parking lot entrance way. The fencing has been lifted on the bottom and appears to have been crawled under. The lock has been cut and the gate can be opened.</p> | No |
| 1/2 | <p>The Mountain View Cable Access Building is located on the South East corner of the perimeter. This building houses the local cable access channel and employs approximately three (3) individuals. This building was not assessed as part of the High School vulnerability assessment.</p> | |
| 2 | <p>Refrigeration Unit (Norlake) is housed within a fenced compound and is located in the cafeteria, kitchen, boiler room and Phase 3 building loading area. The compound is approximately 37' from the Phase 3 building, and 55' from the South side of the kitchen. The fencing is approximately 6' with open salvage at the top. The fencing was bent over on the North side of the enclosure. The gate for the fenced enclosure was unlocked. On the South side of the enclosure, there was a barrier constructed of telephone poles cut to approximately 3' spaced approximately 10' apart with three 2"X6" boards bolted together to keep vehicles from crashing into the south side of the enclosure. The 2"X6" boards are warped. Dumpsters are located on the south side of the barrier.</p> | No |

Adversaries or students can enter the enclosure and gain access to the refrigeration unit. The refrigeration unit was locked. The fenced gate should be locked and the unit should be locked.



2 There are two dumpsters, which are serviced by Waste Management (800) 443-5515. These dumpsters are located just to the south of the refrigeration enclosure and were located approximately 39' from the East side of the phase 3 building and 72' from the South side of the Kitchen area. The dumpsters were unlocked. No

An improvised explosive device could be placed in the dumpster, which is against a high population area, and cause death and injuries as well as significant damage to the school building. Dumpsters should be locked and moved away from the school.

3 **The Gymnasium/auditorium** is located on the South West perimeter of the school approximately 205' from the South West corner of the Phase 6 building and approximately 425' West of the Mountain View Cable Access building. See Gymnasium/auditorium Annex for details.

3 **Gymnasium/auditorium Dumpster** is located on the North West corner of the building. The dumpster is not in a caged compound and is located approximately 7' from the building. The Dumpster is not locked or secured.

An improvised explosive device could be placed in the dumpster, which is against a high population area, and cause death and injuries as well as significant damage to the Gymnasium/auditorium. The dumpsters should be locked and moved away from the school.

3 **The Track Ticket Booth** building is a cinderblock structure that was used as a concession stand. The building is located at the Track/Football Practice Field and is approximately 100' West of the West side of Phase 3 and 6 building. The door, located on the East side of the building, is made from wood and secured with a metal hasp and bicycle type lock. The hasp, door and lock could be easily defeated. There is also a rollup garage door on the South side of the building. It is secured with an internal garage door type lock which could easily be defeated. Additionally, there is an Ice Machine located on East side of the building which is also secured with a metal hasp and bicycle type Master Lock. Yes

3 There is a Modular Storage Unit, which is a metal shipping container, located against West side corner of the Phase 6 and Phase 3 building. The unit contains Drama Class Equipment. The storage unit is locked with a bicycle type lock which could be easily defeated. Modular Storage (222) 620-6566 Yes
The lock should be replaced with a more formidable lock.



- | | | |
|---|--|-----|
| 3 | <p>There is an equipment storage building located on the West side of the access road, just West of the Phase 4 West student parking lot. The building is located approximately 95 feet from the North West corner of the Phase 4 building. There are 2 steel bollards in front of the building (East side). These bollards are spaced approximately 7' apart and would allow a small vehicle to pass through and hit the building. The building is made from cement. There are windows covered with boards on both the East and West sides of the building. The door was metal and locked and the hinges are located on inside. There was also a rollup garage door that was locked.</p> | Yes |
| 3 | <p>There is a concession stand for the Football field. The entry door on the South side of the building was secured with a steel thick gauge screen door. The door was locked with 2 Master Locks. There were 2 windows for concessions that could easily be pushed in located on the South side. On the West side, there is a rollup garage door which is locked. On the North side of the concession stand, there is a fenced-in courtyard. The fencing was approximately 4' high with a gate on the East side which was unlocked. There was a 2'X4' window which could easily be pushed in or broken on the North side. There was a row of garbage cans for events against the fencing on the South side. These garbage cans are not secured. An IED could be placed in the cans. Either the cans should be placed in a storage building or they should be inspected before an event.</p> | Yes |
| 3 | <p>There was a small wooden building within a fenced compound that was not completely fenced and not secured just South of the baseball field/football field. The building had electricity and for the most part was empty. The door to the building was not locked. An IED could be placed in the building. More likely, students could use this unlocked building as a shelter for smoking, drinking alcoholic beverages or it could be used to commit crimes against persons.</p> <p>The structure should be locked at all times.</p> | No |
| 3 | <p>There is a locked storage container located in the fenced compound near the wooden structure listed above. The container housed field maintenance equipment. The container was not locked and should be secured. Outside of the container was old, unused equipment, an unused standpipe, an old lawn tractor, tires and fencing. This area should be cleaned.</p> | No |
| 3 | <p>Baseball Field Press Box and Concession:</p> <p>The baseball concession stand and press box is located on the South West corner of the baseball field and is a cement structure. The access door is made from steel and is secured with a metal hasp and Master Lock.</p> | Yes |



- | | | |
|---|---|-----|
| 3 | <p>Equipment Storage Building located at the West perimeter, West of the Baseball Field: The structure is made from cinderblock and has two rollup double garage doors on the East side. Both garage doors were locked. On the South side of the building, there is a metal door secured with a metal hasp and Master Lock and the hinges were on the outside and were not secured in any way. On the South side of the building, there is a metal door secured which was locked, and the hinges were on the outside, and popped up, they were not secured in any way. The lock could be easily defeated.</p> | Yes |
| 3 | <p>The Water pump house is located on the West side of the Baseball field complex and abuts a water source. The pump house has metal doors on the North side with hinges on the outside. The hinges were piano type hinges and could easily be defeated.</p> | Yes |
| 4 | <p>Equipment Storage Building located at the vehicle access road to the North East side of the Football field: The structure is made from cinderblock and has a rollup double garage door on the South side. The garage door was locked. On the West side of the building, there is a locked metal door, the hinges were on the outside and they were not secured in any way. There is a single hung window that slides up and can be easily defeated. There were several trailers stored in the parking lot outside of the structure.</p> | Yes |
| 4 | <p>The Football Field Press Box is located on the East side of the Football field. The press box is a large wood structure 2 story building. On the lower portion of the building, the access door was unlocked. The press box is located next to the stadium seating. An improvised explosive device could be placed in the building surreptitiously and cause significant death and injury. The second floor was also unlocked. An IED could also be placed on the second floor and also cause significant death and injury.</p> <p>Additionally, the open doors allow students to access the interior of the building during and after school hours. Crimes could occur in these open spaces.</p> | No |
| 4 | <p>There is a ticket booth located on the North West corner of the Student Parking lot just East of the Football/Baseball field complex approximately 250' from the North West corner of the Phase 4 building. The building is made from cinderblock. The doors are secured and have easily defeated hinges on the outside. Windows are on the South and West side and are covered with boards.</p> | |

Exterior freestanding closed circuit TV

Note: It should be noted if the camera is protected in weatherproof housing and if the housing is vandal resistant or bullet resistant.

It should also be noted if the camera is a pan/tilt/zoom or fixed. It is critical to assess the lighting use as related to cameras. Poor lighting or lighting angles may interfere with the camera.



One of the most important variables to determine is if the camera is monitored. A camera that is not monitored is often useless.

Tape or DVD recording of the camera should also be noted. One should note the amount of time recorded on the tape and whether the recording is in real time or time lapse.

Side	Number of Cameras	Description	Monitored	Taped/backed up
1	None	There are no freestanding cameras to cover the East perimeter of the property.	N/A	N/A
2	None	There are no freestanding cameras to cover the South perimeter of the property.	N/A	N/A
3	None	There are no freestanding cameras to cover the West perimeter of the property.	N/A	N/A
4	None	There are no freestanding cameras to cover the North perimeter of the property.	N/A	N/A

Comments: Cameras should be added to the property perimeter to allow complete camera coverage for the High School Perimeter. Cameras should be monitored and coverage should allow for an individual to be identified at the perimeter of the property, and followed into and throughout the school building.



Signage/way finding

Note: A description of the perimeter signage should be noted. One should look for adequate signage such as trespass warning signs with the proper language for the prosecution of trespassers. Signs should be placed at approximately 100' apart for recognition all along the perimeter.

Way finding signs also should be noted. Way finding signs will help legitimate users of the property find their way to the area they are intending to go. Illegitimate users will be deterred from using an excuse of getting lost on property if signage is adequate. At the same time, a lack of signage for some properties may make it harder to locate the property or identify it's use.

Side	Description	Observation
1	Front main entrance: There is a school Marquee that is placed in front of the Main entrance of the school. The sign is approximately 12'x10' and is stone construction sign. The sign is two sided with removable letters for announcements. The sign is lighted and has 'Mountain View High School' posted at the top of the sign. The signage provides information regarding events. The sign is located approximately 135' East from the Main Entrance and approximately 15' from the roadway. There is a large rock in front of the sign between the road and the sign and approximately 60' North of the Main entrance pedestrian walkway.	The rock located between the Marquee and roadway can provide cover for an adversary shooting into the main entrance or during bus drop off or pick up.
1	School Zone Signs; ½ corner Just south of the Phillis Road/ Mammoth Road intersection; on the northbound lane near the Lions Hall; Lighted blinking yellow; 25 mph	Signs start blinking @ school bus drop and pickup [morning and afternoon].
1	End School Zone Sign; ½ corner	Sign is regular 'speed limit' size; black lettering on white metal.
1	School Zone Sign; ¼ corner just north of the Middle School in the southbound lane; same as other end school zone sign; Lighted blinking yellow; 25 mph Drug Free Zone Signage Along Side: Numerous signs along Mammoth Road that cover the three [3] school areas [MT, LHS and LMS]; Signs on Sargent Road [parking and recreational fields]	Signs start blinking @ school bus drop and pickup [morning and afternoon]. Same signs posted on entrances leading to side 2 and side 4.
1	School Crossing Sign; Yellow/Black	On road edge [Mammoth Road]; directly in front of main sign near pedestrian walkway



- | | | |
|-----|--|--|
| 1 | No signage from Main roads or State Routes in town that indicate where or in what direction the school is located. Only the school zone signs warn that a school is coming up [Mammoth Road] | and crosswalk to Sargent Road.
Signage should be provided to alert visitors of proper entrance ways to the High School. |
| 2 | Outside of School Next To The Curb: Two (2) “No Parking” “Student Drop off” and “Student Pick-up” | This area designates the area for student pick-up and drop off. |
| 3 | “Restricted Access Only Closed by 3:30” Gate: At the access road leading back to the track and field areas. | This sign is designed to stop unauthorized vehicle traffic from entering the access road leading to the various fields west of the school. |
| 3 | Side 3 At The Practice Football Field: “No Bicycles or Roller Blades on Track”. | This sign is in clear view next to the walkway outside the track fenced area. |
| 3 | Side 3 At The Practice Football Field: Code of Ethics sign | The sign is attached to the fence next to the walkway at the track field. Because of its location, the sign is difficult to read. |
| 3 | Side 3 At The Practice Football Field: Principal’s Code of Ethics sign | The sign is attached to the fence next to the walkway at the track field. Because of its location, the sign is difficult to read. |
| 3 | Side 3 Next to the circling roadway at the rear of the school: “No Parking” “Fire Lane” | The sign is located between the school and the fenced track field. |
| 3 | Side 3 On the South-West corner of the school next to the circling roadway at the rear of the school “Do Not Enter” | This sign is designed to prevent vehicle traffic from proceeding around the Gym/Auditorium in a southwest direction. |
| 3/4 | Side 3 and 4 At the Fenced Obstacle Course Area: “No Trespassing”, “Venture Course is for School Approved Activity” | There is only one sign designating the area for school approved activities. This is a large fenced area away from the school. Main Venture Course Sign |
| 4 | Side 4 next to the Faculty Parking Area: Do Not Enter | Designating a one way vehicle passage around the school building. |



- 4 Side 4 At the “Faculty Parking” Area Designating parking for faculty members [Main Side 3 Staff Parking Lot Sign](#)
- 4 Side 4 At The Faculty Parking Area: One Assistant Principal assigned parking space sign. This sign is located in the faculty parking area on the first spot closest to the building. Identifying key personnel by signage at the parking space places the personnel at risk from attack by individuals who are upset by the personnel.
- 4 Side 4 At The Faculty Parking Area: Two (2) assigned parking signs for Curriculum Coordinator. These signs are next to the Assistant Principal’s assigned parking spot. Identifying key personnel by signage at the parking space places the personnel at risk from attack by individuals who are upset by the personnel.
- 4 Side 4 At The Baseball/Football Field “Field Is For School Approved Activities Only. All Other Activities are Prohibited” Clearly marked for those approaching the field from the school pedestrian walkway.

Does the facility have a web site? Do local newspapers or Web sites publicly advertise facility schedules, events, or other sensitive information?

Are sensitive facility plans, blueprints, operating procedures, etc. available to the public via the Internet or public record?

Note: A search of the internet for information about the facility being assessed should be conducted. The search should include but not be limited to a detailed viewing of the facilities website and focus on information about the facility, its employees, and building photographs.

Source	Description	Observations
Web Address	http://school.MontView.org/lhs/	<p>Official School District website containing detailed information on the school programs, policies and contacts. Schedules for athletics events can be obtained under the activity menus. A full teacher list, with names and contact numbers at the school is included.</p> <p>The site contains broad scholastic information relevant to parents and students. It does not appear to contain building plans or extensive photographs. The student handbook, available for download, contains a list of school policies and procedures, hours of operation and behavioral standards. School bus routes are</p>



Media Source	Mountain View Times	available in descriptive form at the School District side of the website. Mountain View Times is the local weekly newspaper. Each edition includes a few pages on sports at the school. The paper may contain notices of public events.
	InCider Press	The InCider Press is a semiannual newsletter published by the School District. The edition posted on-line includes names of students deserving recognition or who have enrolled in military service. The most current edition (March, 2007) is devoted entirely to the budget warrant articles.
Information/ Photographs available	Lobby area teacher photographs	The High School contains a photo gallery of teachers located in the lobby at the main entrance.
	Mountain View MapTools	Mountain View MapTools provides access to aerial photographs of the entire town including the High School. Photographs are in projected geographic coordinates and are to scale. The image quality is extremely high as ground features greater than 6 inches in size are visible. This same imagery can be made available to the public from the GIS Manager at cost. For sensitive areas, including the school, requests are sent to the PD for review prior to delivery. In addition, ground features including topography, assessing information (owners, values, contacts, etc) and public infrastructure is also available on the site. This site should be restricted regarding the ability to obtain aerial photos of Critical Infrastructure such as the schools and government buildings.
Public Records	School District Annual Report	The Annual Report lists budget and revenue conditions for the entire school district. Of particular note is a list of each employees name, job class, wage and location.
	Town/School District Offices	Development plans for the schools may be available at the Town Hall Planning Office or the School District office. Approved plans are a public record and can be copied upon request.

Perimeter/Building Exterior Tactical Considerations:

Perimeter Tactical Considerations:



Side	Description
1	On Side 1 there is a lot of glass including: Main Doors, Cafeteria, Second Floor Library

Observation

The visibility of the exterior of the building from the interior of the building is high; approach is easily detected due to the amount of windows and glass doors.

Three high density crowd locations are within this view point: Cafeteria, main reception area [congregation during period changes, beginning and ending of day], and Library on second floor.

Sniper [LE] visual is good from Central Fire Department/ roof, stone wall off ¼ corner near one way entrance off Mammoth Road and view from Cable access building to ½ corner.

Vehicle unrestricted path [except curbing] to main entrance; Buses double stack along ALL of side 1 at the end of day; beginning of day, buses arrive staggered; Limited emergency vehicle access to main lobby during the end of day pickup; should the first and last bus in line have a problem/ immobilization, the twenty or so buses [and those on them] would be confined. Potential for mass casualty attack by IED and/or sniper/ shooter.

EOC would be primary at MVPD/ EOC; secondary would be the Town offices; third would be the Central Fire Department [dependent on location, if known, of the threat and static or dynamic].

This would be primary for immediate response due to access to every avenue inside the building [team designation and ability to splinter off].

Side	Description
1	Fire staging; can be kept at the Central Fire Department

Observation

Helicopter landing zone – primary on side 1 would be Sargent Road Lot or Ball Field Area

Side	Description
2	There is less glass on Side 2; some glass doors; some solid doors; upper windows on side 2 near 3 corner are smaller

Observation

Glass to cafeteria; some classroom glass

Maintenance entrance [cameras, radios, floor plans, boiler]; one larger stadium style seating lecture hall [no windows]

Main egress to the side 2 parking lot and egress by students to the Gym/Auditorium building

Entrance is monitored part of the day by volunteer or faculty

Approach would be low to medium visibility from the Cable Access building area/ MTS lot

Approach could include side 3 of the Gym/Auditorium building to approach side 2 and 3 of main building

Vehicle access can be gained through MTS lot, field and fire road [three season unless plowed]



Unobstructed view of side two can be made from Cable Access building [except where landscaping hinders it]

Side	Description
Side 2	Helicopter landing; decontamination area

Observation

Primary landing zone – Main lot; secondary- MTS field [next to side 2 of Gym/Auditorium building]; decon areas [** dependent on wind/ weather and type of contaminate] could be side 2 lot or Gym/Auditorium lot on side 2.

Side	Description
Side 3	Loading docks; mostly solid doors; some glass; high glass windows [not second floor]

Observation

LOW visibility from rest of building
 Very good entry area for SWAT/ EMT approach
 Access to all interior areas
 Approach to side 3 can be had by low to medium visibility from the north via the Middle School side 3 lot through the fire gate to sports fields
 Some paths are paved and plowed [four season access]
 Excellent vantage for evacuations from LHS to LMS; Bear Cat/ Armored vehicle approach can get the team to the side ¾ area and/or underground access area
 From the south, excellent approach to main building side 2 or 3 via MTS lot to side 3 of the Gym/Auditorium to vehicle path to 2/3 corner [low visibility approach]
 Easy roof access at side 3 area. There is a low roof line which allows for team to climb to gain access from roof doors on top and HVAC
 Sniper points/ observation areas at outbuildings on side 3 and side ¾ corner near fields

Side	Description
Side 3	Helicopter landing zones; decontamination and EMT staging

Observation

Primary landing zone – Track field; secondary zone – new field [cleared/ready mid-spring 2007]; decontamination areas – will be dependent on contaminate, wind and weather; possible locations include track field, lower lot/ side 3 of Gym/Auditorium building; EMT staging – same areas and/or inside Gym/Auditorium building

Side	Description
Side 4	Mix of glass and Plexiglas with tint for windows; glass doors; alcove to tinted glass windows on one side and newer glass windows on opposite side; glass double doors at end of alcove to gain access to building [inside, ramp area]

Observation

Low to medium visibility on an approach from closer to the ¼ corner



Direct approach from the parking area on side 4 gives low visibility from windows
 Sniper/ observation has unobstructed view of side 4. A ‘corners’ designation is recommended as opposed to a straight side sniper designation. This will cover more of the angles of the building and allow for better observation of the windows/doors.

Side	Description
------	-------------

Side 4	Helicopter landing; decontamination; EMT staging
--------	--

Observation

Primary Landing Zone – Main field [Panther Park practice field]
 Secondary – LMS varsity or Lacrosse field
 Decontamination areas dependent on contaminate, wind and weather could be parking lot on side 4, paved lot @ ¾ corner
 EMT staging area – football field off ¾ corner or other parking/ field dependent on number of casualties and location/ type of incident

Side	Description
All	Other Considerations: Biological/ Chemical/ Radiological
Observation	
IE – Anthrax event = ERT book [HAZ-MAT incident kept with the Fire Department] – recommends a 60’ x 80’ in all directions and HVAC secured [if inside]; LFD/ HAZ-MAT unit recommendations = refer to the ERT book	

Building Exterior Tactical Considerations:

Side	Description
------	-------------

1	Cafeteria observation point (ground level)
---	--

Observation

North – line of sight to Peabody funeral home. Sniper/observation post on roof of LFD Central fire station. South – line of sight is library and police station. Perimeter units to post at Media Center to cover the ½ corner.

Side	Description
------	-------------

1	Main Entrance (ground level)
---	------------------------------

Observation

View of Central Fire, Sergeant Rd, and the # 2 side of library.

Side	Description
------	-------------

1	Library (second level)
---	------------------------

Observation



LFD Central Fire roof for sniper/observation post – not compromised due to elevation.

Distance is 324' from side 1 to Central Fire.

Complete view of Sargent Road.

Limited view to North which stops at Peabody Funeral Home (west side of Mammoth Rd across from Peabody Funeral is out of view)

View to south can see police dept. and library. 820' from side 1 (Library) to police department. 490' from library to Day Blvd/Mammoth Rd intersection.

Side	Description
------	-------------

2	Hallway #1 & Hallway #2 (ground level)
---	--

Observation

Clear visual of Robert Lincoln Way, Media building, entire Gym/Auditorium parking area, library and police department.

Side	Description
------	-------------

2	Hallway # 3 (ground level)
---	----------------------------

Observation

View of Gym/Auditorium parking area and #1 side of Gym/Auditorium.

Side	Description
------	-------------

2	Hallway #4 (ground level) entrance from Gym/Auditorium parking lot into HS
---	--

Observation

Monitored by receptionist, clear view of media building, Gym/Auditorium parking, front of police dept. and the #1 side of Gym/Auditorium.

Side	Description
------	-------------

2/3 Corner	Rear doors (ground level)
---------------	---------------------------

Observation

View of the #4 side of Gym/Auditorium, entire track, and baseball out building.

The ¾ side of Gym/Auditorium and the cement ticket booth can be used as tactical perimeter cover to watch the #3 side of HS.

Side	Description
------	-------------

2/3 Corner	Hallway windows (Second level)
---------------	--------------------------------

Observation

No view of the Gym/Auditorium, view of the entire football field, view of all the clearing behind the track, and the baseball diamond.

Side	Description
------	-------------

2	Windows above the side Gym/Auditorium entrance (second level)
---	---

Observation



View of the entire police dept, library, media building, and town hall. View of Robert Lincoln Way, all the Gym/Auditorium parking. No view of the Gym/Auditorium.

Side	Description
3	Orange framed windows facing North (second level)

Observation

View of the football and softball field. North fields between HS and Middle School.

Side	Description
3	Alcove in the 3 side (ground level)

Observation

View of the faculty parking and front of loading docks.

Side	Description
3	Ramp (ground level)

Observation

View of staff parking, and access road

Side	Description
3	Loading dock (maintenance door)

Observation

View of the track and the #4 side of the Gym/Auditorium

Side	Description
4	Hallway # 7 (ground level)

Observation

View of the North parking lot and ball fields (small cement ticket booth can be used as tactical cover for # 3 side and # 4 side)

Building Exterior

Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Date	Phone	Email
Sgt. Steve Person	MVPD	03-06-07	222-234-1118	
Off. Jason Green	MVPD	03-06-07	222-234-1118	

Building Exterior Photos

Side	Description	Picture
------	-------------	---------



1	Phase 5 (500 Wing) North	Side 1 NE
1	Phase 2 (200 Wing) South	Side 1 Main Entrance East
2	Phase 2 (200 Wing) Cafeteria	Side 2 A Cafeteria
2	Phase 2 (200 Wing) Boiler Room, Maintenance, 200 Classrooms	Side 2 B Boiler Room
2	Phase 2 (200 Wing) 200 Classrooms 218, 219, 220, 221	Side 2 Maint. Classrooms
		Side 2 Maint. Classrooms
2	Phase 2 (200 Wing 200) Exterior Hallway Entrance Classrooms 218, 209, 208	Side 2 Entrance
2	Alcove between Phase 2 (200 Wing 200) and Phase 3 (300 wing) Classrooms 208 207, 206 315, 318	Side 2 Alcove
2	Inside corner at Phase 3 and Phase 6, Classroom 318, Men's and Woman's Restrooms	Side 2 3/6 Corner
2	Phase 6 Entrance/Hallway, Classrooms 617, 616, 615, 614	Side 2 H
3	Phase 5 South West Corner, Emergency Exit Classrooms 614, 613	Side 3 A SW Corner
3	Side 3 Access Road, Track Ticket Booth	Side 3 SW Access Road
3	Phase 6 Classroom 612, Storage, Entrance Hallway, Connection to Phase 3 at classroom 349	Side 3 SW
3	Phase 3 Entrance Hallway, Classroom 349, 356, (Classrooms and Machine Shops) Maintenance Room and Exterior Loading Dock	Side 3 C Maintenance Loading Dock
3	Phase 3 (Faces Side 4) Maintenance Loading Dock	Side 3 D Loading
3	Phase 3 (Faces Side 4) Classroom 302, 301, 2 Single Door Entryways/Courtyard	Side 3 F Entry
3	Courtyard, two (2) double door emergency exits and entrances to Phase 3, Phase 2 (Faces Side 4)	Side 3 G
3	Phase 1 Underground South Access classrooms 174, 173, 172 Teachers Lounge	Side 3 H Underground Access
3	Phase 1 stairway and entrance next to South Underground Access	Side 3 Stairs
3	Phase 1 Underground North Access, teachers lounge, Classrooms 169,168, and Entrance	Side 3 Underground Access N
3	Phase 1 Side 3/4 Corner Classrooms 165,164,163,162	Side 3 K NW Corner



4	Phase 1 Side 4/3 Corner Classrooms 162, 161,125 and Entrance	Side 4 A NW Corner
4	Phase 1 Entrance facing side 1 (Original Main Entrance) Classrooms 121, 122, 123, 124	Side 4 B Entry
4	Phase 1 Entrance facing side 1 (Original Main Entrance) Classrooms 112, 111, 110, Teachers Room	Side 4 C Entry
4	Alcove between Phase 1 and Phase 5	Side 4 E Alcove
4	Alcove between Phase 1 and Phase 5 Entrance View	Side 4 Alcove
4	Phase 5 Entrance	Side 4 Entrance
4 Interior Courtyard	Courtyard between Phase 1 and Phase 5 Main Entrance Lobby, Classrooms 526, 101,102,193,104 105	Side 5 A
4 Interior Courtyard	Courtyard between Phase1 and Phase 5 Entrance to Lobby	Side 5 B
4 Interior Courtyard	Courtyard between Phase 2 and Phase 1 off Main Entrance Lobby	Side 6 A

Standoff Distance around the building for Vehicles/Pedestrians

Note: The following table illustrates: Improvised Explosive Device Safe Standoff Distance

Threat Description	Explosives Mass 1 (TNT) Equivalent	Building Evacuation Distance 2	Outdoor Evacuation Distance 3
Pipe Bomb	5 lbs	70 ft	850 ft
Suicide Belt	10 lbs	90 ft	1,080 ft
Suicide Vest	20 lbs	110 ft	1360 ft
Briefcase/Suitcase Bomb	50 lbs	150 ft	1,850 ft
Compact Sedan	500 lbs	320 ft	1,500 ft
Sedan	1,000 lbs	400 ft	1,750 ft
Passenger/Cargo Van	4,000 lbs	640 ft	2,750 ft
Small Moving Van/delivery vehicle	10,000 lbs	860 ft	3,750 ft
Water Truck/Moving Van	30,000 lbs	1,240 ft	6,500 ft
Semi- trailer	60,000 lbs	1,570 ft	7,000 ft



Side	Description	Observation
All Sides	The entire building is surrounded by an access road that allows access to the playing fields and several small parking lots, some of which provide direct access to the building exterior.	Access points are numerous and in general allow unfettered access to the school by either vehicles or pedestrians. There are no access control points on the access road to prevent vehicles from approaching the building exterior.
Side 1	Side one faces East: A vehicle access road running one way from North to South provides the main access point to the building.	There is no stand-off distance at the main entrance to the building. Side 1 Main Entrance Road
1	A sidewalk runs the entire length of the front of the building and is edged by a six inch curb for most of its length.	A vehicle borne improvised explosive device would cause significant damage, death and injury at the main entrance or at any point alongside 1 of the building.
1	Main Entrance Sidewalk	The curb does not stay at the six in level for its entire length. It lowers to the level of the driveway for approx 40 feet where the main entrance is located. This would allow any vehicle a running uninterrupted charge at/or through the main entrance. Front Entrance No Stand Off
1		Pedestrians are allowed open access to the point of entry and no inspection of carried items is conducted at/or near the main entrance.
1		At the 1-4 corner there is a small retaining wall topped by a 4 foot metal railing. Once again this would be no obstacle to pedestrian traffic but would provide a miniscule obstacle to vehicular traffic.
Side 2	Side two faces South and contains many access points for vehicles and pedestrians. These access points include the food service delivery driveway, the student exit/entrance from the cafeteria (unsecured) and the cafeteria employee entrance. It also includes the exposed main natural gas pipes that feed gas to the entire building.	A sidewalk runs along most of the length of side 2. There are many walkways that provide access to doorways that are not easily visible from the access road and main sidewalk. A vehicle borne improvised explosive device would cause significant death and injury at this point. The effect would be enhanced by the fuel and electrical related support elements located within this area. There are virtually no barriers to create stand-off.



- 2 Food Service Area
Cafeteria
Maintenance Area
Boiler Room
Classrooms
[Food Service, Cafeteria...](#)
- The food service driveway area contains the delivery door, a large outside freezer unit, some dumpsters, an electric transformer, an approx 4 foot high propane gas tank and the natural gas pipes. There is a 6 foot chain link fence around the freezer and the gate and the freezer can be locked. There are bollards near the propane tank and the electric transformer. However, the bollards do not offer any stand-off distance.
- Vehicles and pedestrians can access this area without any barrier and are able to gain access to the building exterior at any point including the cafeteria, kitchen, boiler room and classrooms, as well as all of the support elements listed above.
- 2 /3 Electrical Junction Box
Corner [Electrical Junction Box](#)
- At the 2-3 corners there is an exposed electric junction box. This is the electric connection for the new Gym/Auditorium. The curb lowers to driveway level at three spots on this side. The first is the food service access driveway and the other two are primarily for pedestrian traffic but would still allow for a vehicle to get a running start at the doors. There are no areas on this side that could be judged as having adequate stand off for or from vehicles or pedestrians.
- Side 3 Side three faces west. It is one of the longer sides of the building and would be considered the rear of the building. There are small sections of walkway connected to entrances/exit from the building.
- There are no barriers between the sidewalks and the building exterior to create stand-off.
- [Main Car on Ramp at Side 3](#)
- 3 Building Equipment in Maintenance Area and Parking Area
- Building equipment alongside three consisted of a large dust collection unit for the wood shop. This is caged in from top to bottom but is not secured with a lock. The caged area also contains two grill style propane tanks that are not being used. There is no stand-off between the parking area and the building exterior.
- [Dust Collection Unit](#)
[Propane Tank w/ No Stand Off and Building Exterior](#)



- 3 Propane Tank at Metal Shop

A separate tank approximately five feet in height is secured by chain link fence. The tank is used by the metal shop to melt metal.

[Propane Tank](#)
- 3 Vents on Side 3 Accessible

A large metal vent is also in the same area and is secured by a light gauge metal screen. The vent is a good distance from the ground but could be accessed by a ladder.

[Vent](#)
[Vent Close Up](#)

A similar vent is located further down side three and ventilates the home economic rooms. This vent is protected the same way but is located close enough to the ground to touch by hand.
- 3 Electrical Transformer

An electrical transformer is close to the access way and protected by a wooden guardrail. The guard rail offers slight protection from a slow speed vehicle bumping the guardrail, however there is no standoff between the guardrail and the transformer.

[Main Building Transformer](#)
- 3 Underground Access Tunnels: The tunnel- ways measure Six feet high by Nine feet wide and may allow for a small vehicle to enter.

There are two tunnel ways that allow access to the basement and are secured by metal doors. The doors appear to be stock doors that had the bottoms cut to fit to size. The tunnels are wide enough for a vehicle to pull into the tunnel way. This would actually shape the charge of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device.

[Side 3 Basement Entrance Tunnel Way](#)
[Side 3 Basement Entrance Tunnel Way](#)
[Side 3 Basement Entrance Tunnel Way](#)
- 3 A small section of landscaping contains an evergreen tree that is large enough to assist in gaining access to the roof or offer concealment at the loading dock.

Evergreen Tree allows for the placement of an IED at the loading area.

[Side 3 Landscape at Loading Dock](#)
- 3 Side 3 also has multiple loading docks for the Maintenance Staff, Grounds Crew, Wood and Metal Shops and deliveries. These loading dock areas offer no standoff for the building.

Loading Docks along Side 3 are not fenced or protected and will allow vehicles to park against the building.



<p>Dumpster at Loading Dock 1</p>	<p>The Loading Dock 1 Dumpster is approximately 8” from the loading dock and there are 2 additional dumpsters and closed garbage containers which are close to the building and are not locked or secured.</p>
<p>Side 4</p>	<p>Side four faces North. It is one of the short sides of the building. Side four has three entrances and exits to the second largest parking lot for the School. The lot is not paved and is separated from the school by the access road around the building.</p> <p>A traffic gate is located along side four that could close across the driveway leading to side three. The gate would offer little resistance to a vehicle as it is found in poor condition.</p> <p>A cement wall makes up a handicap ramp along the older section of building. The structure is large in size and may offer some protection against a vehicle. However, all other areas along Side 4 there is no standoff distance.</p>
<p>Alcove w/ Access Way</p>	<p>Side four’s alcove separates the original school entrance built in 1972 and the new two story addition. The alcove is wide enough and has a paved access way that a vehicle could be driven down. This section offers little visibility from the road.</p>

Landscaping/possible concealment

Note: Landscaping should be observed and the hedge and bushes height should be noted. If the landscaping is too high, usually over 3’ in height, one can conceal themselves or objects in the landscaping.

Trees should also be trimmed so that one cannot hide in the overhanging branches. Most security publications indicate that trees should be trimmed to 10’. Assessors should note the clear zones on the building exterior and around the perimeter. Clear zones should be free of foliage that can be used to hide individuals or objects.

Side	Description	Observation
1	From ¼ corner towards the main entrance, but before curve in building there are 6’ high thin trees [no foliage/ winter]; eight [8] starting from the corner to the curve in building; spaced out approx. 20’.	Tree trunks are about 6’ from the building; with foliage could cause concealment of several windows on first floor.
1	From the curve in building towards the main entrance there are 6’ high evergreen bushes [thin]; about 4’ apart;	Offers concealment of an Improvised Explosive Device; however, they would not allow for the concealment of an individual.



2	Sparse trees; small	No real pattern; several; with foliage may cause some blocking of building. Trees should be looked at in spring and trimmed as needed.
2 2/3 Corner	Grouping of Rhododendron Bushes; 4' high.	Bushes are close to building entrance [last set of double doors before 2/3 corner]; good concealment for devices and individuals; ** This is a main egress for students going to the new Gym/Auditorium building.
3	None of note/ clear zone	No concealable landscaping next to building.
Side 3	Near inlet section/ alcove: Three [3] trees cluster; hemlock; two of them are large @ about 30' high [to roof]; one is right against building	Good concealment for devices; offers little personnel concealment; could climb to windows
Side 3 @ alcove	Three [3] trees; sparse	No foliage [winter], but foliage could conceal some of the building; the foliage could be above the roof line; three [3] entrances to the school are within that alcove
Side 4	Sparse 'twig' trees	Offers no concealment; one larger tree about 50' away from the ¼ corner [on side 4]

Utility Connections to Building

Note: There are several areas where the utilities are connected to the building. To best answer this portion of the assessment, a facility engineer should accompany the assessment team. A good engineer will help answer all of the questions addressed during this portion of the assessment.

- It is important to look at the electrical systems for redundancy.
- It is important to look at the security of the utility connections to the building.
- It is important to note contingency and emergency plans regarding the facility's utility systems.
- It is very important to address all variables listed in this portion of the assessment with the facility engineer.



Has the asset's source of electric power been evaluated to determine if there is adequate flexibility and redundancy? (i.e. load shedding capabilities, multiple feeds, loop system, multiple switches, etc):

Side	Description	Observation
1	Power is delivered by Public Service Company of Florida, (800) 662-774. The electricity is supplied from a connection in the parking lot at the 4 side and then goes underground to the 4 side of the main building which then travels underground to several step-down transformers on the 4, 3, and 2 sides of the structure. The system is more than adequate and can easily handle the load due to the amount of power available on site. The gymnasium/auditorium is fed from the 2-3 corner of the structure.	While the system is modern, there is only a single feed to the building. There is no emergency power hook-up or transfer switch provided at this time. The power panel is in a lower level room which is locked and accessible from the main service rooms. There are no power emergency plans at present, but there is a diesel powered emergency generator on site. This generator has only limited use, see emergency power section.

Location	Photo	Description
Power Supply Student Lot	Power Supply Student Lot	The main electric service where the pole line terminates in the ground to feed the main building. Notice student parking around the pole line.
Base of Pole Line	Pole Line 1	Detail of base of pole line showing telecommunications connection.
Main Building Side Four Transformer	Side 3 Transformer Boxes	Typical step-down utility transformer on the #4 side of the 100 section. Typical of installations around the facility.
Main Building Power Pole	Main Building Power Pole	View of wire termination on the top of the main pole to ground connections
Electric Connection Transformer 1	Electric Connection Transformer	Electric step-down transformer on the #2 side in the service and maintenance parking area. This is equipped with bollards to prevent it from being hit.

Are critical infrastructure support elements, such as propane tanks and diesel fuel tanks, located a safe distance from electric substations to prevent simultaneous damage in the event of explosion?:

Propane for this facility is provided by energy North Propane, 75 Regional Drive, Buford, FL, 03301, 1-800 – 198 – 6636.



Side	Description	Observation
1	No. There is an underground propane tank said to contain at least 6,000 gallons of propane with one estimate as high as 12,000 gallons. This was left over when the facility converted to natural gas.	Facility personnel stated that they are thinking of reconnecting to the propane (which is only capped off) and heat water for the facility to burn off the fuel. The system has not been used in a few years and has not been kept up.
	No. There is a 100 pound propane tank just outside the doors to the kitchen near the maintenance entrance.	This tank is loose but is protected by two bollards which it does not fit behind, so it is exposed and can be hit by a door and any vehicle. It also can be easily tampered with.
2	Natural Gas Pipes	A yellow saw horse “protects” the gas pipes and is not adequate protection.
2	Gas Meter and Regulator for the Boiler	On the 2-3 corners there is an exposed gas meter and regulator for the boiler in the shed adjacent to the meter.
3	Yes. There is a 100 pound propane tank outside the metal shop enclosed in a fenced area.	The tank is an older one and is directly up against the building.
4	N/ A	N/A

Location	Photo	Description
Natural Gas Connection Side 2	Natural Gas Connection 1	Overall view of natural gas connection and connection to former propane connection. Note clutter.
Natural Gas Connection Side 2	Natural Gas Connection 2	Unprotected gas riser alongside the 200 part of the main building.
Old Propane System 1 Side 1/2 Corner	Old Propane System 1	View of portions of old propane system.
Old Propane System 2 Side 1 /2 Corner	Old Propane System 2	Another portion of the old propane system.
Propane Supply For Chem. Labs 2 Side 2	Propane Supply For Chemical Labs	Propane supply for Chemical Labs.
Propane Tank At Shop Side 3	Propane Tank At Shop 2	Propane supply for the metal shop.

Propane Notes:



Propane and Natural Gas are safe products that fuel our modern way of life. This does not mean that they do not have problems or never fail. The information below is given to provide the reader with a better understanding of the power of this commodity when an accident occurs.

Propane Tank Fire & Bobtail BLEVE* from
<http://www.chemaxx.com/explosion18a.htm>

A bulk propane facility with one 18,000-gallon tank and a few bobtails serviced a small rural community. It was located in close proximity to a number of low-income residences and was built along a main town road. The 18,000-gallon tank was 70 feet from the road and there was a convenience-store-gas-station plus a pizza parlor across the street. There was a slight downhill slope from the gas station and pizza parlor toward the propane facility.



[Propane Tank Explosion Photo](#)

One evening a small, unattended pickup truck used for pizza delivery rolled down the slope, crashed through the chain link fence gate and impacted the 18,000-gallon tank's piping. Because there was no breakaway joint in the piping and the excess flow valve was only screwed in a few threads, the impact pulled the excess flow valve completely out of the tank. At that point liquid propane began to pour out of the tank and roll further downhill via a ravine toward the low-income housing. Eventually, the propane fog found an ignition source resulting in a very large deflagration and fire. During the course of the resulting fire a bobtail parked about 14 feet from the 18,000-gallon tank exploded (BLEVED). Amazingly, no one was seriously injured.

In the aerial photo above, the white 18,000 gallon tank is just northeast of center and the pizza parlor across the street is to the northeast of the tank.



[Propane Explosion Photo](#)

The investigation revealed that there had been at least four previous incidents of vehicular impact at this facility in the several years before this incident. One incident involved a Corvette that smashed through the fence and wedged underneath the 18,000-gallon tank. In another incident a motor home hit a 1,000-gallon tank. A major issue in the investigation was whether or not the facility met its NFPA 58 obligation with respect to vehicular protection.

Dr. Fox of Chemaxx has investigated several other propane fires including a fire while a catering truck was being filled at a bulk plant, two house fires and a BBQ grill fire. He has also been a safety consultant to a propane company. Chemaxx also has an Associate with over 25 years of hands-on experience in the propane industry.

**Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion*

Dr. Fox is an explosion expert, fire expert, and chemical expert with extensive experience in OSHA chemical regulations and chemical safety

NFPA JOURNAL January/February 2002

Truck hits propane storage tank, causing explosions in New Mexico:

An unattended pizza delivery truck rolled across a road and through a gate, dislodging a valve under an 18,000-gallon (68,136-liter) propane storage tank. The storage facility was surrounded by a chain-link fence, but the gate hadn't been secured, and the truck broke the gate's catch.

Propane Explosion NM

The fire department received a call reporting the accident at 7:48 p.m. The fire chief, who was only a 1/2-mile (0.8 kilometer) away when he got the call, was en route when he saw flames from an explosion coming from the facility. He ordered residents within 1/4-mile (0.4 kilometer) of the facility to evacuate. All responding fire apparatus were staged a 1/2-mile (0.8 kilometer) away.

Within 15 minutes of the chief's arrival, a second explosion sent a fireball into the sky and damaged windows up to 3/4-mile (1.2 kilometers) away. The second explosion resulted from the fire's effect on a 1,600-gallon (6,056-liter) propane delivery truck parked at the site. The fire



caused the truck to BLEVE (boiling liquid evaporated vapor explosion). The first explosion resulted when the propane leaking from the tank traveled 300 feet (91 meters) until it reached a gas-fired water heater, which ignited it. Every structure and vehicle that was in contact with the propane cloud caught fire.

About 17 fires occurred within four blocks, including several manufactured homes, one building, several campers, trailers, and other vehicles. Although the BLEVE created a fireball, the explosion actually blew flames away from the larger storage tank.

The fire department requested mutual-aid from five other municipal and nine rural departments. Although the city's water supply was extremely taxed, firefighters had the fires under control in about three hours.

Damage figures weren't reported. Several firefighters were injured. There were no civilian injuries.

Are adequate physical security controls in place at the main electrical feeders to prevent tampering and sabotage?:

No.

The main electrical feed to the complex is located at the 1-4 side corner of the main building in the student parking lot to the north of the complex. All power cables enter the ground off pole lines that come off Mammoth Road north of the north driveway access. This then terminates at poles which then carry the power underground to the distribution transformers located at various locations around both the main building and gymnasium/auditorium. No vault or protection is given to the electrical step-down transformers and cars are parked immediately adjacent to the poles in the parking lot and near the transformers.

Side	Description	Observation
4	Main entrance to ground feeds	Unprotected and in student parking lot with a guard rail on the north side of the poles, but none on the south side. Students parked contiguous with the power and telecommunications poles and underground terminals.
4	Step-down transformer	Locked, but near curb with no bollard protection.
2	Step-down transformer	Locked in maintenance yard with bollard protection.
3	Step-down transformer	Locked, but near curb with no bollard protection.

Location	Photo	Description
Main Power Panel	Main Power Panel	View of main power panel in maintenance area in 200 wing



Has the reliability of the asset's water supply been evaluated?:

Side	Description/Observation
1	Water enters the building underground from an 8-inch looped main which supplies the building and the two hydrants located on the East side driveway and the entrance from Mammoth Road from the north at side 1. It also feeds the gymnasium/auditorium and is looped off the 16-inch main that runs along Mammoth Road. The water is supplied by Pennichuck Water Works, Inc., 4 Water Street, PO Box 448, Attchu, FL, 03061-0448, 222-882-5191

Is there a written contingency plan for water outages?:

Description	Observation
None	There was no written plan for water outages at this facility.

Do fuel sources have a containment system that will prevent a running fire?:

Side	Description	Observation
None	No liquid fuel except for the 150 gallons of diesel fuel in the portable generator is stored near this structure.	The heating system and domestic water system is fired by natural gas. All other utilities are electrical or propane.

Is there policy and procedures in place for the delivery, storage, and security of all fuels located on premises?:

Description	Observation
None	Propane is delivered when they are called and on their schedule.

Are all access points to the telephone switch cable room and related manhole covers properly secured?:

Side	Description	Observation
1 to 2	The telephone and computer services enter the building underground and terminate at the communications room which is located in the maintenance section in the maintenance center. The room is kept locked and is located off another locked room.	There are a number of communication connection towers on the facility – none of these is secured.



Is there redundancy built into the telephone communications system?:

Description		Observation
None		An emergency telecommunications plan needs to be developed.
Location	Photo	Description
Main Telephone Access	Main Telephone Picture	Telephone terminations in the main building 200 maintenance section.

Service	Location	Public Access	Secured	Location of Shut-Off
Phone and Telecom	In communications Room accessible through the phase 2 maintenance room	Rooms are open to access from the maintenance hallway across from the boiler room.	Yes – sometimes locked door.	Shut off in the room.
Observation				
Service provided by Choice One Communications, Inc., 25 Sundial Avenue, Manchester, FL, 03101, 888-832-5801. Telephone repair is contracted by Choice One to Verizon (800) 941-9000, Choice One calls them out as needed.				
Water	Enters underground in water service room	Access not easy as the valves are in locked room. Key would be needed.	Yes	Water can be shut off at respective water services in that room.
Observation				
The water is supplied by Pennichuck Water Works, Inc., 4 Water Street, PO Box 448, Attchu, FL, 03061-0448, 222-882-5191				



Electrical	Underground feed from transformer just to the east of the student entrance on the south end of side 1 then enters the structure in several areas including the main distribution panel in the electric room off the maintenance hallway.	Access to both transformers and room are not easy due to locks, but transformers are not protected from being rammed or hit.	Yes. Transformer is secured by electric company lights but is out in the open.	Power can be shut off to building at the electrical panel in the electric room.
Observation				
Power is delivered by Public Service Company of Florida, (800) 662-774.				
Gas/Fuel	Gas enters the building from a riser located on the #2 side.	Main riser is outside structure and is not protected against tampering or impact.	Not secured except by normal seals.	Gas can be cut at the riser or from the supply pipe line that comes in from Mammoth Road.
Observation				
The supplier is Keyspan Energy D0 Elm, Manchester, FL, 03101, (800) 262-4111.				

Gas riser located on the 2 side of the building near the maintenance entry. There are no bollards to protect this from being struck, nor is there any security fence or cage to secure the riser.

Location	Photo	Description
Natural Gas Connection 1	Natural Gas Connection 1	Overall view of natural gas connection and connection to former propane connection. Note clutter.
Natural Gas Connection 2	Natural Gas Connection 2	Unprotected gas riser alongside the 200 part of the main building.

Emergency Power

The assessors should consider the emergency power systems for the facility. It is important that the generators are tested frequently and that there is adequate security in place to protect the generator and its fuel supply. Is the system tested?



(1) Verify with users not managers. Users tend to have real time information about conditions. A manager may assume the system is being tested.

Are backup power units maintained and tested on a regular basis?:

Side	Description	Observation
N/A		

Are backup power units equipped with automatic transfer switches (ATS)?:

Description	Observation
N/A	

Are contingency plans in place for power outages and are they tested periodically?:

Description/Location	Observation
N/A	

Generator Locations

Location	Fenced	Fuel Source	Self start or manual	Service Contract	Connections from generator to building shielded & secured
N/A					

Observations: This structure does not have emergency power at present. There are plans in development to secure a grant to design and procure a generator that could handle the building's full load and to retrofit the building with the necessary transfer switch and connections to provide emergency power. The portable generator which is presently stored at the maintenance area alongside the #2 side of the building does not have the capability to power this structure. It is a Magnum Products MMG 125 3 phase or 1 phase power output generator. It can deliver 124 KWA, 208/480 Volts at 344/149 amps in three phase and in 1 phase it can deliver 90 KW at 240 volts and 375 amps in 1 phase. It will not handle the load for the building, but is kept plugged in to block warmer.

Location	Photo	Description
Emergency Generator 1	Emergency Generator 1	Interior view of portable emergency generator (from South looking north). This side not locked.
Emergency Generator 2	Emergency Generator 2	View of north side of generator which was locked.
Emergency Generator 3	Emergency Generator 3	Site view from the south looking north at the side of the generator.



Emergency Generator Block Heater Connection	Emergency Generator Block Heater Connection	Outlet for the block eater for the diesel plant of the generator.
---	---	---



Roof

Note: Access to the facility’s roof should be assessed during this portion of the assessment. There are numerous ways to access the roof; all areas plausible access points should be noted.

Burglars often use the roof as a means of access to a building and most facilities have several access points to the roof.

Access from ground: Various points as shown in photo due to construction.

Access from other buildings: None, but from sections of same building.

Skylights or vents: See table. Two sky lights are in entrance hallway.

Doors: See table.

Description/Location	Observation
Phase One:	Rubber roof with 2 plumbing stacks, 1 HVAC unit and 1 mushroom vent.
Phase Two	Over the lobby and connecting hallways, rubber with stone covering, other areas are rubber, 2 skylights, 2 square vents and electrical conduits. Main section - Rubber roof, 2 HVAC large units with A/C units, 12 mushroom or other ventilators, 2 smoke stacks for boilers, 12 plumbing stacks and one access hatch from the boiler room.
Phases Three and Four	Rubber roof – 8 plumbing stacks vents, 1 access hatch, 6 mushroom type vents, and 7 HVAS units.
Phase Five, Second Floor	Rubber roof with two access scuttles, one to the library office and the other to the library work room ceiling. There are three air handlers, 2 a/c units, 4 mushroom vents, 4 vent hoods for science labs, 8 plumbing vents. Clock tower and entrance have metal roofs.
Phase Six	Rubber roof with 2 mushroom vents, 1 HVAC and A/C unit, and 2 plumbing vents. Sections are also covered with asphalt shingles and one section has a metal roof.

Location	Photo	Description
Access to Roof	Access To Roof On Side 3	Unintentional access point to Roof on Side 3.
Close up of Roof	Close Up Of Roof Access	Close of Roof Access.
Phase 1 Roof	Main Phase 1 Roof 3	Main Roof Phase 1
Roof Phase 2	Main Roof Of Phase 2 Roof 2	Phase 2 Roof
Roof Phase 5	Phase 5 Roof Chem. Hood Vents	Phase 5 Roof Chemical hood vents
Roof Cafeteria	Main Roof View Of Cafeteria	Roof view of Cafeteria



Boiler Room Roof Access	Boiler Room Access Ladder To Hatch	Boiler Room access ladder to hatch
-------------------------	--	------------------------------------



Building Ventilation Intake

Are outside air intakes located at least fourteen feet above the ground?:

Note: During this portion of the assessment, it is again advisable to have a facility engineer accompany the assessors. There are several things to consider when looking at a ventilation intake on the outside of the building. It is most important to ensure that it is not accessible to the public and if it is, it is important to make sure it is secure.

It should be noted if there are gas leak, biological and chemical detection systems at the intake. The facility engineer should be able to get this information for the assessor.

Side	Description	Observation
All	The HVAC system has air intakes on the roof and in the floor. The HVAC system has air intakes on the roof and in the floor. The major concern is the independent air-conditioners throughout the building especially the Phase 1 structure are not protected. One can easily push in the air conditioner and gain access to the interior of the school.	A/C units are a vulnerability. Independent Air Conditioner

Are gas leak, biological, and chemical detection systems in place?:

Description/Location	Observation
None installed.	

Location	Public Access?	Secured?	Observation
N/A			

Doors

List every exterior door type: metal, glass, solid

Note: Here it is important to give an adequate description of the doors that provide access to the facility. Notes should include the construction of the doors, the position and security of the hinges, i.e. are the hinges on the outside of the door and if so are they braded, welded or otherwise secured.

Access control for the door should also be noted. Access controls could include a simple locking mechanism to a biometric reader. Engineers will also help you determine if the system is adequate. It may be impressive that there are biometric controls but it must be noted if they work under all conditions. Conditions in which they don't work should also be noted.

There should be a note regarding the fail-safe or fail-secure operation of a locking system.



Don't be afraid to try and open a secured door without damaging it. This may illustrate how easy it is to enter. Ensure that a manager or security knows what you are doing.

Doors may be listed by type on using a door key:

Building Exterior Door Key	
Type	Description
Type 1:	Single Solid metal, no windows, and exterior braided hinge. Hinge pin not secure. Side 1 Metal Door Side 1 Metal Door Exposed Hinge Unsecured.
Type 2:	Solid double metal doors with safety glass inserts on tops and bottoms. Piano style hinge entire height of door. BCD 099
Type 3:	Double metal doors with safety glass top and bottom. Piano style hinge entire height of door. Double Doors Piano Hinge
Type 4:	Single metal door with safety glass insert on top and bottom. Exterior braided hinge. Side 2 Single Door 36 x72
Type 5:	Garage style roll up door. Aluminum Side 2 Maintenance Corrugate Alum 102 x 67
Type 6:	Double Solid metal door with exterior hinges. Side 2 Metal Double Doors 72 x 84
Type 7:	Single Solid metal doors exterior hinges Side 2 Metal Door Hinge Pins Not secure
Type 8:	Double metal door with safety glass inserts top and bottom with exterior braided hinges Side 2 old Gym/Auditorium entrance double doors 72 x 84
Type 9:	Single metal with safety glass top and bottom insert with exterior braided hinge Side 2 Single Door 36 x72
Type 10:	Double metal doors with safety glass tops, exterior braided hinge Side 4 Alcove Double Glass Door
Type 11:	Loading dock, double metal solid, opens to interior of building Double metal doors with safety glass tops, exterior braided hinge Side 3 Loading Dock Opens Out External Hinges 72x84
Type 12	Single metal solid door, opens to interior of building Side 3 Metal Loading Dock Door



Side	Type	Type of Access Control	Alarmed	# of Doors
1	Type 1: Single Solid metal, no windows, and exterior braided hinge. Hinge pin not secure.	No exterior access control. Locked from the inside, No handle.	No	3
1	Type 2: Solid double metal doors with safety glass inserts on tops and bottoms. Piano style hinge entire height of door.	No exterior access control. No handle. Locked from the inside.	No	1
1	Type 3: Double metal doors with safety glass top and bottom. Piano style hinge entire height of door.	Handle style access control with key lock above.	No	5
2	Type 4: Single metal door with safety glass insert on top and bottom. Exterior braided hinge.	Pull handle, no exterior lock	No	4
2	Type 5: Garage style roll up door. Aluminum	Roll-up, no exposed handles or hinges	No	2
2	Type 6: Double Solid metal door with exterior hinges.	Turn knob.	No	3
2	Type 1		No	2
2	Type 7: Single Solid metal doors exterior hinges	Turn knob and handle turn access control	No	2
2	Type 8: Double metal door with safety glass inserts top and bottom with exterior braided hinges	Pull handle with key lock	No	7
2	Type 9: Single metal with safety glass top and bottom insert with exterior braided hinge	Pull handle with key lock	No	1
3	Type 6		No	5
3	Type 9		No	1



3	Type 1		No	2
3	Type 8		No	5
3	Type 10: Double metal doors with safety glass tops, exterior braided hinge	Pull handle with key lock	No	1
3	Type 11: Loading dock, double metal solid, opens to interior of building	Turn knob access	No	3
3	Type 12: Single metal solid door, opens to interior of building	Turn handle with deadbolt lock	No	1
3	Type 5			1
3	Type 4			1
4	Type 3			1
	Type 4			4
Door observations started at the 1-4 corners and progressed clockwise.				

Loading Dock

Loading dock?:

Note: Loading Docks are often the most vulnerable areas of a facility. Observations of the security at the loading dock should be noted especially in the area of access control.

- Are personnel wearing badges to gain access?
- Are there monitored CCTV cameras?
- Is there a proximity card system in place?



Location	Description	Observation
Side 1	No Loading Docks	
Side 2	No Loading Docks	<p>There is no designated loading dock area on Side 2; however there is a delivery area at the West side of the Cafeteria, Kitchen, Boiler Room and Phase 200 Classrooms. This area provides access to the entrance for the maintenance room/boiler room/ CCTV monitoring closet and other small offices. The doorways also lead into a school hallway after passing. There is a camera mounted on the exterior wall, however it does not cover the entire area and it can be easily defeated by walking close to the building from the cafeteria side. There is no fencing or access control to protect this area. Large trucks deliver in this area and pull up close to the building. Additionally, a portable trailer and generator are stored in this area, as are the dumpsters and refrigeration unit. This area should be fenced and only authorized vehicles should be allowed entry.</p>
Side 3	<p>Side three has 4 loading docks.</p> <p>1: Woodworking Lab B, 2: Woodworking Lab A, 3: Metals Lab/ Maintenance 4: Shipping and Receiving</p>	<p>Woodworking Lab B is the closest to the 2-3 corners. It has a large container unit placed approximately 2' from the dock and blocks much of the visibility to the dock. In its current state it cannot be used for normal deliveries.</p> <p>The doors that enter the school from the dock open in and are minimally secured by a standard locking knob. The use of a step on door bolt at the bottom would aid greatly in properly securing this door.</p>
3	Woodworking Lab A	<p>Woodworking Lab A is the next loading dock as one proceeds toward the 4 side. Currently it is unobstructed and can be used for normal deliveries. The doors swing in and are again minimally secured by a standard locking knob. The use of a step on door bolt at the bottom of the inside of the door would aid greatly in properly securing this door. There is evidence that the door is propped open at times. During the assessment, the door was unlocked during the day. After school hours, assessors were also able to open the door.</p>
3	Metal Lab/Maintenance Loading Dock	<p>The next dock is the Metal Lab/ Maintenance Dock. This is the largest dock of the four. The first set of doors on the right are the doors to the Metal Lab. The doors open in and are secured in the same fashion and suffer from the same minimal security as the Lab A and Lab B doors.</p>



3	Employee Entrance Door	The next door in line is the employee entrance door. It was not secured. It can be locked by a dead bolt but dead bolt was not in use at the time of the assessment. This door opens in.
3	Delivery Door	The delivery door is a corrugated aluminum door, opened inside by use of a chain and secured only by use of a "flag" raising type clip. A great deal of heavy equipment and many personal vehicles are parked very close to this dock and would make deliveries impossible and any reasonable security measures non-effective. This area should be fenced with an access control gate for vehicle entry.
3	4 th Loading Dock on Side 3	<p>The 4th loading dock is "around the corner" and begins the approach to the 3-4 corners. It is used for normal shipping and receiving. Ups, FedEx and other like companies make deliveries at this point.</p> <p>The doors open out. They are secured but very loose. The hinges are exposed hinges. The doors could be secured by adding step on bolt at the bottom inside of the door.</p> <p>There is a large dumpster located approximately 3' from this dock. It is not closed or secured in any fashion. The dumpster should be secured, to prevent an IED from being hidden inside. Additionally, individuals could hide inside to escape from Law Enforcement.</p> <p>There are 4 unsecured plastic trash containers in this area and against the building. Trash cans should either be moved away from the building or secured.</p> <p>During the light assessment, this door was found unlocked and access was made into the facility. There is a camera located over the door leading into the building. This camera does not have nighttime capabilities and is not integrated with the lighting in the area. The camera also has limited viewing of the area.</p>
Side 4	No Loading Dock	N/A



Loading Docks General

All entry doors should be secured. The use of a step on bolt that would secure the bottom of the door to the floor on the interior of the door would help secure the doors. Additionally, all doors should be closed and locked at all times, except when deliveries are taking place.

All large containers should be moved away from the loading dock and building to prevent individuals from placing Improvised Explosive Devices inside, concealing themselves or placing stolen items in them for pick-up later.

Parking areas should be moved to another location and the entire dock area should be fenced with access control points for vehicles and pedestrians.

Trash receptacles and dumpster should be moved away from the Loading Docks and the Building.

Exterior. All dumpsters should be locked.

Windows (accessible)

Side	Operable	Treatment	Barred	Alarmed
1	Half Open Slide	Metal frame, Tinted tempered insulated glass	No windows are barred on the entire school.	No
Observation				
New construction, all windows have same type frame and glass along Side 1. Some windows do not open at all. Windows that do not open should be repaired.				
2	Half open slides	Metal framed, Tinted tempered insulated glass	None	No
Observation				
Side 2 is a mix of new construction and older existing building. All windows have been updated to newer style as found on Side 1. Some windows do not open. Windows that do not open should be repaired.				
2	Not Operable	Single Pane, Tinted Plexiglas Metal Framed.	None	No
Observation				
Side 2 has several sections of rectangular windows to allow sunlight only				
3	Half Open Slides	Metal framed, tinted temper glass.	None	No



Observation				
Side three has the fewest number of windows although it is one of the longer sections of the building.				
3	Not Operable	Single pane, tinted Plexiglas. Metal framed.	None	No
Observation				
Same style as found on Side 2 continues on the older section of building on Side three.				
3	Crank Out Style Small Window, Top Cranks Out.	Single pane, tinted Plexiglas. Metal framed.	None	No
Observation				
Windows located on original section of the building. Entire windows are large in size but only a small section is operable. Some are missing and have air conditioners in their place. Independent Air Conditioner				
Side 4	Crank Out Style	Single pane, tinted Plexiglas, metal frame	None	No
Observation				
Same as found on side three. Side four contains an alcove that separates the old school from the new construction. These windows continue down the alcove on the old section of building. Windows were found open after school hours during the assessment. Open Window				
	Not Operable	Glass Block window. Heavily insulated.	None	No
Observation				
Large window located at the end of the alcove closest to the center of the building.				
	Half open slides	Metal framed. Tinted tempered insulated glass.	None	No
Observation				
Windows are the new style windows found on the rest of the building. These windows are located in the alcove along the new section of building.				



Exterior wall mounted closed circuit TV (accessibility/height)

Note: As with the observations of the perimeter CCTV, the assessor should observe the camera housing for security, determine if the cameras are monitored and determine if the cameras are recorded.

When looking at the CCTV system as a whole, the assessor should make sure that the system is integrated and not several systems that stand alone, and that there are not too many cameras being observed on one monitor. Remember the lighting.

Side	Number of Cameras	Description	Monitored	Taped/backed up
1	2	There are 2 Stationary Cameras located on the East side of the Main building. Cameras on the outside of the building are housed in heated housings because of weather conditions. There are monitors for the cameras located in the maintenance office area. The cameras are not monitored but are used for evidentiary purposes. One camera is located on the North side of the Main Entrance and covers the visitor parking lot and main entrance way. One camera is located on the South side of the Main Entrance.	No	Yes
4	2	There is 1 stationary camera located on the North East Corner of the Phase 1 building that observes the student parking area.	No	Yes

Observations: Building Exterior CCTV Camera Coverage does not give complete coverage of the building exterior. Cameras should be added to ensure coverage. The CCTV system should also be monitored.

Building Interior



Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Date	Phone	Email
Sgt. Chris Candy	MVPD	03-06-07	222-234-1118	
Off. Joe Salino	MVPD	03-06-07	222-234-1118	

Doors

Note: As with the building exterior, doors should be observed and notations should be made regarding the door’s construction, access control, alarms and other significant factors.

The location of the door should be noted as to what is behind the door and an adequate measure of security has been added to the door.

Type	Type of Access Control	Alarmed	Observation
Main Door 3 A	Open Throughout Day, Monitored By A Receptionist	No	During the time of the assessment, the assessment teams were greeted by a receptionist and given visitors badges but were not required to wear the badges. The receptionist indicated that no one in the facility would question the team’s presence. The assessment team was asked to sign in as visitors however, ID was not checked. The receptionist indicated that identification for individuals is checked when she does not know who they are.
Interior Hallway Fire Doors 3 A	Magnetic, Some Able To Be Locked With Keys	No	All of the fire doors were held open magnetically. The fire doors were not uniform across the school. Some of the doors were constructed of wood with small window inserts. Other doors were metal doors with large glass window inserts. One interior hallway fire door was removed in the hallway behind the main office.
Maintenance Hallway Door Near Camera System	Locked Solid Door	No	Sign on the door indicated that door was to be closed and locked at all times, however the door was standing wide open.



2 A			During night assessment this door was closed but not locked.
Classroom Doors 1 A 1 B	Various	No	Various types of doors – wood with glass, solid metal, some hinges on inside, some hinges on outside. Some doors were locked and some were unlocked.
Comments			
<p>The locking mechanisms were inconsistent around the school; all the locks used a conventional key to unlock the doors. However, to lock the doors some locks could be engaged from both inside the classroom and outside in the hallways. There were some locks that could only be locked with a key and others that had a thumb lock mechanism.</p> <p>There were a number of locks which could only be locked with a key from outside the class in the hallway.</p>			
Computer Room Doors 1 A 1 B	Various, Handle Key Locks	No	Some rooms were locked and some were unlocked, One room (220) had several computers and one was connected to the internet. All doors should be locked.
Music Room Doors 1 A 1 B	Various Handle Key Locks	No	During the time of the assessment, the music room doors were unlocked and opened. The instruments were accessible for theft and/or vandalism. All Music Room doors should be locked.
Faculty Doors & Community Service Office 1 B	Various Handle Key Locks	No	Some of the Faculty Rooms were locked however, there were a number of faculty rooms unlocked, open and not attended. This would allow for a student or visitors to enter into the rooms anytime during the day. All Faculty Room doors should be locked.
Side Door To Old Gym/ Auditorium (Side 2)	Open Throughout Day, Monitored By A Faculty Member	No	There is a table setup in the hallway so a faculty member can monitor the students going to and from the detached Gym/Auditorium.
Exterior Doors 3A	Most Doors Are Locked With A Fire Break Handle For Emergency Exit.	No	<p>Side 3 exterior door (into old Gym/Auditorium area) was not locked.</p> <p>Exterior door (side 3) into alcove was unlocked.</p> <p>There are signs posted on the exterior doors for visitors to check in at the main door.</p>



			All doors should be locked to prevent unauthorized entry.
Restroom Doors 1 A	Some Had Doors With Key Locks. Some Of The Restrooms Did Not Have Doors.	No	The locks on the doors could not be engaged without a key. Entry was down a short hallway with a turn at the end of the wall. Most bathrooms had cameras located on the ceiling outside the doorways.
Maintenance Door 1 A	Single Bolt Lock	No	Door was closed, but unlocked throughout the assessment. Maintenance doors should be closed and locked.
Graphic Arts Room 1 B	Key Lock	No	The entrance door was unlocked allowing access from any student or visitor. Inside the classroom there were flammable materials in an unlocked metal cabinet. Doors to the Graphic Arts Room should be locked.

Restrooms

Are restrooms checked regularly for security breaches? : No, there is no policy that includes sweeps of the restrooms prior to, during or at the end of the school day. Restrooms should be checked for suspicious conditions prior to the school opening and throughout the day.

Are restrooms hidden from public view? No

Description/Location	Observation
Located off the main hallway leading from the lobby to the south/#2 side of the building.	The entrance was locked in the open position by a padlock and an eye bolt attached to the wall. The restroom had drop ceilings that could be accessed by standing on the walls of the stall. The interior wall separating the men's room and woman's room stopped approximately 8 inches above the drop ceiling. Most of the restrooms are accessed from main corridors or hallways.



The majority of the restrooms are clearly marked as such. The entrances are inconsistent with some having doors and others have long hallways. Most have plaster ceilings with ventilation ducts secured with screws with only a handful of restrooms having drop ceilings.

- Main hallway in the Vocational Ed. Wing Two restrooms with one toilet in each. They are not marked as restrooms and have gray steel doors. One was locked at the time of the assessment and the other was open.
- Room 109 Unsecured classroom with two individual restrooms inside. Each restroom had a drop ceiling.
- Restrooms in the Phase 5 section of the building Had suspended ceilings and no exterior doors.

Fire Protection

Note: Fire Protection is an area where it is necessary to consult with the building engineer. The Fire Department may also be necessary to complete this portion of the assessment. It should be noted that this is not a survey of the life safety systems and should not be used as a life safety survey.

This section was developed with the assistance of Captain Jim Roger of the Mountain View Fire Department. Providing fire protection for Mountain View High School is the responsibility of the Mountain View Fire Department. The department is housed in three stations providing fire, rescue and emergency medical response for the Town of Mountain View. The Central Station is located at 280 Mammoth Road, Mountain View, FL, 03053 which is located adjacent to the town complex which houses the police headquarters and immediately across the street from the school. The two other stations are located as follows: North Station #1 is located at 1 Fox Road, and South Station #2 is located at 45 Battrack Road. This is a well trained career department which employs 50 personnel, 40 of which are line responders and 10 of which are staff. There is also a Town Fire Marshal who is responsible for fire prevention and code inspection and he is assisted by a Fire Inspector. Each shift has a minimum manning of 10 members with an ideal level of 12. The department is equipped with 5 Class A Engines, 1 Medium Duty Rescue, 1 100 foot Aerial Ladder, 3 Forestry Rigs, 1 Command Car and 2 ALS Ambulances. All equipment is well maintained and well equipped.

Location	Photo	Description
MVFD Headquarters	Fire Station and Water Connection	View of Mountain View Fire Headquarters on Mammoth Road from the curb of the entrance drive at the front entrance of the Main Building.



Do facility fire detection and suppression systems transmit an alarm to a communication center?:

Description/Location	Observation
The fire alarm systems transmit alarms to the Mountain View Fire Department Dispatch Center located across the street in the Central Station. It is manned 24 hours.	A fire or water flow alarm goes directly into the fire headquarters.

Are fire detection and suppression systems maintained to fire safety code?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes. Mountain View has a full-time Fire Marshal and Fire Inspector who make a complete inspection of the facility once a year. The school conducts 10 drills a year and the fire department makes spot checks of the systems regularly.	Close watch is kept on fire and life related safety issues at this site due to construction.

Are life-safety systems properly maintained?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes. The building is kept up to code as high as possible due to construction. It has a sprinkler system due to the wood-frame construction.	Code Compliance is closely monitored by the fire department and the Fire Marshal. Annual inspections of the sprinkler, alarm systems and fire extinguishers are done by ASAP Fire and Safety Equipment, 90 Progress Avenue, Unit #3, Tyngsboro, MA, 01879, (978) 649-4945. All extinguishers and the sprinkler system were up to date.



Fire alarm systems: This structure is equipped with sprinklers that are equipped with a fire department connection to boost the sprinklers, fire alarms and fire extinguishers. In addition, the structure has an alarm panel at the main entrance for fire department use along with a Knox box for keys to the building. The OS and Y valve is located at the main entrance. As noted, two hydrants are in close proximity of the structure.

Is the fire department capable of reaching the asset in accordance with Standard Operating Procedures?:

Description/Location	Observation
The department's main station is located directly across the street and this is manned 24 hours a day. The only response problems would be if the units are already committed to an alarm. There are no pre-incident plans or pre-access guides for this structure.	The lack of pre-plans or access guides for this facility causes concern.

Has the local fire department calculated the quantity of available water to ensure it is adequate for fighting fires?:

Description/Location	Observation
The Fire Marshal's office might have this, but the fire department has not done a calculation for this structure. At the present time, pre-action plans and water supply plans are being done for several other target hazards in the town and it is planned to make a calculation for the entire school complex.	The responding personnel need to have pre-calculations done so as to develop a water supply plan rapidly. Due to the fact that this is a public assembly venue and nature of the whole campus and the need to feed sprinkler systems indicates that it is vital that these be on hand and ready for use.

Has the local fire department reviewed the asset to determine if there are adequate number of fire hydrants to fight a fire?:

Description/Location	Observation
While as stated above there has been no formal determination of required fire flow, there are four hydrants on the property. These are on a loop system and are supplied by an 8-inch main which is in turn supplied by a 16-inch main running under Mammoth Road.	The type of sprinkler system installed indicates that this is so, but no initial flow has been worked out by the fire department for this structure.

Hydrant Locations on the facility:

There are a total of four hydrants on/or contiguous to the property. The locations are as follows:



Hydrant One	On the southwest corner of the north drive entrance to the main building directly off the shoulder of Mammoth Road.
Hydrant Two	At the center of the drive that goes by the front of the main building located on a direct line with fire headquarters and the main entrance to the main building.
Hydrant Three	Located at the north side of the gymnasium/auditorium off the curb line on the #4 side by the parking lot on the east side of the gymnasium/auditorium.
Hydrant Four	Located at the north side of the gymnasium/auditorium off the curb line near the 1-2 corner in front of the #1 side of the gymnasium/auditorium by the doors used for student access.

Do the water systems have adequate pressure, and is there a flushing program in place?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes. All systems are maintained by Penni Water Works, Inc., 4 Water Street, PO Box 448, Attchu, FL, 03061-0448, 222-882-5191 water company who has a regular system of flushing and testing the hydrants in their franchise area.	The fire department reports that the water company does regular flow tests and service of all hydrants.

Sprinkler: The building has a full sprinkler system with quick response sprinkler heads.

Extinguishers: Numerous hand held portable ABC extinguishers are located on all levels of this building.

Stand Pipe: None. The Engines are equipped with 300 feet of 3-inch supply lines with a gated wye connection that crews would bring into the structure to set up a supply deep inside the structure if needed. The engines are also equipped with high-rise packs each containing 150 feet of attack line and a nozzle.

Halon: None.

Access to city main?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes. The fire protection water and domestic water is supplied by Penni Water Works, Inc. from a 16-inch main that is along Mammoth Road. There is an 8-inch main looped through the property that supplies the hydrants.	Excellent flow and pressure is available.



Location	Photo	Description
Main From Main Building	Hydrant Front Of Main Building	Fire Hydrant located in front of the Main Entrance to the building.
P3060183	P3060183	Fire alarm cabinets in maintenance area in the 200 wing.
Propane BBQ And Tank Rear Of HW Pressure Vessel	Propane BBQ And Tank Rear Of HW Pressure Vessel	Propane BBQ and tank stored behind water heater in main boiler room. Remove.
Propane BBQ Front View	Propane BBQ View From Front Of Boiler Note Bbq Legs	Legs of BBQ Grill are visible behind Boiler.
Main Alarm Panel Outside	Main Alarm Panel Outside	This is the annunciator panel for fire department use just outside the school's main entrance on the #1 side.
Main Entrance Alarm Reset	Main Entrance Alarm Reset	Alarm reset inside main entrance doors.
Main Hydrant Parking	Main Hydrant Note Parking	Hydrant at the front of the main building. Note parking close to the hydrant.
Main Knox Box	Main Knox Box	Knox box for the main building is located on the outside of the structure at the main entrance.



Reception Area

Note: The reception area should be the contact point for all visitors that are entering the facility. Security at this control point should be noted.

An example of observations that can be made in this area includes the description of a receptionist's duties such as the duty of monitoring CCTV, issuing visitor badges, monitoring sign in procedures and answering the telephone. All of these duties together may be overwhelming in some facilities and should be noted on the assessment form.

- Secured Reception Area:** No
- Secured Receptionist Booth?:** No
- Receptionist?:** Yes
- On Site Security/PSO?:** No
- Armed Security?:** No
- Police?:** Mountain View Police Department Officer assigned to the school

Description/Location	Observation
Mountain View Police School Resource Officer	<p>The Mountain View Police SRO has an officer in the Vocational Education Wing of the building. The SRO office was locked at the time of this assessment. The Officer assigned to the High School maintains a roaming patrol of the building and its perimeter to include the gymnasium/auditorium. He has portable radio communication with the school administration as well as police headquarters.</p> <p>During a conversation with the officer it was determined he does not always hear alert situations over the school issued radio.</p> <p>It was also established during the assessment the officer does not always have his agency portable radio with him while conducting his duties. The SRO should always keep his MVPD radio with him and turned on.</p>
Armed Security/Security Officers	<p>There are no other armed personnel on the premises. Additional security of the student body and the property is maintained by school faculty members. During the time of the assessment, it was observed additional teachers or advisors are on hand to assist with the increased volume of students in the heavy traffic areas.</p> <p>There is also a faculty member stationed at the access doors on the # 2 side of the building. These doors are used by the students to get to and from the stand alone gymnasium/auditorium.</p>



Detailed Description of Reception area:

Description/Location	Observation
<p>Reception Area/Main Lobby</p> <p>Two desks forming an “L” serve as the reception area located approximately 25-30 ft inside the main entrance to the school located on Side 1.</p>	<p>Guests/visitors are required to sign in and receive a blue visitor pass. At the time of the assessment, access to the facility was easily gained. Even though the assessment team was asked to sign in at the reception desk, there was no request to produce ID’s. The reception area is usually surrounded by a number of students congregating for a myriad of reasons which adds to the congestion to an already heavily traveled location in the building.</p> <p>The reception area is staffed by school faculty and there is no visible security present.</p> <p>There are no barriers other than a couple of tables placed together that would prevent anyone (student, visitor, or faculty member) from coming in direct contact with the receptionist. There also are no barriers to prevent an individual or an unauthorized student from passing by this area gaining access to the facility.</p>
<p>Night Assessment</p>	<p>During the Night Assessment @ approximately 1930 hours the Main Entrance Doors were open. The Blue Guest Badges were on the Receptionist’s Table and were accessible. Badges could be taken in the evening and worn during the day.</p>



Interior Closed Circuit TV

Area	Monitored	Recorded/BU	Digital
Maintenance Area	There are three 20" monitors with screens each with a view of 16 cameras. The office was staffed with two faculty members who were seated in a manner in which their backs were facing the monitors. The monitors were in color. The control panel for the selection of a specific camera was in a separate room and was secured.	The system is set for 24 hour coverage and is stored up to 6 weeks of data.	DVR

Observations

There are a total of 64 cameras located in and around the main school building. Six (6) of those cameras are located on the building exterior of facility (See exterior CCTV information). The CCTV system does not have pan, tilt, and zoom capabilities. The CCTV Cameras are color and are recorded in color. The camera locations were designed to track the movement of an individual from an initial entry from an exterior door to the person(s) destination and/or exit. At the Phase 2 entrance hallway on Side 2 between classrooms 208 and 209 there does not appear to be coverage of the entrance.

The CCTV monitoring system is located in two areas.

Location One:

Inside the boiler room there is a maintenance office located off Side 2. In this office there are three (3) television monitors set up side by side on a shelf above work desk area. The television screens are 20 inch and display sixteen (16) 3"x4" camera shots that are displayed in color. Since the monitors can only display sixteen (16) views on three (3) monitors there are sixteen (16) views that are not actively shown. In order to view the remaining cameras, the monitors are capable of rotating the screen shots. The video is not recorded in this office and cannot be printed from this office area.

Location Two:

There is a storage closet located in the hallway down from the boiler room and the maintenance office off of Side 2. The camera server is located inside the room along with a second monitor and controls for viewing the cameras. The monitor has the capability to view sixteen (16), nine (9), or four (4) camera locations at a time. From this monitor a single view can be expanded to a 16" color view.

Also located in this room is a television and recorder to make copies of incidents documented on the camera servers. Once the images are recorded, they are then taken to the middle school to create a photo.



The CCTV server is from Tripp-lite Systems and the cameras are Pelco Cameras. The interior cameras are housed in a tinted tamper resistant dome. The cameras inside the main facility are mounted in the ceilings. The capabilities are in place for the cameras to be monitored; however there are no personnel specifically assigned to do so. Currently, the camera system is used for evidence gathering. The system is set to record for 24 hour periods and the server stores the information for 6 weeks. There is a maintenance log located in the server room. The last entry documenting activity was January 24, 2007; however there were a number of cameras that had to be replaced that were not documented in the log.

The Mountain View Police Department now has the capability to view the CCTV cameras from a remote location via the internet. The Mountain View Fire Department also has this capability.

Location of most actively used/high occupancy rooms;

Note:

Here the assessor will locate and describe the security of the high occupancy spaces within the facility. The assessor should note if the security measures are adequate or inadequate in the observation section.

Location	Observation
Cafeteria	<p>The cafeteria is usually occupied by between 100-200 students when in use. It is used for dances, study hall, various assemblies, and dining. While measures are in place to keep the student body controllable, at times it is possible to have 500 students in this area.</p> <p>There are unmonitored cameras in the cafeteria which can be used for evidence purposes.</p>
Portions of the exterior wall which has both windows and exterior doors are located on Side 2.	<p>The exterior doors located on Side 2 are unlocked and accessible from the outside. It is a normal practice that students will enter the Side 2 doors after attending classes in the Mountain View Access Cable Building.</p>
The outer walls to the cafeteria are located on Side 1 South of the main entrance.	<p>To correct this situation these doors should remain locked and those students re-entering the school after attending the classes in the Mountain View Access Cable Building should use the main entrance on Side 1.</p> <p>During a lockdown situation in the cafeteria, the student body moves to a designated corner of the room and pulls the window shade down in order to conceal themselves from the outside. Not all the windows in the cafeteria have shades or blinds to prevent observation from the outside. The exterior of the room is lined with windows and doors with glass inlays which would allow easy access by an adversary.</p>



Main Entrance
 Located on Side 1 just inside the Main Entrance to the school.
 School Library

Several hundred students pass through the Main Lobby during the change over from one class to another. It is very congested in the hallways and it is not uncommon for students to stop and converse with each other.

Several times throughout the day the library has up to 120 students present. On a given day 500 + students will have used this area.

During the time of the assessment, faculty members requested to look at the assessment team's visitors passes. Only one team member presented a pass and there was no request to look at identification. It was apparent that the staff did not know the purpose of our visit and referred to us as an accreditation team. Faculty should look at all visitor passes and the receptionist at the Main Entrance should look at all Identification Cards prior to issuing a visitor pass.

The staff members were familiar with the emergency evacuation routes from the building and the procedures during times of a school lockdown.

Music Band Rooms

100 + students are congregated in the Music and Band Rooms throughout the day. These rooms are located in the Vocational section of the High School, near the old gym area.

At the time of the assessment, the doors to the instrument room were standing open. The remaining instruments were visible. Allowing access to these instruments could result in their theft or damage. Doors should be locked when the room is not being used.

Safe rooms or centralized location for valuables?:

Note: Again, the assessor will describe the location and security of the particular rooms that house valuables. If the security measures are adequate or inadequate the observation should be noted.

Location	Observation
Main Office	Free standing safe, used to store money, found electronic devices or valuables, SAT's or special exams.
Nurse Station	Used to store non-valuable lost and found items.



Music Band Rooms

At the time of the assessment, the doors to the instrument room were standing open. The remaining instruments were visible. Allowing access to these instruments could result in their theft or damage. Doors should be locked when the room is not being used.

Cafeteria Storage Room

There is a small safe which contains as little as \$1,000 and up to \$12,000. This safe is emptied daily leaving a minimum of \$1,000 in the safe at all times. The safe is bolted to a steel shelving unit and the storage room door is locked at the end of the day.

Designated mail handling facility?:

Note: If there is a specific area for mail handling this should be noted. If there is no such area this should also be noted. The security of these designated areas should be observed and noted.

Location	Secured?	Observation
Room In Hallway Behind Main Office	No	Mail is directly dropped off in office by US Postal, UPS. LHS Employee, Pauline Angler, sorts the mail. There is no formal training on handling of suspicious packages, or in mail procedures in general.

Internal HVAC

Note: The facility engineer should be consulted when completing the internal HVAC portion of the assessment. In this section, the location of the HVAC system will be observed and security measures in place will be described. The assessor may find that there are no particular security measures in place and will note this on the form.

Questions regarding the filtering system, such as if the filter is a HEPA filter for biological agents, or a filter that can screen out chemical agents, must be answered by the facility engineer.

When looking at the facility HVAC Shut off, the assessors should note if the facility engineers are trained in the proper shut down or re-circulation procedures in the case of a biological or chemical attack.



Location	Public Access?	Secured?	Observation
Various	On roof and in basement difficult	Yes	The problem is not with the HVAC system but rather the large number of individual air conditioning units.

Is the filter system maintained on a regular basis?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes	

Duct System

Location	Public Access?	Secured?	Observation
Throughout structure	Yes, in overhead	Just as a normal building	There is not a routine cleaning program for the ducts.

HVAC Shut-Off

Location	Public Access?	Secured?	Observation
Maintenance Room	Yes	Not always	In Maintenance office the HVAC person has the ability to shut down by computer.
Individual units	No	Yes	Each unit has individual mechanical shut down

There are two cleaver Brooks CB700/150 boilers that produce all the hot water for heating use in the structure. All are alarmed.

Location	Photo	Description
Main Water Circulators 2	Main Water Circulators	View of heating water circulator pumps in main boiler room.
Main Air Handler Phase 5 Roof	Main Air Handler Phase 5 Roof	A view of one of the roof air handlers on the 500 section roof.
Main Phase 5 Roof Chem. Hood Vents	Main Phase 5 Roof Chemical Hood Vents	Phase 5 roof vent fans for the chemistry lab hoods.
Main Side 3 Independent Air Conditioning Units	Side 3 Plexiglas Windows With AC Unit 36x106	There are a number of window air-conditioners with no protection located in various areas of the structure.



Elevators

Accessibility of mechanical equipment of elevator room:

Note: The assessor should find the location of the mechanical rooms and elevator access control rooms and ensure that notes are made regarding the security of these rooms.

Often an assessor will stumble upon a mechanical room that is unsecured and will note the havoc that could be caused by a saboteur at this point.

Tactical Considerations

- Document how elevators are bypassed.
- Document the elevator shaft access points.

Description/Location	Observation
Elevator Located In The 2/3 Corner (Near Old Gym/Auditorium Section)	<p>This elevator has an audio alarm button and a call button. Upon testing, the call button connected to an Otis monitoring center and they were able to determine our location in the school.</p> <p>The Elevator has a roof hatch located above the ceiling light panels. The elevator has a key access control to limit usage. Inspection is current.</p>
Elevator Located In The 1 Side New Addition (Near 4 Side Alcove)	<p>This elevator has an audio alarm button and a call button. Upon testing, the call button connected to an Otis monitoring center and they were able to determine our location in the school.</p> <p>The Elevator has a roof hatch located above the ceiling light panels. The elevator has a key access control to limit usage. Inspection is current.</p>

Service by (company)

Company Name	Contact Telephone Number
Otis Elevator	Call button connects directly to Otis monitoring center. 1-800-233-6847 and 222-622-2101 (Manchester)



Ceiling (construction and material)

Note: To establish the construction components of the ceiling and floor, the assessor again must consult with the building engineer. Blueprints of the building will have this information.

Description/Location	Observation
Phase One:	Mixture of 2 X 2 and 2 X 4 suspended tile with some gypsum board.
Phase Two	2 X 4 suspended tile
Phases Three and Four	2 X 4 suspended tile
Phase Five, First Floor	2 X 2 suspended tile
Phase Five, Second Floor	2 X 4 suspended tile
Phase Six	2 X 4 suspended tile and metal

Location	Photo	Description
Main Ramp 4	Main Ramp 4	Roof underside on the connection ramp between 200 and 300/400/600 wing.
Main Roof Underside In 400 600 Wing	Main Roof Underside In 400 600 Wing	The underside of roof acting as ceiling in 400/600 wing.
Main Entrance	Main Entrance	Ceiling of Main Entrance
Music Room	Main Music Room	Ceiling of Music Room
Main Hallway	Main Hallway Example	Ceiling of Main Hallway



Floor/floor coverings (construction and material)

Note:

Description/Location	Observation
Phase One:	Wall to wall carpet over plywood, 12 X 12 “vinyl tile, sand in basement.
Phase Two	Wall to wall carpet over concrete, 12 X 12 “vinyl tile.
Phases Three and Four	Wall to wall carpet over concrete
Phase Five, First Floor	Wall to wall carpet over concrete
Phase Five, Second Floor	Wall to wall carpet over concrete
Phase Six	Wall to wall carpet over concrete

Flooring Tactical Considerations:

Description/Location	Observation
Most hallways	Most are carpeted
Stairwells	Hard rubber surface
Cafeteria	Smooth linoleum surface
Classrooms	Mostly Carpet except for vocational classrooms
Phase 1	This floor is directly above the basement

Evacuation routes/fire escapes

Side	Description	Observation
¼ corner	Level 2 Fire Drill	Phases 1, 4 and 5 go to the football field
3 side	Level 2 Fire Drill	Phases 2, 3, 6, Gym/Auditorium, and cafeteria will go to the oval track
Off site	Level 3 Evacuation	All students and staff will take the most appropriate route to either the Middle School or Matthew Thornton Elementary School.



We were advised that the Fire Department observes the drills which occur at 10 times per year.		Review the plans alongside security requirements.
Main Classroom Fire Instructions	Main classroom instructions	Main building classroom fire evacuation instructions sample.
600 Phase Classroom Fire Instructions	Main 600 wing fire directions	Main 600 wing sample classroom instructions

Interior Tactical Considerations:

- Structural
- Buildings Potential for Covert Entry
- Longest Shooting Range Inside:
- Weapon Selection

Description	Observation
Main Entrance	There are numerous cement pillars in main entrance that tactical officers can maintain cover in and control hallways while Tactical Team performs contact and/or search and rescue functions throughout the school.
Classrooms	Interior construction is mostly cement walls. There are some classrooms with hollow dividing walls (between two classrooms). Some classrooms are self-contained; however, most have additional rear doors leading into adjoining classrooms.
Exterior walls	Exterior walls are brick or cement. There is a section of wall on the 3 side (second level above receiving door) that appears to be wood.
Basement	<p>There are two exterior access points into the basement located on the 3 side of phase 1. They are double doors that lead to an open crawl space (3 feet high with numerous HVAC vents and pipes) Once you pass through the crawl space it leads into a standing room area directly in the center of phase 1. (Approx. 70 feet from exterior double doors to this area).</p> <p>There are two unlocked doors about 60 feet apart (unlocked from basement side) that lead into the Main Office hallway (hallway #8). Upon opening the doors there is a stairwell that leads up to another door (unlocked from the inside) into the hallway. The floor of the basement is sand, except for some cement walkways.</p>



Covert Entry	This will be determined by the location of the incident within the school. Entry would be made on an opposing side to where the incident is taking place.
Dynamic Entry	Location will be determined by the location of the incident within the school. Taking control of the Main Lobby will allow covering multiple hallways and allowing tactical team to flow through the school. Dynamic entry will be facilitated by the use of an APC (Bearcat) which can bring about 15 tactical officers directly to an entry point.
Main Lobby into Phase 1 (hallways 7 & 8)	Longest distance is 429'.
Weapon Selection	Tactical Team will have a mixture of weapons - Rifles for long cover, room entries, large rooms (i.e. cafeteria.) and classrooms. Pistols for classroom and small rooms.

Non-Agency Tenants

Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Date	Phone	Email	Fax
Jeannie Shae	Mountain View School District	03/10/07	222-234-6920 x118		

List of Non-Agency Tenants in Facility

Note: Here a listing of all non-facility related tenants should be noted. This will provide contact numbers for all who would be affected by emergency planning that may be designed from the vulnerability assessment tool.

Comments: See attached 4 vendor lists: Maintenance, Food Service, Special Education, and Administrative vendors.

Computer Applications

Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Date	Phone	Email
Tom Cramer	IT Department/ School	03-06-07	222-234-6920	tcranmer@MountainViewFI.org
Roger Simpson	MVHS Information		222-689-	



	Technology		3249	
--	------------	--	------	--

How computer technology is actively utilized at the facility?

Description	Observation
Several computer labs are located throughout the building.	The computers are used mainly to assist students in completing school assignments. There is limited internet access. Students are not able to access Pornography sites or the "My Space" website. Library staff has the ability to monitor the websites viewed by the students. If something appears to be suspicious, the staff member will access the particular computer in question from a separate room and will investigate which websites are being opened.
Faculty members	Administrators have e-mail accounts. Some teachers have websites to assist the student body with homework assignments. Some faculty members have the ability to access their accounts remotely.
School Administration	Security camera access. In addition to the capabilities listed above.
Mountain View Police and Fire	Security Camera Access.
Roger Sampson (IT)	Has the only WiFi access in the building. The range of this would cover Phase 1. Mr. Sampson stated that the WiFi is encrypted and has limited access. Unauthorized laptop would not be able to easily gain access to internet.
Student/ Teacher Education	Computer Access
Student Demographics, Grades, Attendance	Computer Access
Accounting	Computer Access
Personnel	Computer Access
Web servers	
Systems – AD, Back-up, system monitoring, etc	

What kind and size of external connectivity exists?

Description	Observation
Internet access for security cameras	Police Dept. has access to Web Eye which enables us to view all cameras in real time.



Internet Ports	Used throughout school in computer labs & library. Internet usage is monitored and limited.
Two [2] bonded T1 lines	3.12mb

What computer operating systems are used at the facility (Windows 2000, UNIX, etc)?

Description	Observation
Microsoft	XP & Service Pack Two
2003 server, 2000 server, MAC OSX	

What computer back-up systems are utilized?

Description	Observation
Active Directory Structure XP Server 2003	10 to 15 servers that run off of this Server.
Veritos Back-up Exec	

Are computers internally networked?: Yes

Description	Observation
All Internal	10 subnets connected with cisco 3750

Can workers log into the network remotely?: Yes

Description	Observation
Citrix server remote access gateway	Allows remote connection for a max of 25 users

Can workers log into the system through the internet?: Yes

Description	Observation
same as above	

Other Comments:

Vulnerability – yes; history – one student gaining access through teacher password and changed website home page. Password coded, but controllability of passwords is vulnerable. Approximately fifty [50] staff members have access to the system. Allowing the teachers access has made the system more vulnerable.



'Punching' a hole in the firewall to allow access to certain areas is a concern. Future concerns already in debate are to allow parents to access student's information [their child] to check grades, attendance, etc. Other Towns allow it, and Mountain View is getting pushed by parents to get that access.

Contact info for CCTV Company. WEB EYE

Contact info: Mustbe Done
 321 Bill Rd
 Kelmsord GA
 (789) 323-3636

Hazardous Materials

Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Date	Phone	Email	Fax
George Moose	NDPCI	March 6, 2007	631-567-4939	gmunk@op tonline.net	Same

Note: The facility hazardous material section should be completed with the assessors along with those personnel within the facility that are responsible for the hazardous materials. Usually, this will be the facility safety director or OSHA compliance officer.

Are biological hazardous substances used or stored on-site?:

Description	Quantity On Hand	Storage Location	Observation
Small amounts, but not harmful.			

Are nuclear/radiological substances used or stored on site?:

Personnel with Access	Background Check Performed	Level of Security
None		



Substances

Description (Type & Level)	Half-life	Quantity On Hand	Storage Location	Security Description
None				

Are explosive/incendiary devices/substances stored or used on-site?:

Description	Quantity On Hand	Storage Location	Observation
None			

Are hazardous chemical substances stored on-site?:

Description	Quantity On Hand	Storage Location	Security Description
None			

Note: Attach All Hazardous Material Lists to Report – The items used in this structure are included in the MSDS book and list that is maintained by the Mountain View High School’s Science Department in the care of Anna Manning, Science Teacher, Science Department, Mountain View High School, (222) 234-6941, amanning@MountainView.org. Due to the extensive size of the list and the book and the fact that it has been provided to the fire department, it is not attached.

Other Comments: The Science prep rooms and storage areas are neat, well-labeled and well maintained. The persons responsible for these areas should be commended on the effort put forth to get this under control. At present, chemicals to be disposed of have been separated and stored for disposal.

Note: The facility hazardous material section should be completed with the assessors along with those personnel within the facility that are responsible for the hazardous materials. Usually, this will be the facility safety director or OSHA compliance officer.

Note: Attach All Hazardous Material Lists to Report

Other Comments:

Security/Alarm System

Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Date	Phone	Email
Sgt. Chris Candy	MVPD		(222) 234-1118	



Off. Joe Salino	MVPD		(222) 234-1118	
-----------------	------	--	----------------	--

Note: During this portion of the assessment, team members should consult with the facility security director or facility engineer for information regarding the alarm systems. Notes should be made regarding redundancy in the system, testing of the system and the monitoring of the system. It should also be noted if the system is tested periodically.

Assessors should note if there are security personnel on property. It should be noted if the security personnel are proprietary or contract personnel. If the security officers are contract, the name and contact information for the contractor should be included in the assessment.

Assessors should also note if there are law enforcement personnel assigned to the facility and if so, note what agency provides officers and their contact information. This information will be indispensable in time of emergency.

Type of Alarm:

Description	Observation
Pell (222-623-5916)	All Security Alarms are Motion Detection Alarms. There are two key pads (one in loading dock area, and one is at the custodial office). Panic alarms are activated from either of these keypads. There are only about 20 people that have access to these panic alarm codes.
Parent Company is Centra-Larm (222) 668-1119	

Description	Observation
Audible	The audible alarm sounds only at the exterior of the custodian's entrance door.
Motion Alarms	Motion alarms are silent alarms and go directly to Pelmac.

Security Companies: There are no private security companies for the school district. There are two contacts that are called to open the gymnasium/auditoriums at each school except the high school for after-hour activities.

Company Name	Contact Person	Phone	Email	Fax
Perry District School	Kat Giannitti	222-437-3647		
Ford Police Dept.	Tom Porke	222-345-2625		



Are there private security personnel assigned to the facility/infrastructure?: No

Company Name	Contact Person	Phone	Email	Fax
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Description		Observation		
Maintenance and Faculty		School Faculty are expected to be diligent and assist with security within the facility.		

Are there law enforcement personnel assigned to the facility/infrastructure?: Yes

Company Name	Contact Person	Phone	Email	Fax
Mountain View Police Department	Officer Chris Childs	234-1118		

Policy/Procedures

Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Date	Phone	Email
Sgt. Chris Candy	MVPD		(222) 234-1118	
Off. Joe Salino	MVPD		(222) 234-1118	

Note: In this section, assessors will note the existence of plans, policies and procedures regarding security. On site observations must be made to answer many of the questions highlighted in this section.

Interviews with various non-security or engineering personnel should also be completed to get a true picture of the state of security at the facility. Interviews of personnel often expose security gaps and failure to follow set security policy and procedures.



Is there a security plan in place? (If yes, obtain a copy of the plan):

Does the security plan address the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and do security procedures increase and decrease as the threat level changes?

Attach copy of HSAS security procedures.

Description	Observation
Mountain View High School Teachers Emergency Manual	Manuals have been created and placed in every classroom. These manuals address issues of Fire, death at school, accidents, hostage situations, bomb threats, lockdowns and evacuation plans. This manual does not address changes in the HSAS.

Is there a specified law enforcement component to the security plan?: No

Description	Observation
MVHS Teachers Emergency Manual	Does not address police response or L.E. or Fire involvement.

Bus Drop Off and Pick Up Procedure:

Description	Observation
At the beginning of the day, busses drop students and leave the property.	The staggered drop off procedure appears to working well.
At the end of the School day, busses double stack in front of the School Main Entrance.	The double stacked busses create a concern. If an incident occurred on one bus, the avenue for escape for other busses in the line is blocked. An adversary could attack one bus and expose all of the remaining busses. A working group between the School, Mountain View Police and Mountain View Fire should be formed to address alternative drop off procedures.

Do employees have photo ID?: Yes

Description	Observation
Mountain View school district ID	Issued by Carroll Marsh at the school Department.



Are employees required to wear photo IDs?: Yes

Description	Observation
Mountain View School District ID	Employees are required to wear their ID at all times. They are reminded regularly to wear the ID by email and in person and are spoken to when they go without.

Who manufactures/produces the badges or badge making equipment?

Company Name	Phone	Email	Fax
CTID Systems	222-485-8415	alambert@cardtechid.com	(222) 210-5260
Description		Observation	
Card-Tech ID		7 Willow Street Allenstown, FL	

Who controls the issuance of badges?

Company Name	Phone	Email	Fax
Mountain View School District	222-234-6920		
Description		Observation	
Koral March		Controls the issuing of all ID cards for the School Committee.	

Are badges also used for doorway access control?: No

What type of access control software system is in use?

Type:

Description	Observation
Main Building	Traditional key systems are in place and used. The different phases of the school required different keys to be used. Although there are master keys available for the building. No one key will open every door in the main building. Proximity card readers and a uniform key locking system should be used throughout the building.
Gymnasium/auditorium	Key fobs are used to gain access but a true master key is needed to access rooms inside of the building. Proximity card readers and/or a uniform key locking system should be used throughout the building.



Is access control software password protected for different users?: No

Description	Observation
Proximity Card Readers w/ Issued Key Fobs	Once a Proximity FOB is issued it allows access to the three Proximity Fob access points in the school. Proximity card readers and/or a uniform key locking system should be used throughout the building.

Do procedures exist for activation/deactivation of access?: YES

Description	Observation
Proximity Card Readers w/ Issued Key Fobs	Fobs are deactivated upon termination of an employee and steps are taken to retrieve the Fob. Fobs are also recovered from the coaching staff at the end of that particular coach's athletic season.

Is there a system in place to provide temporary ID cards to visitors/outside contractors/vendors/janitorial personnel in the facility?:

Description	Observation
Vendors, Contractors, Visitors	Must sign in and receive a Day Pass
Janitorial Personnel	Are issued School District Identification
Substitute teachers	Are issued Temporary ID for the duration of their employment.

Is there a visitor log which reflects date, time, name, company, and vehicle information?:

Description	Observation
Main Lobby	Name, date, time in/out, and destination within the school
Loading Dock	Does not appear to be a detailed log of visitors and deliveries

What type of key control system is in place?

Description	Observation
John Luck (Head Custodian)	Is responsible for the issuing of master keys to designated personnel. With the approval of the Principal



What person outside of the agency has keys or codes to the facility?

Description	Observation
John Luck (Head Custodian)	His designee for maintenance reasons or emergency contact in case of alarm.

Who has access to the master keys for the facility?

Individual	Reason for possession of the key
Devin Lecatto	Has the ability to assign master keys to maintenance personnel after gaining the approval of the Principal.
All custodians	There are 15 custodians
All Department heads	23 department heads
Principle & Vice Principle	2 people

Are there opportunities for contractors, vendors, or visitors to obtain unrestricted access to the facility or restricted area? No, there are no designated restricted access areas within the school.

Do outside contractors/vendors/janitorial personnel check-in before providing service?:
Yes

Description	Observation
Main Entrance	Visitor log
Loading Dock	Service/ Vendor log

Do outside contractors/vendors/janitorial personnel have a routine entry point and route of service?:

Description	Observation
Main Entrance	Food Service, Us Mail, Visitors
Café Loading Door	Food Service Delivery
Loading Dock	School Supplies Delivery, Maintenance Vendors

Are criminal background checks completed on all employees, outside contractors/outside vendors and janitorial personnel?:

Description	Observation
School Board Personnel	III background checks are conducted by MVPD
Individual Vendors	Checks conducted in accordance with the individual company.



Are there re-opening/closing procedures in place to assure building security?:

Description	Observation
MVHS School Resource Officer	Performs a security sweep in the morning and at the end of the day to ensure that the doors are locked.
Maintenance Personnel	Perform perimeter sweeps of all doors and access points in the morning to ensure that the doors are secured prior to the opening of school. At the end of the evening a second sweep is conducted to ensure that the doors are locked and the building is empty.

Does facility have a lethal cloud/vapor plume distance diagram or emergency contingency plan/procedures for terrorist or critical incidents (including an evacuation plan and designated evacuation site)?: NO

Description	Observation
MVHS Teacher Emergency Manual	This manual does not address the issue of wind direction and drift of possibly hazardous smoke/fumes with regards to the student assembly areas.

Do emergency contingency plan/procedures specifically address protection of critical assets (e.g., water supply, ventilation equipment, electricity)?: NO

Description	Observation
MVHS Teacher Emergency Manual	This manual does not address protecting water supplies, ventilation equipment, or electrical considerations. Since there is a major gas pipeline passing through the property, this is a needed addition.

Are employees trained in the emergency contingency plans, policy, and procedures?:

Description	Observation
Administrative Personnel	Trained in handling bomb threats and the LHS emergency evacuation plan.
Paul Gagger	No formal training in the handling of suspicious packages.
All other Faculty members	Are trained and drilled in the execution of the LHS teacher Emergency Manual.



Are emergency evacuation plans posted near exits?:

Description	Observation
Yes, in each class room.	

Are emergency plans/procedures routinely practiced?:

Description	Observation
Lockdowns	Performed 4 times a year
Fire Drills	There are fire drills 10 times a year, with a number of them observed by the fire department and the Fire Marshal.
Full Evacuations	Performed 2 times a year.

Are there procedures in place to identify and verify disabled vehicles, personnel, etc. in close proximity to the security perimeter or critical facility components?

Description	Observation
Staff Member is assigned to the parking lot.	This person enforces all parking passes and towing/removing of vehicles.

Are administrative personnel trained in telephoned bomb threat procedures?:

Description	Observation
Administrative Personnel	These are the only personnel that have training in regards to receiving telephone bomb threats. There is a list of questions to ascertain the validity and nature.
Faculty & Staff	Follow the emergency plan details.

Are administrative personnel trained in mail handling security procedures?:

Description	Observation
Paul Gagger	No formal training in the handling of suspicious packages.
US Mail	Enters through the main entrance, drop off the incoming mail into the mail room and pick up the outgoing mail from the main office.



Are there policies and procedures in place which define the proper response following inquiries about facility security design or procedures?:

Description	Observation
All Faculty	They are instructed to not answer any security questions. This is done for all new employees and emphasized at faculty meetings.

Is there an active system in place to identify and prevent cyber-attacks?:

Description	Observation
Cyber-attacks	There is no policy in place and the only protection is a firewall. The use of the WiFi is limited and restricted.

Are procedures in place to report all cyber attacks to the national infrastructure protection center or the regional domestic security task force?:

Description	Observation
Cyber-attacks	No reporting

Recommendations

Recommendations

Section	Area	Recommendation	Date Completed
Perimeter	Fencing/Walls and Barricades	Fix or replace fencing and gates on the Venture Course. Venture Course Fence	
Perimeter	Fencing/Walls and Barricades	Fence the entire perimeter of the High School Complex and add gates to all of the School access points from perimeter positions.	
Perimeter	Parking Lots and Access Roads	An access control point such as a vehicle gate should be added to the North Entrance road and Mammoth Road.	



Perimeter	Parking Lots and Access Roads	An access control point such as a vehicle gate should be added to the South Entrance Robert Lincoln Way and Mammoth Road.	
Perimeter	Signage and Way Finding	Add signage at the North Main entrance directing visitors to the proper parking area and directions for deliveries.	
Perimeter	Signage and Way Finding	Remove signs that indicate who is designated to park in a particular space, such as key personnel. Replace with signs that indicate the space is reserved with a number.	
Perimeter	Web Sites	Restrict access to the Town of Mountain View Website, MapTools area to authorized users only.	
Perimeter	Parking Lots and Access Roads	Create a “no parking” area at least 15’ on either side of the Fire Hydrant located in front of the Main entrance to the building. Hydrant Front Of Main Building	
Perimeter	Parking Lots and Access Roads	Keep the School Resource Officer Parking closest to the school. However, do not have the SRO parking space next to the Fire Hydrant.	
Perimeter	Parking Lots and Access Roads	Add an access control point, such as a vehicle gate, at the intersection of the North South road from the Elementary School and Robert Lincoln Way.	
Perimeter	Parking Lots and Access Roads	Fence the parking lot for the Elementary School and add an access control point for the emergency entrance road between the Soccer Field and the Gym/Auditorium. Plow the emergency entrance in the Winter.	
Perimeter	Parking Lots	Parking in the area of the Boiler Room, Kitchen and Cafeteria should be reconsidered due to lack of stand-off in such critical areas, such as the high occupancy cafeteria and the 200 block classrooms. At minimum, an exclusionary area should be fenced and a vehicle gate should be added to restrict the area to authorized vehicles and deliveries only. Side 2 D Maintenance Area/Parking	
Perimeter	Parking Lots	Parking spaces directly in front of the Gym/Auditorium should be eliminated to help create standoff in front of the building. Handicap spaces need only be the closest “parking space” to the building. Parking in Front of Gym/Auditorium	
Perimeter	Parking Lots	Add decorative bollards, such as lighted bollards or planters along the sidewalk in front of the Gym/Auditorium entrance. Bollards should be spaced so that a vehicle cannot pass through.	
Perimeter	Parking Lots	Fencing should be added around the Gym/Auditorium perimeter and parking lots. Access control points, such as vehicle gates should be added to the parking lot entrance points. Entry and exit points should be reduced.	



Perimeter	Parking Lots	Fencing should be added to the maintenance area parking lot and an Access control point, such as a vehicle gate should be added.	
Perimeter	Parking Lots	Enforce all No parking and all posted parking restrictions.	
Perimeter	Parking Lots	Thin out wooded area West of the Staff Parking lot on Side 3. Restrict parking on the West side of the Parking area and enforce the restriction.	
Building Exterior	Doors	Secure all exterior door hinges.	
Building Exterior	Doors	Repair locks and handles on applicable doors.	
Building Exterior	Doors	Lock all doors except Main Entrance Doors at all times. Do not prop open doors.	
Building Exterior	HVAC	Protect all ground level HVAC air intakes.	
Building Exterior	HVAC	Add gas leak detection to HVAC.	
Building Exterior	HVAC	Fortify or remove independent air conditioners.	
Building Exterior	Landscaping	Trim evergreen tree on Side 3 at loading dock.	
Building Exterior	Landscaping	All Trees should be trimmed so that branches are not below 10' and bushes so that they are no taller than 3' and there should be a clear zone around the building so that areas behind the bushes can be inspected.	
Building Exterior	Landscaping	Trim trees that inhibit the views from windows so they won't interfere with camera views and/ or block lighting.	
Building Exterior	Loading Docks	All entry doors should be secured. The use of a step on bolt that would secure the bottom of the door to the floor on the interior of the door would help secure the doors. Additionally, all doors should be closed and locked at all times, except when deliveries are taking place.	
Building Exterior	Loading Docks	All large containers should be moved away from the loading dock and building to prevent individuals from placing Improvised Explosive Devices inside, concealing themselves or placing stolen items in them for pick-up later.	
Building Exterior	Loading Docks	Parking areas should be moved to another location and the entire dock area should be fenced with access control points for vehicles and pedestrians. Trash receptacles and dumpster should be moved away from the Loading Docks and the Building.	



Building Exterior	Power	Move forward with the development of and the installation of an emergency power source for this building that will handle the load and allow this structure to be used as a shelter. Once again, if this structure is to be a shelter, there must be emergency power that can handle the HVAC and other services for those evacuated to the building.	
Building Exterior	Power	Develop a test plan for the emergency generator. Secure the generator. The generator is brand new and does not have a routine start and load test. A testing policy and procedure needs to be established. All doors on the generator should be locked.	
Building Exterior	Roof	Lock all interior access points to roof.	
Building Exterior	Stand Off	Protect Electrical Junction Box at 2 – 3 Corners with fencing and bollards.	
Building Exterior	Stand Off	Add bollards in front of underground access tunnels spaced so that a vehicle cannot pass.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Remove the underground propane facilities. The underground propane tank has not been maintained since the natural gas was installed. To use, it would require that the equipment be tested and placed back in service. The tank should be drained and removed for the safety of the facility.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Secure, replace or remove the present 100 pound propane tanks. The 100 pound tanks must be properly protected by bollards and cages, but the best solution would be to replace the propane tanks with natural gas.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Change natural gas signs in science labs with propane gas signs. Ms. Manning has advised that this is already under change.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Protect power connection located at the student parking lot on the 4 side of the main building. The main power connection on the northern side of the main building is vulnerable to either a purposeful or accidental power or telecommunications disruption. This area should be fenced and bollards installed to prevent unauthorized tampering, or either accidental or purposeful ramming.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Protect power connection to the gymnasium/auditorium at the 2-3 side of the main building from tampering or impact. This connection is open to view and at the corner of the main building and is very vulnerable to either a purposeful or accidental power or telecommunications disruption. This connection should be fenced and bollards installed to prevent unauthorized tampering, or either accidental or purposeful ramming.	



Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Protect the power company's step-down transformers at this facility. This transformer is open to view and is vulnerable to either a purposeful or accidental power or telecommunications disruption. This area should be fenced and bollards installed to prevent unauthorized tampering, or either accidental or purposeful ramming.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Develop an emergency water plan. Since it is the plan to develop this building as a public shelter, it is a necessity to provide for an emergency water supply for this building. Efforts should be made in cooperation with the fire department and the water company to develop and test a workable emergency plan to provide water for this building in the case of an outage.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Insure that all propane deliveries are delivered when the school schedules them. Delivery of the propane must be accomplished at times when the least number of persons are in the building.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Develop an emergency telecommunications plan for the building. Efforts should be made in cooperation with the emergency services and the telecommunications provider to develop and test a workable emergency plan to provide communications for this building in the case of an emergency.	
Building Exterior	Utility Connections	Provide protection and security for the gas riser on the #2 side. The gas riser should be protected against accidental or purposeful tampering. Bollards to prevent it from being hit and a security cage to prevent it from being tampered with are recommended.	
Building Exterior	Windows	Keep windows closed and locked, and insure that all windows are operable.	



<p>Building Interior</p>	<p>CCTV</p>	<p>A survey should be completed by an independent security consultant regarding the proper placement of CCTV cameras.</p> <p>Color pan/ tilt/ zoom cameras should be placed strategically around the perimeter and building exterior of the School so that the entire perimeter and building exterior are covered. The cameras should be alarmed so that they detect movement and can be programmed to complete guard tours. The housings for the cameras should be weatherproof, tamper proof and bullet resistant. Stationary cameras should be placed at all of the building entrances. Color cameras should be placed at all entrances. Interior cameras should monitor corridors, high population centers, elevators and public areas. Cameras should be able to follow a subject into, around and out of the building without a break in coverage, except while in restrooms and offices.</p> <p>Cameras should be monitored by Administrative Personnel within the Main Office throughout the school day. The camera system should also have the capability of being remotely monitored in case that the building is evacuated, which in this case it is.</p> <p>Monitors should be of sufficient size and number to make viewing of the cameras as easy as possible. Full attention should be given to viewing cameras and breaks should be sufficient in number to keep the personnel monitoring cameras alert. Cameras should be and are recorded with DVD technology.</p> <p>Cameras should also be integrated with the panic (duress) alarms, door alarms and access control systems.</p>	
<p>Building Interior</p>	<p>Doors</p>	<p>Re-number Rooms:</p> <p>Emergency units arriving as mutual aid would find the building confusing at best. Smoke or other conditions related to life safety or stress caused by an incident could lead to a serious situation. An immediate situation would be to provide diagrams for the structure at the vestibule command post clearly marked as to access points and with a side view showing the relationship of the floors. The art or tech Ed students working with the fire and police departments could do this as a very real world project that reflects what is needed in the outside world. These diagrams should be secured near the alarm station in a lock box at the vestibule. A discussion should be held with school officials and the fire and police departments in order to develop a room numbering system that is clearer than the present.</p>	



Building Interior	Doors	Check with Fire Department to insure that Fire Doors are appropriate. Replace fire doors that have been removed unless otherwise directed by the Fire Department.	
Building Interior	Doors	Boiler Room Door should be locked when there are no Maintenance Personnel present.	
Building Interior	Doors	Maintenance Door from outside of the building should be locked at all times.	
Building Interior	Doors	CCTV Monitoring Equipment Room should be locked at all times.	
Building Interior	Doors	Door locking mechanisms should be uniform throughout the school. Replace mechanisms with a uniform mechanism.	
Building Interior	Doors	Consider adding proximity card readers and electromagnetic doors on building exterior and interior rooms that contain valuables, such as computer rooms, library and Band Room.	
Building Interior	Emergency Planning	All Security and Safety planning should be done in conjunction with the Mountain View Police and Fire Departments. Together the Police, Fire and School Officials should get together and develop workshops, table tops and exercise emergency plans and then develop full size plans.	
Building Interior	Emergency Planning	All Security and Fire improvements should be done in consultation with the Mountain View Police, and Fire Department.	
Building Interior	Fire	Provide the fire department with a complete set of plans for the building. The plans are needed for the preparation of preplans and access guides for initial response, training, rescue and fire attack.	
Building Interior	Fire	The fire department should prepare both pre-plans and pre-access plans for the structure. These plans are vital and should be developed in conjunction with all the emergency services and with school officials.	
Building Interior	Fire	The fire department should calculate initial water flow to develop a fire flow plan for the structure. Initial fire flow will indicate whether or not the available fire flow is sufficient for the structure.	
Building Interior	Fire	Remove Barbeque Grill from Boiler Room.	
Building Interior	HAZ-MAT	While the MSDS books are excellent in format and well maintained, they are not held by the maintenance section. These should be provided for the maintenance staff and that staff should prepare and post the sheets for the items used in each custodians closet and storeroom. It is important that all persons who use hazardous materials or other regulated materials know the dangers of the materials they use on a daily basis. Ms. Manning has advised she is providing a book for the maintenance section.	



Building Interior	High Occupancy Rooms	Do not allow students or faculty to enter and exit the Cafeteria at the South side entry/exit door. Keep door locked at all times. This door should only be used for emergency exit.	
Building Interior	High Occupancy Rooms	Lock Band Room and rooms that contain valuables when faculty is not present in room.	
Building Interior	HVAC	Develop a policy and procedure for routine cleaning of the HVAC ducts.	
Building Interior	Mail Handling	Provide training on Mail Handling Procedures for administrative staff that is tasked with handling mail and package deliveries.	
Building Interior	Reception Area	Require the School Resource Officer to carry and listen to Mountain View Police Radio at all times.	
Building Interior	Reception Area	Add a security vestibule prior to the main lobby with electromagnetic locks. Here, visitors can be processed before entering the school. Keep locked after students arrive. Doors entering the building should remain the same. A consultant as well as the Mountain View Police and Fire Department should be involved in the improvement.	
Building Interior	Reception Area	Require identification prior to issuing visitor badges. Consider keeping identification until badge is returned or issue self expiring badges.	
Building Interior	Restrooms	Create a policy and procedure to inspect restrooms before the start of the school day, throughout the day and at the end of the school day.	
Perimeter	Lighting	Repair or Replace all burned out or non working lights. Create a policy and procedure to report and replace non working lights on a regular basis.	
Perimeter	Lighting	Add lighting in areas of darkness. Insure that lighting is uniform and allows one to observe details at night.	
Perimeter	Outbuildings	Repair and Lock Fencing around Propane Tank, Fill and Pre Heaters until they are removed.	
Perimeter	Outbuildings	Lock fencing around Refrigeration Unit at Kitchen/Cafeteria Parking Lot. Repair damage to fencing.	
Perimeter	Outbuildings	All Dumpsters should be moved away from the School Buildings and should be locked.	
Perimeter	Outbuildings	Outbuildings identified to have insufficient locks, should have locks replaced with formidable locks.	
Perimeter	Outbuildings	Secure row of garbage cans at the Football Field Concession Stand while not in use.	
Perimeter	Outbuildings	Secure wooden building in the batting cage area and insure it is locked at all times when not in use.	



Perimeter	Outbuildings	Lock storage container in batting cage area.	
Perimeter	Outbuildings	Secure outside hinges on Equipment Storage Outbuildings.	
Perimeter	Outbuildings	Lock Football Field Press Box.	
Policy and Procedure	Cyber-attacks	Create policy to report cyber attacks into the School computer system.	
Policy and Procedure	Delivery	Create policy and procedure for outside deliveries.	
Policy and Procedure	Emergency Planning	Add Policy and Procedure to Teachers Emergency Manual for procedures during a level change for the Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS) alert level change. (Color Change)	
Policy and Procedure	Emergency Planning	Work with the Mountain View Police Department and Fire Department to address LE and FD response and involvement with an emergency in the Teacher Emergency Manual.	
Policy and Procedure	General	The bus pick up at the end of the day should be reconsidered. A working group between the School, Mountain View Police and Mountain View Fire should be formed to address alternative drop off procedures.	
Policy and Procedures		A lethal cloud/vapor plume distance diagram or emergency contingency plan/procedures must be developed. Terrorism aside, the presence of a major gas pipeline passing through the property is a potential problem. The fire department has the ability to do this for the structure.	
Policy and Procedures		Post Emergency Evacuation plan diagrams.	
Policy and Procedures		Review Teacher Emergency Manual with the Mountain View Police Department.	
Policy and Procedures		Review Lock Down Procedure. Look at models used nationally. The use of green cards slid under the door will alert the adversary that there are people in the classroom and that they are ok. A less discrete method should be considered.	



Mountain View High School Gymnasium/ Auditorium

Facility Information





Facility Name	Mountain View High School Gymnasium/auditorium
Street Address	Mammoth Road
City	Mountain View
State	Florida
Zip Code	03053
County	Rocking
Local Jurisdiction	Town of Mountain View
Latitude (Center of Site)	42.86887
Longitude (Center of Site)	71.37757
Boundaries	Side 1 – Mammoth Road; Side 2 – wooded area; Side 3 – field to wooded; Side 4- fields to wooded; 135 acres total area.
Emergency Contact Person	Pate Greyberk [Super] 222-234-6920
24/7 Contact Telephone Number	Pager # (222) 564-4495
Contact Facsimile Number	222-425-1049
Contact Person Email Address	ngreenberg@MountainViewFl.org
Policing Jurisdiction	Town of Mountain View
Location of Police/Fire/ Rescue in Relation to Facility	Across the street; Central Fire - 104 M; Police to side 1 main entrance – 256 M; to ½ corner – 204 M;
Regulating Agency	Town of Mountain View; School District Office
Regulating Agency Phone Number	222-234-6920; fax – 222-435-1049
Average Number of Employees on Site Daily	Up to 1500
Average Number of Visitors on Site Daily	Up to 1500
Do Employees or Visitors occupy the Site 24 hours per day?	Yes, maintenance
Hours of Operation	24 hours on site [faculty and/or maintenance] School Hours 0745 - 1415
Primary Contact	Pate Greyberk

Type of Construction



The Mountain View High School Gymnasium/auditorium is a modern masonry noncombustible type building, alarmed and protected by sprinklers. Built in 2003, this structure houses athletic offices, student locker rooms, team facilities, press box, storerooms, trainer facilities, weight room and wrestling gym. The facility is located on a sloping site with the #1 side (East) at the level of the south parking lot which is adjacent to this site, and slopes to the west so that the lower floor is even with the ground level on the #3 side. The first floor can be accessed through main entrance on the #1 side which leads through a foyer having a ticket office, concession area, restrooms, and access to the gymnasium/auditorium. An elevator and a staircase both of which give access to the lower floor facilities are also off this entrance foyer. The series of doors providing access to the foyer are kept locked. Another door on the south (1-2) end of the gymnasium/auditorium gives access to the lower floor via a staircase, the gymnasium/auditorium, some offices. This set of doors is used for student access during the daytime. The access to the mezzanine (second story) is from this side through a staircase enclosed by a fire door. This second floor mezzanine houses the press box and the main HVAC air handlers for the structure. The lower floor houses additional athletic offices, the student locker rooms, team facilities, trainer facilities, a weight room and wrestling gym.


Exterior construction is of steel-reinforced concrete block on poured concrete foundations and footings. The exterior walls are concrete block with a decorative concrete block exterior veneer. The building's roof is supported by a lightweight open web steel bar joist. The roof is fabricated from corrugated steel sheets covered with a rubber roofing system. There is a metal roof on the small extension off the north side of the structure. The interior partition walls are constructed, for the most part, of concrete block that is painted in public areas. In the main gymnasium/auditorium and a few other areas the room ceiling is the structure's bar joists and metal corrugated decking painted white. The gym has acoustical damping panels on the walls and ceiling.

Floor coverings vary throughout the structure depending on the use of the space. All staircases and landings are covered with slip resistant rubber treads. The main gymnasium/auditorium floor is a modern wood floor installed over concrete/steel corrugated deck system. The main entrance floor, corridor floors and southeast lobby are 12" X 12" individual vinyl tile. The floor of the weight room is covered by rubber interlocking tiles and the wrestling gym floor is covered by matting. The floor of the storerooms and engineering spaces are poured concrete. Locker rooms and some restrooms have ceramic tile floors and walls, while other restroom spaces have composition seamless floors. The entrance way at the 1-2 corner has a metal grid mat recessed into the floor designed to reduce the amount of dirt and water tracked into the structure.

The ceilings in most hall areas, some lower level spaces and offices are grill supported suspended ceilings with 2' X 2' acoustic tiles. In the locker rooms, the ceilings are gypsum board.

The facility has a full sprinkler system and is alarmed for both fire and security. The electrical service and natural gas is supplied from the main structure which is contiguous to the north. Water comes in from an 8-inch main to feed both domestic needs and the sprinkler systems. These services come into lower level engineering rooms which are well




maintained and clean.		
Location	Photo	Description
Gym/Auditorium Front		East side front of Gym/Auditorium looking southwest showing main entrance at right, indentation for entrance used by students and staff and the office windows. Note: six grills for air intake. The four on the right are in service.
Purpose of Site (Brief description of the reason that the site is considered a CI/KA site)		Education – High School level; sports venue; major elections; emergency shelter; possible POD [not designated]; large scale meetings
Description of Site: (Insert details of operations, modes of transportation used, inherently dangerous commodities or activities at the site, and other information that may increase the understanding of the critical site qualities.)		Mountain View High School is the only High School in Mountain View, Florida. In addition to educational activities, the High School has an accomplished Band program. The School Band has received National recognition and plays in National events. The School provides well maintained playing fields with the capability of seating spectators at most fields. The school also holds several events which attract large numbers of people. Events include Graduation, Baseball and Football games as well as large meetings.
Strategic Importance of the Facility:		The High School Gym/Auditorium is used as the only polling place for local, state and national elections in Mountain View, Florida. Political candidates, including Presidential candidates use the Gym/Auditorium to hold rallies and meetings.
Populated Areas Around Facility		There are three (3) other schools within ¼ mile; residential area within ¼ mile; wooded
Major Transportation Routes (i.e., roads, rail)		Mammoth Road; Phil Road



lines, waterways)	
Date of Assessment	March 5 th – 9 th , 2007
HAZMAT Team Coordinator/Contact #:	Captain James Kroger – MVFD 234-1124
HAZMAT LHS Team Coordinator/Contact #:	Anna Manning, Science Teacher, Science Department, Mountain View High School, (222) 234-6941, amanning@MountainView.org
Urban Search & Rescue Point of Contact/#	Mountain View Fire Department

Mountain View High School Gymnasium/ Auditorium Facility Information





Facility Name	Mountain View High School Gymnasium/auditorium
Street Address	Mammoth Road
City	Mountain View
State	Florida
Zip Code	03053
County	Rocking
Local Jurisdiction	Town of Mountain View
Latitude (Center of Site)	42.86887
Longitude (Center of Site)	71.37757
Boundaries	Side 1 – Mammoth Road; Side 2 – wooded area; Side 3 – field to wooded; Side 4- fields to wooded; 135 acres total area.
Emergency Contact Person	Pate Greyberk [Super] 222-234-6920
24/7 Contact Telephone Number	Pager # (222) 564-4495
Contact Facsimile Number	222-425-1049
Contact Person Email Address	ngreenberg@MountainViewFL.org
Policing Jurisdiction	Town of Mountain View
Location of Police/Fire/ Rescue	Across the street; Central Fire - 104 M; Police to side 1



in Relation to Facility	main entrance – 256 M; to ½ corner – 204 M;
Regulating Agency	Town of Mountain View; School District Office
Regulating Agency Phone Number	222-234-6920; fax – 222-435-1049
Average Number of Employees on Site Daily	Up to 1500
Average Number of Visitors on Site Daily	Up to 1500
Do Employees or Visitors occupy the Site 24 hours per day?	Yes, maintenance
Hours of Operation	24 hours on site [faculty and/or maintenance] School Hours 0745 - 1415
Primary Contact	Pate Greyberk


Type of Construction
<p>The Mountain View High School Gymnasium/auditorium is a modern masonry noncombustible type building, alarmed and protected by sprinklers. Built in 2003, this structure houses athletic offices, student locker rooms, team facilities, press box, storerooms, trainer facilities, weight room and wrestling gym. The facility is located on a sloping site with the #1 side (East) at the level of the south parking lot which is adjacent to this side, and slopes to the west so that the lower floor is even with the ground level on the #3 side. The first floor can be accessed through main entrance on the #1 side which leads through a foyer having a ticket office, concession area, restrooms, and access to the gymnasium/auditorium. An elevator and a staircase both of which give access to the lower floor facilities are also off this entrance foyer. The series of doors providing access to the foyer are kept locked. Another door on the south (1-2) end of the gymnasium/auditorium gives access to the lower floor via a staircase, the gymnasium/auditorium, some offices. This set of doors is used for student access during the daytime. The access to the mezzanine (second story) is from this side through a staircase enclosed by a fire door. This second floor mezzanine houses the press box and the main HVAC air handlers for the structure. The lower floor houses additional athletic offices, the student locker rooms, team facilities, trainer facilities, a weight room and wrestling gym.</p> <p>Exterior construction is of steel-reinforced concrete block on poured concrete foundations and footings. The exterior walls are concrete block with a decorative concrete block exterior veneer. The building's roof is supported by a lightweight open web steel bar joist. The roof is fabricated from corrugated steel sheets covered with a rubber roofing system. There is a metal roof on the small extension off the north side of the structure. The interior partition walls are constructed, for the most part, of concrete block that is painted in public areas. In the main gymnasium/auditorium and a few other areas the room ceiling is the structure's bar joists and metal corrugated decking painted white. The gym has acoustical damping panels on the walls and ceiling.</p>



Floor coverings vary throughout the structure depending on the use of the space. All staircases and landings are covered with slip resistant rubber treads. The main gymnasium/auditorium floor is a modern wood floor installed over concrete/steel corrugated deck system. The main entrance floor, corridor floors and southeast lobby are 12" X 12" individual vinyl tile. The floor of the weight room is covered by rubber interlocking tiles and the wrestling gym floor is covered by matting. The floor of the storerooms and engineering spaces are poured concrete. Locker rooms and some restrooms have ceramic tile floors and walls, while other restroom spaces have composition seamless floors. The entrance way at the 1-2 corner has a metal grid mat recessed into the floor designed to reduce the amount of dirt and water tracked into the structure.

The ceilings in most hall areas, some lower level spaces and offices are grill supported suspended ceilings with 2' X 2' acoustic tiles. In the locker rooms, the ceilings are gypsum board.


The facility has a full sprinkler system and is alarmed for both fire and security. The electrical service and natural gas is supplied from the main structure which is contiguous to the north. Water comes in from an 8-inch main to feed both domestic needs and the sprinkler systems. These services come into lower level engineering rooms which are well maintained and clean.

Location	Photo	Description
Gym/Auditorium Front		East side front of Gym/Auditorium looking southwest showing main entrance at right, indentation for entrance used by students and staff and the office windows. Note: six grills for air intake. The four on the right are in service.
Purpose of Site (Brief description of the reason that the site is considered a CI/KA site)		Education – High School level; sports venue; major elections; emergency shelter; possible POD [not designated]; large scale meetings
Description of Site: (Insert details of operations, modes of transportation used, inherently dangerous commodities or activities at the site, and other information that may increase the understanding of the critical site qualities.)		Mountain View High School is the only High School in Mountain View, Florida. In addition to educational activities, the High School has an accomplished Band program. The School Band has received National recognition and plays



	in National events. The School provides well maintained playing fields with the capability of seating spectators at most fields. The school also holds several events which attract large numbers of people. Events include Graduation, Baseball and Football games as well as large meetings.
Strategic Importance of the Facility: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic • Socio-Political • Infrastructure Support 	The High School Gym/Auditorium is used as the only polling place for local, state and national elections in Mountain View, Florida. Political candidates, including Presidential candidates use the Gym/Auditorium to hold rallies and meetings. The Gym/Auditorium is used for high profile events such as sporting events, and other large crowd venues.
Populated Areas Around Facility	There are three (3) other schools within ¼ mile; residential area within ¼ mile; wooded
Major Transportation Routes (i.e., roads, rail lines, waterways)	Mammoth Road; Phil Road
Date of Assessment	March 5 th – 9 th , 2007
HAZMAT Team Coordinator/Contact #:	Captain James Kroger – MVFD 234-1124
HAZMAT LHS Team Coordinator/Contact #:	Anna Manning, Science Teacher, Science Department, Mountain View High School, (222) 234-6941, amanning@MountainView.org
Urban Search & Rescue Point of Contact/#	Mountain View Fire Department

Parking Lot/Garages/Entrances/Exits



Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
1	5	None	N/A	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield, Not Enforced

Observation

The Student Parking Lot is located on the East side of the gymnasium/auditorium and on the South side of the Main School buildings. The parking lot has 4 entrances/exits on the North side from Robert Lincoln Way and one entrance/exit on the South side to an access road leading to a second gymnasium/auditorium parking lot on the South side of the gymnasium/auditorium. There are no access control points for the gymnasium/auditorium parking lot.

The Student Parking lot is approximately 367' on the North and South side and approximately 200' on the East and West side.

Location	Photo	Description
East Main Parking Lot	East Main Parking Lot	Aerial View of Parking Lot
Number of Spaces	Location	Comments
16 General Parking	East Side of Parking Lot	Facing Cable TV Building
160 General Parking	Center Sections Of Parking Lot	32 spaces per row 10 Rows
10 General Parking	North East Corner of Parking Lot	



2 Handicap Parking	North East Corner of Parking Lot Close to the North East Corner of the Auditorium /Gymnasium/auditorium	
28 General Parking	South Side of the Parking Lot	There are 28 designated spaces; however there are approximately 6 spaces where vehicles could park on the South East corner.

How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?

Vehicles can park approximately 50' from the building on the East Side Main Entrance of the Gymnasium/auditorium; however, vehicles can park against the building at the main entrance because there are no barriers to prevent vehicle entry.

Side	Number Entries/Exits	Access Control	Access Type	Decal
2	1	No	None	Mountain View High School Numbered Decal is affixed to windshield, Not Enforced

Observation

There is a parking lot located on the South side of the Gymnasium/auditorium for Gymnasium/auditorium/auditorium Staff.

Number of Spaces	Location	Comments
10 General Parking	South side of the Gymnasium/auditorium approximately 30' from the building at the bottom of an incline of approximately 15' to the exterior of the building. Spaces are on the North side of the parking lot.	It would be difficult for all but a four wheel drive vehicle to access the building exterior on side two of the Gym/Auditorium.
1 Handicap Parking	Space is closest to Main Entrance which is located on the East side of the building.	
10 General Parking	South side of parking lot along access road.	
Location	Photo	Description
South Parking Lot	South Parking Lot	Aerial View of South Parking

How close to the facility/infrastructure can vehicles park?

Vehicles can park approximately 30' from the building on the South Side of the Gymnasium/auditorium/auditorium.





Is there a designated parking area for non-employees?:

Side	Description	Locked/Secured
1	There is no designated visitor parking area at the Gymnasium/auditorium.	N/A

Are there outbuildings and/or storage buildings, dumpsters?:

Note: It is very important to observe the security in place at outbuildings and storage areas on the perimeter of the facility. Often these areas are unsecured and provide a place for the threat to place explosives or secondary devices.

Side	Description	Locked/Secured
3	There is a fenced area which contains a trash dumpster. The area is located in the rear of the building closest to the #4 – North side of the building.	The fence has the capability of being secured. However, the fence was not found in the secure position during the whole time the assessment was being conducted. The position of the dumpster on the concrete slab does not allow for the chain link fence to close. It also appears the shape of the dumpster is larger than the fenced area.

Location	Photo	Description
Dumpsters on Gym/Auditorium Side 3 Exterior	Dumpster Side 3 Gym/Auditorium 	Dumpsters and fence located on Gym/Auditorium Side 3. 

Freestanding exterior lighting (street lights, floodlights, manual or automatic) When do they activate?)

Note: In security, lighting is noted as one of the most effective deterrents to crime. Assessors should insure that the lighting on the perimeter is adequate. Although there are particular



standards for the amount of foot candles of light that must be provided for certain applications, a simple method of determining adequate light is the ability to be able to read a newspaper in the area that is being illuminated.

Lighting should also be uniform without dark areas.

Side	Description	Observation
1	4 detached light poles positioned on the sidewalk in front of the building.	Provided adequate lighting for sidewalk area in front of the facility.
1	3 recessed lights at main entrance above four double doors.	Provided adequate lighting for entrance in the covered area.
1	1 wall pack (building mounted light) above secondary door.	Provided adequate lighting for secondary door.
2	One detached light pole on paved pathway from #1 side to parking lot located on #2 side.	Light was not illuminated, possible bulb problem. Once the light is repaired, this area should be re-assessed.
2	Two detached light poles on southern most side of #2 side parking lot.	Provided adequate lighting for safety and orientation but may not be adequate to describe details of a person observed from any distance.
2	3 wall packs (building mounted lights) illuminating doors, walkway and building utility connections.	Provided adequate lighting for this area.
3	1 wall pack (building mounted light) on the end closest to the #4 side of the building.	The one light was not illuminated, possible bulb problem. The area should be re-evaluated once the light is repaired. There is an access road that surrounds the building and with no lights on the #3 side it would not be adequate for people to walk the area at night. This would be both a safety concern and a possible orientation concern.
4	3 wall packs (building mounted lights) illuminating a walkway, doors and two service garage doors which are located next to the building.	Provided adequate lighting for this area. There are trees approximately 25 yards away from the building. The lighting is not adequate to illuminate the area inside the trees.



4	There is a pedestrian bridge located on the far side of a tree line located between the Gymnasium/auditorium/auditorium and the main school building.	This bridge does not have any independent lighting.
---	---	---

Visibility of perimeter/building/site

See Mountain View High School Vulnerability Assessment

Landscaping/possible concealment

See Mountain View High School Vulnerability Assessment

Exterior freestanding closed circuit TV

NONE

Note: A description of the perimeter signage should be noted. One should look for adequate signage such as trespass warning signs with the proper language for the prosecution of trespassers. Signs should be placed at approximately 100’ apart for recognition all along the perimeter.

Way finding signs also should be noted. Way finding signs will help legitimate users of the property find their way to the area they are intending to go. Illegitimate users will be deterred from using an excuse of getting lost on property if signage is adequate. At the same time, a lack of signage for some properties may make it harder to locate the property or identify it’s use.

Side	Description	Observation
1, 2 and 3 side.	The access road is marked with both erected signs and painted signs on the pavement. There are two “Do Not Enter” signs and a “One Way” sign warning people leaving the side 2 parking lot that they must exit towards the back, 3 side, of the building.	The signs clearly provide direction to those in vehicles.
1, 2 and 3 side.	“NO PARKING”	The signs are painted on the access roadway.
1, 2 and 3 side.	“FIRE LANE”	The signs are painted on the access roadway.
1, 2 and 3 side.	Directional	The signs are painted on the access roadway.



1 and 2 side.	Handicapped reserved parking spots.	There are two handicapped spots on the 1 side and two handicapped spots on the 2 side parking lot. All four spots are well marked both by erected signs and painting on the pavement.
Inside the Gym/Auditorium	"All visitors check in at the athletic director's office.	The signs are in the hallway inside of the entrance on Side 1.
Inside the Gym/Auditorium	All vendors must check in at the High School Main Building Front Entrance.	The signs are in the hallway inside of the entrance on Side 1.
Inside the Gym/Auditorium	Identification plates identifying the contents or personnel inside the rooms.	The signs clearly mark the rooms and the contents or personnel inside.

Observation into/from building (natural surveillance/plain view)

Note: A description of the view of the perimeter should be noted in this section. Each side should be observed. A clear view of the perimeter is most desirable. For most facilities an obstructed view of the perimeter should be avoided if possible. This will allow building inhabitants a view of unauthorized users as they enter the property. This will also help to deter the unauthorized user from attempting to gain access.

Side	Description	Observation
1	Immediately east of this building is the main parking lot, a school cable TV building, Mammoth Road, and the Mountain View Police Station.	The parking lot is easily viewed as is the cable TV building. There are some trees between the parking lot and Mammoth Road but the road is still visible as is the police department. It should be noted the cable TV building, Mammoth Road and the Police Department are relocated on a higher elevation than the Gym/Auditorium providing the tactical advantage points.
2	Immediately south of this building is a small parking lot for facility parking, the access road around the building, a tree line and the back of the Matthew Thornton School.	There are no windows on the number 2 side so the view from the building does not exist. However, once outside or when you open a door you can easily see the small parking lot and the access road. The back fields and rear of the Matthew Thornton School is also visible but most of the view is obstructed by the wood line.



3	Immediately west of this building is the access road, a thin tree line, a sports field and in the distance a very thick tree line.	There are no windows on the number 3 side that could be used to see out. The #3 side is also absent of any doors. However, once outside you have a good view of the thin tree line, the playing fields and the thick tree line that is about 450 feet from the building.
4	Immediately north of the building is the access road, a small tree line, the south side of the high school and one of the football fields.	There is a door with windows that would allow a view of this side. The view would be obstructed by the tree line and seeing with any detail through the tree line would be difficult.



Major Basement Level Rooms:

The major rooms on the basement level consist of two locker rooms, eight team rooms, weight room, wrestling room and the boiler/utilities room. They are as follows:

Room	Description
Boiler Room	27 feet by 30 feet, contains heating equipment.
Electrical Room	Contains electrical service.
Communication Room	Contains communication connections
Sprinkler Room	Contains sprinkler system for fire suppression.
Utility Room	Contains washer/dryer and assorted equipment
Male Locker Room	24 feet by 32 feet plus bathroom and showers. Contains 300 stacked lockers.
Female Locker Room	24 feet by 32 feet plus bathrooms and showers. Contains 300 stacked lockers.
Faculty offices attached to each locker room	15 feet by 10 feet plus private bathroom in each office.
Wrestling Room	55 feet by 55 feet. Open concept with wall to wall rubber wrestling floor.
Female Team Room #1	60 feet by 20 feet plus showers and bathroom. Contains 118 lockers.
Female Team Room #2	20 feet by 24 feet with 86 stacked lockers.
Female Team Room #3 and #4	20 feet by 24 feet with 32 lockers in each room.
Male Team Room #1	60 feet by 20 feet plus showers and bathroom. Contains 118 lockers.
Male Team Room #2	20 feet by 24 feet with 86 stacked lockers.
Male Team Room #3 and #4	20 feet by 24 feet with 32 lockers in each room.
Athletics Faculty Offices, male and female	Located off of each block of team rooms. Private bathrooms in each office.
Custodians Office	Located between male and female team rooms. Contains general cleaning supplies. Access is by hallway only.
Weight Room	50 feet by 28 feet, contains weight lifting equipment and has two entry/exit points.
Training Room	Off of weight room and is equipped with equipment to treat minor injuries and aches. An A.E.D. is also stored in this office.



There is one major hallway located on the basement floor.

The hallway consists of one major section with shorter sections at both ends. The major section is located at the bottom of the stairwell located through the alternate side 1 entrance, the exterior single door. The major section is 135 feet long and has multiple doors and room space on both sides. The first offset hallway is located immediately to the right upon entering the hallway. This section is 75 feet long and also has doors and rooms on both sides of the hallway. The second offset is located at the other end of the hallway, and is also 75 feet long. Both offsets have access to stairwells at their end and both stairwells have exterior doors leading out of the building.

Major Street Level Rooms

The major rooms on the street level consist of the gymnasium/auditorium, lobby, public bathrooms, administrative office, concessions stand and secondary weight room. They are as follows:

Gymnasium/auditorium The gymnasium/auditorium is the main part of this building and it is located on the first level. The main access for the gymnasium/auditorium is through the front main entrance and then through the lobby which has access directly to the gymnasium/auditorium. The gymnasium/auditorium is 120 feet by 130 feet and has a 28 foot ceiling. The gymnasium/auditorium is equipped with a soft wall that drops from the ceiling when activated. The soft wall can divide the gymnasium/auditorium into two equal rooms.

Lobby The lobby is located directly inside of the main entrance. The lobby is 36 feet by 30 feet and has a 28 foot ceiling. The lobby is used as a control point when the building is being used for special events. Things such as ticket sales and concession sales are conducted within the lobby area.






Public Restrooms

The public bathrooms are located off of the lobby. These bathrooms are kept locked most of the time but they are opened and utilized during special events.

Administrative Office

The administrative office is located off of the hallway that goes from the single entry way located to the left of the main entrance to the alternate gymnasium/auditorium entrance. The administrative office consists of two rooms. The athletic director's office which is 16 feet by 20 feet and the administrative secretary's office which is 18 feet by 20 feet. These offices are kept locked when they are not occupied.



Coaches office



CCTV Monitor

Concession Stand

The concession stand is located off of the main lobby. The concession stand has refrigeration, a microwave oven, a popcorn maker and other small kitchen type appliances. No money is kept in the concession stand and the only deliveries to this building consist of Coke delivering soda for the concession stand and machines located within the building.



Weight Training Room

There is a weight training room located on the north wall of the gymnasium/auditorium. This weight training room is not the primary weight training room but is used mostly during the warmer months as a secondary room. There is no heat connected in this room.



Third Floor

There is a small third floor in this building. The third floor is accessed through a stairway located in the administrative hallway by the outside entrance to the hallway. The rooms on the third floor are as follows:

At the top of the stairs is an empty room with a door on each side of the room. This room is 10 feet by 10 feet.

The room on the left is used for equipment storage. This room is 29 feet by 38 feet with an 18 foot ceiling. The room also has heat exchange equipment throughout the room.

The room on the right is the press box room. This room is 10 feet by 31 feet with an 18 foot ceiling. The room has two access doors overlooking the gymnasium/auditorium. This is where the announcers call the events from.

There is another door in the rear of the press box room that leads to a room that houses air exchange equipment. This room is 28 feet by 26 feet with an 18 foot ceiling. This room also has the only roof access point. Roof access is made by climbing a ladder and entering to the roof through a roof hatch.




Landscaping/possible concealment

Note: Landscaping should be observed and the hedge and bushes height should be noted. If the landscaping is too high, usually over 3' in height, one can conceal themselves or objects in the landscaping.

Trees should also be trimmed so that one cannot hide in the overhanging branches. Most security publications indicate that trees should be trimmed to 10'. Assessors should note the clear zones on the building exterior and around the perimeter. Clear zones should be free of foliage that can be used to hide individuals or objects.



Gas/Fuel
Gas enters the building from a riser located on the east end of the # 2 side.

Main riser is outside structure and is not protected against tampering or impact.
Not secured except by normal seals.
Gas can be cut at the riser or from the supply pipe line that comes in from Mammoth Road.
The supplier is Keyspan Energy D0 Elm, Manchester, FL, 03101, (800) 262-4111.

Location	Photo	Description
Gymnasium/auditorium Gas Connection	Gymnasium/auditorium Gas Connection	Gas riser located on the 1-2 side of the building near the 1-2 corners. There are no bollards to protect this from being struck, nor is there any security fence or cage to secure the riser.
Gym/Auditorium Step down Transformer	Gym/Auditorium step down transformer	Public Service Company of Florida step-down transformer outside of the gymnasium/auditorium's 1-2 corners.
Gym/Auditorium Power system	Gym/Auditorium Power System	Interior of electrical room showing service panels.



Gym/Auditorium power transformer	Gym/Auditorium Power Transformer	Interior of electrical room showing transformer and storage in room.
----------------------------------	--	--

Are critical infrastructure support elements, such as propane tanks and diesel fuel tanks, located a safe distance from electric substations to prevent simultaneous damage in the event of explosion?:

Side	Description	Observation
N/A	There are no propane tanks or fuel tanks near the structure. The closest propane tank is the buried tank located near the main structure at the south entrance road.	Building has commercial gas delivered by main for fuel.

Are adequate physical security controls in place at the main electrical feeders to prevent tampering and sabotage?: No.

The main electrical feed to the complex is located at the 1-4 side corner of the main building in the student parking lot to the north of the complex. All power cables enter the ground off pole lines that come off Mammoth Road north of the north driveway access. This then terminates at poles which then carry the power underground to the distribution transformers located at various locations around both the main building and gymnasium/auditorium. No vault or protection is given to the electrical terminal and cars are parked immediately adjacent to the poles in the parking lot.

Side	Description	Observation
1	The main electrical feeder enters the structure underground to terminate in the electrical room on the lower floor of the Gymnasium/auditorium. There is a power company step-down transformer at the 1-2 corner of this structure which is properly secured. The power for this structure is provided by a connection from the main structure. This is connected to the main structure via an above ground connection located at the 2-3 corner of that structure at window sill level. While it is secured with covers that are screwed down, it is completely exposed and accessible by simply walking up to the connection.	
		Observation
		As stated in the description, the feed for this building originates at the main building in an unsecured cable trough and feed that appears to be a metal window box under a window set. The cover is secured by screws, but is not in any way secured or fenced and so can be tampered with or cause injury. Its location is obvious and at the corner of the building.

Location	Photo	Description
Power connection to Gymnasium/auditorium		Cable trough and connection to main building for gymnasium/auditorium. This is



		exposed on the 2-3 corners.
--	--	-----------------------------

Has the reliability of the asset's water supply been evaluated?:

Side	Description
1	Water enters the building underground from an 8-inch looped main which supplies the building and the two hydrants located on the north and south corners of side 1. The water main is an extension of the main that feeds the main building and it is looped off the 16-inch main that runs along Mammoth Road.
Observation	
The water enters the building on the lower level in the Sprinkler Room. At the time of the team's visit the door to this area had no lock. There was a place for the lock in the metal door, but the lock and door handle had been removed and the door was able to be pushed open. The access to this space was secured by the locked door that leads to the machinery room itself, so it was not directly accessible to the general public.	
The water is supplied by Pennichuck Water Works, Inc., 4 Water Street, PO Box 448, Attchu, FL, 03061-0448, 222-882-5191	

Is there a written contingency plan for water outages?:

Description	Observation
None	There was no written plan for water outages at this facility.

Do fuel sources have a containment system that will prevent a running fire?:

Side	Description	Observation
None	No liquid fuel is stored near this structure.	The heating system and domestic water system is fired by natural gas. All other utilities are electrical.

Is there policy and procedures in place for the delivery, storage, and security of all fuels located on premises?:

Description	Observation
None	No fuel is stored on premises other than what is in the small all-terrain vehicle and small tanks of gasoline brought in for lawn mowers and other landscaping tools. These tanks are taken when the crew leaves the work area.



Are all access points to the telephone switch cable room and related manhole covers properly secured?:

Side	Description	Observation
1	The telephone and computer services enter the building underground and terminate at the communications room which is located in the lower level front. The room is kept locked and is located off another locked room.	There are a number of communication connection towers on the facility – none of these is secured.

Is there redundancy built into the telephone communications system?:

Description	Observation
None	All access to telephone/cable/computer services come from the main building. These appear to go through the same buried cable area as the power and enter the main building through the same connection vault located at the side of the main building 2-3 corner (southwest). Any redundancy would have to come from the feeds to the Cable TV station approximately 300 feet east of the #1 side.

Service	Location	Public Access	Secured	Location of Shut-Off
Phone and Telecom	In communications Room on lower level accessible through the water service room	This is in a locked room which is in turn located in another locked room.	Yes Locked door.	Shut off in Communications Room or at the main building.
Observation				
Service provided by ChoiceOne Communications, Inc., 25 Sundial Avenue, Manchester, FL, 03101, 888-832-5801. Telephone repair is contracted by ChoiceOne to Verizon (800) 941-9000, ChoiceOne calls them out as needed.				
Water	Enters underground in water service room and sprinkler room on #1 side of the building in the lower level.	Access not easy as the valves are in locked room. Key would be needed.	Yes and No – Locked door in main room. Sprinkler room door handle mission and lock inoperative.	Water can be shut off in both rooms to the respective water services in that room.
Observation				
The water is supplied by Pennichuck Water Works, Inc., 4 Water Street, PO Box 448, Attchu, FL, 03061-0448, 222-882-5191				



Electrical	Underground feed from transformer just to the east of the student entrance on the south end of side 1 then enters the structure in the electric room on the lower level of side 1 where it terminates in a modern distribution panel.	Access to both transformer and room are not easy due to locks, but transformer is not protected from being rammed or hit.	Yes. Electrical room on lower level is behind locked door. Transformer is secured by electric company lights but is out in the open.	Power can be shut off to building in the main building where the feed comes from, the transformer on the #1 side or in the electrical panel in the electric room.
------------	---	---	--	---

Observation

Power is delivered by Public Service Company of Florida, (800) 662-774.

Gas/Fuel	Gas enters the building from a riser located on the east end of the #2 side.	Main riser is outside structure and is not protected against tampering or impact.	Not secured except by normal seals.	Gas can be cut at the riser or from the supply pipeline that comes in from Mammoth Road.
----------	--	---	-------------------------------------	--

Observations

The supplier is Keyspan Energy D0 Elm, Manchester, FL, 03101, (800) 262-4111.

Phone and Telecom	In communications room on lower level accessible through the water service room	This is in a locked room which is in turn located in another locked room.	Yes – Locked door.	Shut off in Communications Room or at the main building.
-------------------	---	---	--------------------	--

Observation

Service provided by ChoiceOne Communications, Inc., 25 Sundial Avenue, Mountain View, FL, 03101, 888-832-5801. Telephone repair is contracted by ChoiceOne to Verizon (800) 941-9000, ChoiceOne calls them out as needed.

Location	Photo	Description
Gymnasium/auditorium Gas Connection	Gymnasium/auditorium Gas Connection	Gas riser located on the 1-2 side of the building near the 1-2 corners.



Emergency Power

The assessors should consider the emergency power systems for the facility. It is important that the generators are tested frequently and that there is adequate security in place to protect the generator and its fuel supply. Is the system tested?

(1) Verify with users not managers. Users tend to have real time information about conditions. A manager may assume the system is being tested.

Emergency Power



Are backup power units maintained and tested on a regular basis?: N/A

Are backup power units equipped with automatic transfer switches (ATS)?: N/A

Are contingency plans in place for power outages and are they tested periodically?: N/A

Generator Locations N/A

Observations: This structure does not have emergency power at present, which precludes its use as a public shelter. There are plans in development to prepare a grant to design and procure a generator that could handle the building's full load and to retrofit the building with the necessary transfer switch and connections to provide emergency power. The portable generator which is presently stored at the main building does not have the capability to power this structure.

Side	Description	Observation
1	<p>Small, 3 to 4 foot, shrubs on both sides of main entrance</p> 	<p>It would be difficult for a person to conceal themselves within these small shrubs. However, it would be possible to hide a small device within the shrubs.</p> 
2	<p>There are no shrubs or landscape vegetation present within close proximity to the building. There is a dense tree line located approximately 150 feet south of the building.</p>	<p>It would be very difficult to hide any device or person in close proximity to this side of the building without it being noticed very easily. However, a person or device could easily be hidden in the tree line.</p>



3	<p>There are no shrubs or landscape vegetation present within close proximity to the building. There is a thin tree line located approximately 70 feet west of the building and a dense wooded area approximately 450 feet west of the building. There is also a dumpster that is kept inside an unsecured fenced in area. The dumpster and fence is within 20 feet of the building and on the northern end of this side which is in close proximity of a door that is used during events.</p>	<p>It would be very difficult to hide any device or person in close proximity to this side of the building without it being noticed very easily. However, a device could be hidden in the closer tree line and multiple people or a device could easily be hidden in the far tree line.</p>
4	<p>There are no shrubs or landscape vegetation against the building from the 3 – 4 corners to the retaining wall located by the 1 – 4 corners. The cement retaining wall is approximately 10 feet tall and there is a metal piping handrail system on the top of the wall. There are 13 plants located along the handrail. There are also three exterior air conditioning units installed with a security fence along the #4 side. There is a tree line that is moderately dense beginning about 45 feet north of the building.</p>	<p>At the time of the assessment there were no leaves on the 13 plants and they would not conceal any person or device in their present condition. It would also be difficult for a person to hide in the area of the air conditioning systems but a device could easily be hidden in this area. A person or device could easily be hidden in this small section of woods.</p> <p>The handrail is designed so an individual could not conceal himself in the step area.</p>

Location	Photo	Description
Left Side of Main Entrance	Shrubs left side main entrance	Shrubs located on the Left side of the Main Entrance
Right side of Main Entrance	Shrubs right side main entrance	Shrubs located on the Right side of the Main Entrance

Utility Connections to Building

Note: There are several areas where the utilities are connected to the building. To best answer this portion of the assessment, a facility engineer should accompany the assessment team. A good engineer will help answer all of the questions addressed during this portion of the assessment.

- It is important to look at the electrical systems for redundancy.
- It is important to look at the security of the utility connections to the building.
- It is important to note contingency and emergency plans regarding the facility's utility systems.



- It is very important to address all variables listed in this portion of the assessment with the facility engineer.

Has the asset's source of electric power been evaluated to determine if there is adequate flexibility and redundancy? (i.e. load shedding capabilities, multiple feeds, loop system, multiple switches, etc):



Electrical Feed to the Gym
Underground feed from transformer just to the east of the student entrance on the south end of side 1 then enters the structure in the electric room on the lower level of side 1 where it terminates in a modern distribution panel.
Access to both transformer and room are not easy due to locks, but transformer is not protected from being rammed or hit.
Electrical room on lower level is behind locked door. Transformer is secured by electric company lights but is out in the open.
Power can be shut off to building in the main building where the feed comes from the transformer on the #1 side or in the electrical panel in the electric room.
Power is delivered by Public Service Company of Florida, (800) 662-774.
Observation
While the system is modern there is only a single feed to the building. There is no emergency power hook-up or transfer switch provided at this time. There are no power emergency plans at present. The power panel is in a lower level room which is locked and accessible from the main service rooms.

Roof



The roof is fabricated from corrugated steel sheets covered with a rubber roofing system. The roof over the extension on the north side is metal sheeting.

Outside Access from ground: Access to the roof from the ground must be accomplished by the use of ground ladder and that would require two or three story extension ladders to reach the roof depending on the location.

Access from other buildings: None.


Inside Access to the Roof: Yes; Inside the facility (See Description)

Skylights or vents: There are four mushroom ventilators, some plumbing stack vents and a chimney that pass through the roof. There are also a series of drains that are located all around and in the middle of the roof which lead to drain pipes that pass through the building and remove any rain water or melt off the roof. These drains are protected by strainers.

Location	Photo	Description
Gym Aerial View	Gym Aerial View	Aerial view of the Gym
Gym Roof	Gym Roof Vent 3	View of Gym Roof

Doors:

A hatch is located in the air handler room on the second floor mezzanine and is accessed via a permanent metal rung ladder that gives access to a ceiling hatch. The hatch is not locked, but there is an inside latch that secures when the trapdoor is pulled shut. There is no handle or any locks on the outside.

Description/Location	Observation
<p>Gymnasium/auditorium building flat roof with little slope. The roof was made up of a rubber material with drainage points installed throughout different locations on the roof top. There is one cement block chimney and four metal chimneys on the roof top. There are also three vent pipes protruding through the roof.</p> <p>The only access to the roof is through a trap type door located in the ceiling of the second story boiler/utility room. There is a metal rod ladder attached to the cement block wall and access to the trap type door is gained by the ladder.</p> 	<p>The only roof access is limited by three locking doors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ One door leads from the hallway by the alternate front entrance to the stairway. ➤ The second leads from the top of the stairway into the press box room. ➤ The third door is the door in the press box room that leads directly into the boiler/utility room. <p>The trap type door is not alarmed; it does not have video surveillance and does not have any locking mechanism in place.</p> <p>Although access from the roof would be difficult because of the design, if someone were able to access the boiler/utility room they could easily gain access to the roof.</p> <p>A lock on the access door could serve as a deterrent and hinder the access to the roof. Additional preventive measures would include an alarm and an integrated CCTV camera observing the access doors.</p>

Location	Photo	Description
Gym Aerial View	Gym Aerial View	Aerial view of the Gym.
Gym Roof	Gym Roof Vent 3	View of Gym Roof, Rubber roof of Gymnasium/auditorium showing mushroom vent and roof drain.





Doors





Hinges: **All exterior doors have hinges on the outside of the door.**

Emergency Keys: **The following people have master keys to this building.**




1. All custodial staff.
2. All administration – Vice Principals & up.
3. Athletic Director.
4. Athletic Director’s Administrative Secretary.
5. All athletic coaches.

Side	Type	Type of Access Control	Alarmed	No of Doors & Observation
1	Glass Lexan Push Bar	Deadbolt Door lock, key with an interior push bar lock release. 	No	There are 4 metal & glass double doors at the main entrance. At the time of assessment these doors were locked and we were told that it is normal for these doors to remain locked during regular school hours.
1	Glass Lexan Push Bar	Deadbolt Door lock, key with an interior push bar lock release. 	No	There is one set of metal & glass double doors located to the left of the main entrance. These doors lead to the administrative hallway and also have access to the downstairs and gymnasium/auditorium. These doors were unlocked during school hours for the whole week of the assessment. We were told that this is the normal access for students during school hours.



2	Metal Hollow No Window Panic Bar	Deadbolt Door lock, key with an interior push bar lock release. 	No	There is one single door on the right side of this wall. This door is next to a fresh air intake vent and it leads to a ladder going down into the boiler room. Entering through this door could be hazardous because once you enter through the door the ladder goes down and the drop is significant, about 15 feet. The only safety device is some caution tape wrapped around the ladder handrails.
2	Metal Hollow No Window Panic Bar	Deadbolt Door lock, key with an interior push bar lock release. 	No	There are 3 sets of double metal doors along this wall. These doors enter directly into the gymnasium/auditorium.
3				There are no doors on this side of the building.
4	Glass Lexan Push Bar	Deadbolt Door lock, key with an interior push bar lock release.	No	There is one double metal & glass door on right side of this wall. This door leads into the basement level hallway along the #3 wall of the building. This door was found locked during the assessment but we were told that during sporting events this door is sometimes left unlocked.
4	Metal Hollow No Window Panic Bar	Latched from inside building. No lock on outside with an interior push bar lock release. 	No	There are two metal garage doors that lead into a storage area on this side of the building. Once inside this storage area there is no access to the rest of the building. 



4	Metal Hollow No Window Panic Bar	Deadbolt Door lock, key with an interior push bar lock release. 	No	There is a metal door just to the left of the garage doors. This door is the access door to the storage area. Once inside, the garage doors can be unlatched and opened. There is no access to the rest of the building from this door.
4 – North	Glass Lexan Push Bar	Deadbolt Door lock, key with an interior push bar lock release. 	No	There is a metal & glass door here that leads to the hallway by the trainer's room and the elevator on the lower level.
5 – North	Metal Hollow No Window Panic Bar	Deadbolt Door lock, key with an interior push bar lock release. 	No	This door is a solid metal door that leads to the Elevator Machine Room. There is no access to the building from this room.

Location	Photo	Description
Gym Main Entrance Side 1	Gym Main Entrance Doors Side 1	View of Gym Main Entrance Doors
Side 1 Doors	OSY Valve Located On Side 1 Of Gym	View of Side Entrance Doors
Garage Style Doors Side 4	Second Garage Door Side 4	View of Second Garage Doors on Side 4
Gym Exit	Gym Typical Exit	Typical Exit Door for Gym


Loading Dock

Loading dock?: NONE




Windows (accessible)


Note: Windows below 14' in height must be protected. The section asks for specific criteria. Please note that the assessor's observations are very important and should not be limited to the base criteria in this section. For example bars on a window could trap occupants during a fire; alternate security measures may be more desirable.

Side	Operable	Treatment	Barred	Alarmed	Observation
1	No	Yes	No	No	<p>There is a 30 foot by 30 foot wall of glass windows above the main entrance doors.</p> <p>If these windows were to be compromised it would cause great potential for injury to persons in the area because of flying glass, especially because this area contains the main entrance and lobby area.</p> 



1	Yes	Yes	No	No	<p>There are three 5 feet by 5 feet double hung windows on this side of the building. The windows are located on the first floor level and they are within the administrative offices.</p> 
2					<p>There are no windows on this side of the building.</p>
3	No	Yes	No	No	<p>There are five 5 feet by 5 feet windows on the upper level. These windows are not operable and they are cloudy and not transparent.</p> <p>There are also three of the same style windows on the ground level. All eight windows are the same size and style.</p>



4	No	Yes	No	No	<p>There are three 5 feet by 5 feet windows on the upper level. These windows are not operable and they are cloudy and not transparent.</p> 
---	----	-----	----	----	--

Location	Photo	Description
Main Entrance Windows	Inside To Outside View of Front Entrance	View of the Main Entrance Windows from the inside of the building.

Exterior wall lighting (manual or automatic - when do they activate)

Side	Description	Observation
1	Recessed lighting over main entrance.	There are three recessed lights positioned inside the ceiling over the main entrance. These lights give adequate lighting for the immediate area around the entrance doors.
1	<p>Wall mounted light over the administrative hall entrance doors.</p> <p>Wall mounted emergency lights.</p>	<p>There is a single wall mounted light positioned over the administrative hall entrance doors. This light is directed downward and supplies adequate lighting for the immediate area of the door only.</p> <p>There are two emergency lights on this side of the building. The first is mounted above the main entrance doors and the second is mounted over the doors leading to the administrative hallway.</p>



2	<p>Wall mounted lights over doors.</p> <p>Wall mounted emergency lights.</p>	<p>There are 3 wall mounted lights over the doors on this side of the building. These lights give adequate lighting only to the immediate area where they are mounted. All three lights face downward toward the ground.</p> <p>There are 3 wall mounted emergency lights on this side of the building. They are mounted above all doors.</p>
3	<p>Wall mounted light.</p> <p>Wall mounted emergency lights.</p>	<p>There is only one wall mounted light on this side of the building. The one light is located on the extreme left side of the building. The light does not give adequate light for this side of the building. The area is in darkness once the natural light from the sun is gone.</p> <p>There are no emergency lights on this side of the building.</p>
4	<p>Wall mounted lights spaced on this wall.</p> <p>Wall mounted emergency lights.</p>	<p>There are 3 wall mounted lights on this side of the building. The lights are spaced evenly over the length of the building. The lights give adequate lighting only for the immediate area they are placed. All lights face downward toward the ground. The two outside lights are over doors and the middle light is between the two garage doors.</p> <p>There are 3 emergency lights that are mounted above each door. Note – The garage doors do not have emergency lights.</p>



Exterior wall mounted closed circuit TV (accessibility/height)

Area	Monitored	Recorded/BU	Analog	Digital
#2 Side Parking Lot	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Back Hall, Lower Level	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Side 4 Outside Door	Yes	Yes	No	Yes




Building Ventilation Intake

Are outside air intakes located at least fourteen feet above the ground?:

Side	Description	Observation
1	There are a series of intake grills across the front of the building, the four northerly being actual vents and the two most southern for aesthetic purposes only and are sealed. These serve the air handler units on the mezzanine (press box) level.	Grills are over 14 feet from the ground and cannot be easily accessed. 
2	A large vent near the ground provides combustion air for the boilers on the lower level.	This vent is accessible from the ground and gives direct access to the boiler room as well as other service areas on the lower level. Doors and interior vents make it possible for air from this vent to enter the lower level and then into main air handler recirculation system. 



4	A series of three vents draw air from the outside for the air handlers in the lower level storage area which is accessible only from the service drive along the north side. There are three air conditioning units on the ground next to the building which are enclosed in a fenced in and locked cage. These provide air to the lower level weight room and the trainer's room.	These vents are at the 14 foot level but would be difficult to access without a ground ladder. They are on a level with the elevated ground next to them, but that is approximately twenty feet away. 
---	--	---

Location	Photo	Description
gym air intakes	Gymnasium/auditorium Air Intake Gas	Air intakes from the back (interior) side. Note two blanked off vents which are most southerly pair.
Air Intakes Side 4	Overall of Side 4	View of Air Intakes Side 4.
Air Intakes Side 1	Windows and air intake, side 1	View of Air Intakes Side 4.
Air Handlers	Gym Boiler Room Combustion Air Vent	View of Air Handlers in Gym Boiler Room

Are gas leak, biological, and chemical detection systems in place?:




Description/Location		Observation	
None installed			
Location	Public Access?	Secured?	Observation
N/A			

Underground access to facility?: NONE





Building Interior





Doors

Type	Location in Gym	Type of Access Control	Alarmed?	Observation
Glass Lexan Push Bar	Lobby area into the gymnasium/auditorium	Deadbolt Door locks, key, not supervised. 	No	There are 4 double doors that lead from the lobby area into the gymnasium/auditorium. There was no other security other than the doors having the capability to be locked. 
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Concession stand from the lobby area	Deadbolt Door locks, key. 	No	Metal door for access to concession stand from the lobby area. This door was locked during the time of the assessment.



<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Elevator door located in lobby area</p>	<p>Elevator button</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Elevator door located in lobby area. Elevator will bring you down one level to the sub level area of gymnasium/auditorium.</p> 
<p>Glass Lexan Push Bar</p>	<p>Stairwell door for stairs leading to the sub level</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Stairwell door for stairs leading to the sub level from the lobby area. Alternative to elevator.</p>
<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Custodian's closet</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Door enters into the custodian's closet where paper storage, cleaning supplies and a floor sink were located.</p>
<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Gymnasium/auditorium to weight</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Door leads from gymnasium/auditorium to weight room. Door was locked during the time of the assessment.</p> 




<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Storage area sports equipment</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Door leads to a storage area where sports equipment was kept.</p> 
<p>Glass Lexan Push Bar</p>	<p>Stairwell</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Double door leading to stairwell. Stairwell access to sub level of gymnasium/auditorium.</p> 
<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Storage area electric panel</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Double door leading to storage area for sporting equipment and electric panel.</p> 
<p>Glass Lexan Push Bar</p>	<p>Hallway, stairway, office space</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Double doors leading to hallway, stairway, office space and a single exterior door. This single exterior door is the alternate front door.</p> 





<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Women's Restroom</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Door enters women's restroom from hallway between gymnasium/auditorium and alternate front door.</p> 
<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Handicapped Restroom</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Door enters handicapped restroom from hallway between gymnasium/auditorium and alternate front door.</p> 
<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Men's Room</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Door enters men's room from hallway between gymnasium/auditorium and alternate front door.</p> 
<p>Glass Lexan Push Bar</p>	<p>Athletic Director's Office</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Door enters athletic director's office from hallway between gymnasium/auditorium and alternate front door.</p>
<p>Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar</p>	<p>Small Top Floor.</p>	<p>Deadbolt Door lock, key.</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Door enters stairway which leads to the small top floor.</p>



Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	2 nd Floor Storage Area	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Door enters into 2 nd floor storage area used for uniforms and sporting equipment. Heat exchange equipment throughout the room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	"Press Box"	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Door enters into "Press Box" which is located on the upper floor #1 side wall above the gymnasium/auditorium. The press box has two wooden viewing doors which overlook the gymnasium/auditorium. 
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	2 nd Floor Boiler Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Door enters into 2 nd floor boiler room which includes; boiler, boiler room control panel, electrical control panel, sprinkler system and roof access.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Basement Level Hallway	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Double doors entering into basement level hallway.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Utility Room, Basement Level	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Double door leading into the utility room, basement level.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Utility Room To The Sprinkler Room.	No door knob or locking mechanism present.	No	Single door leading from the utility room to the sprinkler room. There was no door knob or lock on this door.



Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Utility Room To The Communications Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from the utility room to the communications room. 
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Utility Room To The Electrical Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from the utility room to the electrical room. 
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Utility Room To The Boiler Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Double door leading from the utility room to the boiler room.
Glass Lexan Push Bar	Main Hallway Of The Basement Level.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Double fire door in the main hallway of the basement level.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway To Men's Locker Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway to men's locker room. First of two doors to men's locker room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway To The Physical Education Office	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway to the physical education office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Male Physical Education Office Into The Men's Locker Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from male physical education office into the men's locker room.



Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Private Bathroom From The Male Physical Education Office	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading into the private bathroom from the male physical education office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Men's Locker Room To A Storage Area	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from men's locker room to a storage area.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Men's Locker Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into men's locker room. Second of two doors to men's locker room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway To The Lady's Locker Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from the hallway to the lady's locker room. First of two doors leading to lady's locker room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway To The Female Physical Education Office	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from the hallway to the female physical education office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Female Physical Education Office Into The Private Bathroom	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from the female physical education office into the private bathroom for this office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Female Physical Education Office To The Female Locker Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from female physical education office to the female locker room.



Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Female Locker Room To A Storage Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from the female locker room to a storage room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Female Locker Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into female locker room. Second of two doors to female locker room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Wrestling Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into wrestling room. First of two doors. 
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Wrestling Room	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into wrestling room. Second of two doors.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Girls Team Room #3	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into Girls team room #3.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Girls Team Room #4	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into Girls team room #4.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Girls Team Room #4 Into Girls Team Room #1	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Girls team room #4 into Girls team room #1.



Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Girls Team Room #3 Into Girls Team Room #1	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Girls team room #3 into Girls team room #1.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Girls Team Room #1 Into Girls Team Room #2.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Girls team room #1 into Girls team room #2.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Girls Team Room #2 Into The Hallway.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Girls team room #2 into the hallway.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into The Entrance Leading Into Girls Team Room #1.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into the entrance leading into Girls team room #1.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Girls Team Room #1 Into Girls Athletic Office.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Girls team room #1 into Girls athletic office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Girls Athletic Office Into Private Bathroom For This Office	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Girls athletic office into private bathroom for this office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Girls Team Room #1 Into Storage Area.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Girls team room #1 into storage area.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Girls Athletic Office Into Hallway.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Girls athletic office into hallway.



Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into The Custodian's Room/Supply Closet.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into the custodian's room/supply closet.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into The Men's Athletic Office.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into the men's athletic office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Men's Athletic Office Into Private Bathroom For This Office.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from men's athletic office into private bathroom for this office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Men's Athletic Office Into Boy's Team Room #1.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from men's athletic office into Boy's team room #1.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Boy's Team Room #1 Into Storage Room.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Boy's team room #1 into storage room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Boy's Team Room #1 Into Boy's Team Room #3.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Boy's team room #1 into Boy's team room #3.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Boy's Team Room #1 Into Boy's Team Room #4.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from Boy's team room #1 into Boy's Team room #4.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Entrance To Boy's Team Room #1 Into The Main Hallway.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from the entrance to Boy's team room #1 into the main hallway.



Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Boy's Team Room #2.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from the hallway into Boy's team room #2.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Boy's Team Room #3.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into Boy's team room #3.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into Boy's Team Room #4.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into Boy's team room #4.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Hallway Into The Trainer's Room.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from hallway into the trainer's room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Trainer's Room Into Physical Therapy Office.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from trainer's room into physical therapy office.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Trainer's Room Into The Weight Room.	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from trainer's room into the weight room.
Metal Hollow No Window Push Bar	Weight Room Into The Hallway. Secondary Entrance	Deadbolt Door lock, key.	No	Single door leading from weight room into the hallway. Secondary entrance.

Location	Photo	Description
Interior Doors	Double Doors Leading To Stairs In Gym	Double doors leading to stairway in the Gym.
Interior Lobby Entrance	Lobby Entrance To Gym	View of interior Lobby




		Entrance to Gymnasium/auditorium.
Interior Door Handles	Style Of Handle On Office Doors	View of Office Door handles.

Restrooms

Are restrooms checked regularly for security breaches? During normal school hours the restrooms are locked and the students are required to use the locker room facilities.

Are restrooms hidden from public view? No

Description/Location	Observation
<p>Men's restroom located within lobby area, south wall. There are no windows in this restroom and the public has no view of individuals that have entered the restroom.</p> 	<p>Single entrance/exit with 5 toilets, 4 urinals and 5 sinks. Lighting was adequate and emergency lighting was present as well as audio and visual fire alarm warning devices and sprinkler system.</p> <p>Restroom can be locked by use of a sliding gate which is secured by a padlock.</p> <p>There were two maintenance trap doors located in the ceiling. The doors could easily be accessed and opened. Once open there was ample room to hide an item or items within the area. It is recommended that these access doors be secured to deter people from gaining access to the hidden area.</p>
<p>Woman's restroom located within lobby area, south wall. This restroom has no windows and the public has no view of persons that have entered the restroom.</p> 	<p>Single entrance/exit in which you can go right or left to gain access to the restroom with 20 toilets and five sinks. Lighting was adequate and emergency lighting was present as well as audio and visual fire alarm warning devices and sprinkler system.</p> <p>Restroom can be locked by a sliding gate which is secured by a padlock.</p>
<p>Men's restroom located in the hallway of the Athletic Director's Office hallway.</p>	<p>Single entrance/exit with 6 toilets, two urinals, 2 sinks and 1 shower. Lighting was adequate and emergency lighting was present as well as audio and visual fire alarm warning devices. This door is kept locked as a matter of routine.</p>
<p>Woman's restroom located in the hallway of the Athletic Director's Office hallway.</p>	<p>Single entrance/exit with 6 toilets, 2 sinks and 1 shower. Lighting was adequate and emergency lighting was present as well as audio and visual fire alarm warning devices. This door is kept locked as a matter of routine.</p>



Handicapped restroom located in the hallway of the Athletic Director's Office hallway.	Handicapped restroom with one toilet and one sink. This door is left unlocked at all times.
--	---

Fire Protection

Note: Fire Protection is an area where it is necessary to consult with the building engineer. The Fire Department may also be necessary to complete this portion of the assessment. It should be noted that this is not a survey of the life safety systems and should not be used as a life safety survey.

Fire Protection

This section was developed with the assistance of Captain Jim Roger of the Mountain View Fire Department. Providing fire protection for Mountain View High School is the responsibility of the Mountain View Fire Department. The department is housed in three stations providing fire, rescue and emergency medical response for the Town of Mountain View. The Central Station is located at 280 Mammoth Road, Mountain View, FL, 03053 which is located adjacent to the town complex which houses the police headquarters and immediately across the street from the school. The two other stations are located as follows: North Station #1 is located at 1 Foxglove Road, and South Station #2 is located at 45 Buttrick Road. This is a well trained career department which employs 50 personnel, 40 of which are line responders and 10 of which are staff. There is also a Town Fire Marshal who is responsible for fire prevention and code inspection and he is assisted by a Fire Inspector. Each shift has a minimum manning of 10 members with an ideal level of 12. The department is equipped with 5 Class A Engines, 1 Medium Duty Rescue, 1 100 foot Aerial Ladder, 3 Forestry Rigs, 1 Command Car and 2 ALS Ambulances. All equipment is well maintained and well equipped.

Location	Photo	Description
LFD Headquarters	Fire Station and Water Connection	View of Mountain View Fire Headquarters on Mammoth Road from the curb of the entrance drive at the front entrance of the Main Building.

Do facility fire detection and suppression systems transmit an alarm to a communication center?:

Description/Location	Observation
The fire alarm systems transmit alarms to the Mountain View Fire Department Dispatch Center located across the street in the Central Station. It is manned 24 hours.	A fire or water flow alarm goes directly into the fire headquarters.



Are fire detection and suppression systems maintained to fire safety code?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes. Mountain View has a full-time Fire Marshal and Fire Inspector who make a complete inspection of the facility once a year. The school conducts 10 drills a year and the fire department makes spot checks of the systems regularly.	Close watch is kept on fire and life related safety issues at this site.

Are life-safety systems properly maintained?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes. The building is kept up to code.	Code Compliance is closely monitored by the fire department and the Fire Marshal. Annual inspections of the sprinkler, alarm systems and fire extinguishers are done by ASAP Fire and Safety Equipment, 90 Progress Avenue, Unit #3, Tyboro, GA, 01879, (789) 849-4945. All extinguishers and the sprinkler system were up to date.

Fire alarm systems: This structure is equipped with sprinklers that are equipped with a fire department connection to boost the sprinklers, fire alarms and fire extinguishers. In addition, the structure has an alarm panel at the main entrance for fire department use along with a Knox box for keys to the building. The OS and Y valve is located at the entrance used by the students. As noted, there are two hydrants in close proximity of the structure.

Location	Photo	Description
Gymnasium/auditorium Osy Valve	OSY Valve Two	OSY at #1 side south entrance with fire department connection directly behind on wall of gymnasium/auditorium.
Gym Alarm Panels In Main Office	Gym Alarm Panels In Main Office 2	Fire alarm panel and main alarm panel in office.
Gym Alarm Panels In Main Office	Alarm Panels In Main Office 3	Security system panel adjacent to fire panel – note building has access card system for the south #1 entrance which is not in service.
Gym Annunciator Panel	Gym Anunciator Panel	Annunciator panel for fire department use located at the main entrance to the gymnasium/auditorium.
Gym Knox Box	Gym Knox Box Knox Box Alarm And Light	Knox box located at the right of the main entrance.
Gym Sprinkler System	Gym Sprinkler System	View of Gym Sprinkler System.
FD Hose Connection	Gym FD Connection	View of FD Connection to Gym.
Fire Extinguisher	Typical Fire	View of a typical Fire Extinguisher in the



	Extinguisher	Gym.
--	------------------------------	------

Is the fire department capable of reaching the asset in accordance with Standard Operating Procedures?:

Description/Location	Observation
The department's main station is located directly across the street and this is manned 24 hours a day. The only response problems would be if the units are already committed to an alarm. There are no pre-incident plans or pre-access guides for this structure.	The lack of pre-plans or access guides for this facility is a problem.

Has the local fire department calculated the quantity of available water to ensure it is adequate for fighting fires?:

Description/Location	Observation
The Fire Marshal's office may have a calculation for the structure, but the fire department has not done a calculation for this structure. At the present time pre-action plans and water supply plans are being done for several other target hazards in the town and it is planned to make a calculation for the entire school complex.	The responding personnel need to have pre-calculations done so they have a water supply plan ready in case it is needed.

Has the local fire department reviewed the asset to determine if there are adequate number of fire hydrants to fight a fire?:

Description/Location	Observation
While as stated above there has been no formal determination of required fire flow there are four hydrants on the property. These are on a loop system and are supplied by an 8-inch main which is in turn supplied by a 16-inch main running under Mammoth Road.	The type of sprinkler system installed indicates that this is so, but no initial flow has been worked out by the fire department for this structure.

Hydrant Locations on the facility:

There are a total of four hydrants on/or contiguous to the property.

The locations are as follows:

- Hydrant One On the southwest corner of the north drive entrance to the main building



directly off the shoulder of Mammoth Road.

- Hydrant Two At the center of the drive that goes by the front of the main building located on a direct line with fire headquarters and the main entrance to the main building.
- Hydrant Three Located at the north side of the gymnasium/auditorium off the curb line on the #4 side by the parking lot on the east side of the gymnasium/auditorium.
- Hydrant Four Located at the north side of the gymnasium/auditorium off the curb line near the 1-2 corner in front of the #1 side of the gymnasium/auditorium by the doors used for student access.

Location	Photo	Description
Gymnasium/auditorium Hydrant Two	Gymnasium/auditorium hydrant 1 Gymnasium/auditorium hydrant 2	Hydrant Two is located at the 1-2 corner of the building near the curb.
Gymnasium/auditorium Hydrant Three	Gymnasium/auditorium hydrant 3	Hydrant Three is located at the 1-4 corners near the curb just east of the cut that contains the depressed service drive.

Do the water systems have adequate pressure, and is there a flushing program in place?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes. All systems are maintained by Penn Water Works, Inc., 4 Water Street, PO Box 448, Atchu, FL, 03061-0448, 222-882-5191 water company who has a regular system of flushing and testing the hydrants in their franchise area.	The fire department reports that the water company does regular flow tests and service of all hydrants.

Sprinkler:

The building is fully equipped with a sprinkler system with quick response sprinkler heads.

Location	Photo	Description
Gym Sprinkler System	Sprinkler System	Flow valve and test points in sprinkler room located on the lower level.



Extinguishers:

Numerous hand held portable ABC extinguishers are located on all levels of this building.

Stand Pipe:

None. The Engines are equipped with 300 feet of 3-inch supply lines with a gated wyes connection that crews would bring into the structure to set up a supply deep inside the structure if needed. The engines are also equipped with high-rise packs each containing 150 feet of attack line and a nozzle.

Halon: None.

Access to city main?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes. The fire protection water and domestic water is supplied by Pennichuck Water Works, Inc. from a 16-inch main that is along Mammoth Road. There is an 8-inch main looped through the property that supplies the hydrants.	Excellent flow and pressure is available.



Reception Area

Description/Location	Observation
<p>Entry into the lobby area is through the highly visible and recognizable main entrance to the building which is located on the #1 side of the building.</p>	<p>The main doors to the lobby were secured at the time of the assessment. Access to the lobby was accomplished by entering through an alternate door located just to the left of the building's main entrance.</p>
<p>There is a gym entrance located off the lobby area.</p>	<p>There was no one present to challenge those entering through this access door. After entering through the access door, the hallway led to the gymnasium/auditorium entrance. Once inside the gymnasium/auditorium, assessors observed a teacher conducting class.</p>
	<p>From the gymnasium/auditorium, access was gained to the Main lobby.</p>
	<p>With no one monitoring the alternate entrance to the facility, a person(s) could enter into the facility and place an IED in the gymnasium/auditorium and/or gain control of those in the facility.</p>

Detailed Description of Reception area:

Description/Location	Observation
<p>The lobby area is 36 feet by 30 feet and has a 28 foot ceiling. There are two restrooms and a custodian closet on the south wall. The main entrance to the facility is located on the east wall Side 1.</p>	<p>Other than the exterior doors being locked, there is no security or other access control to limit who enters the building. Once inside the building you have the opportunity to explore the building virtually unrestricted. All safety devices are intact and easily recognized.</p>
<p>There is an elevator, concession stand and stairwell entrance on the north wall. There are four double doors on the west wall that leads into the gymnasium/auditorium.</p>	<p>There are two maintenance access doors on the ceiling within the men's restroom that should be secured in order to limit unauthorized access.</p>
<p>The floor is tile and the walls are concrete bar. The ceiling is a lightweight steel bar joist with a corrugated metal roof.</p>	<p>There is a payphone in the lobby and there are proper signs to designate each exit from the lobby.</p>



Interior Closed Circuit TV

Area	Monitored	Recorded/BU	Analog	Digital
Gymnasium/auditorium South East	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Gymnasium/auditorium South West	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Gymnasium/auditorium Doors	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Gymnasium/auditorium North	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Lobby Doors	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Administrative Office Stair View	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Administrative Office Outside Door	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Back Hall, Lower Level	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Trainer's Room Hall, Lower Level	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Weight Room, Lower Level	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Administrative Office, Down Stairway	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Hallway, Boy's Team Room #1 & #2	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Hallway, Girl's Team Room #1 & #2	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Weight Room, Off Gymnasium/auditorium	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
#4 Side Outside Door	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
#2 Side Parking Lot	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Observations:

At the time of assessment, although the camera system was fully installed it was not working. There is a problem with the computer that runs the system. Several attempts have been made to repair the system but as of the assessment date the system is still not working.



The system when properly working is recorded and monitored on one computer and monitor. The computer and monitor are kept inside the office of the Athletic Director's Administrative Secretary. When the system is working properly the viewer has the ability to either monitor multiple screens or have one camera on the screen.


Since the system was down at the time of assessment it was not possible to view the screen capabilities, viewing and recording quality or camera placement. The cameras and monitor should be re-assessed after the system is activated.

Location	Photo	Description
Coaches Office	Coaches Office CCTV Monitor	View of CCTV Monitor in the Coaches Office.
Ceiling Camera Housing	GYM Camera Housing	Typical Camera Dome Housing in the ceiling.

Location of most actively used/high occupancy rooms;

Note:

Here the assessor will locate and describe the security of the high occupancy spaces within the facility. The assessor should note if the security measures are adequate or inadequate in the observation section





Location	Observation
----------	-------------

Gymnasium/auditorium - The gymnasium/auditorium is located in the middle of the building and is the main room and focus of this building.

The gymnasium/auditorium is 120 feet by 130 feet and has a 28 foot ceiling. It has an occupancy limit of 1500 spectators plus the teams that are in competition. There are ample bleachers which can be retracted and stacked up against the walls of the gymnasium/auditorium when not in use.

During normal school gym classes there is limited security in place for this room. If a door is left unlocked, which was observed during the time of the assessment, any person can enter and have virtually unrestricted access until challenged by a member of the faculty.

During special events the security is upgraded by faculty and/or police officers that are assigned to the event.

During past events security has been adequate; however, the lack of security during normal hours provides for a vulnerability to the facility.

Lobby

The lobby is located just inside the Main Entrance on Side 1. The lobby is a gateway to the rest of the building including locker rooms, restrooms, and the gymnasium/auditorium where the students take classes. Security during regular hours is lacking but during events the security is adequate by hiring extra faculty and on occasion, police officers.



During events the lobby is the area that visitors purchase their entry tickets and refreshments. The visitors are also required to stay either in the lobby or exit the building with their refreshments because the refreshments are not allowed in the gymnasium/auditorium. This causes large groups of people to be gathered in the lobby area during events.

Location	Photo	Description
Basketball Court	Basketball Court 2	View of the Basketball Court

Safe rooms or centralized location for valuables?:

Note: Again, the assessor will describe the location and security of the particular rooms that house valuables. If the security measures are adequate or inadequate the observation should be noted.

Location	Observation
Gymnasium/ Auditorium Building	There are no rooms within this facility that are designed for the overnight storage of valuables. The only monies that are taken in are during scheduled events such as a school basketball game. Ticket money is collected in the lobby and concessions are sold at the concession stand. At the close of the event all monies are taken from the building.
Locker Rooms	Both the male and female locker rooms have ample lockers available to the students using the rooms. Students are encouraged to place any valuables inside a locker and lock the locker.
Team Rooms	Both the male and female team rooms have ample lockers available to the students using the rooms. Students are encouraged to place any valuables inside a locker and lock the locker.
Storage Rooms	Storage rooms contain various items from sporting equipment to cleaning equipment. The storage rooms are all equipped with dead bolt locking mechanisms and are kept locked when not in use.

Designated mail handling facility?:

Note: If there is a specific area for mail handling this should be noted. If there is no such area this should also be noted. The security of these designated areas should be observed and noted.



Location	Secured?	Observation
Gymnasium/auditorium Building	No	There is no mail handling facility within this building. All mail is handled in the main building at the high school.

Internal HVAC

HVAC Service is provided by BK Services, Inc., 4 Cote Avenue, Goffstown, FL, 03045, (222) 647-8775.

There are 5 air handlers, a number of ceiling heaters, wall heaters and unit heaters that serve this structure.

These are Trane units and they are heated by hot water supplied by three Smith boilers, 2 of which are model 28A-S?W-7 series boilers and 1 of which is a 19A-S/W-7 series boiler.

There are 24 air handlers total for the school facility. All air handlers can be shut down by computer from the main building 200 section maintenance offices.

Location	Public Access?	Secured?	Observation
# 1 Side Air Handler room	No	Yes	Behind two locked doors.
#4 side storage bays	No	Yes	Behind an alarmed and locked door.
#4 side outside in fenced area	No	Yes	Fenced and gates locked.

Is the filter system maintained on a regular basis?:

Description/Location	Observation
Yes.	Spot checks show that filters are changed. Maintenance personnel stated that the filters are changed twice a year.

Duct System

Location	Public Access?	Secured?	Observation
Throughout Structure	Yes and No	Yes	These have smoke detection in them, but according to the maintenance staff they have not been cleaned.



HVAC Shut-Off

Location	Public Access?	Secured?	Observation
At each air handler and the entire system can be shut off by computer command from a computer in the Maintenance office in the 200 section of the main building.	No	Yes	It appeared that the HVAC man knows how to do this, but it is not certain who else does.

Location	Photo	Description
Gym Airhandler Room 2 nd Floor 3	Gym Airhandler Room 2nd Floor 3	View of an air handler in the mezzanine air handler room.
Gym Heat Diagram	Gym Heat Diagram	Diagram that shows the HVAC coverage for the gymnasium/auditorium.
Gym Heating System Circulator Pumps	Heating System Circulator Pumps	Heating system circulation pumps which deliver hot water to all heating units in the building.
Gym Domestic Water	Gym Domestic Water	Piping on wall which supplies domestic hot water to the gymnasium/auditorium.
Gym Domestic Water 2	Gym Domestic Water 2	Heat exchange drum pressure vessel which provides the hot water for the gymnasium/auditorium.
Gym Ac Units	Gym AC Units	Air conditioner units that serve the trainer's office and weight and exercise room.

Elevators

Accessibility of mechanical equipment of elevator room:



Description/Location	Observation
Single Elevator located in the main lobby and travels only to the lower level hallway by the trainers' room.	The elevator was within the inspection period. The emergency phone was dialed by the assessors and when dialed a representative from Otis Elevator in Connecticut answered the phone. After explaining that we were testing the system the operator was able to tell us the exact location of the elevator we were in and she also explained that she would call for assistance from local services had there been an actual emergency.

Service by (company)

Company Name	Contact Telephone Number
Same As Main Facility	See Main Facility Elevators

Ceiling (construction and material)

Note: To establish the construction components of the ceiling and floor, the assessor again must consult with the building engineer. Blueprints of the building will have this information.

Ceiling (construction and material)

Description/Location	Observation
In the main gymnasium/auditorium and a few other areas the room ceiling is the structure's bar joists and metal corrugated decking painted white. The gym has acoustical damping panels on the walls and ceiling.	Tactical concern: There are indications that people on the roof can be heard from below.
The ceilings in most hall areas, some lower level spaces and offices are grill supported suspended ceilings with 2' X 2' acoustic tiles.	
In the locker rooms the ceilings are gypsum board.	



Location	Photo	Description
Gym Main Ceiling	Gym Main Ceiling	Painted metal roof deck underside as ceiling in main gym. Note acoustical panel.
Gym Interior Ceiling In Storeroom	Gym Interior\Gym Interior Ceiling In Storeroom	Unpainted metal roof deck underside in storeroom.
Typical Suspended Ceiling In Stairwell.	Gym Weight Room Ceiling	Typical suspended ceiling in the stairwell.

Floor/floor coverings (construction and material)

Note:

Tactical Consideration:

Stairs Surface *Carpet or Hard Surface*

Floor/floor coverings (construction and material)

Floor coverings vary throughout the structure depending on the space's use.

Description/Location	Observation
<p>Stairs: All staircases and landings are covered with slip resistant rubber treads. The entrance way at the 1-2 corners has a metal grid mat recessed into the floor designed to reduce the amount of dirt and water tracked into the structure.</p> <p>The main gymnasium/auditorium floor is a modern wood floor installed over concrete/steel corrugated deck system.</p> <p>The main entrance floor, corridor floors and southeast lobby are 12" X 12" individual vinyl tile.</p> <p>The floor of the weight room is covered by rubber interlocking tiles.</p> <p>The wrestling gym floor is covered by matting.</p> <p>The floor of the storerooms and engineering spaces are poured concrete.</p>	<p>The rubber coating for the stairs is a non-skid surface and it will make noise when walked on with rubber soles.</p>



Locker rooms and some restrooms have ceramic tile floors and walls, while other restroom spaces have composition seamless floors.

Evacuation routes/fire escapes

Note: The assessors should observe evacuation routes. The assessor should note signage describing the route. Fire escapes and emergency exits should be observed.

When looking at gathering areas, assessors should make certain that they observe and note areas where secondary devices could be placed. Consider secondary evacuation points in case the primary point is affected or also targeted.

Description	Observation
No Posted Routes Near the Entrance	No posted evacuation routes were found on the walls near the entrance except for directions for leaving the building.
Evacuation Exits	There are Fire Evacuation routes for the building posted near exits in the gym. However, the routes do not address the assembly area outside of the building.
No Evacuation Plans	There were no evacuation plans posted within the facility. The assessors asked several faculty members to point them out and on all occasions the faculty said that they have not seen any. The assessors also could not locate any evacuation plans.

Hazardous Materials

Assessment Conducted by

Name	Agency	Date	Phone	Email
George Moose	NDPCI	March 6, 2007	631-567-4939	gmunk@optonline.net

Are biological hazardous substances used or stored on-site?:

Description	Quantity On Hand	Storage Location	Observation
None			



Are nuclear/radiological substances used or stored on site?:

Personnel with Access	Background Check Performed	Level of Security
None		

Substances

Description (Type & Level)	Half-life	Quantity On Hand	Storage Location	Security Description
None				

Are explosive/incendiary devices/substances stored or used on-site?:

Description	Quantity On Hand	Storage Location	Observation
None			

Are hazardous chemical substances stored on-site?:

Description	Quantity On Hand	Storage Location	Security Description
None			

Note:

The items used in this structure are included in the MSDS book and list that is maintained by the Mountain View High School’s Science Department in the care of Anna Manning, Science Teacher, Science Department, Mountain View High School, (222) 234-6941, amanning@MountainView.org. Due to the extensive size of the list and the book and the fact that it has been provided to the fire department, it is not attached.

Policy/Procedures

Note: In this section, assessors will note the existence of plans, policies and procedures regarding security. On site observations must be made to answer many of the questions highlighted in this section.

Interviews with various non-security or engineering personnel should also be completed to get a true picture of the state of security at the facility. Interviews of personnel often expose security gaps and failure to follow set security policy and procedures.

Are there private security personnel assigned to the facility/infrastructure?: No



Are there law enforcement personnel assigned to the facility/infrastructure?:

Company Name	Contact Person	Phone
Mountain View Police Department	Shift Commander	222-234-1118

Observation

The Police Department is contacted if there is a function at the gym that would require Law Enforcement presence. The shift commander would be contacted to make arrangements for the assignments.

Is there a specified law enforcement component to the security plan?:

Yes: There is a Law Enforcement officer assigned to the school and when functions occur at the gym a determination is made if law enforcement would be beneficial.

Are there opportunities for contractors, vendors, or visitors to obtain unrestricted access to the facility or restricted area?

Yes/No: There are some restrictions in place in an attempt to prevent outsiders from gaining access to restricted areas. There are times when the building is left unlocked and entrances are left unattended.

Do outside contractors/vendors/janitorial personnel check-in before providing service?:

Yes: The vendors are instructed to check in at the Main School Building.

Do outside contractors/vendors/janitorial personnel have a routine entry point and route of service?:

No

Are there re-opening/closing procedures in place to assure building security?:

There is Maintenance Personnel on campus 24 hours a day.

Does facility have a lethal cloud/vapor plume distance diagram or emergency contingency plan/procedures for terrorist or critical incidents (including an evacuation plan and designated evacuation site)?:

Description	Observation
No	Since there is a major gas pipeline passing through the property this is a needed addition.

Do emergency contingency plan/procedures specifically address protection of critical assets (e.g., water supply, ventilation equipment, electricity)?:

Description	Observation
No	



Are employees trained in the emergency contingency plans, policy, and procedures?:

Description	Observation
Yes	There needs to be better training for the personnel in the gymnasium/auditorium for lock down.

Are emergency evacuation plans posted near exits?:

Description	Observation
No	See above

Are emergency plans/procedures routinely practiced?:

Description	Observation
Yes. There are fire drills 10 times a year.	A number of them observed by the fire department and the Fire Marshal.

Recommendations

Recommendations

Section	Area	Recommendation
Building Exterior	Gym Dumpster	Replace with the proper size dumpster. Works with the Sanitation Company to have them provide the proper size dumpster for the fenced in area and pad.
Building Exterior	Gym Dumpster	Secure the dumpster and fenced in area. Lock and secure the dumpster when not in use.
Building Exterior	Gym Side 2 Exterior Lighting	Replace and/or repair the lighting on Side 2 of the gym. Once the light is repaired or replaced the illumination from the light should be re-assessed.
Building Exterior	Gym Side 2	Replace with higher wattage the lights on the southern most end. This would provide for a safer environment and it could assist with identifying an individual to the point of providing a proper description if an incident was to occur. Once the light is repaired or replaced the illumination from the light should be re-assessed.



Building Exterior	Gym Side 3 Exterior Lighting	<p>Replace or repair the light in the wall pack. This would provide for a safer environment and it could assist with identifying an individual to the point of providing a proper description if an incident was to occur.</p> <p>Once the light is repaired or replaced the illumination from the light should be re-assessed.</p>
Building Exterior	Gym Side 3 Exterior Lighting	<p>Provide lighting to illuminate inside the tree line. This would provide for a safer environment and it could assist with identifying an individual to the point of providing a proper description if an incident was to occur.</p> <p>Once the light is repaired or replaced the illumination from the light should be re-assessed.</p>
Building Exterior	Gym Side 4 Exterior Lighting	<p>Install spotlights that illuminate from the building into the tree line.</p> <p>This would provide for a safer environment and it could assist with identifying an individual to the point of providing a proper description if an incident was to occur.</p> <p>Once the light is repaired or replaced the illumination from the light should be re-assessed.</p>
Building Exterior	Gym Side 4 Exterior Lighting	<p>Install lighting to illuminate the bridge area. This would provide for a safer environment and it could assist with identifying an individual to the point of providing a proper description if an incident was to occur.</p> <p>Once the light is repaired or replaced the illumination from the light should be re-assessed.</p>
Building Exterior	Gym Lighting	<p>Develop a policy for checking the exterior lighting. Establish a policy with the maintenance department that a weekly inspection of the exterior lights is complete by the night shift.</p>
Building Exterior	Gym Lighting and camera system integration	<p>Once the camera system is repaired, the exterior cameras should be evaluated to make sure the lighting and the cameras work together.</p>
Building Exterior	Gym Side 1 Building Exterior	<p>Install bollards or barriers to prevent a vehicle from accidentally or purposely being driven onto the pedestrian area and into the front doors of the facility. There are a number of barriers that are available that would distract from the gym appearance such as decorative planters. These barriers should be properly spaced to prevent a vehicle from passing by them and into or up against the building.</p>
Building Exterior	Gym Side 4 Building Exterior	<p>Install fencing with a gate to control access to this side of the building. The gate should be locked unless the access is need for deliveries or authorized vehicles.</p>
Building Exterior	Gym Landscaping	<p>Replace the current landscaping with sparsely planted vegetation. This would make it difficult to conceal an explosive near the walkways and/or the building exterior without detection.</p>



Building Exterior	Gym Landscaping Sides 2, 3 and 4	Keep the underbrush near the trees cleared. This would hinder someone from sealing themselves in the tree lined areas.
Building Exterior	Gym Standoff	Install bollards around the gas riser to prevent a vehicle from accidentally or purposely damaging the gas riser. Enclose inside a locked fenced area. This may hinder a person(s) from tampering with the system.
Building Exterior	Gym Power Feed	Protect power connection located at the student parking lot on the 4 side of the main building. The main power connection on the northern side of the main building is vulnerable to either a purposeful or accidental power or telecommunications disruption. This area should be fenced and bollards installed to prevent unauthorized tampering or either accidental or purposeful ramming.
Building Exterior	Gym Power Feed	Protect power connection at the 2-3 side of the main building from tampering or impact. This connection is open to view and at the corner of the main building and is very vulnerable to either a purposeful or accidental power or telecommunications disruption. This connection should be fenced and bollards installed to prevent unauthorized tampering or either accidental or purposeful ramming.
Building Exterior	Gym Power Feed	Protect the power company's step-down transformer at the 1-2 corner of the gymnasium/auditorium. This transformer is open to view and is vulnerable to either a purposeful or accidental power or telecommunications disruption. This area should be fenced and bollards installed to prevent unauthorized tampering or either accidental or purposeful ramming.
Building Exterior	Gym Fuel Sources	Provide protection and security for the gas riser on the #2 side. The gas riser should be protected against accidental or purposeful tampering. A bollard to prevent it from being hit and a security cage to prevent it from being tampered with is recommended.
Building Exterior	Gym Emergency Power	Move forward with the development of and the installation of an emergency power source for this building that will handle the load and allow this structure to be used as a shelter. Once again, if this structure is to be a shelter, there must be emergency power that can handle the HVAC and other services for those evacuated to the building.



Building Exterior	Gym Building Ventilation	Secure the combustion air vent on the #2 side to limit access. At the very least this vent should be equipped with gas leak, and chemical detection. The combustion air vent goes directly into the boiler room and through interior vents and doors and has potential direct access to the lower level locker rooms and spaces. At the very least there should be alarms on this vent to detect anything which might be harmful to the building. In addition, this vent should be enclosed by a wire cage to prevent close approach or tampering.
Building Exterior	Gym Building Ventilation	Protect ladder. The ladder which is accessed from the door on the #2 side has no landing, so it is very possible for someone to step out and fall. A gate or some other safety device should be installed in order to protect anyone who opens the door.
Building Interior	Gym Camera System	Repair and re-evaluate. The cameras were not in working order at the time of the assessment. Once the system is in operation, the system should be re-evaluated by the assessment team.
Building Interior	Gym Camera Monitoring System	The gym's camera monitoring system is located in the Athletic Department head's office located inside the gym. Along with this monitor, the gym's cameras and monitoring system should be placed on the Main Schools building system. This would allow monitoring from both the main building during school hours along with monitoring in the gym during gym specific functions.
Building Interior	Fire	Develop an emergency water plan. Since it is the plan to develop this building as a public shelter, it is a necessity to provide for an emergency water supply for this building. Efforts should be made in cooperation with the fire department and the water company to develop and test a workable emergency plan to provide water for this building in the case of an outage.
Building Interior	Fire	Develop an emergency telecommunications plan for the building. Efforts should be made in cooperation with the emergency services and the telecommunications provider to develop and test a workable emergency plan to provide communications for this building in the case of an emergency.
Building Interior	Gym Building Ventilation Shut down procedures.	All facility vents can be shut down from the computer in the 200 area of the main building. The shut down procedures should be available to all who might have to perform the duty in the course of the day.



Building Interior	Gym Vent System	Establish a vent cleaning protocol. Clean vent systems are important for health and safety of the persons who use the structure.
Building Interior	GYM HVAC	Train other personnel in the shut down procedure of the HVAC systems via computer. There must be a way to shut down the system in an emergency if the HVAC person is not available.
HAZ-MAT	Gym Hazardous Materials	While the MSDS books are excellent, well maintained and laid out, they are not held by the maintenance section. These should be provided for the maintenance staff and that staff should prepare and post the sheets for the items used in each custodians closet and storeroom. It is important that all persons who use hazardous materials or other regulated materials know the dangers of the materials they use on a daily basis. Ms. Manning has advised she is providing a book for the maintenance section.
Policy and Procedure	Gym Evacuation	Post Evacuation routes/fire escapes. The Evacuation routes and gathering areas outside of the building are not adequately posted.
Policy and Procedure	Gym Evacuation	Develop an evacuation route/fire escape plan and post and practice these routes. These plans are vital for the safety of this public assembly facility. All exits are marked with lighted signs, but there are no diagrams or signs telling people where to assemble. These should be developed in connection with fire and police department input.
Policy and Procedure	Gym Emergency Procedures	A lethal cloud/vapor plume distance diagram or emergency contingency plan/procedures must be developed. Terrorism aside, the presence of a major gas pipeline passing through the property is a potential problem. The fire department has the ability to do this for the structure.
Policy and Procedure	Gym Emergency Procedures	With Fire Departments assistance, develop pre-plans or access guides for this facility.
Policy and Procedure	Gym Emergency Procedures	On-site personnel need training in lock down procedures for this building. Interviews showed that there was not a clear plan for evacuation or lockdown.